

dred men were sick and unfit for duty—ninety-six of them from diarrhea, and four from fever.

Savage had seen diarrhea in all of its forms in Mexico. He requested General Donelson to permit the regiment to camp on the side of the mountain above Huntersville where the winds blew and the air was cool and there was a spring of water almost as cold as ice and big enough to turn a mill. Donelson refused. Savage drew a petition to General Loring for permission to change his camp, which, by military law, must pass through the hands of Donelson. Dr. Read, brigade surgeon, was present when the petition came to Donelson's hands, who disapproved it, speaking sneeringly of it.

Being so informed by Dr. Read, Savage determined to disobey Donelson and take the consequences. He believed it was a higher duty to save the lives of men under his command than he owed to Donelson's order. He took a detail to clean off a place in a swag on the mountain side above Huntersville, sufficient for a camp. The swag in the mountain selected by Savage for his camp was covered by small oak brush apparently cut down to prepare for cultivation. The men were piling the brush, when a man came and asked Savage what he was doing that for. Savage told him that bad water and bad air had caused one hundred of his men to get sick in forty-eight hours and that he would move the regiment up there where the air and water were pleasant and healthy. The man replied, "This is my property and I will protect it. You cannot camp here or get water from my spring." Savage replied, "The lives of those men, near a thousand, are in my keeping, and it is my duty to guard them against death by disease as much as by death in battle, and I shall move the regiment and camp here, and get water out of your spring, unless you show me a spring near to the camp." The man replied, "I will then make an Ellsworth-Jackson case of it;" meaning the assassination of Jackson by Ellsworth in Alexandria

at the beginning of the war. Savage replied: "Nobody but a fool or a coward would talk that way in sight of my regiment of near a thousand men. If you were to hurt me these men would hang or shoot you to death instantly. Nobody fears you; if it was not my duty to command and take care of these men I would agree to meet you on some lone mountain or desert far away from men and would expect to see you run like a turkey." He replied, "I will kill the first man that comes to my spring after water." Savage replied, "I will get the first bucket full; you can leave here now and don't show yourself again." He left Huntersville. This man was named Skein, and was a lawyer.

The soldiers reported that Mrs. Skein would not allow them to get water out of the spring. Savage took a guard and said to the lady: "To protect you from rude or lawless conduct on the part of my soldiers I put a guard over your lot with strict instructions to let no soldier visit your house or enter your lot except for water, and to get water and return. If you are molested in any way let me know and I will protect you from all trouble."

Breakfast was early; all wagons were packed and started to the new camp. As they ascended the mountain Savage rode to Donelson's tent, saluted him and said, "General, your orders will hereafter reach me where you see those wagons." Savage requested the quartermaster to furnish plank to build ten shanties. He replied, saying, "We do not furnish it." Savage replied, "Have the plank at my camp immediately and present your bill and I will pay it." The plank came but no bill was presented. Ten shanties were put up, the sick put in them, a guard put over them under orders of the doctor, with instructions to give no medicine to the diarrhea men, but to confine them to the shanties, with the allowance of one cracker and one cup of coffee three times a day, and to drink very little water. In forty-eight hours all men with bowel complaint reported for duty.

When the order came to proceed to Valley Mountain the Sixteenth had seven hundred healthy men for duty. Colonel Brumby, reported as the head of the military school of Georgia, had been at Huntersville some time before the Sixteenth and had camped on one of those sluggish branches at the foot of the mountain. There were many new graves near where he had camped. He had one hundred and thirty men fit for duty. His regiment reported as one thousand men.

CHAPTER VII.

WEST VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.

At Valley Mountain the brigade was ordered to take three days' rations and march against the enemy. It moved all day up a hollow and passed the night, without fire, at a house and hay field called Winnants'. Next morning Anderson's brigade was seen marching to the right. Donelson's brigade went down a steep pathway along a little branch. The Eighth Regiment was in front with Captain Bryant's and Captain Savage's companies' front guard. The guard surrounded a house and captured three pickets.

An order came along the line, "Colonel Savage to the front." When he came General Donelson told him to take charge of the guard and capture the pickets if he could. The men captured said that there were five others below, at the timber left of the pathway. The branch ran through heavy timber. Captain Bryant was ordered to go the short route through the timber, Captain Savage to follow the path around it. Before Captain Savage's company got

NOTE.—A few days after Savage removed his regiment to the mountain General Donelson rode up to his tent and said: "Col. Savage, I like your encampment. If you will clean off a place for me I will come up and camp with you." A camp was prepared for the general under some beautiful trees, and he left the little muddy stream down there and occupied the camp cleaned off for him.

around, the guide (Wood) shot one of the pickets; one ran for the mountain, and was pursued and shot by Dr. Butcher, another guide. Wood, after shooting the picket, became sick, went into the timber, deserted, and never made his appearance again.

It was reported that three pickets with guns had run down the path. Savage rode his horse down the road rapidly, overtook them, passed them and ordered them to "Halt and double quick back!" A big fellow said in broken English: "I am tired and can't double quick." Savage thinking the man saw help coming, put his pistol near his head and ordered him to "Double quick or go to h—l!" Savage didn't disarm them but marched them back until meeting the guard.

Savage and Butcher riding ahead, discovered a picket. They said, "Halt!" and they started to capture him. When near him Savage saw two others run into a little clump of juniper bushes, which they ran through and were running for the mountains. Savage jumped his horse over logs, getting between them and the mountain, when they ran back into the juniper bushes. He ordered them to surrender. Waiting for the front guard, these prisoners were delivered to the guard.

Savage and Butcher again rode ahead. Suddenly Stewart's Run made its appearance on the right near the road, running rapidly. A man was seen on the opposite bank down upon his knees. Savage had some trouble to call his attention. By motion of his pistol he made the man wade the river. At this time two more men were seen upon a drift about fifty yards above them, where the waters ran very violently against the mountain. They came upon motion of the pistol and surrendered. They were captain and lieutenant, who were fishing, and the other soldier was getting bait.

Savage said, "I go ahead; the guard will come on as fast as they can." Captain Bryant, a large, heavy man, said,

"We are tired." Savage said: "Move your company out of the road. Captain Savage to the front." Captain Savage's company were all young men raised among the hills of Caney Fork. The creek inclined away from the road and was hidden by a strip of bushes. Savage and Butcher rode ahead. At about six hundred yards the strip of bushes ended in a gravel bed which inclined about fifty yards distant, running rapidly against a bank four or five feet high. Across the run at a distance of about one hundred and fifty yards appeared a house with yard and fence, and a squad of men in the yard. Each party looked at the other. The men in the yard began to stir, apparently getting their guns. Savage started his horse in a direct line to the house, but this made him ride obliquely against the bank and made it difficult for his horse to jump upon it. He turned his horse to the right so that he ran perpendicular to the bank, upon which he jumped with ease. It was about eighty yards distant and a smooth field from the creek to the mountain. The horse had gone about half the distance when he was opposite to and was directed to the gap in the yard fence at the house. Men were inside of the gap with their guns. Savage at a distance of about sixty or seventy yards demanded their surrender. With threats to have them all killed if a gun was fired, and waving his pistol at those who seemed inclined to shoot, he rode at full speed through the gap, passing between the house and the mountain. In the rear of the house there were five men with guns, running in the direction of a clump of peach trees near the mountain. They were ordered to halt. The horse was directed so as to prevent them from getting into the thicket of peach trees. A large man was near the trees. Savage thought the horse would run against him, but he ran between the man and the timber so close that the timber knocked Savage's cap off. Wheeling his horse as soon as possible, he ordered "Down with your guns." To the big fellow at the thicket he said in language not here to

be repeated, "Give me up my cap or I will —." The order was obeyed promptly and politely. Savage said to the squad, "Back double quick!" He was about thirty yards in the rear of the house. There were five men between him and the house. As they approached the house he discovered muzzles of guns at the window. He rode by the men towards the window, saying, "Fire if you dare, and the last one of you dies. Down with your guns;" and the noise of guns thrown upon the floor was heard. Savage rode to the front, while two or three of his men had crossed the creek and had got upon the bank about sixty yards distant, and he thought they were about to fire upon the men in the yard. Savage commanded "Down with your arms; the man that fires dies." No gun was fired. Savage was informed by Doctor Butcher that he thought his horse could not jump the creek bank, that he followed the road around to the rear and took charge of the five men that Savage had left in the rear and marched them to the front. This was an Ohio regiment, the Sixteenth. There were forty-eight men at the house. A detail hid the captured guns on the side of the mountain, and a guard took charge of the prisoners. The brigade left the creek, and took a horse road up the mountain, descending from the top to Beckey's Run on a road leading down from Cheat Mountain. Donelson called for a council of war, and showed his order for the first time. He suggested that there were one thousand men five miles farther on that might be captured. Savage replied, that "one thousand three hundred might capture one thousand, but if reports are true we are now in the rear of about five thousand men, at Crouch's, and separated from General Loring, and would have trouble in bringing one thousand men if captured." General Reynolds had at Elk Water (called Crouch's) eight regiments, two batteries and two cavalry companies, and the garrison at Cheat Mountain. (See vol. V, series I, page 644, reports of General Reynolds. Vol. V, pages 184-192,

series 1, *War of Rebellion*.) Donelson's brigade, composed of two regiments—about one thousand, two hundred men—were in the rear of this force, at least estimated at seven thousand men; while Loring was in front and could not be joined except by a march of about eight or ten miles over mountain passes and rough roads. If General Reynolds had known the fact he could have killed or captured Donelson's brigade. As Savage understood Donelson's orders, the brigade was now three or four miles in advance of the position which Donelson was ordered to occupy to support Loring, and as it was raining and getting dark and too late to countermarch, he advised Donelson to leave the road, let the men spend the night in the timber without fire, and if Loring assaulted the enemy in front in the morning he might condone his error by attacking in the rear; if no attack was made by Loring at daylight, he should fall back as fast as possible.

The Eighth Regiment was in front and left the road, crossing a little field, ascending the mountain by a horse path. At the top of the mountain the Yankee camp in Tygert's Valley appeared in full view, apparently not more than a mile distant. The Eighth Regiment had gone down a little path in a steep hollow. Savage halted and asked Donelson what orders he had given Colonel Fulton, who replied, "I told him to hunt a good place to camp." Savage said: "It is strange that the enemy's pickets have not fired on him; he must be near their camp. I will not let my regiment go a step farther. Three hundred men on the top of these mountains in the morning could kill or capture your brigade." Donelson replied, "I don't know what to do about it." Savage said, "Will you let me manage it?" He replied, "Yes." Savage dismounted, sent word along the line, "Colonel Fulton, halt!" He had difficulty in passing Fulton's men in the little wet path down the mountain. Fulton had halted his guard on the level land. The light in the camp of the enemy appeared not more than a half mile

distant, lighting up their encampment. The roar of running water could be heard in that direction. Savage said, "Colonel Fulton, move your regiment back to the top of the mountain; put a guard at the head of the hollow. I will move the Sixteenth back down the path we came and guard it. In the morning we must get away." It rained incessantly nearly all night and Colonel Fulton did not get all of his men to the top of the mountain until midnight.

As signs of day appeared next morning Savage passed the sentinels and followed the top of the mountain some half mile to where it terminated in a precipice some hundreds of feet above the valley of Tygert's River. From this he had a good view of the Yankee camp at Crouch's, and was of the opinion that there might be from three to five thousand men there. Returning, a sentinel told him General Lee was in camp and an inquiry had been made for him. He reported what he had seen of the Yankee camp to General Lee, who inquired of the conduct of the men should a battle occur. Savage replied: "The men are all right. Guns are wet; as soon as this rattle of ramrods ceases they are ready for battle."

General Lee directed Savage to move his regiment, and take possession and guard the road until the brigade passed. The Sixteenth Regiment had two companies in the rear guard, with two vedettes. The march had not gone more than one hundred yards when two Yankee vedettes were shot, being followed by one hundred or more men. The firing was rapid. Savage, believing that men shot better upward than downward, ordered a charge. The Yankees were driven down the mountain and down the main road. The Sixteenth lost one man at the foot of the mountain, a detail burying him while Savage with his guard held the road. The brigade lost no time in getting away, General Lee riding in front and leading it. Stewart's Run was not seen, and the march continued on another road to the point that Donelson had been directed to hold.

Lee had followed Donelson with a half dozen dragons, but lost the trail in the dark and spent the night in the timber where Donelson had held his council of war. He came to the brigade the next morning along the pathway about five minutes before the Sixteenth commenced the battle with the Yankee front guard. He escaped capture by passing along the road a few minutes before the Yankees came upon it.

A delay of a day or two occurred when the troops were ordered to return to Green Brier Bridge, near Huntersville. General Loring said to Savage: "General Lee is now at Sewell Mountain, about ninety miles away. The Yankees and Confederates are near each other—may be fighting now. I have detached you from Donelson's and attached you to Anderson's brigade. You are very quick, Anderson is very slow. Get off as soon as you can and if Anderson never overtakes you he will never give you an order." Maney's and Hatton's regiments were with Anderson. The Sixteenth reached Sewell Mountain nearly a day before Anderson arrived there. Lee put Savage in command of the troops on the right of the National road. The Wise Legion, a Baltimore battalion of artillery and the Sixteenth Regiment General Floyd commanded on the left of the road.

The Yankee and Confederate forces faced each other in sight, and nothing but a deep hollow in the mountain between them. Lee ordered Savage to cut down timber and make a defense of logs, so that the men could protect themselves by the logs. Savage reported to Lee that his order had been executed, but it was a surprise to his men, as he had told them that they needed no fortification but their bayonets; that in this war they should be charging upon the enemy or getting away from them; that legs were as necessary in this war as guns and bayonets. After remaining some days Savage received an order from General Lee to look well to his command, that from information

it was thought that the enemy would attack in the morning or retreat. Savage after inspecting his command called at headquarters, said to General Lee, "I am a lawyer by profession, which taught me how to weigh evidence." General Lee then stated the reports in his possession from his agents. Savage said: "As a lawyer, from the evidence I think it means a retreat. If you want to fight them now is the time." General Lee said: "I do not want to lose a man; if I should defeat them I could not follow them. My purpose is to prevent a further advance."

