Civil War Defenses of Washington Historic Resource Study

Supplies

The acquisition of supplies and equipment became more difficult as the Civil War progressed due to the great numbers required and the financial restraints imposed to prevent fraud. Various branches of the Army–Engineers, Quartermaster, Commissary of Subsistence, Ordnance, Signal Corps, Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry–acquired and procured supplies and equipment used on and in the defenses of Washington, D.C. Some supplies and equipment could only be used by one branch while in some instances one branch procured items that would be mostly used by another. Chief Engineer Joseph G. Totten, Corps of Engineers, informed the Secretary of War on August 5, 1861, that "no contracts have been made by this Department since the 4th of March last and that no military supplies have been purchased since that date except Intrench tools, wheel barrows, sand bags, shovels, spades, picks, &c, &c required for the hasty construction of Intrenchments for the defences of Washington" and the necessary "purchases were made in the market here at reasonable prices, wherever found for sale, or they could be manufactured by citizens of known loyalty to the Union without practicality or other regard to persons" but the bulk was "being supplied by the wholesale hardware establishments of E.M. Lithicum & Co. of Georgetown, and Campbell and Son of Washington, and, to the extent of their ability, by the retail houses of Sibley & Guy, L.L. Savage & Co., and others of Washington." [111]

To do all the construction and maintenance on the Civil War Defenses of Washington, a variety of tools, building materials and miscellaneous other items were necessary. Although the army cut down acres and acres of timber, additional lumber was required. Thus, a Moses A. Commins submitted a bill for 1096 hardwood trees 14 inches in diameter at $2.50 each for a total of $2,740. On September 18, 1862, J.T. Lenman reported that he had lumber on hand as required. William McLean, on September 16, 1862, wrote that he could furnish lumber as required. In June 1863, Lt. Col. Alexander reported back to the Secretary of War that timber cut from Mr. S.R. Colby's land near forts Stevens and Slocum "was done to open a view for our guns" and that some of it was used in construction of forts and that the owners should be paid, but there was no authority to do so. Special Orders No. 18, August 27, 1863, attempted to alleviate this problem by ordering that no timber would be cut "for the express purpose of construction without first referring the circumstances to the general commanding." Further, wherever timber is required for construction "an arrangement must be made with the owner thereof " or the property must belong to a "known Secessionist" and "authority must have been obtained from the general commanding to enter upon such property." On August 31, 1864, Samuel Strong offered to sell timber to the Engineer Department and upon request, he wrote that he would sell it for "50 cents per lineal foot." [112]

The Engineers didn't need to purchase stone because they quarried it at Cloud's Mill dam on the right of the Leesburg turnpike about two miles in front of Fort Ward and at Fort Totten to be used on the fortifications and in some of the buildings used. Edward Sowers reported on September 16, 1862, that he couldn't furnish the roofing presently required. Johns & Crosley, though, submitted requested information relative to supplying "gutta percha cement roofing" on November 24, 1862. The commander of the 1st Maine Heavy Artillery, on May 9, 1864, received instructions to get nails from the regimental quartermaster "to put up the Stables at Fort Simmons." [113]

Barnard requested that the Engineers pay Richard Cruickshank, Esq., 50 cents each for 685 gabions used at forts Ethan Allen, Marcy, and others. Tens of thousands of sand bags were procured. Captain E.L. Hartz, in October 1862, submitted invoices and receipts for 24 grindstones. In May 1861, one regiment "hired on its own account, out of private means, some wagons to procure its supplies." In July 1862, the engineers in the defenses spent $13.35 for stationery while for August and September, the cost was $43.70. [114]

A major expense was tools for constructing and maintaining the defenses of Washington. E.M. Lithicum, in October 1862, informed Barnard that he did not have as many sledges as required but he would order more from Baltimore. Barnard requested the following tools on May 7, 1861: "1000 shovels, 500 Picks, 300 Axes, 200 ax handles, etc." On July 13, 1864, at the time of Jubal Early's raid, Barnard exclaimed that entrenching tools were unobtainable in Washington, D.C. and recommended that 5000 shovels, 2000 picks, 5000 axes and 6000 handles be ordered from one of the northern cities. Through most of the war, the New York U.S. Engineer Agency, an engineer depot, in New York City had been supplying a great amount of tools. In addition, the Quartermaster Department furnished entrenching tools and for specific purposes, even the Ordnance Department had some. Despite these supply sources there were never enough entrenching tools. [115]

