Cape Gloucester: The Green Inferno
by Bernard C. Nalty
The Capture of the Cape Gloucester Airfields
The 1st Marine Division's overall plan of maneuver
called for Colonel Frisbie's Combat Team C, the reinforced 7th Marines,
to hold a beach head anchored at Target Hill, while Combat Team B,
Colonel William A. Whaling's 1st Marines, reinforced but without the 2d
Battalion ashore at Green Beach, advanced on the airfields. Because of
the buildup in preparation for the attack on Conoley's battalion,
General Rupertus requested that Kreuger release the division reserve,
Combat Team A, Colonel John T. Selden's reinforced 5th Marines. The Army
general agreed, sending the 1st and 2d Battalions, followed a day later
by the 3d Battalion. The division commander decided to land the team on
Blue Beach, roughly three miles to the right of the Yellow Beaches. The
use of Blue Beach would have placed the 5th Marines closer to Cape
Gloucester and the airfields, but not every element of Selden's Combat
Team A got the word. Some units touched down on the Yellow Beaches
instead and had to move on foot or in vehicles to the intended
destination.
While Rupertus laid plans to commit the reserve,
Whaling's combat team advanced toward the Cape Gloucester airfields. The
Marines encountered only sporadic resistance at first, but Army Air
Forces light bombers spotted danger in their patha maze of
trenches and bunkers stretching inland from a promontory that soon
earned the nickname Hell's Point. The Japanese had built these defenses
to protect the beaches where Matsuda expected the Americans to land.
Leading the advance, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, under Lieutenant
Colonel Hankins, struck the Hell's Point position on the flank, rather
than head-on, but overrunning the complex nevertheless would prove a
deadly task.
Rain and Biting Insects
Driven by monsoon winds, the rain that screened the
attack on Conoley's 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, drenched the entire
island and everyone on it. At the front, the deluge flooded foxholes,
and conditions were only marginally better at the rear, where some men
slept in jungle hammocks slung between two trees. A Marine entered his
hammock through an opening in a mosquito net, lay down on a length of
rubberized cloth, and zipped the net shut. Above him, also enclosed in
the netting, stretched a rubberized cover designed to shelter him from
rain. Unfortunately, a gale as fierce as the one that began blowing on
the night of D-Day set the cover to flapping like a loose sail and drove
the rain inside the hammock. In the darkness, a gust of wind might
uproot a tree, weakened by flooding or the effect of the preparatory
bombardment, and send it crashing down. A falling tree toppled onto a
hammock occupied by one of the Marines, who would have drowned if
someone had not slashed through the covering with a knife and set him
free.
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The
monsoon rains flood a field kitchen at Cape Gloucester, justifying
complaints about watery soup. Department of Defense (USMC) photo
72821
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The rain, said Lieutenant Colonel Lewis J. Fields, a
battalion commander in the 11th Marines, resembled "a waterfall pouring
down on you, and it goes on and on." The first deluge lasted five days,
and recurring storms persisted for another two weeks. Wet uniforms never
really dried, and the men suffered continually from fungus infections,
the so-called jungle rot, which readily developed into open sores.
Mosquito-borne malaria threatened the health of the Marines, who also
had to contend with other insects"little black ants, little red
ants, big red ants," on an island where "even the caterpillars bite."
The Japanese may have suffered even more because of shortages of
medicine and difficulty in distributing what was available, but this was
scant consolation to Marines beset by discomfort and disease. By the end
of January 1944, disease or non-battle injuries forced the evacuation of
more than a thousand Marines; more than one in ten had already returned
to duty on New Britain.
The island's swamps and jungles would have been
ordeal enough without the wind, rain, and disease. At times, the
embattled Marines could see no more than a few feet ahead of them.
Movement verged on the impossible, especially where the rains had
flooded the land or turned the volcanic soil into slippery mud. No
wonder that the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Lemuel
C. Shepherd, Jr., compared the New Britain campaign to "Grant's fight
though the Wilderness in the Civil War."
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Flooding caused by the monsoon deluge makes life
miserable even in the comparative comfort of the rear areas.
Department of
Defense (USMC) photo 72463
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Rupertus delayed the attack by Hankins to provide
time for the division reserve, Selden's 5th Marines, to come ashore. On
the morning of 28 December, after a bombardment by the 2d Battalion,
11th Marines, and strikes by Army Air Forces A-20s, the assault troops
encountered another delay, waiting for an hour so that an additional
platoon of M4 Sherman medium tanks could increase the weight of the
attack. At 1100, Hankins's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, moved ahead,
Company I and the supporting tanks leading the way. Whaling, at about
the same time, sent his regiment's Company A through swamp and jungle to
seize the inland point of the ridge extending from Hell's Point. Despite
the obstacles in its path, Company A burst from the jungle at about 1145
and advanced across a field of tall grass until stopped by intense
Japanese fire. By late afternoon, Whaling abandoned the maneuver. Both
Company A and the defenders were exhausted and short of ammunition; the
Marines withdrew behind a barrage fired by the 2d Battalion, 11th
Marines, and the Japanese abandoned their positions after dark.