The enemy retreated the second morning after this and the march back to Huntersville soon after began. The First and the Seventh Regiments under Anderson had been camped in the rear, and were in front when the return march commenced. General Loring said to Savage: "The danger is now at Huntersville. If an opportunity offers, pass those regiments and get there first." The Sixteenth got in front near Lewisburg and reached Huntersville first. A staff officer (Colonel Stark, afterwards made brigadier-general, and killed at Sharpsburg) said to Savage: "There is a fine lot of clothing for distribution among the troops here, and because of your rapid marches General Lee has ordered that your regiment shall get whatever the men want before a further distribution is made." The boys got shirts, shoes, pantaloons, coats and overcoats, some of which latter garments survived the war. The Eighth and Sixteenth regiments were ordered from Huntersville to Dublin Depot on the road from Bristol and Petersburg, and thence to Pocotaligo, South Carolina, near which General Lee had already established his headquarters. Mr. Davis' report in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government" is misleading and inexcusably untrue. As reported, Colonel Rust, of Arkansas, had command of forces that were to capture Cheat Mountain Pass, which included Anderson's brigade, Maney's, Hatton's and Forbes' Tennessee regi-

ments. This ends the report of the campaign in West Virginia.

Colonel Taylor, aide to General Lee, in his book entitled, "Four Years with General Lee," says the operations in West Virginia were a failure. Savage, in a letter to the "Confederate Veteran" wrote, that "Lee failed."

Davis says that Rust was to open fire at daylight, which was to be a signal for general action; that the pickets were captured without firing a gun and no notice had been given of their approach; that Rust found that he was mistaken and could not take the place by assault and did not understand that his firing should be a signal for a general attack, and withdrew without firing a musket. This is false.

Judge B. J. Tarver, of Lebanon, Tennessee, a member of Colonel Hatton's Seventh Regiment, writes: "We returned, leaving our wounded with the enemy, one of whom I saw several times after he had been exchanged." Judge Tarver further says, that he heard the firing at Beckey's Run and heard Savage give the order to "Charge bayonets," and the yelling of the men. At this time General Lee was present with Donelson's brigade and saw the charge of the Sixteenth upon the Yankees. He led the brigade by a road, avoiding Stewart's Run, back to Snyder's, or Beef Hill, as the soldiers called it. Beckey's Run is on the main road at the base of the mountain, and Cheat Pass is on the top of the mountain more than a mile from Beckey's Run. Rust and Anderson were defeated and left their dead and wounded men in possession of the enemy.

The enemy was not surprised. Many guns were fired and many soldiers killed and captured on each side. The enemy admit a loss of fifty and an officer. (See report of General Reynolds and the colonels, and the report of Colonels Rust and Jackson) series 1, Rebel Records, pages 184-192.) He was writing a book to sell, and was ignorant or willfully false.

Jeff Davis' report in his "Rise and Fall" is false. General Lee made no report of his campaign in West Virginia.

It will be difficult for persons well acquainted with political and military reports, by officers, politicians and newspapers, to decide which has the least regard for the truth.

Savage, by his services in the United States army in the war with Mexico, and his eight years in Congress, was almost as well known to the people of Virginia as to the people of Tennessee. When in command of the troops at Sewell Mountain, on the right of the National road, consisting of his own regiment and the Wise Legion, he consulted with the officers and soldiers of the Wise Legion in regard to military affairs, learning what he could from them as to the supposed amount of Rosecrans' force on Sewell Mountain. From this explanation he was of opinion that Rosecrans' force did not amount to over 7,000 men, perhaps less.

He also inquired of them as to the character of country and the road leading from Sewell Mountain to the Kanawha Valley. He was informed that the road lay along the top of the mountain before commencing to descend to the Kanawha Valley. He was informed that for some four or five miles, more or less, the road passed over the top of a high mountain through timber, the mountain being narrow on the top so as to be easily obstructed by cutting and falling of timber, enabling a small force to defend itself against a much larger one. Savage was of opinion that a skillful scouting party could find a way by which one hundred or more men could reach this defile without being discovered by the enemy. Savage was of opinion that it would be easy to drive Rosecrans from the top of Sewell Mountain by an assault in the front, the assaulting party to go down to the bottom of the mountain, separating the two forces

NOTE.—The Commissary of the Wise Legion was a clerk in the House when Savage was in Congress, and Savage consulted him in regard to Rosecrans' force.

and ascending to the brink upon which Rosecrans' force was posted; that Rosecrans could not use artillery upon the forces ascending the mountain; and that men shot much better upwards than shooting downwards; that if Rosecrans formed his line upon the brink to shoot at the force ascending, his men would over-shoot and aim with little certainty, while the ascending force would kill every man that appeared upon the brink, and this force would be sufficient to drive Rosecrans from Sewell Mountain. But Savage believed it possible to capture him, and his plan was to assault in front with the Sixteenth, the Seventh (Colonel Hatton), the First (Colonel Maney), and at the same time assault Rosecrans with the Wise Legion and with Floyd's forces, and have the defile in the rear at the same time occupied by a detail of one hundred men to obstruct the Kanawha road by cutting down the timber on the top of the mountain. This arrangement if executed would have captured Rosecrans and his whole army, and furnished the half-armed Confederates with artillery, arms, clothing and ammunition, all of which was much needed and would have redeemed West Virginia from invasion by the enemy. Savage's policy was much discussed by the soldiers and was approved by them. When he asked permission of General Lee to send a scout to the rear to find a way to the defile, Lee replied: "If you attempt that you will get a man killed, and I do not want you to lose a man. It is not my policy to fight them. I only want to keep them from advancing further." When Lee told Savage that the enemy would either attack or retreat the next morning, Savage replied: "It means a retreat, and if you want to fight them now is your time." Lee again replied that it was not his policy to fight them. It is clear beyond doubt, as much so as anything can be made certain in military affairs, that the forces under Lee's command could have easily captured Rosecrans.

Rosecrans had not more than fifty-two hundred men on

Sewell Mountain, as reported by himself. (See series I, vol. V, page 615, *War of Rebellion*). General Floyd, near Sewell Mountain, had thirty-nine hundred men. (*Id.*, page 163.) Wise's Legion contained twenty-eight hundred and fifty. (*Id.*, page 151.) The Sixteenth, the Seventh (Colonel Hatton), and the First (Colonel Maney), were estimated at two thousand men. Now, here is a force of eighty-seven hundred and fifty in front, to the right and to the left, in sight of Rosecrans, with a defile in his rear at four miles, say, easily made impassable. A man like Forrest seeking a battle upon equal terms or with superior numbers would have captured Rosecrans. In talking to Lee about sending scouts and attacking Rosecrans he went as far as, and perhaps a little farther than, strict military law would allow him.

Savage in discussing the question of the capture of Rosecrans and his forces with the men and the officers of the Wise Legion, said that the assaulting party would have much the best in the battle, that they could easily drive Rosecrans from his position on the edge of the mountain, that five thousand men could not only defeat him but capture him. The report was circulated among the soldiers that Savage had told General Lee that if he would give him control of five thousand men he would capture Rosecrans. If General Lee had showed a disposition to favor his plan, he intended to ask permission to visit General Floyd and ask General Floyd to cooperate with the assault by the Wise Legion on the right, the Sixteenth, Seventh, and First regiments in front, and his force on the left.

Davis removed General Wise from the command of the Wise Legion, which shows that he favored General Floyd's plan of battle as against Wise's campaign. General Lee adopted Wise's plan of battle at Sewell Mountain and strengthened it by the Sixteenth, the Seventh and the First regiments, which shows that he approved Wise's plan of fighting Rosecrans as against Floyd's plan. It seems General Lee was unwilling to incur the illwill of General Floyd

by forcing him to cooperate cordially with General Wise's plan of battle. It cannot be shown that General Lee during the four years did or said anything calculated to bring upon him the illwill of the soldiers or the people on either side, consequently when the war ended the soldiers and the people on both sides had goodwill and no illwill whatever to General Lee.

General Lee allowed Colonel Rust, with nothing to recommend him except that he had been elected to Congress from Arkansas, to persuade Lee that he, with a half-disciplined, badly-armed regiment could storm the lines and fortification of the garrison at Cheat Mountain at the very point where the garrison was best prepared for defense, and this may have caused him to turn a deaf ear to Savage's suggestions and requests. But Savage was a different sort of a man from Colonel Rust. Savage had been twice discharged as a private from the United States army, and in the war with Mexico he was wounded by a bombshell thrown from the Castle of Chepultepec, as major of the Fourteenth United States Infantry, and on the day following General Lee, then captain of engineers, was wounded when Chepultepec was captured by the Americans. The spots where each was wounded were not a mile apart. But Savage was not for secession, and this was an unpardonable sin in the eyes of Jeff Davis. With a study of the art of war and a service in the army of the United States equal to General Lee, Davis at the request of Harris promoted a man over him who held no commission in the service; and whose command of the brigade at Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge was such as to put him on duty as post commander the balance of the war.

CHAPTER VIII.

SAVAGE'S MANAGEMENT OF HIS REGIMENT UPON THE MARCH
TO SEWELL MOUNTAIN AND THE RETURN TO
GREEN BRIER BRIDGE.

He packed all his heavy baggage and his tents, and carried nothing but axes, cooking utensils, blankets, arms and ammunition. He knew from experience and history that men upon a campaign were healthier sleeping by fires than sleeping in tents, and that the lighter the baggage they carried the faster they could march. It was his habit to inspect his regiment about 10 o'clock every night and if he found a man or a mess without fire he called a guard and required them to make a fire. Colonels Hatton and Maney carried with them their tents and heavy baggage, and for this reason Savage made the march from Green Brier Bridge to Sewell Mountain twenty hours before Hatton's and Maney's regiments got there. Savage fared like his men, had no baggage but his blanket and sheep skin, and slept upon the ground by a fire. The march from Sewell Mountain and the time consumed while facing Rosecrans' army was ten or twelve days, during which time he never lost a man or had one sick. Returning to Green Brier Bridge he took possession of the tents and heavy baggage he had left there.

Savage is of the opinion that General Lee disliked the service assigned him by Davis in the West Virginia campaign; that he was unwilling to attempt to reconcile the trouble between General Floyd and the Wise Legion; that he was unwilling to do any act that might confine him as commander against Rosecrans in West Virginia; that he desired to escape service in the war against Rosecrans; that he preferred service elsewhere. It is apparent that Lee was not well qualified for the task assigned him by

Davis in West Virginia, and that his campaign was a failure. He made no report, and the report of Jefferson Davis, which he says was made upon information from Lee, is false. Colonel Taylor, who, as General Lee's aide, was with him four years, in his book published after the war entitled "Four Years with General Lee," says: "Lee's campaign in West Virginia was a failure," which statement is well proved by the facts. The facts go to show that Lee was unwilling to do any act that would place upon him the responsibility of continuing in the service against Rosecrans in West Virginia.

"General Lee, not perfect in the military art, instead of assuming supreme control of all military affairs under his command, obeyed the order of President Davis and the War Department." (*Four Years with General Lee*. By his aide, Colonel Taylor. Pages 147-148.)

Cromwell would have disobeyed the orders of Jefferson Davis and have conducted the war as he thought best. Lee was too obedient to be commander in chief of the armies of the Confederacy. (*Id.*, 138-139.)

CHAPTER IX.

POCATALLIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA. SAVAGE DISREGARDS DONEL-

SON'S ORDERS. SAVAGE ARRESTED FOR DISREGARD-

ING DONELSON'S ORDERS IN WEST

VIRGINIA.

Donelson's brigade under orders of General Lee marched from Green Brier Bridge by the way of Lewisburg to Dublin depot on the railroad, and from thence by railroad through Petersburg to Charleston, South Carolina, and from thence to Pocatalligo. Savage is satisfied that these regiments made this movement under the orders of re-

NOTE.—Stonewall Jackson wrote the Secretary of War: "Send me more men and no orders, or more orders and no men."

quest of General Lee. General Pemberton was in command at Pocatalligo, and General Lee established his headquarters a few miles from it.

Soon after the brigade was camped at Pocatalligo General Donelson caused Colonel Savage to be arrested for disobedience of his orders in West Virginia. A court-martial was assembled but Savage had no defense, and the sentence of the court-martial suspended him from the command of his regiment for a short period. This sentence by military law confined Savage to his quarters with his regiment. General Lee modified the sentence so as to allow Savage to spend the time for which he was suspended in the city of Savannah.

Twice while Savage was under arrest the Yankees attempted to make raids from the island of Beaufort across the Port Royal River, and each time General Pemberton released Savage from arrest and placed him in command of his regiment, saying that he was unwilling for the regiment to go into battle without Savage being commander. When the danger passed Savage would again go under arrest.

The day after the battle of Port Royal Ferry General Pemberton directed Savage to take his regiment and see whether the enemy was in force at Port Royal Ferry, and if the enemy was there to so report, and he would order all the forces to fight them, saying, "Of course, I have to give you this order through General Donelson but it is for you to execute it in your own way."

General Donelson rode along with the regiment, and when about two miles and a half from the ferry he halted and said: "Look there! Don't you see them? There is the enemy. Let us send back word to General Pemberton and let him bring down the forces to attack them." Savage said: "I can't join you in any such report." Donelson pointed out what he called the enemy. Savage said, "I see it but it may be fowls, cattle or hogs. General Pem-

berton told me to make this examination and I am going to do it in my own way and on foot, and if any of you gentlemen want to go with me leave your horses hitched or in care of the sergeant-major." Savage never saw Donelson after this. That night, and about dark, reached Fort Royal Ferry and found no Yankees.

After the fall of Fort Donelson the brigade was ordered to Corinth, Miss., and was engaged in the battles there, losing one man killed and a few slightly wounded. When the retreat was ordered the Sixteenth Regiment was in the rear and cut timber across the road to obstruct the progress of the enemy. It was considered a kind of forlorn hope, a sacrifice which was necessary to the safety of the retreating army.

"Camp Grahamville, S. C., March 29, 1862.