The engineers working on the defenses of Washington purchased much of the supplies and equipment that they used. Barnard reported on December 30, 1862, that $550,000. had already been expended on the defenses mainly for employment of a large number of civil assistants, superintendents, overseers, troops and laborers and the purchase of lumber and other materials required. The engineers, therefore had to keep ledgers of their purchases such as the following:

Certified Bills Sent to Mr. Eveleth, October 1862

Tools

To accomplish the work necessary to construct and maintain the defenses of Washington, a variety of tools were necessary. Author David V. Miller wrote that the defenses of Washington "were constructed by manual labor (some 3,000 men in 1862) using pick, shovel and heavy carpenter tools." On May 7, 1861, Barnard wrote that he desired "the following entrenching tools":1000 shovels, 500 Picks, 300 Axes, 200 ax handles, etc. On the same day, Barnard asked for shovels, picks, axes, axe handles, hand saws, cross cut saws, augurs and wheel barrows. Other tools frequently requested were spades, broad axes, sledge hammers, hatchets, drawing knives, crow bars, tape lines, and transits. [117]

The soldiers who worked on the Defenses of Washington, frequently mentioned the tools in their letters, memoirs, books and in regimental histories. In 1862, the First Maine Heavy Artillery Regiment quickly erected Fort Sumner with "the diligent use of axes in front, with the teams hauling timber, with pick and shovel, crosscut saw, broadax, and other tools which the Government furnished." Alfred Bellard wrote that " . . . the men are put to work with pick and shovel . . ." The Twenty-Seventh New York Infantry Regiment "put aside . . . drilling, and exchanged . . . guns for the pick and shovel." George Washington Beidelman, in September 1861, exclaimed "we have been exchanging the musket for the pick and shovel about every other day since, and will continue to do so, no doubt, until the work is finished, which will be soon." The Fifteenth New Jersey Volunteer Regiment was happy when " . . . a force of two hundred contrabands from North Carolina were sent to take our places in the ditches, and we willingly turned over to them our picks and shovels." The Sixteenth Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment, in September 1862, worked daily ". . . on a line of breast-works connecting the forts" and the regimental historian felt that "Many of them, reared on farms, had a natural propensity for digging holes and shoveling dirt, which had been fully satisfied by details to dig "sinks" and tent drains" but they " . . . were glad of a chance to exhibit their artistic qualities on something less degrading than a camp sink." [118]

One author wrote that when the Army crossed the Potomac into Northern Virginia on May 24, 1861, "an ample supply of intrenching tools" accompanied them. But Barnard reported that there was a "want of tools" and he "found the Sixty-ninth N. Y. S. M. halted in position, waiting for the arrival of the entrenching tools in order to commence the works of defense which had been projected by the U.S. Engineers." At the time of Jubal Early's raid on Washington, Barnard remarked that intrenching tools were unobtainable in Washington, D.C. [119]

Manuals

The West Point graduates and some of those who attended other military schools had taken military engineering, had some fortification drawing and possibly, had some practical experience in erecting them. A variety of Regular Army officers and men, and some volunteers, who had served in earlier wars, oversaw or actually constructed field fortifications. Others observed them in other countries as at least 150 U.S. Army officers had visited Europe between 1815 and 1861, some even witnessed fighting there. [120]

But, many of those officers and most of the enlisted men, who served in the Civil War had no experience with fortifications whatsoever. But, a variety of manuals and other technical literature were available. For an extensive list of mostly foreign language fortification manuals and other technical literature see pages 374-77 in Henry W. Halleck's Elements of Military Science, 1859 edition. Numerous pertinent British texts were extant and some officers used them. In 1861, when the war started, available fortification manuals published in the United States were: Louis von Buckholtz, On Infantry, Camp Duty, Field Fortification, and Coast Defence (Washington, DC: Selmar Siebert, 1860); Dennis Hart Mahan, A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification, with the General Outlines of the Principles Regulating the Arrangement, the Attack, and the Defense of Permanent Works (New York: Wiley & Long, 1836) and subsequent editions with the title A Treatise on Field Fortification, Containing Instructions on the Method of Laying Out, Constructing, Defending, and Attacking Intrenchments, With the General Outlines Also of the Arrangement, the Attack, and Defence of Permanent Fortifications in 184, 1856, and 1861; and Chapter II entitled "Field Fortification." in Henry D. Grafton's A Treatise on the Camp and March with Which Is Connected the Construction of Field Works and Military Bridges. With an Appendix of Artillery Ranges, &c. for Use of Volunteers and Militia in the United States (Boston: W.P. Fetridge and Co., 1854), pages 23-38; Chapter III. entitled "Fortifications." and Chapter XIV. entitled "Field Engineering" in Henry W. Halleck's Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles, &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, adapted to the use of Volunteers and Militia (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1846 & 1859), pages 61-87, 342-77; "Field Works" and shorter sections under other headings in Henry L. Scott, Military Dictionary: Comprising Technical Definitions; Information on Raising and Keeping Troops; Actual Service Including Makeshifts and Improved Material; and Law, Government, Regulation, and Administration Relating to Land Forces (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), pages 283-99; and Chapter IX, entitled "Field Fortifications." in Egbert L. Viele. Hand-book for Active Service; Containing Practical Instructions in Campaign Duties, for the Use of Volunteers (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), pages 92-148. [121]

