. . . AND A FEW MARINES: Marines in the Liberation of the Philippines
by Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
Phase Three: Mindanao
With the first phase of Marine aviation on Leyte long
gone, and with the second phase focused on Luzon successfully over, the
complex operations in the southern Philippines now took center stage as
phase three. The Army planned five major operations (code named VICTOR)
to seize eight different islands. Marine planes would be called upon to
provide fighter cover and landing zone bombing for these, and then to
furnish close air support for both guerrillas and Army divisions as they
battled the Japanese. Thus, MAGs-24 and -32 would close down their
MAGSDAGUPAN operations on Luzon and move to Mindanao when an airfield
was ready to receive them. MAG-12, under a new commanding officer,
Colonel Verne J. McCaul, would leave Leyte to join them. Jerome would be
in charge of all three air groups. Meanwhile, MAG-14 would remain on
Samar to support operations on Panay, Cebu, and also Mindanao. The new
squadrons would also play their part: Marine Bomber Squadron 611 with
its North American Mitchell PBJ medium bombers and Air Warning Squadron
4 with its electronic capabilities would come into Mindanao early, with
AWS-3 joining later.
The attack on Mindanao began in a unique way. A week
before the first Army landing, two Marine officers and six enlisted
Marines were inserted behind Japanese lines. They were taken to a
guerrilla-held airstrip near the town of Dipolog, 150 miles from the
main assault objective, Zamboanga on the far western tip of Mindanao.
Within a few days, 16 Corsairs were there on the primitive Dipolog field
to support the guerrillas, as well as cover the landing of the 41st
Infantry Division at Zamboanga on D-day, 10 March. Also coming ashore on
D-day was Jerome; his objective was the nearby San Roque airstrip.
Taking over that site, the Marines renamed it Moret Field after
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Moret, a well-known Marine aviator who had died
in a transport crash after taking off from Noumea, New Caledonia in
1943.
Another D-day arrival was AWS-4. It would set up its
radio and radar equipment to serve as the 76th Fighter Control Center,
coordinating air-ground attacks. As one veteran aviator noted, "The air
warning squadrons were the heart and soul of air defense and air traffic
control."
Right behind them came McCutcheon. His assignment was
to organize Marine Aircraft Group, Zamboanga (MAGSZAM) at Moret similar
to MAGSDAGUPAN which had been so successful on Luzon.
On 15 March, the VMF-115 fighters of MAG-12 came in
from Leyte. With Japanese air threats nearing zero, the F4Us would now
shift their emphasis to close air support. A Marine aviation history
explains the plane's versatility:
The Corsairs, although designed as fighter planes,
proved to be well adapted for close support work. They had three bomb
racks capable of carrying a variety of bomb and napalm loadings, and
they were armed with six forward-firing machine guns. Faster than the
SBDs, they possessed ample speed to get in and out of a target area in a
hurry. Also, since Corsairs were equipped with both VHF and MHF radio
sets, they fitted into the air-ground liaison system easily, without a
necessity for additions or alterations to existing equipment.
When combined with the slow speeds of the L-4 Cub
spotter planes, the fast F4Us were able to get pin-point directions for
their targets from the jeep radios of their ALP Then the Marine
fire-power grew even heavier as the SBDs of MAG-32 came wheeling in from
Luzon on 24 March. The combination of F4Us and SBDs at Moret again gave
the 41st Division daily close air support to the Army infantrymen. At a
ceremony held at Moret on 29 March, Major General Jens A. Doe, USA,
commanding the 41st Division, formally presented to Colonel Jerome and
his Marines a plaque which commemorated the close cooperation between
the Army and the Marines.
The plaque was six feet high and four feet wide, with
Japanese naval signal flags, an enemy light machine gun, and a silk
Japanese battle flag. The inscription read, "IN APPRECIATION - 41ST
INFANTRY DIVISION." At the bottom their combined campaigns were listed:
Jolo, Sanga Sanga, Basilan, and Mindanao.
|
2dLt
Willard C. Olson, left, and 1stLt Winfield S. Sharpe show how Sharpe
doubled up in the cockpit of a VMF-115 Corsair, which supported
guerrillas in their rout of Japanese forces threatening the Dipolog
airstrip on Mindanao. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 117637
|
During the ceremony, General Doe spoke of the
Marines' "outstanding performance . . . . readiness . . . to engage in
any mission . . . their skill and courage as air men, and their splendid
spirit of cooperation in aiding ground troops . . . the most effective
air support yet received . . ."
As always in war, there was a painful aspect to this
massing of squadrons at Moret. First Lieutenant Charles F. Flock later
wrote of the cruel fate of one flight to Mindanao when, on 24 March,
Second Lieutenant Charles T. Rue (VMSB-142) encountered engine trouble
off Panay Island:
One of the escorting transport planes accompanied
Rue's SBD to a point over a small strip at San Jose on the SW coast of
Panay. This strip had been labeled as friendly according to intelligence
reports prior to take-off. Rue executed a safe landing, and he and his
gunner, SSgt Robert R. Stanton, were seen to wave by the pilots in the
transport before it continued on its way to Zamboanga. (The strip was
too short for the heavily-laden transport to attempt an evacuation of
the men.)
As it turned out, the strip was actually in enemy
hands, and both Marines were taken prisoner. Later, when San Jose came
under U.S. control, it was established that Rue and Stanton had been
killed by the Japanese and buried near the airstrip.
Besides the missions on Mindanao, the Marine planes
covered the successive landings on Basilan, Panay, Cebu, and Negros. One
of the veteran squadrons over Cebu was VMF-251 from MAG-14 on Samar; it
had previously been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) for its
superb record at Guadalcanal.