"To the Friends of the Sixteenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, at Home:

"In this hour of confusion and peril, I deem it not improper to address you a few words in regard to the impending dangers and the future conduct of the regiment. In more fortunate times I have warned you of the stern realities now upon us; and whether my words have proved true or not, you will remember. In regard to the regiment, it may be said that in July last, the men were eager to assist Virginia; in December more anxious to go to South Carolina than Tennessee; now they feel it a duty as soon as discharged (commencing May 14) to return to their State, where the danger is greatest. And although injustice in some things has been done them, they will, with few exceptions, promptly re-enter the service, believing it right to fight for their country under all circumstances. Others desiring to join will have an opportunity to do so until the number is increased to twelve hundred and fifty.

"In this contest, your position imposes on you a high duty, The mountains have in all ages been the refuge of liberty, and it is in the power of the people to make the Cumberland Range an asylum for the unfortunate, and immortal by glorious achievements if our homes are polluted by invasion. The ladies and children are patriotic everywhere;

I have yet to find a woman cold or doubtful of the issue, and who was not devoted and ready to sacrifice all rather than be conquered. Let our weak-hearted men take courage from this example. Supply the places of those trusty rifles unwisely taken from you, and be ready to make every suitable ambushade the grave of a Lincolnite.

"I warn you against undue excitement. Greater injuries oftentimes result from this cause than are inflicted by the enemy. Common sense and cool reflection should govern your conduct. When danger is seen, it is easy to avoid it, and the means of victory and safety can be provided. Whether the misconceptions of public agents have been the cause of misfortunes in Tennessee, is a question for the future historian, but I may say, that in revolutions, no man should be permitted to hold office a moment longer than is consistent with the public good, or under repeated failures. Want of success should be held *prima facie* evidence of unfitness to command. If any man has entered this war expecting to fight in the *rear rank*—win glorious victories, and enjoy fame long after its termination, he should be forced to the front, turned out or shot. The places of such can be easily supplied, and this contest requires that every man's life, fortune and honor be put to the hazard.

"Let none doubt the final success of the revolution. If the present government should fail, and those now commanding be conquered, the people will call men from the workshop and the field to lead them to victory and freedom. It is not wisdom to halt between two opinions, to weep over the decrees of inevitable destiny, or to expect aid from England and France—not does Providence, in my opinion, help any but the vigilant and the brave. Cowards are fit to be slaves, and are always conquered—men worthy to be free, will rise in their might and make the greatest danger a hundred fold less. Rigid discipline and heroic fighting will secure the victory, and better that the ocean waves should roll over us than that the South should be conquered. If we cannot live free, we should die gloriously, leaving patriotic deeds as beacon lights upon the pages of history. Shall descendants from the heroes of King's Mountain and New Orleans bow before a Northern conqueror? He who accepts less than is his, is a slave, whether it be from the 'Union,' an emperor, or Lincoln. The people once worshiped the Union 'as a God'—regarding it

as an assurance of imperishable glory and peerless grandeur among the nations. This ambitious sentiment heretofore kept them together. It held the men of Tennessee and the Middle States 'spell bound,' long after reason had pointed to the pathway of safety. It caused the people of Babel to say 'let us build a Tower, whose top may reach unto heaven, and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth.' It controlled the conduct of Alexander, Caesar and Bonaparte, and of all the tyrants who have scourged mankind. This idol of our ambition, like most false gods, has been worshipped under various names—such as 'extending the area of freedom,' 'an ocean-bound Republic,' 'lifting up the down trodden nations, and making the world free and happy.' But alas! the tower whose top we hoped might reach to heaven, and make us a name surpassing all ancient and modern fame, has been shattered and broken, and confounded and divided forever. And whether this be the work of the people or of Providence, the facts are unalterable, all history teaching that revolutions never turn back. If national grandeur without freedom was the desire of our ancestors, they ought to have remained in the English Union. Can Lincoln and his generals quiet the ocean, build a tower to heaven, or move the eternal hills from their foundations? As well may they hope to do these things as conquer the Southern people if true to themselves. We fight in defence of rights secured by the valor of Revolutionary heroes, and for which the best men of other nations have offered up their lives upon the field and the scaffold. The course of Lincoln is a fatal return to the bloody doctrines of past ages—the divine right of kings to maintain their ill-gotten power by the faggot and the sword. His followers the Union (the king) can do no wrong, which doctrine has sometimes been construed to mean, that if the royal carriage should destroy the citizen, his majesty would in no way be liable for the injury.

"And such is the doctrine that Andrew Johnson and the soldiers of General Buell are attempting to enforce, and who in substance say that the government must be maintained, no matter who may perish beneath the royal wheels, because they deem it more important that the government move on than that the people should live and be free. To accomplish this they are willing to blot out the rebel states,

to reduce the white race to the level of the negro, and to hopeless infamy and ruin. They say to the South we will build upon this continent the greatest power that ever has existed, but your part of the inheritance is cut off, and your posterity shall perish. Hereafter history will record the glory of Northern men alone—the South shall only be remembered by her infamy.

"This insolent injustice is enough to make our Revolutionary sires rise from the grave, and our rocks and mountains mutter for vengeance. We have only to let the Yankees know that the tower of Northern glory must rest upon the dead bodies of five hundred thousand Southern soldiers, and his heart will sicken, and his arm become palsied before the magnitude of the task. If the war be 'sharp and bloody,' holding every man to a stern responsibility from the private soldier up to the President, in less than twelve months our victorious standards will wave in triumph over the soil of a beaten foe. Respectfully,

"JOHN H. SAVAGE,

"Colonel Sixteenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers."

Written while suspended from command.

This address, written while suspended from command for disobedience to the orders of General Donelson in Virginia, shows:

- (1) Dissatisfaction with public officers.
- (2) Want of success and repeated failure, proof of unfitness to command.
- (3) Politicians in command should be forced to the front in battle or shot.
- (4) Every man's life, fortune and honor must be put to the hazards.
- (5) If the present Government should fail it should be set aside and a better one organized.
- (6) It is not wisdom to expect aid from England or France or Providence.
- (7) Rigid discipline and heroic fighting will secure victory.

(8) The war should be sharp and bloody, holding every man to a stern responsibility, from a private soldier up to the President.

(9) These sentences show want of confidence in the President and severe condemnation of the management and methods of conducting the war. Savage did not consider it war. He saw the men who did most to bring on the war getting staff appointments—volunteer aides to generals—quitting the army for Congress, getting bomb-proof positions whenever possible.

He considered Davis without military skill or knowledge of the art of war as taught by great commanders; no statesman or financier above a third-rate politician, without a single qualification to fit him as the leader in a great and dangerous revolution; a pusillanimous man whose proper place would be an inferior monk in a monastery.

JEFFERSON DAVIS AND COLONEL SAVAGE.

When the news of the death of Jefferson Davis reached McMinnville a meeting of the citizens was called at the Cumberland Presbyterian Church (Dr. Stainback, pastor). A large congregation of ladies and gentlemen assembled. Colonel John H. Savage was requested to address the meeting. He took the platform in front of the pulpit and spoke about fifteen minutes. He said:

"The little that I may say shall be the truth as I understand it. I think it a bad custom to speak ill of a man while he lives and then give him undue credit and applause in sermons and speeches after death. Mr. Davis has filled much space in the minds of our people and will take his place in history to be compared with others who have held high office.

"I will briefly compare Mr. Davis with a few of the men of ancient and modern times who have distinguished themselves as politicians, warriors and statesmen and who have established churches and religious systems. Looking

to Greece Mr. Davis as warrior will not compare favorably with Xenophon, Epaminondas, Philip or Alexander; and as a statesman there is nothing like Solon or Lycurgus to commend him. Looking to Rome, as warrior, statesman and politician he cannot compare with Fabius, Marius, Sulla or Caesar.

"Coming down to modern times: as a skillful general, commanding armies; as a politician and statesman with the lives, honor and liberties of a devoted and brave people intrusted to his keeping, an attempt to compare him with Oliver Cromwell, Frederick the Great of Prussia, or Washington or Napoleon, would be a failure. The distance between these men and Mr. Davis is too great to be measured.

"Looking to men who have established religious systems, adopted creeds and built churches, Mr. Davis has nothing in common with Mohammed, St. Paul, Martin Luther, John Wesley, Alexander Campbell or Brigham Young. But there is an honorable class of men appearing all along in history called martyrs, who have been beheaded, hanged, drawn, quartered, and burnt at the stake for opinion's sake, many of which opinions we now regard as of no importance, and it is in this class of weak-minded men that, in my opinion, Mr. Davis is entitled to high rank. Mr. Davis, politically speaking, became the political heir of John C. Calhoun and adopted without question his impracticable policies and speculative theories, and spent much time and work to prove that secession was a right; and because it was a right of the Southern people, therefore, it was right to let it be submitted to a trial upon the battle field. It is the history of all nations in all ages that might makes right. The right is with the strong. Mr. Davis had not read history wisely and well, but was true to Calhoun's unwise, impracticable and unfortunate teachings."

CHAPTER X.

As a prelude to my report of the battle of Perryville, I will state a few facts, as follows:

Under the orders of Cheatham and Donelson the Sixteenth Regiment charged a battery in front of the main line of the Yankee army, solitary and alone, without any Confederate force in sight. The battery fired upon the regiment, enflading it—killing a captain, a lieutenant, and many privates, and sending a grape shot through the head of the horse that Savage was riding.

Savage dismounted, took a six-shooting Remington pistol from the holster, and to escape the fire of the battery ordered the regiment forward. At a distance of about forty yards in a beech forest he was fired on by the main line of the Yankee army, formed behind a rail fence. He charged with the regiment, emptying his pistol, and the regiment made three charges upon the Yankees behind the fence before they fled. The battery at which Major-general Jackson was killed was firing on the regiment at a short range, say forty yards. There were two cabins near the battery; after emptying his pistol, Savage got between them and would watch the gunner ram home the charge, and then say, "Lie low boys, he is going to fire." While performing this service a minie ball passed through his leg; the wood off of a canister shot struck the cabin, rebounded and knocked Savage down, paralyzing him for an hour. He directed Colonel Donelson to take charge of the regiment and the battery at which Major-general Jackson was killed, as he, Savage, was unfit for service. He was hauled back to Tennessee in an ambulance. He was on crutches from that time until a few days before the battle of Murfreesboro.

Looking to the "War of Rebellion" and finding a blank space left for Cheatham's report and no report appearing,

knowing that Governor Porter had been upon Cheatham's staff, he wrote him to know why no report was made by Cheatham of the battle of Perryville. Governor Porter in reply, in a letter dated June 18, 1900, wrote as follows: "Perryville was a splendid fight and I will never cease to regret that the men who made it made no report." Cheatham did not want to put all he knew in an official report. Porter makes a very poor excuse for his commander. The soldiers will never cease to regret that he did not let everybody know what important military secret Cheatham desired to conceal.

In the eighth volume of "Confederate Military History," page 52, it is written: "Donelson's brigade sustained a loss of three hundred and forty-seven, killed and wounded, the Sixteenth, under Colonel Savage, losing one hundred and ninety-nine men, more than half the casualties of the brigade." This is fifty-one men more than the loss of the balance of the brigade. The total loss of Bragg's army was three thousand, two hundred and twelve. It is estimated that Cheatham's division (most all Tennesseans) lost one thousand, two hundred and sixty-two.

I think it due to the men of the Sixteenth Regiment and to the Tennesseans who were in Cheatham's division, who now sleep in unmarked graves upon the hills of Chaplain's Creek where the battle of Perryville was fought, to do for them what Cheatham and Donelson, for some unknown cause, failed to do, regardless of their duty as commanders of brave and patriotic men.

BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE.

Inasmuch as no reports by General Maney, General Donelson and Major-general Cheatham can be found in the records of the War of Rebellion, or elsewhere, I propose to make a report of this battle in accordance with the facts within my knowledge, and also of the acts and conduct of the Sixteenth Regiment under the orders of Brigadier-

general Donelson and Major-general Cheatham, so as to correct errors made by those persons who have attempted to write history. My experience in political contests and in war satisfies me that there is less reliance and less regard for truth in the reports of military officers in regard to campaigns and battles than there is in the reports of parties and leaders in political contests, for the reason that the falsehood or lie of the party leader can be contradicted immediately, whereas the error or falsehood of the military officer cannot be contradicted until after the war is ended. Lord Byron wrote: "Truth is often more strange than fiction itself."

Many strange questions are presented in reference to the conduct of Generals Cheatham and Donelson before the battle, at the battle and after the battle. In the eighth volume of a publication called "Confederate Military History," purporting to give an account of the battle of Perryville, it is written: "General Polk being in immediate command of the army until the arrival of General Bragg, General Cheatham was in command of the right wing, Brigadier-general Daniel S. Donelson taking temporary command of his division." There is no truth in this statement as will be shown hereafter. It was further written: "Cheatham's division was almost exclusively Tennesseans, the First Brigade, Donelson's, being temporarily commanded by Colonel John H. Savage." There is no truth in this statement. Savage never had command of Donelson's brigade for a moment at the battle of Perryville. These false statements as made shift the responsibility for the loss of one hundred and ninety-nine soldiers of the Sixteenth Regiment, from Cheatham's and Donelson's shoulders so as to wrongfully charge it on Colonel Savage, all of which will appear hereafter.