As the war progressed, new works were available. Mahan's Field Fortification appeared in new editons. In James C. Duane's Manual for Engineer Troops (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862) there was Part II, "Rules for Conducting a Siege," pages 51-144; Part III, "School of the Sap," pages 147-204; Part IV, "Military Mining," pages 207-37; and Part V, "Construction of Batteries," pages 241-65. William P. Craighill's The Army Officer's Pocket Companion (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1863) included Article 98– "Field Works," pages 219-40. Even the Confederates, with poor supplies of paper, etc., published field fortification manuals such as Egbert L. Viele, Hand-Book of Field Fortifications and Artillery; Also Manual for Light and Heavy Artillery with Illustrations (Richmond, VA: J.W. Randolph, 1861). In addition, as had occurred before the war, technical articles on fortification appeared in periodicals such as "Fortification–Land Defences– Profiles," Army and Navy Journal, 1 (November 14, 1863), page 182; James R. Willett's "A Method of Determining a Plane of Defilement." United States Service Magazine 1 (June 1864), pages 618-21; and "The Defence of Field Works," in Army and Navy Journal, 2 (September 3, 1864), pages 20-21. Immediately after the war, still more technical literature appeared on field fortifications: Francis J. Lippitt, A Treatise on Intrenchments ( New York: D. Van Nostrand, Publisher, 1866); F.P.J. Piron, "The Systems of Fortification Discussed and Compared," United States Service Magazine, 5 (January 1866), pages 34-40 (February 1866), pages 108-14; (March 1866), pages 225-34; (April 1866), pages 328-32; and "Field Intrenchments," Army and Navy Journal, 6, (November 7, 1868), pages 184-85. [122]

Generally, the U.S. Army considered Mahan's Field Fortification as the official manual but officers consulted other publications at times. Major General Henry W. Halleck, an Army Engineer for many years who became commander-in-chief of Union forces in July 1862, wrote that Professor Mahan's Treatise on Field Fortification "is undoubtedly the very best work that has been written on field fortification, and every officer going into the field should supply himself with a copy," in both the 1846 and 1859 editions of his Elements of Military Science. [123]

Acquisition of Land

Margaret Leech, author of Reveille in Washington 1860-1865, in discussing the days following the Union's move across the Potomac River into Northern Virginia on May 24, 1861, wrote:

"The soldiers in the vicinity of Washington had at once begun the arduous labor of building earthworks. On both sides of the river, the farmers were ruined. Not only were their orchards and vegetable gardens trampled and their fields filled with tents, but the very face of their land was changed, as its soil was shifted into high mounds, and deep ditches." [124]

On December 10, 1861, Barnard wrote Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers, and, among other subjects, exclaimed:

"I should have mentioned, in connection with my statement of the amount actually expended, that the Treasury Department has advanced over $20,000 on account of the defenses of Washington, which should be refunded. I feel it my duty in this place to urge that Congress should take immediate measures to assess the land and other damages arising from these works and from the occupation of troops. In most cases the owners are ill able to bear temporarily the losses to which they have been subjected." [125]

Later, in his published 1871 report on the Defenses of Washington, Barnard elaborated on this terrible treatment of the land owners:

"OCCUPATION OF LANDS–The sites of the several works being determined upon, possession was at once taken, with little or no reference to the rights of the owners or the occupants of the lands–the stern law of "military necessity" and the magnitude of the public interests involved in the security of the nation's capital being paramount to every other consideration. In one case a church, and in several instances dwellings and other buildings were demolished, that the sites might be occupied by forts. Long lines of rifletrenches and military roads were located and constructed where the principles of defense or the convenience of communication required them, without regard to the cultivated fields or orchards through which they might pass. In addition to the ground immediately occupied by the defensive works, the lands in front for a distance of two miles were cleared of standing timber. At this work alone there were employed in the autumn of 1862 details of troops numbering from 2,000 to 3,000 men for a period of several weeks. The timber so cut down was used, so far as it was found to be suitable, in the construction of the forts, or for abattis.

