Part of a series of articles titled If This Valley is Lost, Virginia is Lost.
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Battle of Cross Keys
Library of Congress
“The smoke and fog prevented my seeing the effect of our fire until I mounted the fence. I then noticed that the enemy were in great confusion; but when we reached their line, we saw a most appalling sight. There, lay in the clover, most of the 8th New York Regiment, either dead or wounded”
Capt. James Nisbet, 21st Georgia
The twin battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic closed out Stonewall Jackson’s 1862 Valley Campaign. At Cross Keys, Jackson occupied key bridges to keep US generals Frémont and Shields from joining their armies. Jackson then defeated each general in turn before withdrawing to make his stand at Port Republic.
Federals Try to Trap Jackson
In late May 1862, President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, set a trap. Lincoln hoped to capture Confederate Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson and his army. Jackson was in the Northern Shenandoah Valley, near Winchester, Virginia. He was in danger of being cut off by two Federal armies moving into the Valley south of his position.
Lincoln ordered Gen. John C. Frémont, with approximately 11,500 Federal troops to move east into the Valley. At the same time, troops under Gen. James Shields converged into the Valley from Central Virginia.
Frémont was unable to follow Lincoln’s orders. Due to poor roads, he marched his army into the Valley by an indirect route, giving Jackson extra time. Jackson was able to march his troops faster on the paved Valley Pike, pass through the planned Federal rendezvous and escape the trap.
South Through the Valley
As Jackson continued to move south through the Valley, both Federal columns chased him. Frémont marched on the West side of Massanutten Mountain, in the Shenandoah Valley. Shields’s troops headed south in the Page or Luray Valley to the east. Jackson skillfully used the imposing mountain range to keep both Federal armies separated.
As Jackson reached the southern end of Massanutten Mountain, he had the opportunity to leave the Valley, head to Richmond and join Robert E. Lee’s army. Instead, Jackson turned to fight. His troops controlled the bridges over the Shenandoah River, near the town of Port Republic. With these bridges, Jackson could keep the Federal forces separated and fight each one in turn. Jackson organized most of his troops around the river crossings at Port Republic. He deployed one division, 6,000 men and twenty cannon, under Gen. Richard “Dick” Ewell. This position overlooked the crossroads at Cross Keys and blocked the road Frémont would take to reach Port Republic.
Early Morning Deployment
On June 8, 1862, Frémont’s army neared Cross Keys around 8:00 a.m. after an early morning march. As his advance units encountered the pickets of the 15th Alabama Infantry, Frémont deployed his men across the fields on both sides of the Port Republic Road. Thinking he was outnumbered, and facing Jackson’s entire army, Frémont acted cautiously. As the infantry began to deploy, he ordered his long-range artillery to shell the Confederate line. Ewell, meanwhile, took advantage of this time to fortify his position; by 10:30 a.m. Ewell had skillfully deployed his division and awaited Frémont’s attack.
Mid-Day Attacks
Frémont decided to attack the right or eastern end of the Confederate line. To open the battle, he ordered division commander Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker to advance one of his brigades and make contact with the enemy. That brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Julius Stahel, moved forward, around 11:00 a.m. But as they marched through thick woods, only the 8th New York Infantry pushed ahead, without support.
Waiting for the 550 New Yorkers was Confederate Brig. Gen. Isaac Trimble’s brigade of about 1,400. The Confederates, crouched behind a rail fence, were ordered to wait until the Federals were very close, perhaps no more than forty yards away, and then, to rise and fire. The Confederates were armed with smoothbore muskets using “buck and ball” ammunition – one round ball and three buckshot; at extreme close range, this was deadly to the New Yorkers. In just moments, the 8th lost 43 killed and 134 wounded, while 43 were captured; a total loss of 40 percent. As the New Yorkers and the rest of the Stahel’s brigade fell back in confusion, Trimble’s men counter-attacked and drove the Federals back into the cover of the woods. The entire attack and counterattack were over in 10 minutes.
