MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

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Asahel Curtis photograph of Rainier Park Company President Henry Rhodes (front), Mount Rainier National Park Superintendent O.A. Tomlinson (middle), and National Park Service Director Stephen Mather (right), against a backdrop of Mount Rainier, 1928. *(Photo courtesy of the Washington State Historical Society, Tacoma, Washington)*

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

WONDERLAND:
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

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MOUNT RAINIER

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INTRODUCTION

Mount Rainier ranks among the great mountains of the world. With a summit elevation of 14,411 feet above sea level, it is the largest in a chain of volcanoes that extends through the Pacific Coast states from Mount Shasta in California to Mount Baker in Washington. Most of these volcanoes rise several thousand feet above the other summits of the Cascade Range and are visible for a hundred miles or more, appearing ethereal at this distance like islands in the sky. Mount Rainier's significance relates in part to its premier place in this impressive range of Pacific Rim volcanoes. As viewed from Seattle or Tacoma through the intervening haze, the mountain's glistening, white dome appears to rise directly from a low, forested tableland.

Viewed at closer range, Mount Rainier reveals its distinctive form: massive, rugged, and asymmetrical. Successive eruptions of lava, ash, and cinders, and the probable movement of the volcano s main vent during the period of Mount Rainier's growth, produced a broad, irregular cone with interbedded layers of black andesite and lighter-shaded ash. The cone was further modified by the cutting action of streams in the soft ash, and later by the erosive force of huge glaciers which formed during the Pleistocene Epoch. Today a number of resistant dikes of lava radiate out from the mountain core, including the massive buttress on the southeast flank known as Gibraltar Rock and the 11,117-foot spire on the east known as Little Tahoma. Together with the mountain's broken summit, these features account for Mount Rainier's varied appearance.

Mount Rainier's twenty-five separate, named glaciers comprise the largest single-peak glacier system in the United States outside of Alaska. The largest of these glaciers descend into forested lowlands near the foot of the mountain. Measurements of the movement of the Nisqually Glacier date from 1857 and become detailed after the turn of the century, constituting the longest such record in the Western Hemisphere. The glaciers are another outstanding feature of Mount Rainier National Park and have long attracted both scientific and scenic interest.

Mount Rainier National Park is renowned for its subalpine meadows or "mountain parks." Often graced by mountain lakes and profusions of wildflowers, these mountain parks are the most visited and photographed areas of the park. Encircling the mountain between approximately 5,000 and 7,000 feet elevation, the mountain parks are practically unique to Mount Rainier, without parallel in the Cascades or on the other volcanoes which occur at latitudes to the north and south. Early scientists attributed this feature, and Mount Rainier's great diversity of flora in general, to the mountain's tremendous range of elevations and the influence of its bulk and height on local climate. In the classic phrase coined by campaigners for the national park in the 1 890s, Mount Rainier was "an arctic island in a temperate zone." Since then biologists have identified much more intricate variations in the flora than the vertical zones that were once used to describe the mountain's varied plant life. The flora of Mount Rainier is influenced by differences of elevation, contrasting climates from one side of the mountain to another, variety of soil types, and disturbances from fire, flood, and other phenomena.

Mount Rainier's biological diversity extends to animal life, too. The national park's wildlife has probably played less of a role than its lush forests and flower fields in shaping the popular conception of Mount Rainier as a natural paradise; nevertheless, sightings of mountain goat, black bear, deer, and various small mammals have long been among the park's popular attractions. Some 130 species of birds and 50 species of mammals occur in the park. Protection of wildlife habitat constitutes an important and longstanding management concern.

These natural features--the volcano, the glaciers, the flora, and the fauna--are Mount Rainier National Park's principal resources. As Congress proclaimed in the Mount Rainier National Park Act of March 2, 1899, they give the area national significance. In the course of the national park's long history since 1899 another significant resource has developed: the cultural heritage of the national park itself. Today the park contains four historic districts and more than one hundred historic buildings of national significance, virtually all associated with the first half-century of administration and development of the park. With its carefully planned roads, campgrounds, and administrative areas, the built environment of Mount Rainier National Park exhibits perhaps as well as that of any other national park the philosophy of the U.S. National Park Service during its formative years.

The purpose of this administrative history is three-fold: to provide a summary of the park's century-long development, to present a synthesis of the many issues that have concerned park managers from 1899 to the present, and to offer an analysis of local and regional influences that have contributed to making Mount Rainier National Park's history distinct from other national parks. Four main historical themes emerged in the course of this study which may be summarized as follows:

(1) *The nearby cities of Seattle and Tacoma profoundly influenced the development of Mount Rainier National Park.* The proximity of these cities had myriad effects. In the first place, recreational use of Mount Rainier by urban, middle-class visitors developed at an early date and contributed significantly to the campaign for the park's establishment. This pattern of use continued during the park's early years, forming a contrast to the predominantly upper-class visitor use that was typical of Yellowstone, Glacier, Grand Canyon, and other early national parks. Moreover, Seattle and Tacoma businessmen provided virtually all of the private capital for the development of hotels and camps in the park, supplanting the role played by railroad companies in many other national parks of the American West. Since most Mount Rainier visitors came to the park by automobile from nearby communities, and most private investment in the park came from local businessmen, it followed that local interests took an unusually keen interest in this national park's early road, hotel, and campground development.

(2) *Changing patterns of visitor use posed constant challenges to the park administration.* These changing patterns were complex, involving such developments as growing numbers of visitors, rising visitor expectations for overnight accommodations and other services, new modes of transportation, new forms of recreational use, and increasing socio-economic diversity among the visitor population. The implications for management were as varied as the patterns themselves, but can be broadly defined into three central challenges.

First, the administration continually had to adapt the park's infrastructure to accommodate new patterns of visitor use. Roads and trails, lodging and camping facilities, museums and waysides all required extensive modification over the years. At best, this process of adaptation was costly; at worst, it occasionally resulted in overdevelopment and visitor dissatisfaction.

Second, some types of visitor use called for developments that detracted from other types of

visitor use, and the park administration had to weigh these conflicting uses and determine which were more appropriate. Winter use of Mount Rainier National Park, with its attendant demands for aerial trams, permanent downhill chair lifts, and snowsheds on the road to Paradise--eyesores in any other season--best exemplified this problem.