The injuries thus inflicted upon the citizens living along the lines, in the destruction and use of private property, were in the aggregate very considerable, and there were probably individual cases of extreme hardship; but, however much these evils might be deplored, they could not be avoided. No compensation for such damages or occupation of lands was made or promised, nor was it even practicable to make an estimate of their pecuniary amount. In some instances a statement of the number of acres denuded of timber, and a general description of its kind and quality, and in others of the number and kind of trees cutdown, was given to the owners, upon request being made therefor, as a supposed basis for future indemnity by the Government; but no general system of estimating, damages was attempted." [126]

Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, commanding the Department of Northeastern Virginia, on May 29, 1861, wrote the Adjutant General's Office in Washington, D.C. reporting that, "The troops are occupying houses in some cases, and fields, and cutting wood for fuel. Shall not rent and compensation be paid? If so, funds are needed for that purpose . . ." That same day, McDowell wrote another message, also to the Adjutant General's Office, and begged that his message be sent on to the "General-in-Chief " stating that there were "rumors of outrages committed by volunteers in Alexandria" and testimonials of "several cases of trespass, depredations, and attempts at burglary" in Northern Virginia. Confederate Brigadier General P.G.T. Beauregard, commanding the Department of Virginia, on June 5, 1861, cited these Union depredations in an attempt to incite the "good People of the Counties of Loudoun, Fairfax, and Prince William to rally to the standard of your State and country, and by every means in your power compatible with honorable warfare to drive back and expel the invaders from your land." [127]

Even before Beauregard issued his plea, McDowell had already attempted to alleviate the situation by issuing General Orders, No. 4, on June 27, 1861. The order required that "Statements of the amount, kind, and value of all private property taken and used for Government purposes, and of the damage done in any way to private property by reason of the occupation of this section of the country by the U.S. troops, will, as soon as practicable, be made out and transmitted to department headquarters by the commanders of brigades and officers in charge of the several fortifications." Further, these "statements will, as far as possible, give the value of the property taken or of the damage sustained, and the name or names of the owners thereof. Citizens who have sustained any lessor damage as above will make their claims upon the commanding officers of the troops by whom it was done, or in cases where these troops have moved away, upon the commander nearest them." Additionally, the statements were to exhibit:

On July 18, McDowell issued General Orders, No. 18, reiterating his orders for the "preservation of the property of the inhabitants of the district occupied by the troops under his command." His troops had committed additional depredations and he felt the "deepest mortification." The order provided that commanders of regiments select an officer as provost-marshal along with ten men as a police force to preserve property. The least punishment for infractions would be incarceration in the Alexandria jail." [129]

But, even by October 1, 1861, depredations continued. Major General George B. McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac, issued General Orders, No. 19, on that date, remarking that the "attention of the General Commanding has recently been directed to depredations of an atrocious character that have been committed upon the persons and property of citizens in Virginia by the troops under his command." Further the order provided that "all persons connected with this army who are detected in depredating upon the property of citizens shall be arrested and brought to trial" and he "will admit of no remission of the death penalty which the military law attaches to offenses of this nature." In subsequent years more land was confiscated as the Army Engineers erected new fortifications and cleared land for fields of fire and although additional incidents of depredation occurred in Northern Virginia, there were far fewer incidents. [130]

Plans and Details of the Fortifications

Reed Hansen, who researched and wrote a history masters degree thesis on Fort Marcy states that the planners of the Defenses of Washington:

"meticulously based their work on D.H. Mahan's A Treatise on Field Fortification, Barnard's principal reference book and the classic syllabus of its day. Mahan, a West Point professor, explicitly outlined those defensive procedures, specifically the embrasure and barbette, which Barnard put to good use in his fortifications." [131]