Roughly 15 minutes after Company A assaulted the
inland terminus of the ridge, Company I and the attached tanks collided
with the main defenses, which the Japanese had modified since the 26
December landings, cutting new gunports in bunkers, hacking fire lanes
in the undergrowth, and shifting men and weapons to oppose an attack
along the coastal trail parallel to shore instead of over the beach.
Advancing in a drenching rain, the Marines encountered a succession of
jungle covered, mutually supporting positions protected by barbed wire
and mines. The hour's wait for tanks paid dividends, as the Shermans,
protected by riflemen, crushed bunkers and destroyed the weapons inside.
During the fight, Company I drifted to its left, and Hankins used
Company K, reinforced with a platoon of medium tanks, to close the gap
between the coastal track and Hell's Point itself. This unit employed
the same tactics as Company I. A rifle squad followed each of the M4
tanks, which cracked open the bunkers, twelve in all, and fired inside;
the accompanying riflemen then killed anyone attempting to fight or
flee. More than 260 Japanese perished in the fighting at Hell's Point,
at the cost of 9 Marines killed and 36 wounded.
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A
75mm pack howitzer of the 11th Marines fires in support of the advance
on the Cape Gloucester airfields. Department of Defense (USMC) photo
12203
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With the defenses of Hell's Point shattered, the two
battalions of the 5th Marines, which came ashore on the morning of 29
December, joined later that day in the advance on the airfield. The 1st
Battalion, commanded by Major William H. Barba, and the 2d Battalion,
under Lieutenant Colonel Lewis H. Walt, moved out in a column, Barba's
unit leading the way. In front of the Marines lay a swamp, described as
only a few inches deep, but the depth, because of the continuing
downpour, proved as much as five feet, "making it quite hard," Selden
acknowledged, "for some of the youngsters who were not much more than 5
feet in height." The time lost in wading through the swamp delayed the
attack, and the leading elements chose a piece of open and comparatively
dry ground, where they established a perimeter while the rest of the
force caught up.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, attacking
through that regiment's 3d Battalion, encountered only scattered
resistance, mainly sniper fire, as it pushed along the coast beyond
Hell's Point. Half-tracks carrying 75mm guns, medium tanks, artillery,
and even a pair of rocket-firing DUKWs supported the advance, which
brought the battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Walker A. Reaves,
to the edge of Airfield No. 2. When daylight faded on 29 December, the
1st Battalion, 1st Marines, held a line extending inland from the coast;
on its left were the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, and the 2d Battalion,
5th Marines, forming a semicircle around the airfield.
The Japanese officer responsible for defending the
airfields, Colonel Kouki Sumiya of the 53d Infantry, had fallen
back on 29 December, trading space for time as he gathered his surviving
troops for the defense of Razorback Hill, a ridge running diagonally
across the southwestern approaches to Airfield No. 2. The 1st and 2d
Battalions, 5th Marines, attacked on 30 December supported by tanks and
artillery. Sumiya's troops had constructed some sturdy bunkers, but the
chest-high grass that covered Razorback Hill did not impede the
attackers like the jungle at Hell's Point. The Japanese fought gallantly
to hold the position, at times stalling the advancing Marines, but the
defenders had neither the numbers nor the firepower to prevail. Typical
of the day's fighting, one platoon of Company F from Selden's regiment
beat back two separate banzai attacks, before tanks enabled the
Marines to shatter the bunkers in their path and kill the enemy within.
By dusk on 30 December, the landing force had overrun the defenses of
the airfields, and at noon of the following day General Rupertus had the
American flag raised beside the wreckage of a Japanese bomber at
Airfield No. 2, the larger of the airstrips.
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On
31 December 1943, the American flag rises beside the wreckage of a
Japanese bomber after the capture of Airfield No. 2, five days after the
1st Marine Division landed on New Britain. Department of Defense (USMC) photo
71589
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The 1st Marine Division thus seized the principal
objective of the Cape Gloucester fighting, but the airstrips proved of
marginal value to the Allied forces. Indeed, the Japanese had already
abandoned the prewar facility, Airfield No. 1, which was thickly
overgrown with tall, coarse kunai grass. Craters from American bombs
pockmarked the surface of Airfield No. 2, and after its capture Japanese
hit-and-run raiders added a few of their own, despite antiaircraft fire
from the 12th Defense Battalion. Army aviation engineers worked around
the clock to return Airfield No. 2 to operation, a task that took until
the end of January 1944. Army aircraft based here defended against air
attacks for as long as Rabaul remained an active air base and also
supported operations on the ground.
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