It appears in said volume, page 52, that the Sixteenth, under Colonel Savage lost one hundred and ninety-nine men, more than one-half of the casualties of the brigade,

and that among the killed was Captain J. B. Vance. This is an error. It was Captain J. G. Lambert who was killed. Bragg's total loss in this battle was three thousand two hundred and twelve, of which Cheatham's division lost one thousand two hundred and sixty-two, as estimated. No reports are found in the "War of Rebellion" by Donelson, Maney or Cheatham. General Maney, by his letter January 16, 1901, writes me: "The war records show no report of this battle by General Cheatham, chief of division, or either of the brigade commanders." General Maney also says in his letter: "Assuming always that your regiment, the Sixteenth, was part of Donelson's brigade, I very well remember in conversation having stated to you that it had been engaged for not less than thirty minutes before my command came to your assistance by attacking at your right, and having so stated verbally, of course am willing at your pleasure to place it in writing as I here do. On this point I am persuaded that though wounded, you were still with your command when I went into action, and you had not been borne off the field, so your memory will thoroughly concur with mine, and here again intervening events involving time in occurrence may be relied on as conclusive support." (*General Maney's letter.*)

SAVAGE'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

From early in the morning until twelve o'clock the Sixteenth Regiment was in line of battle in the dry bed of Chaplain Creek, its right resting on the road that leads to Harrodsburg. The regiment was then ordered to march down Chaplain Creek. After going a mile or more the cannon balls began to fall among the men but did no harm. At the distance of about two miles the creek widened to something like a small bottom, with water in it, the banks having become forty or fifty feet high, covered by heavy timber and undergrowth. Turning to the left the Sixteenth was ordered by General Donelson to ascend the bluff,

through the timber and undergrowth, which was steep and difficult to get up. The path led along the foot of the bluff some fifty or sixty yards to a dug road, up which I rode into an open field and saw a battery of artillery some two hundred yards out in the field. Riding to where the men were getting up the hill into the edge of the field, I formed the regiment into line on the edge of the bluff directly fronting the battery. By this time General Donelson rode up and said, "Colonel, I am ordered to attack," to which I made no reply. He repeated a second time, "Colonel, I am ordered to attack." I again made no reply. He repeated a third time, "Colonel, I am ordered to attack the enemy!" I then said: "General, I see no enemy to attack except that battery over there in the field. Do you mean, sir, that you want the Sixteenth to charge that battery?" He said, "Yes." I replied, "General, I will obey your orders but if the Sixteenth is to charge that battery you must give the order." He raised his voice in a rather loud and excited tone and said, "Charge."

I believed that the battery was supported by a strong line of infantry concealed by a fence, and a forest not more than eighty yards in its rear, and that it had been placed in the field as a decoy to invite a charge. I believed that a charge would end in my death and the defeat and ruin of my regiment, and while I had often disobeyed Donelson's orders, for which he had court-martialed me, I could think of no military principles that would authorize me to disobey such an order in the face of the enemy and at the beginning of such a battle.

There was running up from Chaplain Creek a long hollow about half way between the battery and where the regiment was in line. I thought as soon as I moved into that hollow I would be out of reach of the battery and that I could come up on the other side within sixty or seventy yards of the battery. I was in no hurry; got in front of my regiment and said, "Forward, march!"

About the time the regiment reached the bottom of the hollow an aide of General Cheatham's came from the woods near the right, saying that the enemy that General Cheatham wanted attacked was in the woods at the head of the hollow at the right. I halted the regiment, ordered my color bearers to the front and ordered the regiment to dress on them so as to march in the new direction indicated by Cheatham's order. I was in no hurry, for outside of Cheatham's aide and Donelson there was no Confederate in sight. There was no reason why the battery should not have fired upon the regiment while it was in line, except that a fire would pass through the line and only do a little damage. Marching in the new direction indicated by Cheatham's aide, I was soon in an open beech forest on the top of the hill. I was riding in front expecting a surprise, the left of the regiment was at the edge of the forest and the field, when the battery, about one hundred and fifty yards from the regiment, fired, enfilading it, sweeping the whole length of the line, killing a captain, a lieutenant and many privates. I was riding in front of the regiment; a grape shot passed through the head of my horse below the eyes. Remembering to have seen thirty or forty riderless horses running over the field of Molino del Rey, I threw the bridle of my horse over a snag, took a Remington pistol from the holsters, and ordered the regiment forward to get out of range of the battery. Descending the hill some forty or fifty yards, we were fired on by the main line of the Yankee army, not more than fifty or sixty yards distant, concealed behind a rail fence which was a prolongation of the fence enclosing the field in which the battery was situated.

There was a fence and a field on my right running up to two cabins at the line of the enemy's forces. There were skirmish lines along this fence which fired on our rear as we advanced. The Sixteenth had no protection except a few trees in the forest. I ordered a charge. We drove the

enemy from behind the fences, killing many of them as they fled. The right of the regiment was at the two cabins. There was a battery in the line of battle to the right, about thirty or forty yards from these cabins, between which cabins there was an entry, or space, of ten or fifteen feet. The battery opened fire upon us, killing many men, and at the same time a fire of small arms from the line of battle was directed upon these cabins. The battery fired obliquely into this space. I stood between the cabins, would watch the gunner ram home the charge, and say, "Lie low, boys; he is going to fire," and step for protection close to the cabin nearest the battery. The battle was furious, the men loading and firing as rapidly as possible, falling back and again charging up to the fence. A private, Andrew Dow Mercer, said, "Boys, let's take the battery," and started in that direction. At this time I saw a force to my right and in my rear. I countermanded Mercer's order, but he had gone some five or six steps towards the battery to a tree. Seeing that he was not supported, he hugged the tree closely for a short space of time and returned to the cabin without being wounded. While standing between the cabins a minie ball passed through my leg without breaking the bone, and the wood off of a canister shot struck the opposite cabin, and glancing knocked me down, paralyzing me for a time. The men at the battery had been killed or wounded or had fled before Maney's brigade appeared in the field to my right, some hundred yards or more distant, and the battle had ceased at the battery. I said to Colonel Donelson: "I am unfit for duty. Take charge. Go to the battery. It belongs to the Sixteenth." There was then no enemy in front or firing upon the regiment. After the battle was over Captain Fisher of the Sixteenth said to me: "Colonel, we killed at that battery the bravest captain we ever saw. We tried to get him to surrender, but he would not surrender and we had to kill him," and I recognized

in Captain Fisher's "brave captain," Major-general Jackson, whose body was found among the guns of this battery.

None of General Maney's brigade was nearer than one hundred yards of this battery. The batteries taken by General Maney's brigade were half a mile or more to the right of this battery. During the hottest of the battle my lieutenant-colonel, Donnell, came to me and said: "Colonel, order a retreat. We are losing all our men and are not supported." I replied: "Protect your men by those trees and that fence and I will protect this wing by these cabins. We were ordered to fight. To order a retreat at the beginning of a great battle is not war. We must hold this position until supported, and it is the duty of our commanding officers to bring us support." The regiment could not then retreat without being brought again under the fire of the battery in the field. Soon after the time that Maney's brigade appeared on the right the Thirty-eighth Regiment belonging to Donelson's brigade engaged the enemy's line of battle on the left. It is stated in this same volume of "Confederate Military History" that the Sixteenth Regiment under Colonel Savage lost one hundred and ninety-nine men, more than half the casualties of the brigade.

Either Savage or his commanders are responsible to God and their country for this terrible slaughter of brave men. It is difficult to form an opinion as to why this occurred as it did. Was it incompetency or neglect on the part of Donelson and Cheatham, or were there other motives operating to produce this result? There was at the time no good feeling between Donelson, his son and son-in-law upon his staff, and Savage. The friends of Savage claim that by disobeying Donelson's orders at Huntersville in Virginia he saved his regiment from great loss by fatal disease. It was also claimed that by disobeying Donelson's order at Valley Mountain in Western Virginia he saved Donelson's

brigade and also General R. E. Lee from capture next morning.

It appears in the sixteenth volume, page 1022, "War of the Rebellion," that the battle of Perryville has been reported by forty-four officers, twenty-eight of whom are Yankees, and sixteen Rebels. I have carefully read these reports to try to form an opinion as to the truth and fairness of the statements made on each side. I am inclined to treat the statements made by officers as testimony made by a witness in court, whose feelings and prejudice are all on one side. There are certain leading facts on each side that must be credited, because in accordance with reason and in harmony with admission on each side. To corroborate and sustain my report, I have taken the statements of five soldiers of the Sixteenth Regiment, now residing in Warren County—J. C. Biles, Jesse Walling, E. S. Rowan, Huel Moffitt and W. H. White—who all remember the facts as I report them, and they all agree that no regiment of Donelson's brigade or other Confederate force was in sight when Cheatham and Donelson gave the fatal order to the Sixteenth Regiment, solitary and alone, under the fire of the battery in sight in the field, to charge the main line of the Yankee army; and that the regiment was engaged for half an hour before Maney's brigade appeared on the right.

I here state a few facts appearing in the report of General Buell and his officers which corroborate and sustain the recollections of the soldiers of the Sixteenth, whose statements I have taken.

General Buell approached Bardstown with an army of fifty-eight thousand men, at which point Bragg's army was stationed under command of General Polk, who left Bardstown when Buell was approaching. Buell followed Polk, and on the night of October 7, 1862, Bragg determined to give Buell battle at Perryville and ordered Polk to remove Cheatham's division, then at Harrodsburg, back to Perry-

ville to support Hardee, then pressed by the enemy. Bragg directed Polk to attack Buell at daylight, which Polk failed to do. Bragg arrived on the battle field at ten o'clock and made suggestion to Polk, but no battle was commenced until the afternoon, when Bragg in person ordered the attack, Cheatham's division being rapidly removed from the left to the right, under a continuous fire of artillery. The battle was furious until dark.

Buell reports a loss of four thousand, three hundred and forty-three, and names as killed Major-general Jackson, Brigadier-general William R. Terrill, Commanding Brigadier-general Geo. Webster, P. Jonnet, W. P. Campbell, Alex. S. Berryhill and John Herrell. He says the corps of General McCook was very much crippled, and the division of General Jackson almost entirely disappeared as a body.

Oldershaw, assistant adjutant-general, and chief of staff, says that General Jackson, while standing on the left of the battery was killed by two bullets entering his right breast; that the battery had been taken and that it was impossible to recover the body of General Jackson. (See *War of the Rebellion*, vol. XVII, page 1060.)

This statement corroborates and sustains the statements of the men of the Sixteenth, and makes it most probable that Terrill and Colonel Webster were killed by Maney's brigade.

General McCook says, "The bloodiest battle of modern times for the number of troops engaged on our side." (Page 1042, vol. XVII, *W. of R.*)

Colonel Oscar F. Moore, of the Thirty-third Ohio, was wounded and taken prisoner. Captain I. I. Womack directed a Rebel and a Yankee soldier to carry Colonel Moore to the Rebel hospital, about dusk.

General Hardee reports his loss in this battle at two hundred and forty-two killed, one thousand, five hundred and four wounded—including three brigadier-generals,

Cleburne, Wood and Brown—with a quartermaster and commissary killed and three colonels wounded, next in rank to brigadier-generals.

Yet it is remarkable and strange to say that in all these reports, Yankee and Rebel, nothing appears from Cheatham, Donelson, Stewart or Maney, nor any officer in Cheatham's division except the reports of the commanders of regiments in Maney's brigade. This taken in connection with Governor Porter's letter and General Maney's letter is conclusive proof that Cheatham and Donelson willfully, wrongfully, violating military law, suppressed all reports. Common sense makes it plain that they pursued this course because of some guilty conduct which they dared not disclose for fear of dismissal from the service and punishment.

First. It is proven beyond doubt that no regiment of Donelson's brigade or any Confederate force was present or in sight when Cheatham and Donelson gave the fatal orders, or appeared until after Maney's brigade appeared on the right.

Second. J. C. Biles, clerk and master of the Chancery Court at McMinnville, in his written statement says that after the regiment had been formed in the edge of an old field, with a battery in its front, General Donelson rode up, and after some talk between him and Colonel Savage, Donelson rose up in his stirrups and gave the order to charge; that the regiment moved as if to charge the battery and was halted after moving a short distance, and was formed in line of battle at right angles to the line when marching to charge the battery in the field.

The letter of Jesse Walling, now president of the National Bank at McMinnville, is given and is in accordance with the statement of Biles and the others.

"COLONEL JOHN H. SAVAGE:

"DEAR SIR: In reply to your inquiry as to what I remember about the part your regiment took in the battle of Perryville, Ky., I would state that we were encamped near

a creek when orders were given to break camp and move forward. We ascended a very steep embankment, formed line and moved southward, probably one-half mile, when General Donelson appeared, and after talking with you for about a minute or so we were ordered to charge the enemy. The first sight that we had of the enemy was a battery of beautiful cannon. We charged in right oblique course and were met by the grape and canister shot from these guns, which killed many of our men.

"All at once the enemy raised up from behind a rail fence, pouring a deadly fire into us and killing great numbers of our men. We fell back a short distance, rallied and charged again, meeting the same deadly fire which drove us back for the second time. The third time we went over the fence, driving the enemy before us, capturing the cannon. We continued running them, killing them as they ran. Their dead and wounded lay thick behind the fence and over the field.

"I was in the center of the regiment (Sixteenth Tennessee), and noticed that we were not supported either to the right or to the left. My company went into the fight numbering eighty-four men and next morning we only had sixteen men able for service. You will see that our loss was terrible, but the most surprising thing to me is that every man in your regiment was not killed, as we fought the enemy to the front, left and right flanks unsupported.

"The Sixteenth was engaged with the enemy for at least thirty minutes when General Maney's men appeared to our right as we were running the enemy across the field.

"I could not begin to name over all the dead and wounded as most all our company were in this list, and to name some of our brave and good and leave out others equally as honorable, I could not do.

"Why our regiment was ordered to fight this battle alone and on a field where our position was decidedly against us I shall never be able to understand. To look at the great numbers of the enemy in comparison to our little Regiment it seemed that we were brought up to be slaughtered.

"One of the bravest men I have ever seen was one of the enemy, who stood upon his fine brass gun, waving his hat over his head after all his comrades had fled. But he

too fell in this brave act. I could not hear distinctly his words as he stood there waving his hat.

"You will please pardon me for speaking of this brave fellow, but he is always before me when I think of this terrible battle.