Third, changing patterns of visitor use increasingly raised critical resource protection issues. Growing numbers of backcountry users denuded the highcountry camps of vegetation; growing numbers of climbers produced a human waste problem on the upper mountain; growing numbers of dayhikers cut up the fragile alpine meadows with unintended foot trails.

Because of Mount Rainier National Park's proximity to two growing metropolitan areas, it frequently experienced the management problems associated with changing patterns of visitor use earlier than most other national parks.

(3) *Mount Rainier National Park twice served as a model for national park development plans.* In 1928 it became the first national park in the system to be given a master plan for the development of all roads, visitor services, and administrative sites. In 1955 it served as a pilot park for the design of a ten-year redevelopment plan under the Park Service's Mission 66 program. Add to this impressive record the creation of the Rainier National Park Company out of the new national park concession policy of 1916, and it becomes clear why the history of Mount Rainier National Park's physical development was so significant for the national park system as a whole.

(4) *Master plans only partially succeeded in modifyiing established patterns of visitor use.* The Master Plan of 1928 and the Mission 66 Plan of 1955 shared the essential goal of spreading visitor use more evenly around the developed sections of the park. The earlier plan sought to deflect some of the heavy use at Paradise to the new development area at Sunrise, while the latter plan had the more far-reaching object of moving visitor services from these fragile alpine areas to lower elevations within and outside the park. In both instances the park's private investors and some of the park's most frequent users opposed the change and blunted the planning initiatives. Similarly, the Master Plan of 1972 sought to alleviate automobile congestion through the introduction of a mass transit system, but local opposition to the idea dissuaded park officials from pursuing it. The National Park Service found it difficult to modify established patterns of visitor use even when such uses were inimical to park resources and visitor experiences. This was due in part to the close relationship of Mount Rainier National Park to its Seattle and Tacoma constituencies.

This administrative history is organized both chronologically and topically. The report is divided into six parts corresponding to six distinct eras in the park's history. Within each part, three to five chapters address such recurring topics as resource management, interpretation, development, concessions management, and research. The decision to organize the administrative history in this fashion was based on the judgment that the vital stories of Mount Rainier National Park's physical development, its extraordinarily long history of recreational use, and its hundred-year evolution of resource management could not be told separately from one another. Physical developments affected recreational use just as recreational use affected resource management. Resource management in turn affected physical developments and recreational use. Moreover, these stories are embedded in the history of the National Park Service, the region, and even the nation. It was decided that the nearly century-long administrative history of this important national park could be made more comprehensible if it were presented in a chronological narrative, with an emphasis on historical context. The single exception to this organizational scheme will be found in Chapter I, which carries the discussion of Indians and Mount Rainier National Park up to the present time.

The disadvantage of a chronological organization is obvious: the reader who is primarily interested in the history of one function of the park administration may have to look for that topic in four or five places in the report. Moreover, the reader will note that the names of administrative functions have changed over time. Thus the interpretive function was formerly called the nature guide service, resource management was earlier known as resource protection, and the park's current science program practically has no parallel in the years prior to about 1965. It is hoped that wherever chapter titles fail to guide the reader to the relevant sections, the subject index will succeed.

I am grateful to the numerous people who assisted me in the preparation of this report. I first wish to thank Gretchen Luxenberg, regional historian in the System Support Office (SSO) in Seattle, who set up the project and deftly kept it alive through two years of "downsizing" and reorganization of the agency. Through it all her sense of humor never deserted her. I also wish to thank Stephanie Toothman, chief of the Cultural Resources Division, SSO, and Darryll Johnson, project leader of the Social Science Program of the Cooperative Park Studies Unit, University of Washington, for assisting Gretchen in ensuring the project's completion.

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Several of my former colleagues in the SSO provided me with insights on Mount Rainier's administrative history, NPS policies, and agency culture. For this I wish to thank in particular Gretchen, Stephanie, David Louter, Fred York, Laurin Huffman, Cathy Gilbert, Kathy Jope, Mike Blankenship, and Nancy Hori, as well as Darryll Johnson of the Cooperative Park Studies Unit. I appreciate the final editing performed by Frank Norris of the Alaska Regional Office in Anchorage.

My parents, Nancy Catton and William R. Catton, Jr., introduced me to Mount Rainier National Park when I was three years old by leading me and my two older brothers on a thirteen-day backpacking trip over the rugged 93-mile Wonderland Trail around the mountain. Four years later we repeated the trip in the other direction, varying the route in the northern section of the park, this time with my then-three-year-old younger brother. Like so many other Seattleites, we also made innumerable short trips to the park, camped in the park campgrounds, visited the museums, hiked a good many of the trails, and packed toboggans and inner tubes up to Paradise in winter. Home movies of these adventures, narrated by my mother and father and set to Brahms and Beethoven symphonies, became the touchstones of my early boyhood years in the 1960s. In writing this report I have tried to eschew sentimentality and nostalgia. Nevertheless, I admit here to two biases that stem from those childhood experiences: one in favor of the local park visitor, and the other in support of the National Park Service's noble mission to preserve the park resources for present and future generations.

Theodore Catton
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MOUNT RAINIER

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PART ONE: THE CULTURAL SETTING

I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INDIANS AND MOUNT RAINIER

INTRODUCTION

The Indians of the Pacific Northwest held in awe the snowcapped volcanoes of the Cascade Range. Mount Rainier, Mount Adams, Mount Saint Helens, and Mount Hood, with their looming presence on the horizon, frequent cloud caps, rumbling avalanches, and terrifying eruptions, inspired numerous legends about the spirits that were thought to inhabit them. The Indians' legends told of fiery eruptions in the distant past, of vicious feuds when the mountains hurled rocks at one another, of a great flood when all the lowlands were inundated, killing all creatures except the pure ones which climbed to the mountain tops and ascended ropes of arrows into the sky. In the Indians' view, humans offended the mountain spirits at their peril. [1]

It is very difficult today to separate legends and other facets of the Indians' relationship to Mount Rainier from the history of the area as a national park. Indian legends about the mountain held strong appeal for whites who sought to preserve and promote the mountain's scenic grandeur. Many white people who themselves felt a kind of reverence for Mount Rainier worked diligently to preserve Indian legends and place names in order to give Mount Rainier National Park a local accent. The best known work of this kind was John H. Williams's The Mountain That Was "God" (1911), in which the author contended that Puget Sound Indians had once perceived Mount Rainier, or "Takhoma," as the most dreadful of all the Pacific Northwest's volcanoes. Whether consciously or not, Williams and many others were, in effect, creating a history of Indians on Mount Rainier to suit their purpose of celebrating the mountain.

