UP THE SLOT: Marines in the Central Solomons
by Major Charles D. Melson, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)
The New Georgia campaign began for the 1st Marine
Raider Regiment when Admiral Turner received a request for support
and/or rescue from the resident coastwatcher at Segi Point, Donald G.
Kennedy. The Japanese were moving into his base area where the Allies
planned to build an auxiliary fighter strip. Responding to the request
for help, Turner loaded Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Currin's 4th
Raider Battalion on high speed destroyer transports (APDs) and sent it
north to Segi Point. Captain Malcolm N. McCarthy met the raiders in a
dugout canoe to guide the ships in. McCarthy felt certain that Company
P's commander, Captain Anthony Walker, would have his men's weapons at
the ready, and "I kept hollering, 'Hold Your Fire!'"
(click on image for an enlargement in a new window)
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Currin went ashore with part of his headquarters and
Companies O and P, followed by Army and Navy forces to begin the
airstrip. After linking up with Kennedy, Currin turned his attention to
his initial goal, the seizure of the protected anchorage at Viru Harbor.
He had to accomplish this prior to the arrival of the invasion force on
30 June, and on the night of 27 June, he and his Marines set out by
rubber boats across the mouths of the Akuru and Choi rivers for
Viru.
After an eight-mile paddle, the raiders arrived at
Regi Village early on 28 June. Led by native guides, Currin began the
approach march to Viru Harbor. Fighting a stubborn combination of
terrain, weather, and Japanese patrols, the raiders were short of their
objective on 30 June. Meanwhile, the landing force arrived on schedule
and stood off the beach after taking fire from Japanese coastal defense
guns.
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The
approach to Rendova Harbor as seen from the deck of an LSD carrying
Marines ashore. It sails through the narrow Renard Entrance with Rendova
Peak in the background and the Lever Brothers' landing at the right just
around the bend. Marine Corps Historical Collection
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The raiders launched their attack at 0900, l July, to
seize Tetemara and Tombe Villages. Captain Walker attacked Tombe with
part of his company, while the remainder attacked Tetemara with First
Lieutenant Raymond L. Luckel's Company O. After six hours of fighting
and a Japanese counterattack, the objectives were captured. Sergeant
Anthony P. Coulis' Company P machine gun squad finished mopping up and
searched for food and water. The 4th Raider Battalion lost 13 killed and
15 wounded in this action. The Japanese defenders with drew, with an
estimated 61 dead and 100 wounded. Currin turned the beachhead over to
the Army occupation force and was taken back on board ship and returned
to Guadalcanal. The remainder of the 4th Battalion headquarters and two
companies, led by battalion executive officer Major James Clark, carried
out separate tasks in accordance with plans to secure Wickham Anchorage
at Vangunu Island to protect lines of communication from the Russells
and Guadalcanal for the New Georgia operation. On 30 June, Captain Earle
O. Snell, Jr.'s Company N and Captain William L. Flake's Company Q
supported an Army landing force by going ashore at Oloana Bay, where it
joined a scouting party and Coastwatchers already there. Raider Irvin L.
Cross later wrote that he and the other raiders disembarked from his
assault transport "in Higgins Boats during a typhoon. In the dark it was
impossible to see the landing craft from the deck." Despite a confused
landing in poor conditions, by afternoon the Marines and units of the
Army 2d Battalion, 103d Infantry reached the Kaeruka River and attacked
the Japanese located there. This position was taken and then defended. A
member of Company Q, John McCormick, recalled that the attack "was not
very productive," but that a battle went on all day with the Japanese,
who had gotten "quickly organized" and fought back with their machine
guns and mortars. On 2 July, the Japanese tried to land three barges
with supplies, but were met on the beach and shot up. The raiders lost
14 killed and 26 wounded securing Vangunu. The next raider deployment
was like those at Viru and Vangunu, a supporting exercise to back the
main XIV Corps effort to take Munda Point. Soon after the Rendova
landings, Colonel Liversedge's mission was changed from being the
landing force reserve to being an assault force designated the Northern
Landing Group directed to attack Japanese positions on New Georgia's
northwest coast at the Dragon's Peninsula.
Individual Combat Clothing and Equipment
By 1943, the cotton sage-green herringbone twill
utility uniform was being issued to the troops in the field (although
some camouflage clothing was available) and to new Marines at the
recruit depots. These jackets and trousers were worn with field
shoes, leggings, and the M1 steel helmet. Individual combat
equipment was the distinctive Marine Corps 1941 pattern that
derived from earlier Army M1910 designs. Basic components included
the cartridge belt, belt suspenders, haversack, and knapsack;
supplemented by poncho, shelter half, entrenching tool, gas mask,
and canteens. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Griffith II,
commanding the 1st Raider Battalion, recalled that officers and men
landed with a basic allowance of ammunition, a canteen of water,
a battle dressing, and individual first aid kit on the belt. In the
pack were two days K-Rations, one D-Bar (a highly enriched and very
hard chocolate bar), tobacco, a change of underwear, three pairs
of socks, a poncho, and a pair of tennis shoes. The pack roll was
made from a shelter half, blanket, and "one utility garment." A
4th Raider Battalion Marine noted that at Vangunu they "learned that
one canteen of water was not enough. We all had been issued a second
canteen."