Yours very truly,
"JESSE WALLING, *First Lieutenant.*"

The report appearing in the eighth volume of the so-called "Confederate Military History" does the Sixteenth and Colonel Savage a gross injustice by the suppression of and failure to state important facts. It fails to state that the Sixteenth Regiment killed General Jackson, who refused to surrender at the battery they captured, and that Jackson's body was found among the guns of the battery near the double cabins. It also fails to state that Savage was wounded by a minie ball and was knocked down by the wood off a canister shot, fired by the battery near the double cabins at which General Jackson was killed. It also fails to state that the Sixteenth Regiment under orders from Donelson and Cheatham and without support on the right or the left charged and broke the enemy's line of battle thirty minutes before General Maney's brigade appeared in the open field on the right. It also fails to state that the Sixteenth charged and drove from its line of battle formed behind a fence the Thirty-third Ohio Regiment, and wounded and captured its colonel, Oscar F. Moore, with whom Savage served in Congress, and that Savage directed his doctor to take the same care of Colonel Moore as he would take of himself if wounded. It fails to state that Savage's horse was wounded by a grape shot, also that Colonel Donelson's horse was killed at the fence behind which the Yankees had formed their line of battle. Savage charged with the regiment and emptied his Remington revolver, and these were the only shots fired by him during the war.

It is difficult to form a satisfactory opinion as to the reasons and motives that induced Donelson and Cheatham

to order the Sixteenth Regiment, solitary and alone, to charge the main line of battle of the Yankee Abolition army. Did it result from excitement and stupidity or dullness on the part of these officers, or was it a purpose to sacrifice a disobedient and insubordinate officer? This last suggestion derives strength from the fact that neither Donelson nor Cheatham made any report of this important battle, but suppressed the facts, which if published might show that they ought to be dismissed from the service or shot by court-martial.

Governor J. D. Porter, in a letter to me the 19th of June, 1900, says: "Perryville was a splendid fight. I will never cease to regret that the men who made it made no report. Cheatham did not want to put all he knew in an official report." The proof is clear beyond doubt that Cheatham wilfully failed to report, and suppressed all reports, which constituted a military crime of the highest grade, deserving of the greatest punishment—which should have resulted in the dismissal of himself and Donelson in disgrace from the army.

The charge of the Sixteenth Regiment at the battle of Perryville, under orders of Cheatham and Donelson, was as gallant, brave, dangerous and desperate as the charge of the Light Brigade or six hundred men upon the Russian battery at Balaklava during the Crimean War, under the rash and fatal orders of Lord Cardigan, which has been immortalized by the poets Meek and Tennyson. And the Tennesseans who sleep on the hills of Chaplain Creek, with no stone to mark their graves and with no report by commanding generals to keep in memory their heroic valor, invite the attention of some future unborn poet to present the charge of these brave men as equal in desperate daring to the charge of England's Light Brigade of six hundred. There are many incidents in the charge of the Sixteenth upon the main line of the Yankee army under the fatal orders of Cheatham and Donelson similar to the charge of

the Light Brigade of six hundred under the rash and fatal orders of Lord Cardigan, and to show the similarity of these two battles I quote from Tennyson's poem as follows:

“Forward, the Light Brigade!
Was there a man dismay'd?
Not tho' the soldier knew
Some one had blunder'd:
Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die:
Into the valley of death
Rode the six hundred.

“Cannon to right of them,
Cannon to left of them,
Cannon in front of them,
Volley'd and thundered;
Storm'd at with shot and shell,
Boldly they rode and well,
Into the jaws of death,
Into the mouth of hell,
Rode the six hundred.”

Bennet Young, of Perryville, said in a speech at Murfreesboro: “The fighting was at close range; and at one time and in one part of the fray, only a rail fence divided those who were thus contesting in deadliest combat.” This was the Sixteenth, solitary and alone, for thirty minutes in battle with the Yankee army. Persons who had seen Shiloh and Chickamauga declare that Perryville in many parts was the most dreadful battle field they had ever seen. Yet Cheatham and Donelson made no reports; and the “Confederate Military History” misstates the facts so as to transfer the blunder and crime of Donelson and Cheatham to Colonel Savage.

Many attempt to explain the mysterious and strange conduct of Cheatham and Donelson. I propose to judge of their acts at the battle of Perryville by those universal rules of law and common sense adopted by courts of justice

to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the parties charged with crime. “The law presumes that the party intended that which is the immediate or probable consequence of his act.”

(Roscoe's *Criminal Law*, page 16.)

The order to charge the battery and the enemy's line of battle without support was equivalent to ordering the death of Savage and the defeat and destruction of his regiment, and law and common sense say they so intended. This fatal and malicious order resulted in killing Colonel Donelson's horse, the wounding of Savage and his horse and the killing and wounding of one hundred and ninety-nine men—more than half his regiment. If Cheatham and Donelson were on trial for murder before a jury the verdict would be with malice aforethought. “The law presumes parties guilty of crime who suppress and destroy evidence.” (First *Greenleaf*, page 37). Why is it that no report appears from Stewart or his regimental commanders? Why were no reports made by Cheatham or Donelson? These facts, in connection with the letter of Cheatham's adjutant-general and best friend, prove beyond doubt that Cheatham and Donelson gave the fatal order jointly, and the law presumes they continued to act in conjunction until the contrary is proved.

Every unlawful act is a criminal act, and every careless act or omission of duty by which life is lost is a crime. It is remarkable that none of the Sixteenth saw Cheatham or Donelson during the battle or when removing the dead and wounded from the battle field. It may be that they dreaded to look on the dead men that they had ordered to certain death and defeat. The proof shows the guilty conduct of Cheatham and Donelson beyond doubt, and excludes all other conclusions, except proof that they were drunk. In all prosecution for murder malice is a necessary element, which the law says is evidence by antecedent menaces, former grudges and concerted schemes to do another some bodily harm. I propose to show the causes why Donelson

and Cheatham entertained hatred and malice for John H. Savage.

They were both men of no very great knowledge or ability, not above the level of the ordinary soldier they commanded, and without military instinct and with but little knowledge of the art of war, with many soldiers in the ranks who were their superior in brain and business capacity. They were soldiers fit to be commanded and ready enough to obey orders, and believed it a great military offense to disobey orders, and that it deserved the severest punishment. They had never heard or read that Plutarch in writing the history of Lycurgus, the great Greek legislator and statesman, had declared it to be a military axiom that "Men are not bound to obey those who do not know how to command." Or the saying of Cyrus, king of Persia, that "None ought to govern but those who are better than those he governs."

It was well known to Cheatham as well as Donelson that Savage had disobeyed Donelson's orders at Huntersville and Valley Mountain. There were other occasions of smaller import not necessary to be named. The arrest of Savage at Pocatalligo, South Carolina, showed the malice and hatred of Donelson; and the facts that Savage held the respect and confidence of Generals Lee and Pemberton, as manifested by his release from arrest, and special instructions to make investigations without consulting Donelson, were calculated to arouse the hatred and illwill and vanity of Donelson. There were other considerations calculated to gain for Savage the illwill of Cheatham and Donelson. It was well known that Savage was in the habit of criticizing severely President Davis and his administration, and his unwise and unfortunate management of military affairs. It was well known that Savage often said that Davis and his administration were a failure, and that unless some change was made the conquest of the Southern people was a certainty; that the Government and the army should be

reorganized, from the President down, or the people should make peace on the best terms that could be obtained. Savage came into the army unpopular with President Davis and Isham G. Harris because of his known opposition to the doctrines of secession as taught by them and Calhoun. The proof in this case, if it does not establish beyond doubt the guilty purposes of Cheatham and Donelson, is inconsistent with any other conclusion than that they persuaded themselves that the best thing they could do to maintain the honor and discipline of the army and to secure the triumph and freedom of the Southern people was to bring about by any means possible the death of the disobedient, insubordinate and disrespectful Colonel Savage.

Some persons may think or say that the assumption that the officers intended to commit a crime so enormous ought not to be entertained. Let us see a few examples as to what has occurred in the past. Human nature is now the same as it has been throughout the ages, and what has occurred at one time may occur again, for history repeats itself. The churches in past ages have beheaded, hanged, drawn, quartered and burnt at the stake thousands upon thousands of brave men and good women for heresy, for disbelief in questions which we now consider as of no importance whatever. The Duke of Alva executed twenty thousand good people and banished one hundred thousand more because they could not believe in accordance with the creed of the Church of Spain. The number of victims of the Spanish Inquisition from 1481 to 1801 amounted to three hundred and forty-one thousand and twenty-one. Of these nearly thirty-two thousand were burned. There were twenty thousand officers of the Inquisition, who served as spies and informers. (Spofford's *Encyclopedia*.) Charles II of England caused the bones of Oliver Cromwell, of his mother, and his son-in-law, Ireton, after they had long been buried, to be dug up and cast into a lime pit. The skeleton of Cromwell was hung and his head was put

on a pole upon the walls of West Chester Abbey. Lucius Junius Brutus, a Roman consul and general, condemned his son to death for disobedience of orders, and was present and saw his son slain without any manifestation of sympathy. It is stated in history that towards the close of the seventeenth century the belief in witchcraft was transmitted to New England and spread far and wide, and that twenty women at Salem and in Boston were tried, condemned and hanged, and hundreds were imprisoned, whipped or branded for this imaginary offense.

Cotton Mather, one of the ablest and best educated men of his day, was the avowed champion of this persecution. It is history that under the decrees and bulls of the Pope of Rome five hundred witches were burned at Geneva in three months, about the year 1515, and one hundred thousand in Germany, the last execution taking place in 1749; and that thirty thousand were put to death in England as witches. It may be assumed that David, king of Judea, was as good a man at heart as Cheatham and Donelson, although a Jew. He had more brains and intelligence than either of them. Yet for less cause of hatred and malice than had Cheatham and Donelson against Savage, he recited it to his conscience to send Uriah to certain death by an order to Joab, his general, saying: "Set ye Uriah in the forefront of the hottest battle, and retire ye from him, that he may be smitten, and die."

Cheatham and Donelson ordered Savage to the forefront of the battle and then retired from him as if the earth had swallowed them, and no soldier of the Sixteenth saw them or knew where they were during the battle. Perhaps no human sagacity will be able to determine beyond doubt the motives that caused Cheatham and Donelson to order the Sixteenth Regiment, solitary and alone, without any Confederate force in sight, to attack the main line of the Yankee Abolition army. This was apparently an order for the death of Savage and the destruction of his regiment.

It was a strange order given by two strange sort of men. Was it necessary to sacrifice Savage and his regiment for the general success in the battle, or did some other matters cause the fatal order? The proof appears to show that Cheatham and Donelson were drunk, and their reason had been dethroned by looking at the batteries in front of them.

The attempt of Abraham Lincoln and his fanatical abolitionists to give to the negro race equal rights with the Anglo-Saxon white race is treason to good government and a bold defiance to the decrees of an all-wise Ruler of a boundless universe, and is equal in enormity to the cruelties of the Spanish Inquisition, the burning of witches in Germany, England and the United States. It is the history of fanatics that the more unreasonable are their theories the greater the numbers join them and greater cruelties are inflicted upon innocent people.

SAVAGE'S COMMENTARY UPON CHEATHAM AND DONELSON AT
THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Generals Donelson and Cheatham were guilty of a crime or an inexcusable blunder in sending one regiment, solitary and alone, under the fire of a battery to attack the main line of the Yankee Abolition army. It was their duty to see that all the regiments were in line of battle in supporting distance of each other. The brigade should have been moved forward as a unit and the attack should have been made by all the regiments at the same time. It was Cheatham's business to see that all the brigades in his division were on hand and in line of battle and in supporting distance of each other, so that his whole division could make a simultaneous attack upon the enemy. Cheatham's aide, changing Donelson's order to attack the battery, came out of the woods near the beech forest and near the Sixteenth Regiment, and Cheatham must have seen the Sixteenth Regiment at the time he changed Donelson's order and must have known that there was no support in sight for the Six-

teenth Regiment. It was his duty to arrest Donelson's march and to order him to form his brigade in the proper place to support the Sixteenth in the charge which they ordered. Savage never saw Cheatham during the battle and does not know whether he was drunk or sober.

Savage assumes that this fatal order of Cheatham's and Donelson's resulted from one of three causes:

First. From undue excitement by the presence of the batteries and main line of the Yankee army, dethroning their reason and banishing their common sense.

Second. From drinking liquor to stimulate their courage to meet the dangers in the impending battle.

Third. To cause the death of the disrespectful, disobedient and insubordinate Colonel Savage, who was constantly declaring that the army should be reorganized, Davis removed and a dictator appointed, or the conquest of the South by the abolitionists was a certainty. This made all office-holders the bitter enemy of Savage.

CHEATHAM'S OPINION OF SAVAGE.

On page 52, volume eight, "Confederate Military History," it is written: "General Cheatham said of the gallant Savage that in battle he had an instinctive knowledge of the point of difficulty and danger and went to it." Savage thinks that his conduct in battle, called by Cheatham "instinctive knowledge," was the result of a long study of the art of war. Savage is further of opinion that a general might know the point of danger and have prudence enough to keep far away from it and might command a division or brigade for ten years and never get wounded or have a horse shot under him, and never find an opportunity to distinguish himself and his command by acts of heroism or military skill.

Bragg's sacrifice of thirty-two hundred and twelve soldiers, induced Buell to follow him from Tennessee to Kentucky and back to Tennessee. If he could not defeat

Buell in Tennessee, how could he defeat him in Kentucky? His policy shows neither courage, skill nor common sense. His folly was idiotic. Did he really expect Polk at Perryville to defeat Buell's army or did he expect Polk's defeat? Polk had convinced himself that Bragg was not fit to command and Bragg knew that Polk assumed to have great influence with President Davis.

ANDREW JOHNSON UPON BRAGG AND SAVAGE.

While Johnson was military governor of Tennessee during the Civil War he frequently said to Savage's friends and acquaintances that he was much surprised that Savage was not in high command in the Confederate army; that as a military man Bragg was not his superior. With Savage's opinion of Bragg's total unfitness for a high command as general of an army as developed while he was the commander in the various campaigns in Kentucky and Tennessee he would not consider it a compliment to be ranked with Bragg as a military man. He supposes that Johnson had forgotten those bitter speeches that Savage had made against secession and against the doctrine taught by Davis, Harris and Calhoun, which were, in the eyes of these men, an unpardonable sin, and on account of which they gave him no command nor even justice while he was fighting for the Confederacy; and they would have considered it a great misfortune to have him promoted. In Savage's opinion, Bragg had none of the instincts and elements of a great soldier and manifested no knowledge of the past history of nations. He was mentally and physically an old, worn-out man, unfit to actively manage an army in the field.