POPULAR CONCEPTIONS

The story of Sluiskin, Mount Rainier's most famous Indian, reveals much about the complexity of the Indian relationship to Mount Rainier. [2] In 1870, Sluiskin served as guide to a party of white men who were intent on climbing Mount Rainier. As this early climbing party approached the lower slopes of the mountain, Sluiskin grew more and more despondent. Finally, on the eve of the ascent, he exhorted the white men not to attempt the climb or they would be punished by demons. He told his white companions of the angry spirit that animated "Takhoma" and inhabited a "lake of fire" in the summit crater. He refused to go farther. The white men, undaunted, successfully reached the summit the next day where they took shelter in the warm steam vents that Sluiskin had apparently alluded to, and returned to camp on the day following. Sluiskin, who had given them up for dead, greeted them with cries of "Skookum tillicum! Skookum tumtum!" ("Strong men! Brave hearts!") [3]

Many years later, in 1915, Sluiskin's identity became wreathed in mystery. A Yakima chief named Sluiskin claimed that it was he who had guided the climbing party, but others insisted that the original Sluiskin had belonged to another tribe. Articles appeared in the Tacoma Ledger. Tacoma Daily News, and Yakima Republic, variously disputing or supporting the old chief's claim. David Longmire, the son of James Longmire and a longtime resident in the area, stated that he knew three different Sluiskins. The dispute was never settled to anyone's satisfaction. [4] Years later, ethnologist Allan H. Smith made the original Sluiskin a Taidnapam (Upper Cowlitz) Indian rather than a Yakima. [5]

The significance of Sluiskin is that whites and Indians alike transformed the man into a symbol of the Indian relationship to the mountain. For the Yakima chief who claimed to be the guide of forty-five years earlier, the thing of importance was that the country had "once belonged to us." [6] This Chief Sluiskin told a local writer who was trying to test the veracity of his story that when he was a young man the climbing party had hired him on the pretense of surveying the line of the Yakima Indian Reservation established under the Yakima Treaty of 1855. That was why he had led the party to the mountain. For whites, Sluiskin had a different meaning. The story of Sluiskin's fireside oration became a metaphor for the Indians' dread of the mountain. The account of Sluiskin was the most familiar of many accounts by pioneer climbers of Mount Rainier which described the reluctance of their Indian guides to accompany them too far up the mountain. The Indian guide became a foil for demonstrating the climbers' courage and impetuosity, genuine as those character traits may have been. The image of the fearful native in a forbidding wilderness was not peculiar to Mount Rainier climbing accounts, but was practically a convention in the literature of nineteenth century exploration. It had special relevance to Mount Rainier National Park, however, because these nineteenth century pioneer climbs played such a crucial role in framing twentieth century Americans' perception of the mountain and its original inhabitants. The anecdotes about Sluiskin and other Indian guides were repeated so often that they became part of the mountain's mythology.

Sentiment about the mountain and Mount Rainier National Park shaped people's perceptions of the Indian relationship to Mount Rainier in other ways, too. In the twentieth century, Americans increasingly looked to national parks as places where they could find vestiges of their past. [7] Park patrons enjoyed the association of parklands and Indians. Next to their feeling of awe about the mountain, Indians were most often remembered for the seasonal use they made of the area to pick berries and hunt game. This also obtained a picturesque quality over the years in the context of the national park. Early settlers of Washington Territory told a story about Henry, a Yakima Indian and son of a chief. He was banished from his tribe for killing a medicine man, and forced to flee to the west side of the Cascades. Each spring, the story went, Henry vanished into the mountains with his poor squaws and lean ponies. He was nearly given up for dead, only to reappear in the fall, grinning to himself, with his wives looking plump and content and his ponies laden with venison and dried berries. Asked by whites to reveal where his hunting ground was, Henry always shook his head, and the reputation of his secret hunting ground grew each year. Finally a man succeeded in trailing the old Indian to his summer camp on the southwest side of Mount Rainier, a place that became known as Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. Within a few years a permanent trail was built to this flower-strewn meadow and it became one of the popular backcountry destinations in the national park. [8] That Henry was a real person, whose Indian name was So-to-lick, mattered less than the fact that his story captured the imagination of so many local residents. The story was another example of how Indian use of Mount Rainier became intertwined with local mythology about the mountain.

Mount Rainier National Park, like other national parks, commemorated Indians' past use of the area through Indian place names. White Americans' fondness for Indian names has been described as a form of nationalism, for it celebrated what was distinctively American. [9]

Americans were nowhere more enthusiastic about Indian place names than in national parks, with their aim to preserve the American heritage. Sometimes the use of Indian names in national parks was undertaken with the benefit of native informants and ethnographic data, as was the case in Glacier National Park, Montana, where ethnologist George Bird Grinnell restored original Indian names to many of the park's natural features. In other cases, Indian names were applied more whimsically. In Mount Rainier National Park many glaciers, rivers, parks, and waterfalls took their names from Indian individuals and groups associated with the area, or from the old trading language known as Chinook jargon. The names Nisqually, Cowlitz, Yakima, and Puyallup came from tribes in the region; Sluiskin from the famous guide; Owyhigh from a Yakima chief; Mowich from the Chinook jargon term for deer; Ollala from the term for berries; Mazama from the term for mountain goat. The practice of using names of Indian origin, wrote Park Naturalist Floyd Schmoe, was "far more in keeping with the policy of the National Park Service than that of bestowing the names of more or less obscure people, as so often happens." [10]

Indian place names sometimes originated from contemporary events rather than original Indian names for that particular place. In the early 193Os, as the road to Yakima Park neared completion and plans developed for a hotel development there, boosters in the Puget Sound region lobbied for changing the name of this broad ridgetop to Sunrise in order to avoid confusion with the city of Yakima. The Yakima Chamber of Commerce wanted to retain the name Yakima Park. L. V. McWhorter, a rancher, writer, and friend of the Yakima Indians, pushed for an Indian name, either Me-yah-ah Pah or "Owhi's Meadow," in honor of a Yakima chief. [11] McWhorter described in some detail how Owhi's band had used Yakima Park for a summer hunting ground and a place to engage in horse racing and other events of the season.

