LIBERATION: Marines in the Recapture of Guam by Cyril J. O'Brien
Securing the Force Beachhead Line
With the breakthrough at Fonte and failure of
Takashina's mass counterattack, the American positions could be
consolidated. The 3d and 21st Marines squared away their holds on
heights and the 9th Marines (July 27-29) pushed its final way up to
Mount Alutom and Mount Chachao.
The most serious resistance to occupying the Mount
Alutom-Mount Chachao massif and securing the Force Beachhead Line (FBHL)
across the hills was a surprisingly strong point at the base of Mount
Chachao. Major Donald B. Hubbard, commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th
Marines (replacing Lieutenant Colonel Asmuth, wounded on W-Day), called
down artillery, and, after the barrage, his Marines attacked with
grenades and bayonets. They destroyed everything that stood in their
path. When that fight was over, Major Hubbard's battalion counted 135
Japanese dead. As the assault force pushed up these commanding slopes,
the Marines could spot men of Company A of the 305th Infantry atop Mount
Tenjo to the west. Lieutenant Colonel Carey A. Randall's 1st Battalion,
9th Marines, then moved up and made contact with the Army troops.
Originally, Mount Tenjo had been in the 3d Division zone, but General
Bruce had wanted to get his men on the high ground so they could push
ahead along the heights and not get trapped in the ravines. He also
wanted to prevent the piecemeal commitment of his division and to
preserve its integrity.
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A Marine uses a flamethrower on a Japanese-occupied pillbox on what had
been the Marine golf course on Guam, adjoining the Marine Barracks on
Orote Peninsula. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 88153
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Conservative estimates put the Japanese dead as a
result of the counterattack at 3,200 men. The loss of Takashina's
infantry officers, including General Shigematsu, who had commanded the
48th Independent Mixed Brigade, was held to be as high as 96
percent. Takashina himself fell to the fire from a machine gun on an
American tank as he was urging survivors out of the Fonte position and
on to the north to fight again. With Takashina's death, tactical command
of all Japanese forces remaining on Guam was assumed by General Obata.
He had only a few senior officers remaining to rally the surviving
defenders and organize cohesive units from the shattered remnants of the
battalions that had fought to hold the heights above the Asan-Adelup
beaches.
All through the night of 28 July, Japanese troops
trudged along the paths that led from Fonte to Ordot, finding their way
at times by the light of American flares. At Ordot, two traffic control
points guided men toward Barrigada, where three composite infantry
companies were forming, or toward Finegayan, where a force of five
composite companies was to man blocking positions. As he fully expected
the Americans to conduct an aggressive pursuit on the 29th, General
Obata ordered Lieutenant Colonel Takeda to organize a delaying force
that would hold back the Marines until the withdrawal could be
effected.
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This Japanese airstrip on Orote Peninsula was one of the prime
objectives of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in its zone. Pockmarks
on the strip resulted from the aerial, ships' gunfire, and artillery
bombardments directed at this target. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
88134
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Contrary to the Japanese commander's expectations,
General Geiger had decided to rest his battle-weary troops before
launching a full-scale attack to the north. The substance of his orders
to the 3d and 77th Divisions on 29 July was to eliminate the last
vestiges of Japanese resistance within the FBHL, organize a line of
defense, and patrol in strength to the front. With capture of the
beachhead line and its critical high ground and the annihilation of
great numbers of Japanese, the turning point of the Guam campaign had
been reached.
Yet, few Japanese had surrendered and those captured
were usually dazed, wounded, or otherwise unable to resist. Almost all
of the enemy died fighting, even when their lives were lost without
sense or purpose. Still, a substantial number of troops from the 29th
Division were still not accounted for.
General Geiger's intelligence sections could only
list about one quarter of the estimated soldier-sailor strength that had
been on the island, and he needed to make certain that his rear was
secure from attack before heading north after the enemy. Captured
Japanese documents and prisoners of war, and sightings from aircraft,
all indicated to Geiger that the Japanese had withdrawn to the north to
better roads, denser and more concealing jungle, and commanding terrain
for strongpoints.
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A tank-infantry team from the 4th Marines advances slowly through the
dense scrub growth that characterized the terrain in the regiment's zone
on Orote Peninsula. The attack moved forward yard by yard until the
objective was secured. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 88152
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To ensure that his rear area was not threatened,
General Geiger had the 77th Division detail patrols to scour the
southern half of Guam, repeating and intensifying the searches the
brigade had made. These soldiers, as the Marines before them, found
Guamanians every where, some in camps established by the Japanese,
others on their farms and ranches. The natives, some surprised to see
Americans so soon after the landings, reported the presence of only
small bands of Japanese and often only single soldiers. It became
increasingly evident that the combat units that remained were in the
north, not the south. The best estimates of their strength ranged around
a figure of 6,000 men.
Obata had expected a hasty pursuit, and set up strong
rear guards to give time for his retreating forces to organize. Victory
was no longer even a hope, but the Japanese could still extract a
painful cost. General Geiger, who had a little time now, could give his
troops a rest and move into attack positions across the width of the
island. Strong and frequent patrols were sent out to find routes cross
country and glimpse clues of enemy strength and dispositions.
Obata organized delaying defenses to include the
southwest slopes of Mount Barrigada, midway across the island from Tumon
Bay, and the little town of Barrigada itself, barely 20 houses. On all
approaches to his final defensive positions near Mount Santa Rosa, in
the northwest corner of the island, he organized road blocks at trail
and road junctions, principally at Finegayan and Yigo, and concealed
troops in the jungle to interdict the roads which were the only
practical approach routes to the northern end of the island. The
Japanese commander felt sorely besieged, and as his notes later
revealed: "the enemy air force seeking our units during daylight hours
in the forest, bombed and strafed even a single soldier." Perhaps even
more damaging than the air attacks were artillery and naval gunfire
bombardments brought down on men, guns, trenches, anything, by the Navy,
Marines, and Army spotter planes which were constantly overhead.
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Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade hurl hand grenades at enemy
positions on the other side of one of the rice paddies that slowed their
advance toward Orote.
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Marines bypass two smoldering Japanese light tanks, knocked out of
action by Marine Sherman medium tanks on the road to Sumay on Orote
Peninsula. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93468
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