CHAPTER XI.

THE BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO. THE CONDUCT AND MILITARY SKILL OF BRAGG, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE CONFEDERATES, AND OF ROSECRANS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE YANKEES, DISCUSSED AND COMPARED. GENERALS HAZEN, CHEAT-HAM AND DONELSON MENTIONED AND DISCUSSED.

When Savage wrote his report of the part taken by the Sixteenth Regiment in the battle of Murfreesboro, he had no knowledge as to what forces, brigades or divisions of the enemy the Sixteenth had met in battle. The past history of his service under Brigadier-general Donelson showed Donelson's bitter hatred and malice to Savage. He, therefore, thought it best to write briefly and state only the undisputed facts, not knowing what Donelson might write, and not having seen him or had any talk with him during the battle or since he gave the order at Perryville. What is written now is based upon statements appearing in a volume, of 476 pages, entitled "Rosecrans' Campaigns and Battle of Stone's River." Special references are also made to vol. XXX, series I, in "War of Rebellion."

Comparing the reports of the commissioned officers on each side, the plan of battle by each general is made clear beyond a doubt. The plan of each general was to attack his enemy with his left wing. Bragg planned to crush the enemy's right. For this purpose he massed his forces south of Stone's River, leaving Breckinridge to take care of himself on the other side of Stone's River.

Rosecrans planned to attack Breckinridge by crossing Stone's River, defeating Breckinridge and capturing Murfreesboro. For this purpose some of the forces of the Yankee left had already crossed Stone's River when the

defeat of McCook on the right of the Yankee line made it necessary to recall the forces of the left wing to support the right, so that the decisive battle took place at the center on both sides of the main road and the turnpike. At this point the commands of General Hazen and General Wagner and Cox's battery were actively engaged, supported and assisted by all the forces of the Yankee left wing, the general in chief having countermanded the order to attack Breckinridge and recalled his left wing to save his right wing from destruction.

Cox's batteries were planted some short distance in front of where the Hazen Monument now stands. The Sixteenth was ordered to put two companies on the right side of the railroad and eight companies on the left, guide to the right and advance upon the enemy. When ordered to advance it was more than a mile from where the Hazen Monument now stands, and during the advance was subject to a continuous cannonade by Cox's and other batteries of the left wing. A cannon ball knocked down a soldier near Savage's horse, which so frightened his horse that it made desperate efforts to throw him, which caused the regiment to halt to see the result. Unable to quiet the animal he dismounted and sent it to the rear and went on foot the balance of the battle. So soon as the Sixteenth passed the point where the river turns north its right flank was exposed to the whole force of the Yankee left. It advanced rapidly and killed the horses at these batteries, which were abandoned by the men. Then a furious battle ensued between the Sixteenth and Hazen's and Wagner's brigades supporting these batteries, assisted by such help as other parts of the left wing were in condition to give. The enemy now retreated, but the Sixteenth did not pursue, for at this time a column was seen coming up the river about one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of the Sixteenth, coming from the Round Forest. When the two companies on the right were ordered to attack them and all the officers on

the left being killed or disabled, Horace McGuire, the bugler, was sent across the railroad with orders to Private Hackett to bring those eight companies to the support of the two companies attacking the column coming up from the Round Forest (called by General Polk, "hell's half acre"). These forces coming up the river were Van Cleave's, who was wounded in the face, and turned the command over to Colonel Beatty.

In this contest, Lieutenant Anderson, of Captain Savage's company, was killed, which left the regiment without a single commissioned officer. About this time General Adams reported that he had come to relieve me. I told my men to rally to me at the turn of the river where it leaves the railroad. General Adam's brigade commenced to take their places and had not got into position until the enemy charged, and it was driven in confusion. The men of the Sixteenth and those who were acting with it were ordered to retreat up the river. A few of the Sixteenth had gone so far down the river that they were not able to make the turn and were captured. The regiment was rallied, reformed and placed in line of battle behind the works erected by General Chalmers. The great struggle took place about where the Hazen Monument now stands, and was a glorious victory for the Sixteenth Regiment when the brigades of Hazen and Wagner were driven from the field. It broke the enemy's center, and if there had been a brave brigade, division or corps commander or general in chief to bring reinforcements to hold the position, the victory for the Confederates and the destruction of Rosecrans' army would have followed.

ROSECRANS' INSTRUCTION TO HIS SOLDIERS AND CONDUCT
IN BATTLE.

Rosecrans, restless and active, consulted with his generals and advised his soldiers how to fight in battle, to be cool

and not to throw away ammunition, to be sure of their aim, to fire low and often.

He was under fire during the battle, on horse, at the front line; a man was killed at his side (page 182, *Rosecrans' Campaigns*); an orderly was killed and fell at his side; horses of two of his staff shot near him (pages 212-213); directs the planting of a battery (page 214); under the fire of musketry and artillery (page 214); blood from the wounded horse of his orderly flew into his face and started the report that he had been wounded (pages 216-217); led a charge in person (page 222); his favorite aide, Garresche, killed by a bombshell at his side (pages 277, 278).

These are a few of the facts that go to the credit of Rosecrans and show that he, by his personal efforts, gained this victory. The question may be asked, Where were Bragg, Polk, Cheatham, Donelson, and what were they doing, while Rosecrans was thus defying fate and the storm of battle? Bragg's headquarters was some two miles in rear of the line of battle, and if ever he was on the front line, it is not so recorded. Nor is it anywhere shown that Polk or Cheatham were ever on the front line, directing brigades or divisions or within the range of enemy's muskets. A brave and skillful general or even a corps commander with his eye upon every part of the battle field, as reckless of danger as Rosecrans seemed to have been, would have caused victory for the Confederates and the destruction of Rosecrans' army. There is no proof that either Polk or Cheatham was actually engaged upon the line of battle, directing the management of the corps, division or brigades, or was under the fire of musketry. It does not appear that Bragg was at any time under the fire of musketry or within the range of the artillery firing north of the railroad. It was reported that Cheatham fell off his horse during the battle.

General Hazen, in his report of this battle, on page 547, series 1, volume XX, says: "Close observation of the conduct and character of our troops for the past few days has convinced me in a long settled belief that our army is borne down by a lamentable weight of official incapacity in regimental organizations. The reasonable expectations of the country can, in my opinion, never be realized until this incubus is summarily ejected and young men of known military ability and faculty to command men without regard to previous seniority are put in their places."

Savage agrees to all that this general says, and more. I constantly declared that the army should be reorganized and reformed and made a real fighting machine. I meant that old, worn-out men like Polk, unfit men like Cheatham and Donelson should be removed and young, active men put in their commands. I also thought that the Government should be reformed; that Mr. Davis should be removed as President, and a dictator appointed; and this much I said when a candidate for Congress after I resigned my commission.

On page 544 of said volume XX, series 1, General Hazen says: "Upon this point as a pivot the army oscillated from front to rear the entire day. I gave orders to fix bayonets, to club guns and hold the ground at all hazards, as it was the key to the whole left." Savage concurs with General Hazen in this opinion.

On page 712, Donelson says: "Colonel Savage's regiment, with three companies of Colonel Chester's, held, in my judgment the critical portion of that part of the field. I ordered Colonel Savage to hold his position at all hazards, and I felt it my duty to remain with that part of the brigade holding so important and hazardous position as was occupied by him."

The general is badly mistaken. He never gave me any order during the battle and was not with the regiment when

the battle was fought and did not come upon the field until after the batteries planted by Hazen's and Wagner's brigades had been captured and destroyed by the Sixteenth, and the Hazen brigade had been driven from the battle field, and the two companies on the north of the railroad had been directed to engage Van Cleave's forces coming up the river, and the eight companies on the south of the railroad had been ordered to cross the railroad and support the two companies engaging Van Cleave's forces coming up from the Round Forest.

Donelson's regular aides were his son-in-law and his son. They were not upon the field; he says in his report that they were absent by leave. Captain Rice, a distinguished lawyer of Nashville, attended him as volunteer aide. Rice told me that when he and Donelson came over the hill in that part of the battle field in which the Sixteenth Regiment was fighting, "the regiment was engaged with the forces coming up the river from the Round Forest;" and that Donelson, seeing a lot of men lying upon the ground between the railroad and the turnpike, near where the Hazen Monument now stands, called his attention to them, and said "Look there. Those men are skulkers. Go and order them to join Colonel Savage, who is fighting down the river." Rice says he galloped over to where the men were lying and found them all dead, dressed in perfect line of battle, that he galloped back and said, "General, these men are not skulkers. They are dead men." He said the general shook all over and the tears ran down his cheeks. I told him that he ought to report these facts. He said no, he was only a volunteer aide and had no right to report, and that Donelson would be offended by it.

Donelson's report, while there is some truth in it, is misleading; the whole truth is not told and it is a thing which often occurs in military affairs when an officer reports such occurrences as are favorable to him and suppresses those which cast a shadow upon his reputation.

SAVAGE'S OPINION OF BRAGG AS A GREAT GENERAL.

Bragg, in Savage's opinion, was not the kind of man out of which to make a great general. Savage rode some distance near Bragg in the Sequatchie Valley when on his raid to Kentucky close enough to get a good look at him; and knowing that his life and lives of his men were in his keeping, he tried to form an opinion as to what manner of man Bragg was and his capacity to win victories. He saw nothing in Bragg to impress him with the opinion that Bragg was a great general. He did not look like a conqueror and hero. Savage thought that he wore the appearance of a broken merchant, or disgraced preacher flying from the wrath of his congregation, accused of immoral conduct. Savage recently saw what he supposed to be a first-class portrait of Bragg in the narrative of Joseph E. Johnston. This caused him to remember Aristotle's doctrine as illustrated by men of science to estimate character, talent and the disposition of men by an inspection of their Physiognomy. In this portrait there is none of the grandeur, strength and confidence of the lion. His face was not a lion's face and his history shows that he was not lion-hearted. There is none of the cruel ferocity of the Bengal tiger apparent in his countenance. There is none of the cunning of the fox nor the rapacity of the wolf. To make a great general out of a man with such a face as Bragg had would amount to a miracle. Men with such a face as Bragg had are incapable of making great generals. The faculty of judging men by their faces is in constant use. We do not select a dull, stupid fellow for a lawyer or doctor, or a man with an evil countenance for our friend or servant.

SAVAGE RESIGNS.

After the battle of Murfreesboro Savage resigned as colonel of the Sixteenth. This resignation, while regretted, was approved by military men and was in strict accord with

the opinion and conduct of officers who have been treated unjustly by the Government or their commanders. That there was a deliberate design to insult and humiliate Savage is proved beyond doubt by undisputed facts. That Harris dreaded Savage and did what he could to injure him, politically, before the war, and worked to prevent his promotion in the army is proved by the letter of Major Faulkner, which is as follows:

H. H. Faulkner, major of the Sixteenth Regiment, wrote me a letter stating that "while Savage was under arrest at Pocatalligo, S. C., General Donelson read him a letter from I. G. Harris, in which Harris wrote, 'he had his foot on Savage's neck and he should never be promoted.'" If Savage had been promoted he would not be alive to-day.

The person appointed brigadier-general by Davis at the request of Harris held no office in the army; he was employed in the conscript service. Savage considered him very poor material out of which to make a good soldier. His conduct as brigadier at Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge appears to have lost him the respect of his brigade and the confidence of his commanders, as he was put upon post duty the balance of the war. (See Colonel Anderson's report of his conduct upon the battle field at Chickamauga, *War of the Rebellion*.) He took Harris' son on his staff when in command of Donelson's brigade.

There were other considerations besides the injustice and wrong done Savage as an officer that made him think it his duty to resign. At Perryville he had been ordered to attack the enemy's line of battle under fire of a battery with no Confederate supporting force of any kind in sight, and broke the enemy's line and held it for thirty minutes before any support came, losing one hundred and ninety-nine men, more than any regiment in Bragg's army lost. At Murfreesboro he had been sent as the right of Bragg's attacking force to attack the enemy's line of battle, assailed by three batteries in front and the whole left wing of the Yankee

army assailing his right flank, losing more than half of his regiment. He will leave his readers to form their opinion as to whether these orders were intended as a compliment to the Sixteenth Regiment and its colonel, or resulted from a reckless disregard of his life.

Another reason—Savage's military experience taught him that the war was a failure, that it would end in defeat and that the end was a mere question of time, not far distant, and that the officers causing men to be killed in battle from that time onward were little better than murderers. Ignorance alone can excuse them. If Savage had entertained any hope of success he would have remained in the army notwithstanding the wrongs done him. He was not willing to have compliments paid him at the expense of the life of his soldiers; he believed it best for the lives of the men of the Sixteenth that he should not command them. The reports show that after he resigned the death list of the men was small to what it was while he led them in battle.

'POSSUM SUPPER.

When Bragg's army was occupying Missionary Ridge, Savage was at Marietta, and was invited by the quartermasters and commissaries to partake of a 'possum supper. After the supper he was called upon to say what he thought of Bragg's position on Missionary Ridge. He replied: "If I was Mr. Lincoln if my generals didn't capture or drive him in defeat from Missionary Ridge within ten days I would cashier them." Soon thereafter at the breakfast table they informed Savage that Mr. Davis had passed during the night to Bragg's headquarters on Missionary Ridge. Savage said: "He will promptly remove Bragg and his army from Missionary Ridge." On the second morning thereafter they informed Savage that Mr. Davis passed during the night and that Bragg was still on Missionary Ridge. Savage replied: "I now say that Mr. Davis is as big a fool and no better soldier than Bragg, and that unless

Davis and Bragg are removed and a dictator appointed with power to reorganize the Government and the army, the conquest of the South will be certain."

CHAPTER XII.

SAVAGE A CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESS.