> Sham battles were staged there, and warriors rehearsed their feats of skill and daring, and there were foot-racing and wrestling and the playing of games now forgotten except by a very few of the old Indians. Dancing, wooing, religious ceremonies, wailing for the dead—all the things that were a part of the oldtime Indian life are associated with this place. [12]

McWhorter made a strong case, but he did not wield as much influence as the advocates of Sunrise and Yakima Park. The NPS found a tactful way to settle this dispute by using the name Sunrise for the development site, Yakima Park for the physical land form, and Owhi (in altered form) for the Owyhigh Lakes.

The passion for Indian names in national parks may have reached a climax in the furor over the name of Mount Rainier itself, which many local citizens wanted to change to Mount Tacoma. This battle raged on for many years and fixed in many people's minds the idea that "Tacoma" was the Puget Sound Indians' word for "The Mountain That Was God." Opponents of the name change insisted that Tacoma was merely a generic term for snow-capped peak. The controversy came to involve much more than an interest in historical accuracy, for citizens of Tacoma saw an opportunity to associate their city with the national park and the tourism revenue it generated. [13] Citizens of Seattle and other communities around the mountain saw the name change as a crass, commercial gimmick masterminded by the Tacoma Chamber of Commerce. The controversy showed how something as "Indian" as the name of the mountain could be appropriated by whites and invested with meanings that were practically unrelated to any real Indian concerns. This was one fight for the restoration of an Indian name that the NPS assiduously avoided.

HISTORIC USES AND ACTIVITIES

Folklore about Indians and Mount Rainier was not the only way in which the national park celebrated the past through Indians. In 1925, Yakima Indians agreed to perform for tourists at Paradise Park, on the south flank of Mount Rainier. They held daily drum dances, rode horses, and demonstrated their spear fishing. Their leader was none other than Chief Sluiskin. The Rainier National Park Company, a concession operation, sponsored the events. The agreement soon broke down, apparently because the Indians proved unwilling to pose for souvenir photographs. [14] While the NPS was not averse to this activity and occasionally arranged similar events in other parks, it apparently did not become involved with this one. [15]

At the same time that these Indians were performing some of their people's traditional uses of the park for the amusement of hotel guests at Paradise, other Indians were continuing to visit Mount Rainier to gather huckleberries which they dried for food. That they did not receive the same attention as the performing Indians was not surprising. At that time Indian use of the park did not match whites' preconceptions of Indians in nature. "The Indian of today," wrote Park Naturalist Floyd Schmoe,

> has lost much of his former picturesqueness. Although the women still carry their "papooses" in a shawl on their backs and use some very remarkable baskets made by their mothers from the local Squaw grass, it is more common to see them arrive in closed cars than upon wiry mountain ponies, and although some of them still employ the Chinook jargon, or tribal dialects, typical American slang phrases are as frequently heard. [16]

Such an invidious comparison underscored how the national park setting shaped people's perceptions of contemporary and historical Indian use of the area.

The Indian relationship to Mount Rainier has been much romanticized. In the 1920s the concessioner marketed the

national park with this stylized image of Indians worshipping *"The Mountain that was God." (Rainier National Park Company publicity photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park)*

The conflict in the public's mind between romanticized Indians like those who performed for tourists at Paradise Park, and Indians who still used the park's natural resources was at no time more evident than in 1915-17, when Chief Sluiskin and his band of Indians from the Yakima Reservation pressed for their perceived right to hunt in the park under the Yakima Treaty of 1855. The incidents leading up to the arrests of six Indians in 1917 and the official correspondence surrounding them is worth reviewing, for the case was precedent-setting and revealed much about the ambiguities of NPS-Indian relations. A Department of the Interior solicitor's opinion in 1915 held that the federal government could not prohibit Indian hunting in the park. But the NPS's chief clerk, J.J. Cotter, advised one year later that the solicitor's opinion had been superseded by a state law and two court opinions. As a result of this legal premise, park administrators continued to forbid hunting by Indians.

The issue of treaty protected hunting rights first came to light in July 1915, when Ranger Thomas E. O'Farrell was passing through Yakima Park, northeast of the mountain, and found the remains of an Indian camp. The camp included a wigwam and two horse corrals, all of which were built from timber cut down in the area. Large quantities of bones and other animal remains lay about. O'Farrell reported to Supervisor DeWitt L. Reaburn that "bands of natives" had been making annual visits to the park to hunt deer, and he wanted to be advised whether they had treaty rights. If they had no such rights, he wanted to know what steps he should take to end this practice. Reaburn forwarded O'Farrell's letter to the Secretary of the Interior. The Department replied that in order to make a determination, it was necessary to know to which tribe the Indians belonged. [17]

Knowing that the Indians usually encamped at Yakima Park in late summer, O'Farrell sent his two assistant rangers, Leonard Rosso and Arthur White, back there at the end of August. Rosso and White found about thirty Yakima Indians encamped in the high meadow with their leader, Sluiskin. Using a Yakima woman interpreter, they told Sluiskin that it was against the law to hunt game in the park. Sluiskin referred the rangers to the Walla Walla Treaty that his nation's chief had signed sixty years earlier in 1855. Sluiskin believed that the treaty reserved rights to hunt, gather, and fish on all open and unclaimed lands formerly belonging to the Yakima tribe. Rosso and White did not press the issue with Sluiskin, but reported to Reaburn that the Indians claimed rights under the Walla Walla Treaty. [18] Reaburn wired the Secretary on September 1, 1915:

> The Yakima Indians under Chief Sluiskin are now on a hunting expedition in the northeast corner of the park. They refuse to obey the ranger's orders claiming the right to hunt and kill as they please, but say they will slaughter only what is needed. [19]

Assistant Secretary Bo Sweeney submitted the matter to the Department's solicitor, noting that the treaty's restriction of Indian hunting rights to "open and unclaimed land" probably meant that the treaty right did not extend "within the metes and bounds" of Mount Rainier National Park. [20] But the solicitor's opinion, given three weeks later, surprised him.

