Threats to Camp Nelson – Part Two

1864 print showing Confederate guerillas robbing a man on horseback, at gunpoint, while others attack a covered wagon in the background.

Library of Congress

Guerrilla War Threatens Camp Nelson – October 14-15, 1864

In the fall of 1864, the Civil War in Kentucky changed dramatically, with the state seeing an explosion of guerrilla warfare. On October 27, 1864, the Dayton Daily Empire (Ohio) declared, “Kentucky is overrun by guerrilla bands.” Contrary to the traditional style of combat, where units were well organized, uniformed, and tended to avoid targeting civilians, this irregular style of war included brutal murders, stealing from the local populace, and was generally more personal. It was during this massive wave of guerrilla activity that Camp Nelson experienced its last major threat of being attacked.

What is a Guerrilla?

Guerrillas have been a part of warfare since the beginning of military organizations. Often the term was attributed to a small band of partisans who fought deep behind enemy lines and tended to create small pockets of resistance. However, during the Civil War, the term guerrilla gained vast amounts of meanings. Many guerrilla bands held mixed allegiances. For some, their style of warfare meant stealing, depriving, or killing locals, no matter their support for the U.S. or the Confederacy. Others fought in a more traditional sense, mainly attacking Federal military installations or personnel. These styles of warfare often blended together and resulted in a brutal war in Kentucky in the later stages of the war.

In April 1863, the US Army enacted General Orders No. 100, also known as “The Lieber Code,” which served as an instruction manual for the rules of war and code of proper conduct for the armies of the United States. The code defined guerillas as:

Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers – such men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.

By stating that guerillas should not be treated like traditional enemy soldiers, the Lieber Code permitted Federal forces to retaliate harshly against Confederate irregulars, including executing them.Like everywhere in the Bluegrass State, Camp Nelson was plagued by the constant threat of being hit by roving guerrilla bands. Mostly, these enemy groups would attack supply wagons or patrols sent out from Camp Nelson rather than assault the military base itself.

 

US Army Brigadier General Stephen G. Burbridge, commanding the District of Kentucky during the Civil War.

US National Archives

Setting the Stage

On October 14, 1864, Brigadier General Stephen Burbridge, commanding the District of Kentucky, observed in a letter to his superior, “As the election approaches, the guerrillas are much more bold and troublesome. If some new regiments from the North can be sent to me, I hope they will, as my forces are now entirely inadequate.” During the fall of 1864, Camp Nelson’s garrison was stripped to dangerous levels. In the span of one month from early September to early October, six regiments originally posted at Camp Nelson were either sent away to guard other installations in the state or were ordered to participate in a distant campaign. What units were left to defend the camp was a scratch force of various regiments, companies, and civilian employees.

The vast majority of men left in the camp were elements of the USCT regiments raised at Camp Nelson. There was also a small number of white troops, including Company F of the 43^rd Indiana Infantry, which was fresh from the battlefields in the Trans-Mississippi Theater of the war. Only 100 of the men at Camp Nelson were armed, most of whom belonged to the 43^rd Indiana contingent. However, the base did boast three 30lb Parrot Rifles and eighteen 12lb Napoleon cannons to help defend it from an enemy attack.

The seeds of an attack began to grow just a few days after the last sizable contingent of men left Camp Nelson. Beginning on the morning of October 8, 1864, Colonel Thomas D. Sedgewick, commander of the 114^th US Colored Infantry and, for the time being, the post commander at Camp Nelson, received news of a guerrilla attack that occurred a few miles to the northwest. The attack was led by “Captain One-arm Berry,” who stopped a stagecoach coming from Nicholasville to Harrodsburg and robbed the passengers of their valuables. After receiving the news, Sedgewick sent a small twenty-man detachment to search and capture the band of thieves. Sedgewick’s small force, likely from the mounted contingents under his command, arrived too late to capture Berry’s men.

Though the attack was small in retrospect, the incident was part of a much large event gripping Kentucky. With the 1864 presidential election a month away, Federal officials in the state witnessed a massive uptick in guerrilla activity. Many of the bands throughout the state were outraged at US officials in Kentucky for allowing the enlistment of African Americans into the army and harboring them and their families in Federal installations. As such, many of the guerrilla organizations in Kentucky launched attacks and raids throughout the commonwealth, attacking everything from soldiers and supply wagons to civilians and stagecoaches. In many cases, these attacks were a show of force against the recent policy changes in Kentucky.

 

Colonel Horace Capron, a US Army cavalry commander during the Civil War.

Library of Congress

The Perfect Storm

On October 14, 1864, news reached Sedgewick that several guerrilla bands ranging in size were raiding different small towns near Camp Nelson and getting closer. Though such a report would not have been a great cause for concern had it come a month before, it was now taken more seriously since only 100 men were armed at the base. Unable to accurately see where these small bands were due to a limited amount of cavalry, Sedgewick immediately requested more support. The only sizeable force nearby was Colonel Horace Copran’s cavalry brigade at Nicholasville, recovering from the rigors of the Atlanta Campaign.

In what could only be described as a series of unfortunate events, the most likely and readily available support for Sedgewick was unable to do so. First, with the election nearing, an entire regiment from Copran’s brigade was sent home upon reaching the area to vote and also to secure furloughs. Additionally, at the time of the threat, Copran’s entire unit was in a painfully slow process of remounting and rearming themselves. By October 14, the only regiment fully mounted and armed was the 8^th Michigan Cavalry, which was armed with infantry rifles. To make matters worse, with the onset of the Nashville Campaign in Tennessee, Capron’s brigade was ordered that very same day to move out of Nicholasville and head south. By the afternoon of the 14^th, elements of Copran’s men began to board train cars bound for Louisville.

