TOP OF THE LADDER: Marine Operations in the Northern Solomons
by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
Hand Grenade Hill
The lead for the next assault on 25 November was
given to the fresh troops of Lieutenant Colonel Carey A. Randall, who
had just taken over the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines. They were joined by
the 2d Raider Battalion under Major Richard T. Washburn. Randall could
almost see his next objective from the prime high ground of Cibik Ridge.
Just ahead rose another knoll, like the ridge it would be the devil to
take, for the Japanese would hold it like a fortress. It would soon be
called "Hand Grenade Hill" for good reason. Two of Randall's companies
went at it with Washburn's raiders. But the Japanese gave a good account
of themselves. Some 70 of them slowed the Marine attack, but one company
got close to the top. The Marines were from five to 50 yards away from
the Japanese, battling with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand
grenades. The enemy resisted fiercely, and the Marines were thrown back
by a shower of hand grenades. One Marine observed that the hill must
been the grenade storehouse for the entire Solomon Islands.
It was on Hand Grenade Hill that Lieutenant Howell T.
Heflin, big, memorable, one of Alabama's favorites, son of a Methodist
minister, snatched up a BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) and sprayed the
Japanese positions. He pried open a way for his platoon almost to the
hilltop, but could not hold there. He was awarded the Silver Star Medal,
and later he went on to become Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court and then the senior U.S. Senator from Alabama.
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Concealed in the heavy jungle growth, these men of
Company E, 2d Battalion, 21st Marines, guard a Numa Numa Trail position
in the swamp below Grenade Hill. National Archives Photo 127-N-69394
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At the end of the action-filled day, the Marines were
stalled. In the morning of 26 November surprised scouts found that the
Japanese had pulled out in the darkness. Now all of the wet, smelly,
churned-up terrain around the Piva Forks, including the strategic
ridgeline blocking the East-West Trail, was in Marine hands.
There now occurred a shuffling of units which
resulted in the following line-up: 148th and 129th Infantry Regiments on
line in the 37th Division sector on the left of the perimeter. 9th
Marines, 21st Marines, and 3d Marines, running from left to right, in
the Marine sector.
The Koiari Raid
As a kind of final security measure, IMAC was
concerned about a last ridge of hills, some 2,000 yards to the front,
and really still dominating too much of the perimeter. Accordingly, on
28 November, General Geiger ordered an advance to reach Inland Defense
Line Fox. As a preliminary, to protect this general advance from a
surprise Japanese attack on the far right flank, a raid was planned to
detect any enemy troop movements, destroy their supplies, and disrupt
their communications at a place called Koiari, 10 miles down the coast
from Cape Torokina. The 1st Parachute Battalion, just in from Vella
Levella under Major Richard Fagan, drew the assignment, with a company
of the 3d Raider Battalion attached. While it had never made a jump in
combat, the parachute battalion had been seasoned in the Guadalcanal
campaign.
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Evacuation of the wounded was always difficult. These
men are carrying out a casualty from the fighting on Hill 1000.
National Archives
Photo 127-N-71380
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Carried by a U.S. Navy landing craft, the men in the
raid were put ashore at 0400, 29 November, almost in the middle of a
Japanese supply dump. Total surprise all around! The Marines hastily dug
in, while the enemy responded quickly with a "furious hail" of mortar
fire, meanwhile lashing the beachhead with machine gun and rifle fire.
Then came the Japanese attacks, and Marine casualties mounted
"alarmingly." They would have been worse except for a protective curtain
of fire from the 155mm guns of the 3d Defense Battalion back at Cape
Torokina. With an estimated 1,200 enemy pressing in on the Marines, it
was painfully clear that the raiding group faced disaster. Two attempts
to extricate them by their landing craft were halted by heavy Japanese
artillery fire. Now the Marines had their backs to the sea and were
almost out of ammunition. Then, about 1800, three U.S. destroyers raced
in close to the beach, firing all guns. They had come in response to a
frantic radio signal from IMAC, where the group's perilous situation was
well understood. Now a wall of shellfire from the destroyers and the
155s allowed two rescue craft to dash for the beach and lift off the
raiding group safely. With none of the original objectives achieved, the
raid had been a costly failure, even though it had left at least 145
Japanese dead.
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