Solicitor Preston C. West argued that the act of 1899 establishing Mount Rainier National Park did not terminate the Indians' treaty right to hunt game within the boundaries of the park. First, the solicitor argued, the national park did not remove the area from the status of "open and unclaimed land" as it was construed in the treaty. West referred to the longstanding principle in federal Indian law which required the courts to resolve all

ambiguities of meaning in Indian treaties according to how they had been understood by the Indians. The Indians who signed the Walla Walla Treaty of 1855, West presumed, recognized "open and unclaimed land" as land that was not settled upon or appropriated by claimants under the general land laws. The treaty's Indian signers, West argued, "intended to reserve the right to hunt on the open and unclaimed lands as effectually as they reserved the right to fish in waters outside the reservation described in the treaty for their use." [21]

Second, the act of 1899 did not specifically address hunting by Indians. With respect to the protection of game, the act of 1899 gave the Secretary authority "to provide against the wanton destruction of the fish and game found within said park, and against their capture or destruction for the purposes of merchandise or profit." Looking at the treaty right issue in the context of 1855, West argued, it did not seem that either party had in view the wanton destruction of game or hunting by the Indians for the purposes of merchandise and profit. Therefore, wrote West, "the law of 1899 simply stated specifically what was necessarily implied in the treaty." Since the treaty language appeared not to have given the Indians the right to destroy game wantonly or to hunt game for the market, West reasoned that the act of 1899 had taken nothing away. It followed that the Indians' right to hunt for their subsistence within the park had not been taken away by the law of 1899, either. This did not mean that subsistence hunting by Indians was not subject to regulation, West hastened to add. Since the act of 1899 gave the Secretary of the Interior broad authority to fulfill the purposes of the park, and the park was created for the public's enjoyment, "the Indians must exercise their privilege in such manner as not to defeat this expressed purpose." In sum, West believed that Indian hunting rights and national park purposes were in fact compatible under carefully drawn regulations. [22]

This was a remarkable formulation. In effect, it called for park administrators to treat the Indian groups who had made traditional use of Mount Rainier as living cultures rather than historical artifacts. Nothing in the solicitor's opinion suggested that Indians who hunted in the park would in any way enhance the public's enjoyment; the intent was not to put them on display as the Rainier National Park Company did at Paradise Park in 1925. West merely supposed that subsistence use of the park by Indians would be benign from the standpoint of protecting park resources, and that the public could be persuaded to tolerate it.

Unfortunately, this idea clashed with the popular conception of national parks as vestiges of America's past. When Indians hunted in national parks, it stirred images in the public's mind of picturesque noble savages and white-Indian conflict. A writer for the Tacoma Ledger, for example, could not resist reporting the incident as if it were a humorous throwback to the Indian Wars. For the first time in the park's history, government officials had "indulged...in an Indian hunt," the newspaper stated. "The result was a bag of four Indian bucks, two squaws, 20 head of horses and 'artillery' consisting of three fine rifles." The report gave details of the "chase," the officials' cautious advance on the "Indian encampment," the curious "federal court" held in an automobile, and the confiscation of the Indians' "artillery." From the newspaper's standpoint, the incident closed with "the departure of six sad but wiser Indians, gladdened somewhat by the return of their horses and other trappings, to their native hunting grounds in the Yakima country." [23] In contrast to the solicitor's opinion, the journalist assumed, as his readers probably did as well, that Indians had no place in the national park except as symbols of America's frontier past. Perhaps it was for this reason that no one in the Department followed West's advice to draft park regulations that would be sensitive to Indian hunting rights.

The Department may have chosen to ignore the solicitor's opinion for another reason as well. It ran counter to the current trend in game law for increased state jurisdiction over game management, including hunting of game by Indians outside Indian reservations. Shortly after West wrote his opinion, the Washington State Supreme Court decided in State v. Towessnute

that Yakima Indians outside their reservation were subject to the state game laws. The following year, in June 1916, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a decision affirming the right of the State of New York to regulate fishing by Seneca Indians on lands which that tribe had ceded to the United States. The Washington State Game Commission brought these facts to the attention of national park and national forest administrators in Washington in October 1916.24 A further development that bore on the issue of Indian treaty rights in Mount Rainier National Park was the Act of Congress of June 30, 1916, which accepted the cession by the State of Washington of exclusive jurisdiction over the lands embraced within the park. This act clarified the authority of park officials to make arrests. [25]

The initiative to end subsistence hunting by Indians in the park came from local authorities—seasonal park rangers, state and county game wardens, newspaper editors—and not from any general policy that was crystallizing in the national park system bureaucracy. On October 28, 1916, Supervisor Reaburn wired Superintendent of National Parks Robert B. Marshall that the band of Yakima Indians was back in the park hunting game. "Shall we arrest them and bring them before the park commissioner," read the telegram, "instructions desired immediately." Marshall replied affirmatively. [26] Although the decision finally came from NPS officials in Washington, D.C., these officials were responding to the pressure of events at the local level.

If Reaburn acted immediately on Marshall's instruction, he failed to catch any Indian violators that season. The following summer, Reaburn stationed Park Ranger O.W. Curtis in Yakima Park. When word came from Curtis of the Indians' presence there in early October 1917, Reaburn responded with haste. Starting out from headquarters at Longmire with Ranger John Yorke and Commissioner Edward S. Hall, he drove his automobile all day on rough and circuitous roads clockwise around the outside of the park to the White River, which he reached shortly after dark; then, leaving two hours before light the next morning with Yorke, he hiked on foot up to the Indians' encampment. They arrested six Indians in the possession of freshly skinned deer hides, and brought them back down to the White River for a "court" appointment with Commissioner Hall beside Reaburn's automobile. As the Indians offered no resistance and pleaded guilty to the charge of illegal hunting, Hall gave them all light fines. [27]

That the new NPS lacked a definite policy on subsistence hunting by Indians was further demonstrated by the drawn out correspondence which ensued between senior officials of the NPS and the Office of Indian Affairs over the proper disposition of the three confiscated rifles. Assistant Director Horace M. Albright wanted to use the occasion of returning these items to the Indians to make an official announcement that the Indians' treaty rights did not extend to the park. Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs E.B. Meritt initially opposed having the BIA be a party to any such announcement. Reaburn finally worked out a compromise with the Yakima Reservation's superintendent, Don M. Carr. The warning that these officials issued to the Indians is not in the records, but the arrests evidently had the desired effect. [28]

RECONSTRUCTING THE INDIAN PAST

With the advent of ranger naturalists in the park in the 1 920s, the NPS made a more concerted effort to compile information about Indian lore and past resource use in the area. In some sense this marked a change from a popular conception of Indians and Mount Rainier to a more sophisticated understanding. Park naturalists collected numerous references to Indians in their mimeographed periodical, Mount Rainier Nature Notes, and tried to present a balanced picture of the area's indigenous people to park visitors. Yet the cultural phenomenon of the national park continued to control how the Indians' relationship to Mount Rainier was

interpreted. The mere fact that Americans came to expect memorialization of Indians in their national parks inevitably created a false picture of Indians. Indians became an adornment for the nation' s scenic wonderlands—picturesque, nostalgic, and innocuous. In the hands of the park's naturalists, the Indian past in Mount Rainier National Park was sentimental and compliant with the park's purpose.