When Rosecrans advanced upon Bragg at Tullahoma Savage retired through the mountains to Chattanooga. He declared himself a candidate for Congress in the Confederate Congress. In his speeches he criticised severely General Bragg and his military policy. Among other things, he said that General Bragg had the reputation of being a great general and it was not his purpose now to deny it, but he would say that if General Bragg was a farmer the eagles and the owls would catch all his turkeys, the hawks and the 'possums would catch all his chickens, the minks and the coons would eat all his ducks, the foxes would catch his young pigs, the rabbits would bark his apple trees, and he would never know how to set a trap, snare or deadfall to catch one of them.

Savage and his friends believe that he was elected but was counted out by Harris and his gang. It was circulated and reported that Savage, if elected would introduce a bill to end the war by maintaining the supremacy of the white man and to set the negro free with compensation to his owner. To prevent this Harris, with his political opinions, would have thought it right to count Savage out of his election. It was also circulated that Savage was in favor of reorganization of the army and the Government from the President down.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE WAR AS WAGED BY LINCOLN AND SHERMAN.

A sentence is quoted from a letter from General Sherman addressed to Lieutenant-general Grant, dated Kingston, Ga.,

October 11, 1864: "I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city; send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea." Now here is war presented in a spirit of hell-born cruelty that deserves the universal curse of all soldiers and just men. Nothing appearing in the history of the Huns, the Goths and the Vandals equals it. Nothing appearing in the history of the Indian wars with the Americans approaches in cruelty and inhumanity these hell-born sentiments of Tecumseh Sherman. Here is a deliberate purpose expressed to drive the old and the young, the women and the children from their homes from Atlanta to Chattanooga; also a purpose to drive the old men and old women and the young children from their homes and to destroy by fire the homes of the people in one of the most important towns in the State of Georgia; and this act was accomplished without any apparent military necessity. No such act of cruelty can be found in the history of the noble Indian chief, Tecumseh, nor of any other Indian chief at war with the whites. If the noble Indian chief had been requested or ordered to assist in burning Atlanta he would have replied: "No, sir. I war with brave men, not with the old, worn-out warriors, or with women and children. The Great Spirit will not allow the warrior to insult the old or to war with women and children."

Lincoln had the right to prohibit Sherman from carrying on the war in this lawless and cruel manner, and is to be held responsible in history jointly with Sherman before the people of the United States and of the world for the barbaric cruelty inflicted upon the old men and women and the children of the States of Georgia and South Carolina. When General Scott invaded Mexico, no private property was taken, no man's home insulted, or his women or children insulted or alarmed. No country was laid waste, no

private property confiscated. General Scott bought from the Mexicans all the supplies necessary to subsist his army. This was better for Scott's army and better for the Mexicans than Sherman's hell-born policy to smash and desolate the country with fire and sword, allowing his soldiers to rob all classes of people. When peace was made between the United States and Mexico it was agreed that each party should release all prisoners, and General Scott had but one prisoner to release, who was a camp follower of the army charged with burglary in entering the house of a gentleman in the City of Mexico.

THE WAR OF LINCOLN AND SHERMAN IN WARREN AND WHITE COUNTIES, TENNESSEE.

Frank Marchbanks, son of Judge Marchbanks, was a member of Captain Daniel T. Brown's company, raised in White County. He had read law and settled at Sparta to practice his profession. He was transferred from the Sixteenth Regiment to the cavalry. He was at the house of James Sparkman, a Union man who lived near Rock Island, when a squad of Stokes' cavalry appeared. He fled and was captured trying to cross the Caney Fork River, carried some mile or two up the river and shot by this squad of cavalry. Sparkman conveyed his body to his Grandmother Savage, who had it buried in the McMinnville graveyard. John H. Savage erected a monumental slab over him and called upon his mother to make the epitaph. She said, "Murdered by Stokes' Cavalry." And it is so written on his tombstone. She said: "John, I do not like the Yankees and never expect to like them. They commenced an unjust war to conquer and degrade the Southern people and set the ignorant negro free. They killed my son at the battle of Murfreesboro. For this I make no complaint. They

NOTE.—*Frank Marchbanks*: Statement of J. C. Ramer, I Tom Moffitt, and Mrs. Savage.

murdered my grandchild, Frank Marchbanks, after he had surrendered and was a prisoner. They insulted and robbed non-combatants, old and young. They took everything they could lay their hands on except the land, and would have taken that if they could have carried it away. They preferred to rob and steal from women and children to meeting Southern soldiers in battle. Their flag represents usurpation, robbery, stealing, bloodshed and murder."

J. Firm Morford says: "A man named Hennessee was shot and killed in front of Colville's store. He was the son of Arch Hennessee. There were five others shot and killed down by the Rowan House, and their bodies were thrown on a wagon and hauled through town. One of them was named Coppinger. I do not know the names of the others. A squad of Yankees, called 'Ricket's' men, fired the town and burned a considerable part of the West End."

J. C. Ramsey reports that a squad of Yankees carried Silas Ballard, a member of the Sixteenth Regiment, by his house on the Smithville road with a bayonet in his mouth, and it was reported to him that they had killed him and that he never saw Ballard afterwards.

CHAPTER XIV.

SAVAGE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

The Constitution of the United States is nothing more or less than a contract between the people of the different States. The people made the States and the Constitution and can alter or abolish them at will. If either party to a contract nullifies and breaks it, by universal law the other party is released and not bound to maintain it.

That the Northern people were the first to violate and nullify the Constitutional contract must appear in history


NOTE.—Cortes, the conqueror of Mexico, hanged one of his men for robbing a native of two fowls. (See Prescott's *History of the Conquest of Mexico*, page 168.)

as a fact settled beyond doubt. That Northern men and politicians in pursuit of official stations, wealth and power brought on the war and are responsible for all the loss of property and life, and the misery and poverty of the women and children of the South and North is certain beyond doubt. But for the wrongful and unconstitutional attempt to abolish African slavery in violation of the Constitution, the South would have remained contented in the Union. No contract or agreement between men or nations is perpetual. No human government is immortal. The right to abolish or reform a government is inalienable and a right higher than all governments or constitutions. The South had the right but did not have the might, and Davis, Harris and Calhoun should have employed their time and talents in studying the art of war and preparing arms, rations and war materials and drilling and organizing soldiers before *rebellion*, called *secession*, began.

CHAPTER XV.

LOSS IN MEXICAN AND CIVIL WARS COMPARED.

Three hundred and eighty-three officers of General Scott's command were killed in the valley of Mexico. (Ladd's *War with Mexico*, page 256.) The loss of officers in the Mexican war was much greater than the loss of officers in the Civil War, compared to the losses of men in the Civil War, which speaks well for the courage and patriotism of the soldiers and casts a cloud upon the officers selected and appointed by Davis and Harris. In the Civil War the honor of the men ranks higher than the honor of the officers.



JOHN H. SAVAGE,
1908.

John H. Savage's Life After the War.

CHAPTER I.

SAVAGE RETURNED TO TENNESSEE AFTER THE WAR.

Savage was slow to return. It required a pass from the military to travel on the railroad. Savage waited until he could travel without a pass. He had lived twenty-five years at Smithville. His mother and father lived near McMinnville. The negroes had all left the farm. The stock and provisions were 'most all taken by the Home Guard and Yankee soldiers. He changed his office to McMinnville and soon had a paying practice. He declined to discuss political questions. His advice was to submit quietly; that the enemies of the South had political and military organization not to be offended or resented at this time; that any manifestation of life in the Southern people would be made a pretext for hostile legislation and control by the military forces of the United States. In time this organization will divide, when the South could claim her rights.

SAVAGE A REBEL, NEVER A SECESSIONIST.

He has always cherished the memory of his Revolutionary ancestors as they appear in the English and American histories. The greatest men and the brightest names that adorn the pages of English and American history, were rebels. The Hampdens, the Cromwells, Russells and Sudneys were rebels. The Bruces, Wallaces and the Emmetts were rebels, and are the brightest names in the history of Scotland and Ireland. Washington, Franklin, Jefferson and the signers of the Declaration of Independence and the majority of the people of the Colonies in 1776, were rebels.

Savage prefers to be classed with the best men appearing in the English and American histories and is unwilling to be counted as belonging to the party of Secessionists, represented by Calhoun, Jeff Davis and others.

CHAPTER II.

JOHNSON, MAYNARD AND SAVAGE AT SPARTA IN 1872.

In 1872 Savage, suffering in health from exposure during the war and hard labor before the courts, concluded to go to Hot Springs, Ark., to rest. Robertson, the father-in-law of General Cheatham, came aboard the train at Belbuckle and said that General Cheatham would be a candidate for Congress, to be elected by the State at large. Savage replied that he thought it would be unfortunate for General Cheatham and his friends, that he would regret to see him and Johnson meet upon the stump. Robertson replied that Johnson was under too many obligations to General Cheatham to run against him. Savage replied: "No obligations would bind Johnson. When Coriolanus led a conquering army of the Volci to the gates of Rome the senate requested his mother to use her influence to prevent his entrance into the city. His mother met him at the gate and said: 'If you dare to enter this gate, the first step you take shall be upon your mother's womb.' He replied: 'Mother you have saved Rome; you have lost your son.' Johnson would tread upon hundreds of wombs if they stood in the way of his ambition. He is sure to be a candidate and there is no man in the State prepared to meet him successfully in debate or on the stump. Brown and Bate ought to meet him, but they are rivals for promotion and are not willing to array Johnson's friends against them. I have been engaged in war and in lawsuits since 1859, and could not in justice to my past record meet Johnson. If I had two or three months to refresh my remembrance of facts and arguments I should be glad to meet Mr. Johnson, but I want no office and do

not expect to ever be a candidate for anything. Bate and Brown are aspirants and the burden of the battle should be on them."

Savage, upon his return, was asked to take a part in the canvass, which he declined. He said it was not his fight and it would be humiliating to General Cheatham and his friends; that he should have nothing to do with Johnson, unless he entered the mountain country once represented by Savage in Congress. Johnson published appointments to speak at Alexandria, Cookeville, Carthage, Sparta, McMinnville and other places.

Savage appeared at Alexandria and sent a message to Johnson for a division of time, which he declined to give. When the crowd had assembled and Johnson was ready to begin speaking Savage announced to the crowd Johnson's refusal to divide time, and said he was not there to interrupt but would reply after Johnson had concluded. He did not follow Johnson to Carthage. It being too late to cross the Cumberland River before dark he went directly to Cookeville. Learning that Maynard would be there he addressed the people before dinner, and Maynard and Johnson spoke after dinner.

All three appeared at Sparta next morning. Savage sent General Dibrell with a message for a division of time, which they declined to grant. He sent General Dibrell with another message proposing that Johnson, Maynard and Savage should go together to their platform, and that Savage should open with a speech of thirty minutes, and give way to Johnson and Maynard; and after they had concluded he would reply if it suited him, and if this proposition was not accepted he would put his foot upon their platform and speak as long as he pleased and Johnson and Maynard couldn't get him off until he chose to quit. A platform had been prepared for Johnson's and Maynard's speeches by their friends.

As General Dibrell went to Johnson's room Maynard

came to the door of the hotel. Savage repeated to him the message sent by General Dibrell, and said: "Mr. Maynard, I know nothing in your past history that would require me to treat you otherwise than as if you were a gentleman, if you will allow me to do so." Maynard said: "Hold, let me see Johnson." He came back and said: "Your proposition is accepted."

They all appeared on the platform together. Savage spoke as follows:

"Fellow Citizens: The newspapers report that Andrew Johnson in all his speeches was saying—

'Come one! come all!
This rock shall fly
From its firm base
As soon as I.'

"It was the Government of the Confederate States that failed—not the people.

"I requested a division of time at his appointment at Alexandria, which he refused, and I spoke after him. He and Maynard spoke at Cookeville. I spoke before dinner and they spoke after dinner.

"The South fought for principle; the North fought for power and plunder. We fought for independence; you fought to conquer and rule us. We fought for the right to govern ourselves; you for the power to tax us without our consent. We fought that the white man, whose aspirations are onward and upward, should rule the land that under his care had grown great; you fought to deliver us to the custody of the negro, whose instincts and inclinations are to ignorance and degradation. We fought that our country might be ruled by intelligent freemen, the descendants of Revolutionary sires; you fought that it might be ruled by ignorant slaves, descended from a race whose history for four thousand years, has added nothing to art or

science, morality, liberty, virtue, and whose attempts at self-government have been monstrous and diabolical failures—the brightest pages of whose history are his slavery in the South.

"It is a historical truth and a moral certainty—as reliable as the laws of nature or the return of the season—that the white men and black men will not live together peaceably in the Southern States as equals. The irrepressible conflict has been on for thirty years or more, and in violation of the Constitution for almost an age—and will continue to grow greater for years to come. Neither armies nor the civil power will be able to keep the peace, or to prevent robbery, rape, thefts, roguery, murders, conflicts, riots and general disorders. Such a condition may be neither peace nor war yet worse than either. Nobody will accumulate wealth or rise to eminence.

"The greatest of all tyrants is a usurping crowd. You represent the bloody military policy of Lincoln when he declared: 'This Government can't stand one-half free and the other half slaves.' Like all usurpers he said one thing and did another: pretending to respect the Constitutional rights of the South, and hypocritically pretending to love the Union, he violated the Constitution and did what was most certain to bring revolution and war.

"To-day I asked a division of time, which they refused. I then proposed to occupy their platform for thirty minutes, and then give way to them, and unless they accepted this proposition I would put my foot on their platform and speak as long as I pleased and they could not get me off. They accepted this proposition and I now have thirty minutes to address you. I have an indictment of twenty-three counts against Johnson and Maynard upon all of which they are guilty, which I will now read to you.

"Now I stand before you to read the indictment of twenty-three counts of high political crimes and misdemeanors, in

which I arraign Andrew Johnson as chief criminal, and Horace Maynard as high accessory before and after the fact. In the time allotted me I cannot do more than read these charges, which I believe the people wish to hear answered, and after Johnson and Maynard are through, if you will hear me, I will prove the truth of every one of them, and show you that no citizen of Tennessee ought to sustain either of the honorable gentlemen:

"1. I charge that General Andrew Johnson taught the people, before the war, that the Federal Government was limited and had no power to coerce a State, but that when he took a notion to ride behind Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency, he taught the North a different doctrine, claiming that they had the right to hang every man, woman and child in the Southern States.