Barnard, in his 1871 report, mentions Mahan's manual a number of times. In one place he stated in a section entitled "PROFILES": "The works were originally profiled in accordance with the general section given in Mahan's Field Fortifications." In the same section he offered, "In some instances the scarps of the older works were revetted, either with plank, after the plan given in Mahan's Field Fortifications, or with vertical posts, as hereafter to be described." Later on in a section entitled "MAGAZINES, BOMBPROOFS" Barnard wrote, that the interior structures of the fortifications, magazines, bomb-proofs, etc. "were in accordance (with some variation in details) with the plans given in Mahan's Field Fortification." [132]

It is likely, that inexperienced young Regular Army Engineer officers and those green volunteer Army Engineers most often used Mahan's book. For most of the older Regular Army Engineers, their education at West Point, duty assignments, which during their career meant some experience in planning, erecting and maintaining fortifications, readings and official and unofficial trips provided them with a much fuller technical background upon which to plan and erect the defenses of Washington. Barnard, as well as the two Civil War chiefs of engineers, Joseph G. Totten and Richard Delafield, and other Army Engineers had visited Europe where they visited fortifications and some had the chance to observe their construction and use in warfare. [133]

In the development of the system of fortifications erected around Washington, D.C. that included the forts, batteries, blockhouses, trenches and rifle-pits, Barnard looked to historical examples, especially the Lines of Torres Vedras. Napoleonic scholar and expert David G. Chandler wrote that the Duke of Wellington had instructed his Army Engineers to construct a line of fortifications north of Lisbon. Colonel Richard Fletcher, Royal Engineers, and 17 other engineer officers, beginning in October 1809, oversaw the construction of a line of forts from the sea on the west to the Tagus estuary on the east including 108 redoubts, to which 42 were later added, in three lines mounting 447 guns, at a total cost of £100,000. Manned by about 25,000 men, the fortifications halted Napoleon's troops under the command of Marshal Andre Massena from October 10, 1810 to March 5, 1811, when the French troops withdrew. Barnard, on December 30, 1862, in a letter to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, stated "There has been but one other system of field works that I know of that is analogous to this in extent and character–the famous lines of Torres Vedras." In January 1863, he wrote:

"The theory of these defences is that upon which the works of Torres Vedras were based; the only one admitted at the present day for defending extensive lines. It is to occupy the commanding points within cannon range of each other by field-forts, the fire of which shall sweep all the approaches. These forts furnish the secure emplacement of artillery. They also afford cover to bodies of infantry. The works may be connected by lines of light parapets, or the ground (where practicable) may be obstructed that the enemy's troops cannot penetrate the interval without being exposed, for considerable time, to the effects of artillery or musketry fire of the forts." [134]

In a report on the defenses of Washington, dated December 10, 1861, and another of January 26, 1863, addressed to Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers, Barnard provided a number of comparisons to the Lines of Torres Vedras:

The aggregate perimeter of all the works is about 15,500 yards, or nearly 9 miles, including the stockaded gorges, which, however, form a small proportion of the whole, requiring, computed according to the rule adopted for the lines of Torres Vedras, 22,674 men (about) for garrisons.

The number of guns, most of which are actually mounted, is about four hundred and eighty, requiring about 7,200 men to furnish three reliefs of gunners. The permanent garrisons need consist of only these gunners, and even in case of attack it will seldom be necessary to keep full garrisons in all the works.

The total garrisons for all the works (one hundred and fifty-two in number) of the lines of Torres Vedras amounted to 34,125 men; and as the total perimeters are nearly proportional to the total garrisons, it appears that the lines about Washington involve a magnitude of work of about two-thirds of that in the three lines of Torres Vedras.

The works themselves, fewer in number, are generally much larger than those of Torres Vedras, and involve, I believe. when the amount of bombproof shelter in ours is considered, more labor per yard of perimeter; but the latter lines involved a greater amount of auxiliary work, such as the scraping of mountain slopes, palisading, abatis, roads, &c., than we have had occasion to make.