In 1963, the NPS contracted with Washington State University for an archeological survey of the park and a search of the ethnographic literature on Indian use of the Mount Rainier area. Richard D. Daugherty led the archeological survey and Allan H. Smith produced an ethnographic guide. [29] Inasmuch as the national park boundaries determined the scope of both projects, it seemed that the presence of Mount Rainier National Park continued to shape how past Indian use of the area was reconstructed. The influence of the national park was particularly apparent in the ethnographic study, in which Smith produced a map of the park divided into pie-shaped wedges that purported to represent the hunting and gathering areas of the various Indian groups surrounding Mount Rainier. In the text of his report, Smith protested that such territories were vague and overlapping, and to represent them on a map with lines was to distort their meaning to the aboriginal Indians; still, the organization of his report led irresistibly to this map. Despite these problems, however, the companion studies by Smith and Daugherty represented a big step forward in what was known about Indians and Mount Rainier.

The archeological survey discovered one significant site: a rock shelter near Fryingpan Creek, east of Goat Island Mountain. The shelter was not inhabited year round. All artifacts found at the site were associated with hunting. The cultural affinities of the site pointed to its use by Columbia Plateau Indians some 300 to 1,000 years ago. Based on the archeological and climatological record for the surrounding region, Daugherty suggested that prehistoric humans had used the Mount Rainier area most heavily between 4,500 and 8,000 years ago, but the only evidence of such early use was one projectile point found in a cut on the Bench Lake Trail whose style dated from 6,000 years ago. The NPS sponsored a more complete archeological study of the Fryingpan Rockshelter in 1964. [30]

Smith based his ethnographic guide to the park on the kinds of aboriginal use in the Pacific Northwest which were associated with the four climatic-biotic zones found in the park. These zones included the Humid Transitional zone, consisting of dense, lowland forest up to approximately 3,000 feet above sea level; the Canadian zone, characterized by subalpine forest from approximately 3,000 to 5,500 feet elevation; the Hudsonian zone of alpine meadows and scattered groves of trees; and the Arctic-Alpine zone where bare rock and permanent snowfields predominated. All of these zones possessed distinctive assemblages of plants and animals which Indians used to varying extent. Another factor was ease of access; the White, Ohanapecosh and Nisqually river valleys provided approaches for Puget Sound Indians from the north, south, and west, while Plateau Indians reached the area by mountain passes on the east. [31]

Smith conducted interviews with elderly Indians and combed the ethnographic literature for references to aboriginal use of Mount Rainier. He found no evidence to indicate that there had been any permanent habitation by Indians within the park boundaries. Rather, aboriginal use consisted of forays into the area for hunting and gathering and for occasional spirit quests. Puget Sound Indians hunted and gathered in small groups. The women gathered various plants (chiefly huckleberries and possibly Claytonia roots and medicinal herbs) while the men hunted, singly or in groups of two or three, for deer, elk, bear, mountain goat, and small mammals and birds. Indians from the Columbia Plateau visited the area in larger bands, usually bringing their horses, and exploited virtually the same resources. The most intensive use occurred in late summer and fall when the huckleberries ripened. [32]

When Smith came to differentiating between Indian groups who used the park aboriginally, he emphasized that his conclusions were more tenuous. The Cascade Range formed a natural barrier between Puget Sound and Plateau Indians, though there was significant trade and even intermarriage across the mountains, and the linguistic grouping of Salish and Sahaptian speakers spanned both sides of the Cascade Range as well. Moreover, it was problematic whether Indian "tribes" in the region, particularly on the Puget Sound side of the Cascades, reflected linguistic, cultural, geographic, or political entities. These caveats aside, Smith identified five Indian groups which used the Mount Rainier area: Nisqually, Puyallup, Muckleshoot, Yakima, and Taidnapam. The Yakimas of the Columbia Plateau were organized into bands; the other four groups were organized chiefly around their permanent winter villages on the lower Nisqually, Puyallup, White, and upper Cowlitz rivers respectively. In the Puget Sound Indians' case, Smith noted, Mount Rainier represented the farthest reaches of the major river drainage which each group occupied. [33]

Smith argued that Indian concepts of territoriality were highly flexible. In general, Indians recognized crests between drainages as the limits of their group's territory, but the importance that they attached to such boundaries faded the farther they went from their group's "population center." Stressing that there must have been considerable overlap between such territories, Smith suggested that the Nisquallys had used the upper Nisqually and Paradise river drainages and the Tatoosh Range; the Puyallups had used the west side of Mount Rainier and Carbon River valley; the Muckleshoots had used the upper White River drainage on the north side of Mount Rainier; the Yakimas had used the high parks on the east side of the mountain from Yakima Park to Cowlitz Divide; and the Taidnapam had used the Ohanapecosh River and Muddy Fork drainages. [34]

Subsequent studies of the Yakima and Puget Sound Indians tended to deflate Smith's argument that the area of the park was at one time divided among five Indian groups. Although Smith's report stood as the last scholarly investigation of the ethnographic sources on aboriginal use of Mount Rainier, his conceptual approach was superseded. Later anthropologists started with the premise that political and territorial divisions between Indian groups in the Puget Sound region were inconsequential or nonexistent before the treaties of 1854-55. Neighboring groups were linked by kinship ties, joint ceremonial gatherings, and use of common territory. Groups within each major river drainage had especially strong ties, but there were no breaks in the social network, which extended throughout the southern Puget Sound region and even over the mountains. There were no formal political institutions uniting the villages in each drainage into a tribe. Such tribal divisions as existed after the treaties of 1854-55 were weakly defined and imposed from outside by the treaty-makers. One of the purposes of the treaties was to create political entities that, in theory, would facilitate federal—Indian relations in Washington Territory. [35]