Sedgewick was desperate for support from Copran and asked Lieutenant Corwin M. Holt, Aide-de-Camp of Camp Nelson, to plea with the cavalry officer for some sort of aid. Holt wrote, “Information has been received that this post is in danger of an attack by guerrillas, who are at Shakertown and other places near camp. Please send here without delay what men you can spare, as we have only a very small force (about 100 armed men) for the protection of a vast amount of government property.” The appeal was successful, as Copran sent a small contingent from his cavalry brigade, likely from the 8^th Michigan, to help Sedgewick. Whatever the size of the force that Sedgewick received, it was not enough to adequately defend Camp Nelson. In another attempt to receive more men, Sedgewick also reached out to the Assistant and Adjutant General at Lexington, John B. Dickson. Unfortunately, Dickson could not provide no help, writing back, “Hold all your available men in readiness to repel any attack. Keep scouting parties, under-picked officers, out a few miles on the different approaches to camp. Cannot send you any more cavalry.”

With hundreds of yards of fortifications to defend and miles of roads and paths to scout, Sedgewick faced the very real problem of Camp Nelson being overrun. To help alleviate the monumental task, Sedgewick used every able-bodied man to defend the earthworks, which meant that the civilian contractors and department employees in the base were used as well.

 

Sergeant Elijah Marrs of the 12th US Colored Heavy Artillery.

C. H. Parrish

An Attack Looms

Sedgewick and his men prepared themselves for any further developments, but after nightfall, the situation grew from bad to worse when scouts finally relayed information that a small force of guerrillas was sighted in Danville. Sergeant Elijah P. Marrs of the 12th US Heavy Colored Artillery recalled, “Our stay at Camp Nelson was not altogether devoid of excitement, and this event being my first actual experience in the science of war, is now more vivid to my memory, as I presume it is to my comrades who were with me, than subsequent events of the war. One night the news reached the camp that the rebels were in Danville, Ky.” Not long after the troops at Camp Nelson received this disturbing news, Brigadier General Speed S. Fry, the longtime commandant of the base, arrived with roughly fifty mounted men and alerted the installation to a possible threat. Fry had been on detached duty in Paducah, but he was now back in the region in time to help deal with the potential attack on Camp Nelson. With news of an enemy threat bearing down, Sedgewick and Fry moved troops to the fortifications to defend the Hickman Covered Bridge and the northern boundary of Camp Nelson.

Marrs reported:

The alarm was at once given, the long roll of the drum was beaten, and every man roused and ordered to prepare for battle. We were at once marched to the various forts surrounding the camp, and though up to that time we had only been drilled in infantry tactics, we were commanded to man the cannons. It is true we belonged to the Heavy Artillery, but had never been drilled in the tactics thereof. Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, however, soon learned their positions at the cannon, and while apparently paying attention to their work, could not keep their eyes from peering into the darkness beyond the river, from which direction they thought they heard the clang of swords and the clattering of horses coming upon us.

The question of which band of guerrillas were even operating in the area remains a mystery. On October 16, the day after the threat subsided, a letter written to the Louisville Daily Journal by a soldier with the pen name of Hawthorne wrote, “The guerrilla chieftain (Captain) Pete Everett has been heard of in various parts of the surrounding country, for a week past, doing a thieving business in a small way. He was reported at Clover Bottom, about 12 miles from this point, down the Kentucky River, yesterday.” Confederate guerrilla leader Everett spent the fall of 1864 foraging for supplies and horses in Kentucky, as well as skirmishing with local forces and attacking various stagecoaches and supply wagons. Unlike other guerrilla bands, Everett’s command was a part of a conventional Confederate Army unit, the 3^rd Kentucky Mounted Rifles, and they were seasoned raiders. Though Everett’s band was reported near Camp Nelson, it is very likely that other guerrilla groups were also operating in the area but avoided newspaper coverage.

 

The Quartermaster and Commissary Office at Camp Nelson

National Archives and Records Administration

Aftermath

By the morning of October 15, US forces at Camp Nelson realized the threat of an attack had subsided. Marrs observed, “Day broke, however, and no enemy was in sight, so we marched back to camp in great glee, as much so as if we had met the enemy and gained a great victory.” Though the base was spared from another possible attack, Federal officers quickly realized that steps needed to be taken to prevent such a vulnerability from happening again.

On October 17, general orders were issued that established a permanent garrison at Camp Nelson but in an unorthodox way. Rather than rely on a regular military unit, Fry and his staff decided instead to utilize the local civilian workers at Camp Nelson to garrison the base in case of an extreme emergency. Unlike earlier times when the employees were hastily assembled and used to defend the depot, a makeshift unit would be formed. Companies were organized from the four departments at Camp Nelson – Quartermaster, Commissary, Ordnance, and Engineer. To ensure that the employees were trained in proper military tactics, the impromptu battalion was ordered to drill daily for at least one hour and formally meet three times a month. Though the heads of each department commanded the companies, the employees themselves were able to elect the officers who would drill and lead them in the event of an emergency.

For the last time in its existence, Camp Nelson faced an enemy threat and emerged unscathed. On a much broader scale, the guerrilla war in Kentucky escalated in October 1864. To retaliate against the growing murders, raids, and lawlessness, Burbridge issued one of his infamous orders, General Order No. 8, which allowed for the execution of entire guerrilla bands without the due process of imprisonment or trials. Burbridge’s order, among other controversial measures that he enacted while commanding US forces in Kentucky, cemented his reputation as a tyrant among many of the state’s white residents.