The lines of Torres Vedras were armed with five hundred and thirty–four pieces of ordnance (12, 9, or 6 pounders, with a few field howitzers); ours with four hundred and eighty pieces, of which the greater number are 32-pounders on barbette carriages, the rest being 24-pounders on the same carriages, 24-pounder siege guns, 10, 20, and 30 pounder rifled guns (Parrott), with a few field pieces and howitzers. As to number of guns, therefore, our armament approaches to equality with that of the famous lines mentioned; in weight of metal more than doubles it. [135]

Twice, on December 11, 1861 and December 30, 1862, Barnard, in reports to General George B. McClellan and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, attempted to demonstrate the monetary value of the work on the defenses of Washington by comparing it to the relative costs of the Lines of Torres Vedras:

I mentioned in that letter that our defensive system thus far consisted of about forty-eight works, mounting over 300 guns, some of which are of very large size; and I may add that the actual defensive perimeter occupied is about thirty-five miles, exceeding the length of the famous (and hitherto the most extensive fortified by extemporized field-works) lines of Torres Vedras by several miles. The amount which has been expended will not, therefore, considering the pressure under which the works have been built, appear extravagantly large.

These [lines of Tores Vedras] frustrated the design of Napoleon of driving the English from the Peninsula. They consisted of a greater number of works, but the works were smaller, and much less expensive in workmanship; yet on these lines, in a country where labor commanded but one tenth of what is paid in this country, $1,000,000 was expended from first to last. [136]

McClellan, in the Fall of 1861, asked Barnard and Brigadier General William F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, to determine the number of men necessary "for garrisons and reserves 'for the various works in and about Washington to satisfy the conditions of a good defense'." In a supplemental report, of October 24, 1861, to McClellan through his Assistant Adjutant General General Alpheus S. Williams, Barnard and Barry explained that the example of the Lines of Torres Vedras had helped them calculate the number of men necessary to man the defenses of Washington:

It seems proper to exhibit more clearly the grounds on which our estimate is founded. We have adopted the rule, which experience Showed to be satisfactory for the lines of Torres Vedras, in computing the garrison of the various works, viz: Two men per running yard of front covering line and one man per running yard of rear line, deducting spaces occupied by guns. Computed in this manner, the total of the full garrisons of all the works would amount to 19,789 men, of which 6,581 should be gunners, in order to furnish three reliefs to each gun. [137]

Barnard further compared the defenses of Washington to the Lines of Torres Vedras in his 1871 report. The defenses of Washington were "originally thrown up under pressure; hence, they were sometimes laid out without prepared plans, and not infrequently paced off on the ground. Under such circumstances coordination of plan, or even symmetry and perfection of design, was not to be expected." He felt that this unsystematic origin constituted an important distinction between the defenses of Washington and "other works of like extent to which they would be referred in comparison," such as the Lines of Torres Vedras that were carefully surveyed, located, planned and essentially finished, before Wellington's army took its position behind them. Both the defenses of Washington and the Lines of Torres Vedras "belong to the class of 'field works' and are illustrative of what can be done mainly by the use of earth and timber furnished by the locality . . ." Further, Barnard remarked that the British built practically all of the Lines of Torres Vedras in a year, from October 1809 to October 1810, while the Union spent about four years erecting the Washington defenses. The Lines of Torres Vedras were erected for a specific purpose –"to meet a foreseen contingency"–but the Washington lines were to protect a city against a possibility of incursion, siege or attack by unknown numbers of the enemy. Finally, Barnard argued that the "defenses of Washington exceeded even the length of the lines of Torres Vedras" "due to the large area over which the city, with its public buildings, arsenals, navy yard, &c., is spread, to the incidental necessity of covering Alexandria and holding the Chain Bridge, and of protecting the reservoir of the Washington Aqueduct, and to the vastly increased ranges of modern artillery." [138]

In spite of Barnard's heavy reliance on the Lines of Torres Vedras, he did consider the fortifications at other locations such as the Caucasus and Silestria and especially "Sebastopol" erected during the Crimean War. He remarked that the field fortifications at Sebastopol were "feeble earth-works." Although Sebastopol field fortifications did "prevent an immediate seizure of the place by the allied armies" they could only be protractedly held against a formal siege by the "most extraordinary exertions, combined with a lavish expenditure of the materials of war and an appalling sacrifice of lives of the brave defenders . . ." Later, Barnard wrote, "Sebastopol, a vast intrenched camp defended by field fortifications of heavy profile, derived its principal strength from an armament such as is found only in a great maritime arsenal, and from a numerous army which always maintained its communications open with the interior of Russia." Sebastopol was not "secure against escalade" due to the lack of scarp walls in the defenses. But, the allies were still unable to overrun the Sebastopol defenses for a variety of reasons including their own shortcomings. [139]

Many plans, drawings, and photographs of the fortifications in the defenses of Washington gleaned from Barnard's 1871 report, the National Archives and other repositories and a variety of other sources appear elsewhere in this study.