Each of the treaties described a distinct cession of land to the United States by the undersigned chiefs, headmen, and delegates of the designated tribes. The area that became Mount Rainier National Park touched on three of these land cessions. The Treaty of Medicine Creek, concluded in December 1854 with representatives of the Nisqually, Puyallup, Steilacoom, Squaxin, and other bands, extinguished Indian title to an area around the south end of Puget Sound and eastward to the crest of the Cascade Range. The Treaty of Point Elliot, concluded a few weeks later in January 1855, encompassed all of the western slope of the Cascade Range in Washington Territory north of the area ceded by the Treaty of Medicine Creek, including what became the northeast portion of Mount Rainier National Park. The Treaty with the Yakama of June 9, 1855 described a land cession boundary "commencing at Mount Ranier" (sic) and circling around the Columbia Plateau to "the main ridge of the Cascade Mountains; and thence along said ridge to the place of beginning." It was many years before surveys revealed that Mount Rainier lay west of the Cascade summit, making this description ambiguous. In any case, it was unclear exactly what the boundaries

implied. Article III of the treaty reserved to the Indians "the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle upon open and unclaimed land," but did not stipulate whether this privilege extended beyond the boundaries of the land cession to all accustomed hunting and gathering places. [36] There is no question that Yakima Indians did cross the Cascade summit to hunt and gather in what is now Mount Rainier National Park.

Ethnobotanist Eugene S. Hunn discussed the Yakimas' hunting and gathering in the Cascade Range in Nch'i-Wana "The Big River" (1990). He noted that the Plateau environment did not afford the Yakimas an abundant supply of big game, and that hunting made up a much smaller portion of their diet than fishing and gathering. The Yakimas hunted year-round, but fall was their most productive season, for then they established camps in high mountain meadows where the women gathered berries and the men hunted elk and deer. Interestingly, Hunn's informants told him that the Yakimas did not hunt the hoary marmot. "In the Indian world view it is associated with preternatural beings, the little people, whose whistling might seduce the lone hunter, calling him ever on until he loses all track of time, space, and identity. This species of 'alpine madness' is much feared and, it seems, inhibits the exploitation of the potential resources of the zone above timberline." [37] Though Hunn did not specifically address the Yakimas' use of the Mount Rainier area (his key informants, James Selam and family, described their use of the alpine meadows between Mount Adams and Mount Saint Helens) his work suggested that there was more to be learned about the Yakimas and Mount Rainier.

Hunn related how he and Selam, returning to the Selam family's hunting and berrying ground in the Gifford Pinchot National Forest in 1983, found the meadows less extensive than formerly. This was an inevitable consequence of eighty years of fire suppression, and aptly illustrated one more way in which the Indian past was important to Mount Rainier National Park. Wrote Hunn:

> An old-time ranger I met at the Naches Ranger Station recalled how he used to rave at the Indians for their "carelessness" with fire, as frequent fires were attributed to them during the late summer season. What the ranger failed to appreciate was the fact that fire is one of the Indians' most powerful tools of food production. Fire creates sunny openings in the forest, creates edges that foster the rapid spread of nutritious herbs and shrubs, most notably the black mountain huckleberry and related species, blueberry and grouseberry. . . . Such zones of increased natural productivity draw deer and elk within the hunter's range as well. Though knowledge of the traditional use of intentional burning to create favorable habitat has been all but forgotten by contemporary Plateau Indians, evidence.., shows that the ecological role of fire was known and manipulated in complex ways by Indians from California to Canada. [38]

Park officials long recognized that Indians who annually visited the Mount Rainier area made it their practice to set fires as they left the area each fall. "Burning made the country better for the Indians," explained Grenville F. Allen, a former supervisor of Mount Rainier National Park and member of the U.S. Forest Service when he wrote Forests of Mount Rainier National Park in 1922. "The fires kept down the brush and made it more accessible. Deer could be more easily seen and tracked and the huckleberry patches spread more widely over the hills." [39] Even before Mount Rainier National Park was established, Fred Plummer of the General Land Office surveyed the forest reserve and reported thousands of acres had been burned, much of it intentionally.

What changed from Allen's and Plummer's time to Hunn's was less the awareness of Indian burning than foresters' perception of it. For most foresters in the first half of the twentieth

century, intentional burning might make sense from the standpoint of a hunting and gathering people but it was wasteful from the standpoint of modern forest conservation. Indeed, as foresters moved toward their goal of total fire suppression, they lumped the logger's practice of burning slash with the homesteader's and Indian's practice of burning underbrush or making forest clearings all under the derogatory label of "Paiute forestry." [40] Taking their cue from modern forestry, NPS officials, like the Forest Service ranger in Hunn's account, failed to appreciate the Indians' practice of setting fires. Moreover, they saw no reason to preserve the Indians' role in the fire ecology of the area. It was only with the NPS's new fire policy in 1968 that some national parks began to use "underburning" as a means of restoring plant diversity in some areas. Essentially, the new policy was an attempt to mimic the part that Indians had once played in manipulating the forest ecology. Prescribed burning remained uncommon in the national park system and was not applied in Mount Rainier.

In summary, the relationship of Indians to Mount Rainier is a complex one. Inasmuch as the national park is a celebration of the American heritage, it has made Indians like Sluiskin and Henry into symbols. Although Indian use of the area predated the establishment of the national park, the national park reshaped the Indians' relationship to Mount Rainier by profoundly influencing the way the Indian past was reconstructed. Indian legends concerning Mount Rainier and anecdotes concerning Indian use of the area were distorted at the same time that they were amplified by the existence of the national park. Furthermore, Indian use of the park was altered at the same time that past Indian use of the area was romanticized. Indian use of the area continued for several years after it became a national park. Hunting and gathering clashed with local citizens' views about how the national park should be used; these practices also clashed with the implementation of federal land management responsibilities.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART ONE: THE CULTURAL SETTING

II. MOUNT RAINIER AND AMERICAN SETTLEMENT

INTRODUCTION

National park managers have long understood that land uses outside parks, indeed long distances from parks, can produce environmental changes inside park boundaries. There are so many interrelationships between one kind of land use and another that no mere political boundaries can completely insulate an area from the environmental changes occurring around it. Wildlife populations, fire ecology, scenic vistas, and even air quality are affected by changes in the land around Mount Rainier National Park. Moreover, major land uses such as logging, the construction of the transcontinental railroads, and urbanization have shaped the political environment of Washington state. State and local politics, too, have had an important bearing on how the park was administered.