The squadron history of VMF-115 describes a memorable
occasion when it provided close air support for guerrillas. This
featured one of the most unusual air-ground tactics used during the
entire Zamboanga operation. On 27 March, in answer to a request from the
American officer in charge of the guerrillas, Major Donald H. Wills,
AUS, a division of four VMF-115 Corsairs (led by Captain Rolfe F.
Blanchard) was dispatched to the guerrilla-held airstrip at Dipolog.
About 150 Japanese troops, armed with knee mortars, a light machine gun,
and automatic rifles, had advanced to within 16 kilometers of Dipolog.
They were well-seasoned troops who had been moved into the area from
Zamboanga about five weeks earlier. Major Wills felt that an air strike
might boost the Filipino guerrillas' morale and damage the enemy at the
same time.
However, control of the strike by normal means was
impossible, because there were no maps or photographs of any kind
available, no method for marking targets, and no means of communication
with the troops. But VMF-115 ingenuity found a way:
Into the cockpit of a Marine Corsair climbed Major
Wills, who was thoroughly familiar with the enemy positions; after him
climbed the smallest of the Marine pilots in the division, First
Lieutenant Winfield S. Sharpe. Both men squeezed into the narrow
confines of the cockpit, with Sharpe sitting on Wills' lap.
Soon afterward, with the major pointing out targets
to the pilot, Lieutenant Sharpe's Corsair led a four-plane division in
six strafing passes over the enemy's positions. The enemy area was
thoroughly strafed, and the Japanese were compelled to withdraw.
The Marines' aerial capabilities were once again
dramatically expanded when VMB-611, with its 16 PBJ medium bombers, flew
in to Moret on 30 March. Besides their rocket and bomb capacity, its
PBJs had a massive array of .50-caliber machine guns, plus radar,
long-range radio, and extensive navigational equipment. In a letter, one
of the squadron co-pilots, First Lieutenant Willis A. Downs, sketched
the varied missions of this squadron:
. . . During the Philippine campaign we strafed,
bombed, skip bombed, fired rockets, photographed, flew observers, were
sent on anti-sub patrols, were sent up at night as night fighters, and
bombed at medium altitudes. In fact, one member of VMB-611 shot down
with his fixed guns, and using his bomb sight as a gunsight, a Japanese
twin-engine light bomber . . . .
|
A
Marine flight crew arrives to board a VMB-611 North American PBJ medium
bomber (called the B-25 Mitchell by the AAF). Although a late arrival,
the squadron made a major contribution with these planes in the
Mindanano campaign. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 123037
|
During early April there were more Army landings,
this time on the exotically named Sanga-Sanga and Bongao Islands. Bongao
was a little island that commanded the invasion beach at Tawi Tawi for
the Sanga Sanga landing. The PBJs had instructions to knock out the
radar and radio installations, then strafe and rocket the barracks area
in a night attack. A pilot of VMB-611 remembered years later the
squadron's strike after it solved the problem of how to bomb, rocket,
and strafe something it could not see in the night:
. . . Then a pilot (nobody knows who) suggested a
simple, yet most ingenious solution. The flight leader would load his
bombs (I think they were 500-pounders) with the bottom rack holding a
parachute flare of one million candlepower. Each of the other five
planes in the flight would load a parachute flare first, followed by the
bomb load.
The tactic was simplicity itself. The flight leader
would make a dummy run, dropping only his parachute flare. The second
plane in the flight would bomb on the first flare, then drop his flare;
the third plane would follow suit, followed by the fourth and fifth
plane. By the time the fifth plane dropped his flare, the flight leader
would be in position to drop his load on the last flare. It worked to
perfection.
As the tempo of air operations on Mindanao rose, so
did the use of Moret Field. Before long it housed a total of 299 widely
varying types of AAF and Marine air craft: 96 F4Us, 151 SBDs, 18 PBJs, 2
F6Fs, 18 SBCs (Curtis Helldiver dive bomber), 1 FM (General Motors F4F
Wildcat fighter), 2 TBFs (Grumann Avenger torpedo bomber), 5 R4Ds
(Douglas Sky-train cargo plane), and 6 P-61s.
The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in
commending
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUPS, ZAMBOANGA
consisting of the following Marine Aircraft
Groups:
Marine Aircraft Group Twelve March 10 - June
30, 1945 Marine Aircraft Group Thirty Two March 16 - June 30,
1945 Marine Aircraft Group Twenty Four April 11 - June 30,
1945
for service as set forth in the following
citation:
"For exceptionally meritorious service and
outstanding heroism in support of elements of the Eighth Army during
operations against enemy Japanese forces on Mindanao, Philippine
Islands, and in the Sulu Archipelago. After landing with the assault
forces, Marine Air Groups, Zamboanga, effected wide coverage of battle
areas in flights made extremely hazardous by dense jungles, precipitous
cloud-obscured mountains and adverse weather conditions.
The gallant officers and men of these groups
penetrated hostile defenses to press relentless attacks and reduce vital
enemy targets, disrupt communications and troop concentrations, and
destroy ammunition and fuel dumps despite intense antiaircraft fire over
Japanese objectives. The vital service rendered during these campaigns
in providing convoy cover, fighter defense and close aerial support of
ground forces is evidence of the courage, skill and devotion to duty of
the pilots, air-crewmen and ground personnel operating as a well
coordinated team, and reflects the highest credit upon Marine Aircraft
Groups, Zamboanga, and the United States Naval Service.
|
|