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Drawing by Kerr
Eby, U.S. Navy Combat Art Collection
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Three of the 1st Raider Regiment's four battalions
had been sent elsewhere. Liversedge's landing group consisted of the
Marine raider regimental headquarters, the 1st Raider Battalion; the 3d
Battalion, 145th Infantry; and the 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry Because
the operating area was too far from the main landing force for support,
fire support and supply came from the sea and air. Communications were
dependent upon radio until a land-line linkup could be made with the
rest of the occupation force to the south.
Liversedge was assigned several tasks. First he was
to land and move against the Japanese forces at Enogai Inlet and Bairoko
Harbor. Then he was to block the so-called Bairoko Trail and disrupt
Japanese troop and supply movements between Bairoko Harbor and Munda.
The enemy, weather, and terrain together conspired against this venture
from the beginning and the raiders found themselves in a protracted
frontline fight rather than a swift strike in the Japanese rear. One of
Liversedge's battalion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Griffith
II, observed on embarking at Guadalcanal that although they shot off no
fireworks on Independence Day, "we consoled ourselves with the knowledge
that there would be plenty of those later."
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Soldiers and Marines consolidate their positions and
construct barbed wire obstacles on the Dragons Peninsula after the
attack on Bairoko. Their apparent condition, mixture of clothing, and
the ever-present jungle provide eloquent testimony to the physical
demands of the campaign. Department of Defense Photo (USA)
111SC324513
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On 5 July, the Northern Landing Group landed at Rice
Anchorage east of Enogai and Bairoko. A narrow beach, difficult landing
conditions, and concerns for an enemy naval attack caused the
destroyer-transport force to depart, taking the raiders' long-range
radio with it. The landing from eight APDs and destroyers (DDs) was
unopposed and met only by porters and scouts (Corry's Boys) under
Australian Flight Officer John A. Corrigan. Griffith described them as
small men, "but their brown bodies were wiry and their arm, leg and back
muscles were powerful. They wore gaudy cheap cotton lap-lap, or
lavalavas." These 150 New Georgians were the Northern Landing Group's
supply transport in a region without roads.
Undeterred by the situation, Liversedge moved out on
jungle trails in pouring rain to his first objectives, leaving two Army
companies to secure the rear. In Griffith's words, they "alternately
stumbled up one side of a hill and slipped and slid down the other." The
1st Raider Battalion pushed on to reach the Giza Giza River by the night
of 5 July with the larger and heavier Army battalions following. Here
Liversedge split his force. The 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry was sent
south to block the Bairoko Trail and the remaining units went north
towards the Japanese on the Dragons Peninsula. On the night of 6 July,
the naval Battle of Kula Gulf erupted with the resultant loss of the
cruiser USS Helena (CL 50). This isolated the Northern Landing
Group from even naval support. The villages of Maranusa I and Triri were
occupied and patrols were soon in contact with the enemy, members of the
6th Special Naval Landing Force, so-called Japanese
"marines."
On 9 July, the Enogai defenses were reached and,
after an air strike, Liversedge launched an immediate attack with
Lieutenant Colonel Griffith's 1st Raider Battalion. Captain Thomas A.
Mullahey's Company A was on the left, Captain John P. Salmon's Company C
in the center, Captain Edwin B. Wheeler's Company B on the right, with
Company D under Captain Clay A. Boyd in reserve. Employing machine guns
and grenades, the battalion advanced toward the Japanese position until
halted at nightfall. The Japanese were well dug-in and well armed with
machine guns and mortars, but their heavy-caliber coast defense
artillery could only be used seaward. Supported by 60mm mortars, the
raiders resumed the attack the morning of 10 July, and took Enogai
Village. Richard C. Ackerman, a Marine with Company C, remembered "we
soon came to a lagoon which stopped our forward motion. Our right flank,
though, did over run the enemy's warehouse and food storage area." The
Japanese lost 300 men at a cost of 47 Marines killed, another 74
wounded, and 4 men missing. The battalion had fought for 30 hours
without rations or water resupply. Army troops carried up water and
K-rations and candy bars received in an air drop. The elimination of the
Japanese coast defense artillery at Enogai allowed American destroyers
and torpedo boats to operate unhampered in the Kula Gulf, where they
disrupted Japanese barge traffic.