In order to cover the retreat of Stahel’s troops Blenker sent Brig. Gen. Henry Bohlen forward to form a line with his brigade. Using the cover of a ravine, Trimble continued to push forward, hoping to capture a battery of guns near Bohlen’s line; at the same time, two regiments under Confederate Col. James Walker moved around the eastern flank of the Federal line. About 2:30 p.m., Walker’s attack was halted as his troops came under Federal cannon fire, but the cannoneers were soon, unbelievably, ordered to withdraw. As the cannons retreated, Bohlen’s troops became exposed and they, too, pulled back, leaving Trimble and Walker in possession of that portion of the battlefield. Trimble’s attack, while reckless, pushed back a superior Federal force and convinced Blenker and Frémont they had staved off a major Confederate attack. By 4:00 p.m., the Federal troops on this part of the line pulled back to assume a defensive position.
Afternoon Action
On the other end of the battlefield, and in the center, Frémont continued his artillery barrage against Ewell’s troops on Mill Creek Ridge, today called Artillery Ridge. After a two-hour artillery duel, Frémont ordered two brigades under Brig. Gen. Robert Milroy and Brig. Gen. Robert Schenck to advance against the Confederates on the ridge; Frémont hoped this would draw Confederate troops away from Blenker’s, Stahel’s, and Bohlen’s men.
Milroy’s Brigade, of approximately 2,500, made some progress against the Confederate center, but without positive orders from Frémont, Milroy was cautious about initiating a major assault. Arriving around 1:00 p.m.in support of Milroy, was Robert Schenk’s all Ohio brigade of 2,400. As Schenk’s men deployed into battle line, they came under Confederate artillery fire. Schenk carefully positioned his troops; as they advanced, Schenk believed he had located the Confederate flank and was soon making plans to sweep behind the Confederate line. Believing victory might be close, both Milroy and Schenk were stunned when they received orders from Frémont to pull back, especially considering that Schenck’s troops, were about to attack the Confederate flank.
Evening Withdrawal
By 6:00 p.m., Frémont’s troops had withdrawn from the battle line and returned to their original positions from early that morning. Having received a message from Shields, Frémont believed that he could wait until the next day, June 9th, when Shields was expected to arrive near Port Republic, and both armies could renew the attack, with Jackson caught in between.
Aftermath
Despite outnumbering the Confederates by 2:1, Frémont remained cautious and committed his army piecemeal without a solid plan. Hoping to make something happen, Frémont used his artillery to shell Confederate lines throughout the day. Ewell, however, had deployed his men in a strong position and patiently awaited attack. According to Jackson, Ewell’s “ground was well selected, on a commanding ridge, a rivulet and large field of open ground in front, wood on both flanks.” Ewell used his reserves effectively in response to Federal attacks, and he prevented Trimble from advancing too far, too fast in his counterattack. Ewell knew to conserve his forces as Jackson would need his men, again, the next day.
Frémont’s Army lost 684 casualties, while the Confederates lost 288 killed, wounded, or captured. Ewell’s division held off Frémont’s advance, but Stonewall Jackson focused his attention on Shields. Leaving Trimble’s men to watch Frémont, Ewell, in the pre-dawn hours, began marching the rest of his men to join Jackson near Port Republic. By the time Frémont advanced in the morning, Trimble, too, had slipped away and burned the remaining bridge over the North River, isolating Frémont’s army away from Jackson and preventing a rendezvous with Shield’s forces.
References
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XII, Part I, Serial 15.
Four Years on the Firing Line, By Col. James Cooper Nisbet
Jackson’s Valley Campaign, the Battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic, June 8-9, 1862, by Darrell L. Collins
Conquering the Valley, by Robert K. Krick.
Shenandoah Valley 1862: Stonewall Jackson Outmaneuvers the Union, by Clayton & James Donnell
Shenandoah Valley Battlefields National Historic District website: shenandoahatwar.org
Last updated: August 20, 2023