Lieutenant Colonel Willett's Sortie

National Park Service

While camped near Oriska on the night of August 5^th, General Herkimer sent 3 messengers to the fort, to let Colonel Gansevoort know the militia was on its way. Due to the difficulty of working through the British lines, the messengers did not get into the fort until late the next day, well after Gen. Herkimer had been goaded into continuing his advance. With no way of knowing that the fighting at Oriskany was already underway, the garrison complied with Herkimer's request to fire three signal cannon and to stage a diversion against the enemy's lines.

It was decided that Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett would lead a force of 200 men out of the fort to stage the diversion. Historians have long considered Willett’s subsequent attack on the Loyalist and Indian camps as simply “targets of opportunity” that Willett’s force came across as they made their way down the military road. Newer research however points to the fact that it may have been a pre-conceived attack planned due to the observations of Oneida Indian scouts working out of the fort. These scouts would have reported the absence of so many warriors and soldiers in the enemy camps between the upper and lower landings of the Mohawk River, making them a perfect target. Willett’s force was made up of half New York and half Massachusetts troops. Before Willett set out it was also decided to send a 3 pound cannon with the force, and 50 more men were added to act as a guard for this gun. A rainstorm delayed the attack and at present it is impossible to determine exactly when Willett's force left the fort, but it was most likely in the early to mid-afternoon period.

Willett's force moved quickly out through the main gate with 120 men acting as advance, rear and flank guards, leaving 80 men to form the main body of the attacking force. Willet's troops charged down the road leading from the fort to the upper landing and quickly drove in the few guards protecting the camp of Sir John Johnson's King's Royal Regiment of New York. At this point most of Johnson's Regiment was still at Oriskany or engaged in other siege work. The camp guard was quickly overrun and along with Sir John and his family they fled in panic across the Mohawk River towards the main British camp to the north. It is recorded in Willett's "Narrative" that "The troops under Col. Willett had fair firing at the enemy while they were crossing the river." The main Indian encampment was nearby Johnson's camp and quickly fell to Willett's force as well, with the Indians that were there scattering off into the woods.

Now in control of both camps, Willett ordered scouting parties out to look for signs of any other enemies nearby. His most immediate threat would have been the party of British troops holding the nearby lower landing. This is another area where newer research points to Willett’s attack being well thought out in advance rather than just being a lucky coincidence.[i] In St. Leger’s official report of his expedition, he states “…Lieutenant Bird (the British officer in command at the landing), [was] misled by the information of a cowardly Indian…” This Indian reported that the Indian and Loyalist forces at Oriskany were hard pressed by the militia and in need of reinforcements. At this, the British detachment at the lower landing marched off towards Oriskany, leaving Willett no immediate opposition to contend with. The “Cowardly Indian” that St. Leger mentions, rather than being part of the British forces, was probably one of the Oneida scouts from the fort, sent out by Willett to lead any British forces nearby on a wild goose chase. With no danger of an enemy nearby, Willett placed the 3 pound gun and its guard detachment to the rear to cover his retreat, ordered his troops to take as much of the camp baggage as they could, and destroy the rest. In later accounts of the affair Willett states that he even called for the fort's seven wagons, each of which made 3 round trips, loaded with captured goods, before he decided it was time to retreat to the fort.

When word reached St. Leger of Willett's attack, he was initially caught off guard, but soon dispatched his detachment of the 34^th Regiment, planning to catch Willett's force between this group and the British troops at the lower landing. Upon learning that the troops at the lower landing were gone, St. Leger personally marched his detachment of the 8^th Regiment out to intercept Willet's force on its way back to the fort. Picking up Indian and Loyalist stragglers along the way, St. Leger marched his force to an area just above the upper landing, where the Mohawk River turns to the east. Here he intended to set an ambush for Willett's troops as they passed by on the opposite side of the river.

Unfortunately for St. Leger, the position he chose sat almost directly across the river from where Willett had left the 3 pound cannon. The gun was under the command of Major Badlam of the Massachusetts troops. Prior to joining the Massachusetts line, Badlam had served in an artillery regiment. This is probably the reason he was put in charge of the gun, and why the gun was served so well during the coming skirmish. Willett's force came upon the British before they had completely moved into position, and he immediately swung his troops into line of battle and opened fire. At the same time, Maj. Badlam opened up with the cannon, catching St. Leger's troops in the flank and disorganizing them further. The British troops returned fire, but they were so broken up that their fire had no effect. By this time, they were also coming under fire from the cannon on the south and east sides of the fort.[ii] As one member of Willett's force recorded "This together with a smart Discharge of Small Arms, and one of the Cannon out of the Fort did great Execution amoung them, and soon obliged them to scamper off…” Willett's troops resumed their march and returned to the fort without the loss of a single man.

Perhaps Lt. Col. Willett himself best sums up the success of the sortie. "Nothing could be more fortunate than this enterprise. We totally routed two of the enemy's encampments, destroyed all the provisions that were in them, brought off upwards of 50 brass kettles, and more than 100 blankets, (two articles which were much needed,) with a quantity of muskets, tomahawks, spears, ammunition, clothing, deerskins, a variety of Indian affairs, and five colours, (the whole of which on our return to the fort were displayed on our flag staff under the continental flag.)”. These "colours" were most likely the camp colors of Johnson's Regiment. These were small flags used to mark out the perimeter of an encampment. Also captured were all of Sir John's personal baggage, papers and regimental orderly book. Four or five prisoners were taken from Johnson's Regiment, one being Lt. George Singleton, whom had been wounded earlier at Oriskany and was resting in the Yorker's camp when Willett's force attacked. From these prisoners and Johnson's papers, the garrison learned exact details of the British force besieging them. Casualties inflicted on the on the Loyalists and Indians are hard to determine. Willett mentions "Six lay dead in their encampments, two of which were Indian; several scattered about in the woods; but their greatest loss appeared to be in crossing the river, and an inconsiderable number upon the opposite shore." It is impossible to make any determination about losses in St. Leger's force.

In the end however, the success Willett's sortie achieved would not be measured in the amount of baggage captured or prisoners taken, but by the affect it had on each side involved in the siege. For the garrison of the fort, the sortie's success boosted their moral and gave them greater determination to continue their stand, especially now that they had better knowledge of the forces arrayed against them. The effect of the sortie on the British force was exactly the opposite, especially amongst their Indian allies. The Indians had left for Oriskany taking only what weapons, clothing, and food they needed for battle. Already somewhat stunned and discouraged by the severity of the fighting and the losses they had suffered, the Indians returned from Oriskany to find their camps destroyed and the better part of their personal belongings captured. As the siege wore on, former British promises of an easy campaign with little fighting and easy plunder began to sound hollow and would leave many of St. Legers Indian allies looking for a way to leave the British force at the earliest opportunity.

National Park Service /Ranger Dan U.

Notes & Sources

[i] Brigadier General St. Ledger to General Burgoyne. Cited from Appendix to the Oriskany Centennial Memorial Address, Pg. 104.

[ii] “Adam Hellmer makes a statement”. Cited from The Public Papers of George Clinton, Vol. II. Pg. 212Document # 698.
 

• Willett, William M. A Narrative of the Military Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett taken Cheifly from his Own Manuscript, facsimile reprint of the 1831 edition.
• The Pension Application of John Burroughs. S.22667. Onondaga Couny SS.