"2. When he now comes to preach to us that the South brought on the war and that the South alone is guilty, and the North innocent, he is entitled to no respect, and states that which the most ignorant man in Tennessee knows to be untrue.

"3. That Lincoln's administration cost the country thirty-three hundred millions of dollars—more than double the value of the slave property in America at the commencement of the war.

"4. That Andrew Johnson spent in his administration about sixteen hundred millions of dollars—about as much as the entire slave property in America was worth before the war—and yet he says he is honest and never stole anything (but we have only his word for that).

"5. That Andrew Johnson spent about as much money in four years as was spent by all the Presidents from Washington to Lincoln.

"6. That there is yet unpaid a debt of about twenty-two hundred millions of dollars—one-third more in value than the value of all the slaves in the country before the war.

"7. That if we owned the slaves now, and should mort-

gage them to pay the debt yet unpaid, they could not pay it in a hundred years, if at all.

"8. To pay this debt, we will require to mortgage all the people of the United States and hold them as hirelings for the next fifty years.

"9. That we are not now living under the Government of our fathers, except in form. The spirit of liberty breathed into it by our forefathers has departed, and it is rapidly becoming consolidated and becoming a Government of bankers, bondholders and bayonets.

"10. No living man in America is so much responsible for this result as Andrew Johnson.

"11. That Andrew Johnson, like the Oracle of Delphi, has never spoken the honest truth to the people, but has always talked to them with a forked tongue.

"12. That Andrew Johnson is neither a good man nor a great statesman. He has borne no good fruits. He is one who *with his mouth draweth nigh* unto the people, and calls them with his lips, but his heart is filled with ambition and tyranny, and he has always trampled people and Constitution alike under his feet, when they stood in the line of his advancement.

"13. That his decree of September 30, 1864, as military governor of Tennessee, by which all his political opponents were disfranchised, was an act of power, tyranny and oppression such as no king or emperor of Europe has committed in the last five hundred years, and it is only equalled by the deed of Caligula, Nero, and the other despots of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire.

"14. That he was the real author and executor of the disfranchisement act of Tennessee, by which one hundred thousand of our best citizens were civilly destroyed, and driven from the polls.

"15. That without law he destroyed the governments, constitutions and laws of the Southern States, and appointed carpetbaggers to rob and reign over them.

"16. That he has spent his life in abusing class legislation, yet his misnamed amnesty proclamation divides the poor Rebels into fifteen different classes.

"17. In setting aside the Sherman-Johnson treaty, he violated a solemn contract and understanding between warring States, and is the real author of all the woes inflicted upon the South since the war. Such a breach of faith is worse than a thousand perjuries.

"18. That his misnamed amnesty act was a cruel and cunning political device by which he attempted to confiscate and appropriate to his own political use the intellect and property of the South, and make them his political slaves.

"19. That his oft-repeated declarations made before and after he was President, that 'traitors must be punished and impoverished, their property confiscated, their social power destroyed and public opinion so moulded as to put them down in the judgment of the world' is a sentiment so cruel and inhuman as to be without parallel in history. It is only for writers of fiction for such extreme wickedness to be imagined.

"20. That he opposed your penitentiary system for thirty years without making more than one practical suggestion or substitute for it, and that one is of such character that any man approving it ought to be sent to the penitentiary for life.

"21. That he hanged Mrs. Surratt in violation of the common law of England and America, and the Constitution of the United States and every State in the Union. His friends may plead for mercy, but he is without defense. If I had him before an honest jury of whites, with Judge Fite, or any other able judge of Tennessee, with the question of venue waived, I could hang him as easy as I hanged John Presswood for the murder of Mrs. Billings.

"22. That he is neither a first nor a second Washington. His name cannot be written among those of great and good men of the world. He must take his place in history among

demagogues and tyrants who have flattered, deceived and betrayed mankind. Pistratus, Caligula, Nero, Robespierre, Danton, Titus Oates and such characters are his compeers in history.

"23. He is a man 'whose character is marked by every act which may define a tyrant, and is unfit to be ruler of a free people,' or to represent Tennessee in Congress.

"Gentlemen, these are the charges I make against Andrew Johnson. He has been attempting to bolster up his sinking reputation by grasping at every office within his reach, but in this case he will fail and he is bound to be sent to his home in Greenville.

"The time allotted to me has expired, but if you will stay and hear my rejoinder, I promise you I will sustain every count in this indictment."

Mr. Maynard followed Colonel Savage in a two hours' speech, and he was followed by Mr. Johnson in a speech of equal length.

The people remained. Savage made his rejoinder. The people applauded. Flowers were presented.

Johnson and Maynard received but few votes in Savage's old Congressional district.

CHAPTER III.

SAVAGE AND HARRIS.

While the Sixteenth Regiment was at Trousdale for discipline a member of the Legislature, then in session, paid the camp a Sunday visit and asked Savage his opinion as to the preparations being made by Harris and his military boards to meet the enemy successfully in battle. Savage replied that Harris was a politician and knew nothing of war practically or historically; that he dodged the Seminole war and preferred a seat in the State Senate to fighting in the Mexican war; that it was a great error to take from the people their squirrel rifles and shot guns, that such weapons

against an army with minie rifles, Springfield muskets and rapid firing artillery would be to send good, brave men to certain death and destruction; that a force thus armed would have little more chance to achieve victories than the naked Aztecs with bows and arrows had against the firearms and artillery of General Cortes, who often destroyed thousands of them without losing a man. Savage supposes that the member of the Legislature reported this talk to Harris. Savage never saw Harris during the war after the regiment was ordered to West Virginia. Harris was never present as aide to commanding generals at any battle in which the Sixteenth Regiment was engaged while Savage was in command. Savage often said hard things of Harris during the war to mutual friends, hoping to get a reply that would authorize him to demand of Harris a personal satisfaction. If Harris made any reply it did not come to the knowledge of Savage during the war.

After the war and after Harris' return to the United States General Dunlap, who was comptroller when Harris was governor, called upon Savage and asked him to make friends with Harris. Savage replied: "I consider Harris a man without truth or honor. I should dread his pretended friendship much more than his open enmity. You know as well as I that he has acted the rascal with me and done me all the injury he could. I want nothing to do with him." General Dunlap a second time called upon Savage to make friends with Harris, and got an answer in purport the same as that given in the first interview. There was a public meeting at Nashville, when Dunlap again called on Savage a third time and said: "Harris is here and I wish you would make friends with him. He talks to me and I feel bad about it, and says he would speak to you only he is afraid you would insult him." Savage replied: "I am making no war on Harris, but are you not carrying this thing a good way? Is there anything in my past history that would authorize the conclusion that I would insult the man

who would address me civilly?" The general dodged away in the crowd and soon Harris made his appearance, bowing and offering his hand. Harris immediately began an explanation. Harris humbled himself to get clear of Savage's opposition to him if he should be a candidate. Savage said to Harris: "No explanation. Nothing that you could say would alter my opinion of your conduct in the past. If what I said to General Dunlap meant anything it meant only that I would not insult you if you spoke to me civilly. *Good morning,*" and they parted.

Bate and Harris were candidates for electors in 1876 before the Democratic Convention in Nashville. Bate was elected over Harris in the first place by a large majority. Harris made a crying speech, after the model of Mark Antony over the dead body of Caesar, and the convention in sympathy nominated him for the second place. He went to Memphis and wrote a letter stating that there were objections to his nomination, and stating his great kindness and sympathy for the negro in language which would please abolitionists, and commenced an active canvass of the State for United States Senator.

James E. Bailey was also a candidate for the United States Senate, and having voted for the objectionable railroad bonds and having canvassed the State in his interest as a candidate for Senator, apparently he had concentrated the railroads and the bondholders in his favor. To counteract and take from Bailey the bondholders and the railroads Harris went to Clarksville, Bailey's home and stronghold, and made a speech in which he said: "Fellow Citizens: Your State debt is a mere bagatelle, no more compared to mal-administrations at Washington than is the wound of a mosquito bite to the wound of a cannon ball. Tennessee will be forever disgraced if she offers the bondholders one cent less than dollar for dollar and six per cent interest," and thus Harris by robbing Bailey became the champion of the bondholders and the railroads. There yet remained an-

other difficulty to be removed before he could become United States Senator. The Republican party stood solid against him and something had to be done to conciliate them. This was accomplished by betraying the Democratic party and doing more to give credit and standing to the Republican party than Maynard and his colleagues could have done in ten years.

He said in his speeches during the campaign: "Fellow Citizens: If I had been Abraham Lincoln I would have conquered the South if it had cost me the last dollar and the last man;" and when the Legislature met to elect a Senator the Republican party was solid for Harris. From that time so long as the Senator lived he was in league with the Republicans and got his share of the spoils, no matter which party was in power.

When Wright and Wilson ran for governor and Hawkins was elected, Harris took an active part in electing to the Legislature his men, called high tax men, and it was the Harris men who aided Hawkins to pass the 100-3 bill; which Harris advocated and approved, and which the Supreme Court of Tennessee declared null and void.

Savage was satisfied that political aspirants, Harris and others, would never allow the debt to be settled at 33 1-3 cents, because of the credit and power which it would give Savage with the people. Upon a careful calculation he believed that a settlement at 50-3 would be better for the people than a settlement at 33 1-3 at 6 per cent.

In February, 1882, he made a speech at Sparta advising the high tax men to quit talking about 50-4, which was a disgraced number beaten by the people's thirty thousand votes. They should select another number higher or lower than 50-4 and he would advise any gentleman who wanted to air his eloquence to advocate 50-3. He caused extracts from this speech to be published in Western papers, and it was favorably received and became a low tax Savage-Bate platform upon which Bate was nominated and elected.

Savage said to his friends that he should declare himself a candidate for the United States Senate to force Harris to make low tax speeches; that if Harris would abandon all his past professions and crawl down upon the low tax Savage-Bate platform he could do good service by bringing his high tax following to support 50-3 and thereby help beat Hawkins. If he would do this in good faith it would help to settle the State debt question and he would be Senator; if he failed to make low tax speeches Savage would be the Senator. To carry out this policy Savage called on Harris at his room at the Maxwell and said to him: "I understand you leave for Washington in the morning. I thought it right to let you know before you left that I am a candidate for the United States Senate. As I understand your record as Senator, if ever you have done any good for the Democratic party or the people it has not come to my knowledge. I think the best thing I can do for the people is to beat you if I can, and I now propose that we shall agree upon a list of appointments for a public discussion of the difference between us upon State and national policies. I shall treat you with the respect due the high office you are now holding, and propose that the discussions between us shall be conducted upon a plane, high or low, as shall best please you." Harris declined making joint appointments.

Savage made two speeches criticising Harris and forwarding them to him in Washington, writing him a letter stating that he didn't consider it fair to be discussing him in his absence, and requesting him to fix out a list of appointments at which they could meet face to face before the people. In reply, he wrote he was unwilling to meet Savage in a joint debate before the people.

Before the adjournment of Congress Harris and Senator Howell E. Jackson published a list of appointments for a joint debate between them commencing at Erin, Harris taking the low tax platform and Jackson the high tax platform.

This was done to prevent Savage from meeting Harris. After a few speeches the joint discussion between them was discontinued at Harris' request, upon the ground that the discussion endangered his election to the United States Senate. Harris abandoned all that he had once taught and repeated the arguments and speeches of Wilson, Snodgrass and Thompson.

A few days before the election for Senator, Savage was walking the streets with a gentleman and Sam Donelson, and spoke to Sam as a friend concerning the election. The gentleman sought an opportunity to halt Savage and let Donelson pass on. He said to Savage: "That was a great mistake of yours to talk to Sam Donelson as you did; he is no friend of yours. I was with him in Harris' room a few nights since and heard the bargain between them." Harris told Donelson what men he (Donelson) could influence and what men he wanted him to bring to his room, and wanted him to be on hand all the time and to bring such men as he thought could be influenced by Harris' talk; and if he would do this and he (Harris) was elected Senator within the next six months, he (Donelson) would find himself in a paying office in the city of Washington. Harris kept his promise and Donelson got the office and others afterwards. I give this as one instance of the methods used by Harris to continue himself and followers in official station, and it may be said that Harris was industrious and spent his time to get positions to reward his followers. It may also be truly said that he was very successful in finding places for them. He was on good terms with the Republicans; they favored him and he favored them, and by this means was able to get more positions for his followers than he could otherwise have done. It may be said in his favor that he divided the spoils fairly among his friends according to their merit, manifested by devotion to Harris. It may be said to his discredit, that the bigger the rascal—so that

he was able and cunning and devoted to Harris—the more certain was his chance to get a good office.

Harris' followers seemed to have been conscious that his character as a soldier and a brave man needed a little whitewashing, and fictitious articles published in the press have described him as a fit leader for piratical crews and robber bands. They also seemed to think that his character for honesty needed a little whitewashing and have published through the press false statements in regard to his carrying, possessing and protecting the school funds of the State. Savage also in his open letter published charges against Harris, showing that he caused these falsehoods to be published, and his corrupt conduct in regard to the Pan-Electric Telephone Stock. Copies of this paper were sent Harris by editors and a reply requested, but none was ever received.

Harris also had an appointment to speak at McMinnville jointly with S. F. Wilson, who was considered one of Savage's best friends. Wilson didn't reach McMinnville in time. Harris came from Chattanooga and brought with him the attorney-general of that judicial district. Savage informed Harris' friends that he would hear him speak. Harris had been speaking a few minutes when Savage entered the crowd with a chair and took a seat in front of him. Harris immediately closed and the attorney-general took his place and addressed the crowd for three-quarters of an hour. till Wilson came. Whether the sight of Savage unnerved Harris or he became afraid of personal violence that caused him to quit speaking is not known. He was in no danger; Savage would have considered himself disgraced if he had allowed Harris to be insulted or injured at his home.

Savage was no enemy of Harris. He disapproved, hated and despised what he considered the dishonest methods and unprincipled political policy of Harris.