Last updated: February 26, 2026
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Trials in Command: George Washington’s Difficulties During the Siege of Boston
I have often thought, how much happier I should have been, if, instead of accepting of a command under such Circumstances I had taken my Musket upon my Shoulder & enterd the Ranks, or, if I could have justified the Measure to Posterity, & my own Conscience, had retir’d to the back Country...
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Washington Arrives in Cambridge
On June 15, 1775, the Second Continental Congress appointed George Washington as Commander in Chief of the new Continental Army.[1] A few weeks later, on July 3, Washington arrived at his new headquarters in Cambridge, outside of Boston. Washington’s arrival came just weeks after the British victory at the Battle of Bunker Hill. The Siege of Boston now stood at a standstill, with colonial troops encircling the British military in Boston. In this landscape Washington faced the challenge of turning an untrained group of militiamen into an organized, well-trained fighting force. One that could compete with the British army in Boston.
While trying to achieve this ultimate goal, Washington faced many logistical and strategic issues. The Siege of Boston tested the new commander in unexpected ways.
Hygiene and Disease
An address from the Massachusetts Provincial Congress warned Washington that his task would not be easy. One report described the soldiers as brave and willing to fight, but they held little knowledge of drill, discipline, and health and hygiene standards.[2] For example, subordinate Brigadier General Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island worked to create better hygienic standards by training his men in the proper placement of latrines. Greene noted that soldiers under his command did not know where or seemingly how to place latrines. Instead, they used open fields, which became unseemly and likely contributed to the spread of diseases throughout camps.
Disease plagued Washington’s army throughout the siege and war. Dysentery and smallpox caused death and devastation, delayed military engagements, and decimated armies. But hygiene was only one issue Washington faced.
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Supplying an Army around Boston
Approximately 14,000 crowded the area around Boston, hemming the British soldiers in Boston. A question arose: how would these men be supplied for an infinite amount of time? Fresh materials did not present a problem as raids on nearby islands supplied livestock and hay, but other military supplies, such as blankets, and winter quarters became a point of concern.
Winter quarters around Cambridge proved inefficient as the availability of empty structures could not adequately house the army. Compounding the issue, residents, who recently left due to British military raids in 1775, began returning and reoccupying their abandoned homes. "I feel a great Repugnance to exclude them from what is their own," Washington wrote, "but Necessity in this Case I fear will supersede all other Considerations." Although Washington did not want to exclude residents from their homes, he felt military needs came first.[3]
Gunpowder supply also remained a constant concern for Washington. British colonists imported most of their powder, and in 1775 British forces targeted powder stores around Massachusetts to prevent an open rebellion. As a result, the army around Boston had 10,000 pounds of powder readily available. This equated to approximately nine shots per soldier. Could Washington sustain a prolonged siege with this quantity of powder? Could he even engage in a single battle with the British in Boston? As the siege progressed, powder trickled into camp, but not enough to ease his mind in 1775.
French artist Jean Baptiste Antoine de Verger, ca. 1781-1784. Library of Congress
Maintaining A Fighting Force
Washington most worried about enlistments. Initially when he arrived in Cambridge, Washington believed he commanded 20,000 soldiers around Boston. In reality, he commanded 16,000, of which only 14,000 soldiers were fit for duty. The soldiers under his command were not a regular army but instead militiamen, mostly from New England states whom Washington viewed negatively. As the siege progressed, soldiers from Virginia and other colonies made their way north, but at the same time other enlistments ended in December.
Washington and his subordinates tried everything to encourage militiamen to reenlist. They offered bounties and shorter enlistment periods, but these incentives did not bring in the numbers Washington desired.
In considering alternative methods to draw reenlistments, Washington looked to Major General Charles Lee for assistance. Simeon Lyman, a Connecticut soldier, said Connecticut militia were marched to Washington’s quarters where General Lee addressed them. Lee berated the soldiers, cursing, swearing, and challenging their dedication to the cause.[4] Understandably, this tactic did not entice the militiamen who saw their service as secondary to their rights as citizens.
In the face of difficulties recruiting soldiers, Washington refused to enlist Tories, vagabonds, free and enslaved Black men, boys unable to bear arms, and older men unable to endure long campaigns. "The Rights of mankind and the freedom of America will have Numbers efficient to support them without resorting to such wretched assistance," Washington wrote, justifying his actions.[5] However, by January 10, 1776, Washington could only count 8,000 soldiers around Boston. Only 5,500 were fit for duty. Washington hoped for 10,000.[6]
Washington, understandably, grew frustrated by his experience in Cambridge, as noted in his January letter to Joseph Reed at the top of this article. The soldiers under his command were not learned in military tactics; supply plagued campaign plans; and spats of disease and low enlistments hampered military effectiveness. Despite these difficulties, Washington’s first campaign ended in victory thanks to his strategic decision to fortify Dorchester Heights, which prompted the British evacuation of Boston in March 1776.
Throughout the rest of the War for American Independence, Washington faced difficulties similar to those he saw in Boston. However, the lessons he learned during the Siege of Boston equipped him with the experience to address these challenges over the next seven years.
Footnotes
[1] George Washington quote from: "George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed, 14 January 1776," Founders Online, National Archives. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 3, 1 January 1776 – 31 March 1776, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988, pp. 87–92.]
[2] "Address from the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, 3 July 1775," Founders Online, National Archives. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 1, 16 June 1775 – 15 September 1775, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985, pp. 52–53.]
[3] "George Washington to the Massachusetts General Court, 6 October 1775," Founders Online, National Archives. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 2, 16 September 1775 – 31 December 1775, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987, pp. 118–120.]
[4] George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolution Through the Eyes of Those Who fought and Lived It (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1957), 102.
[5] Derek Beck, The War Before Independence, 1775-1776 (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2016), 240; "General Orders, 12 November 1775," Founders Online, National Archives. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 2, 16 September 1775 – 31 December 1775, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987, pp. 353–355.]
[6] Washington’s orders of barring Black enlistment did not last long. By the end of 1775 he instructed recruiting officers to enlist Free Black men with previous military experience. In a letter to John Hancock on December 31, 1775, Washington wrote, "it has been represented to me that the free negroes who have Served in this Army, are very much disatisfied at being discarded—as it is to be apprehended, that they may Seek employ in the ministerial Army—I have presumed to depart from the Resolution respecting them, & have given Licence for their being enlisted, if this is disapproved of by Congress, I will put a Stop to it." See the following sources: "General Orders, 30 December 1775," Founders Online, National Archives. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 2, 16 September 1775 – 31 December 1775, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987, p. 620.]; "George Washington to John Hancock, 31 December 1775," Founders Online, National Archives. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 2, 16 September 1775 – 31 December 1775, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987, pp. 622–626.]
Sources
Beck, Derek. The War Before Independence: 1775-1776. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2016.
Golway, Terry. Washington’s General: Nathanel Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution. New York, NY: Owl Books, Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2016.
McCullough, David. 1776. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005.
Puls, Mark. Henry Knox: Visionary General of the American Revolution. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 20078.
Scheer, George F. & Hugh F. Rankin. Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolution Through the Eyes of Those Who Fought and Lived It. New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1957.