Under Japanese air attacks, the 1st Marine Raider
Regiment consolidated its gains and blocking positions, while Colonel
Liversedge studied the Bairoko Harbor defenses. Communications,
resupply, and fire support were problem areas. The Japanese improved
their own dispositions and continued to bring in troops and supplies
from Kolombangara by sea and then moved them overland to Munda Point.
The main Japanese line was on a ridge in front of the Americans. The
enemy fighting positions were log and coral bunkers that made excellent
use of terrain and interlocking machine-gun fire supported by heavy
mortars. On the night of 12-13 July, the Navy intercepted a Japanese
troop landing at Kolombangara. Four days later, on 17 July, Liversedge
pulled the 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry back to Triri Village for closer
mutual support, while other Army companies continued to hold the Rice
Anchorage area and communications routes.
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1st
Raider Regiment casualties from the attack on Bairoko had to be treated
in place or evacuated by aircraft. Some 200 casualties were carried from
the field, then taken by rubber boat to Consolidated PBY Catalinas.
After this picture was taken a Japanese air attack disrupted this effort
and damaged one aircraft. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
152113
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Reinforced on 18 July by the 4th Raider Battalion,
Liversedge planned to attack Bairoko on 20 July 1943. The attack was
launched on schedule despite the failure of a requested airstrike to
arrive. Liversedge sent in Griffith's battalion, followed by Currin's
battalion, to find an undefended flank or a breakthrough point. Griffith
committed Wheeler's Company B and Company C under First Lieutenant Frank
A. Kemp. His other companies had been used to bring these two up to
strength. Currin's battalion fielded four companies, but was some 200
men understrength. Companies B and C soon stalled on the Japanese
defenses. Captain Walker took Company P forward for support, while
Snell's Company N tried to find an open flank along the shoreline to the
north. One of Snell's men, Frank Korowitz, remembered feeling that he
wanted to get up and run when Japanese attacked by surprise at close
range, but "I also felt that l would rather be killed than have anyone
know I was scared." Liversedge fed in his remaining units to cover the
gaps that developed between the two battalions and no longer had a
reserve. Walker recalled, "without some kind of fire support (naval
gunfire or air) these raiders could not penetrate the fortified enemy
line." McCormick, with Company Q, wrote that the Japanese had plenty of
time to prepare and had "machine gun pits in the natural shelter
provided by the roots of banyan trees and cut fire lanes through the
underbrush," The combination of machine guns, mortars, and snipers
guaranteed "almost instant death" to any Marine caught in these fields
of fire.
At 1445, a Japanese mortar barrage was followed with
a counter attack in the 1st Battalion area. After this, another assault
attempted by the Marines of Company Q lead by Captain Lincoln N.
Holdzkom bogged down within sight of Bairoko Harbor. By now there was a
loss of almost 250 Marines, a 30 percent casualty rate. The 1st Marine
Raider Regiment had 46 killed and another 200 or so wounded, and about
half the wounded were litter cases. Liversedge made no further headway
and withdrew that night to Enogai. It required another 150 men to move
the casualties back and all units were in defensive positions by 1400,
21 July.
By then, the effects of the fighting and living
conditions had taken a toll in sickness and exhaustion of the Northern
Landing Group. Liversedge was ordered to hold what he had with available
forces. Resupply and casualty evacuation were by air and there was no
further reinforcement, except a 50-man detachment under Captain Joseph
W. Mehring, Jr., of the 11th Defense Battalion that provided needed 40mm
and .50-caliber antiaircraft guns at Rice Anchorage.
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The
dead had to wait until the wounded were taken care of and the
battlefield was secured to be buried, In some cases it was not until
after the Japanese had withdrawn or been solidly beaten before burial
details could recover the dead Marines. Department of Defense Photo (USMC)
60483
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Bairoko Harbor was attacked by destroyers and torpedo
boats, and bombed by B-17 Flying Fortresses. On 2 August, XIV Corps
informed Liversedge that Munda Point was reached and his force should
cut off retreating Japanese near Zieta. On 9 August, the Northern
Landing Group linked up with elements of the 25th Infantry Division
advancing from Munda Point and assumed control of the 1st Marine Raider
Regiment. Scattered fighting continued around Bairoko until 24 August
when it was occupied by the 3d Battalion, 145th Infantry. The Japanese
defenders, the Special Naval Landing Force men, had pulled out by
sea. Occupying Corrigan's "Christian Rest and Recreation" camp of
thatched lean-to's, the Marines to taled their casualties for this
effort; regimental headquarters had l killed and 8 wounded, 1st Raider
Battalion lost 74 killed and 139 wounded, 4th Raider Battalion had 54
dead and 168 wounded; and all suffered from the unhealthy conditions of
the area. By 31 August 1943, the 1st Marine Raider Regiment was back on
Guadalcanal for reorganization scheduled in September, officially noting
the presence of "bunks, movies, beer, chow."
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