The cultural setting of western Washington is integral to Mount Rainier National Park's historical development. This section focuses on three salient features of this cultural setting: the timber industry, transportation links, and urbanization. The timber industry became the leading sector in the regional economy as early as the 1850s and remained so well into the twentieth century. Transcontinental railroads exerted enormous influence on the area's development in the 1880s and after. The railroads in turn created the necessary conditions for the rise of Seattle and Tacoma in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century. The cities did more than any other factor to reshape people's attitudes about the wilderness and the way they used it.

THE TIMBER INDUSTRY

Early visitors to western Washington found that its wet climate had produced a lush growth of Douglas fir, hemlock, spruce, and cedar, from the slopes of the Cascades to the very edge of Puget Sound. Early lumbermen recognized the region's economic potential as soon as the California gold rush created a market for lumber on the west coast. The industry began on the shores of Puget Sound in the early 1850s with California-owned sawmills erected at Port Ludlow, Port Blakely and Port Madison, and with a New England-owned sawmill built at Port Gamble. The new companies soon expanded on their coastal trade by finding markets in Hawaii and around the Pacific Rim. Approximately eighty percent of investment in Washington Territory's economy in the 1860s and 1870s went into lumbering. [1] Nevertheless, without railroad connections to eastern markets the industry remained small in comparison to lumbering operations elsewhere in the nation. Before the coming of the railroads, one historian has written, "northwest lumber [was] something like Robinson Crusoe's pile of gold; there was lots of it but it was worth very little since there was so little opportunity to use it." [2]

The first major change in Washington's timber industry occurred with the completion of the transcontinental Northern Pacific Railroad in 1883. The railroad stimulated settlement, created local markets for lumber, and linked the Pacific Northwest to markets back east. These changes also attracted new investment capital to the region, particularly from Midwestern lumber barons who faced dwindling supplies of timber for their operations in the Great Lakes States. They found Washington lands not only more heavily timbered per acre than what they were used to, but far cheaper as well. Making often fraudulent use of the Timber and Stone Act of 1878, lumber companies acquired hundreds of thousands of acres of timberland from the public domain in the 1880s. The land grab by these lumber companies was an important spur to the creation of Washington's first forest reserves in the 1890s. [3]

The center of lumbering in Washington shifted in these years from the upper Puget Sound region southward to Tacoma and westward to Grays Harbor. Lumber interests built numerous branch railroads inland to exploit new timberlands. They were aided further by the introduction of the steam-powered donkey engine which could move logs farther and faster than the old ox-team and skid road method of logging. While the old mill ports continued to handle the waterborne lumber trade, these mostly California-owned companies found themselves at a competitive disadvantage with the new lumber companies which used the railroads to reach much wider markets. [4]

A second major change in Washington's lumber industry developed after the turn of the century as lumbermen began coming to grips with the fact that the state's timber supply was not limitless. The larger companies began to seek a change from the "cut-and-run" logging operations of the nineteenth century to less wasteful methods of timber harvesting based largely on economy of scale. Symbolic of this transition was Midwest timber magnate Frederick Weyerhaeuser's purchase in 1900 of 900,000 acres of Washington timberland from the Northern Pacific's land grant holdings. In three and a half years Weyerhaeuser increased the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company's interests in western Washington to 1.3 million acres. These huge holdings by one of the nation's leading timber barons showed that the center of the timber industry had shifted from the Midwest to the Pacific Northwest. At the same time, lumbermen began to work in cooperation with government foresters to address what were seen as the two biggest imperatives for improved efficiency in the timber industry: protection of forests from wildfire and reform of the property tax system. To this end, lumbermen and foresters formed the Washington Forest Fire Association in 1908 and the Western Forestry and Conservation Association in 1909, and supported the establishment of a Forestry School at the University of Washington in 1907. [5]

Efficiency was also the watchword of the new conservation movement. Led by Gifford Pinchot, forestry "professionals" sought to manage forests as though they were crops, harvesting trees when they were "ripe," protecting stands against fire and disease, guarding against deforestation and soil erosion. Government forestry initially focused on research and conceived of its role as an advisory one; after the turn of the century, however, the Forestry Bureau (later the U.S. Forest Service) began to concern itself primarily with the management of forest reserves (national forests). In Washington, as elsewhere in the West, leaders in the timber industry generally supported conservation as part of their drive to resolve problems of overcompetition and supply. Opposition to the forest reserves came mainly from smaller concerns as well as agricultural and mining interests. The groundswell of suspicion by westerners toward federal control of resources reached a peak during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, in the first decade after Mount Rainier National Park was established.

All of the land included in the park today was previously set aside as forest reserve or national forest land. The Pacific Forest Reserve, proclaimed on February 20, 1893, formed roughly a square thirty-five miles on a side, with the summit of Mount Rainier on its western

edge. A subsequent presidential proclamation on February 22, 1897 changed the name of the reserve to the Mount Rainier Forest Reserve and greatly enlarged its boundaries to the west and south. [6] By the time Mount Rainier National Park was established in 1899, the timber industry was already shaping western Washington's cultural landscape in ways that reached far beyond the extent of actual logging operations. Forest lands throughout the Cascade Mountains were being surveyed, purchased, taxed, protected from fire, and placed in reserves for future logging operations and for watershed protection. These myriad forest activities created a political and economic climate which continued to affect land use around and even inside the national park after it was established.

THE RAILROADS

Railroads shaped the cultural setting of Mount Rainier in a very different way than the timber industry. Their primary significance was in binding the Pacific Northwest more closely to the national economy. They not only brought a flood of new settlers to Washington and carried Washington's products to eastern markets, but their advent encouraged an influx of investment capital into the Pacific Northwest as well. The railroads themselves required great concentrations of capital; consequently, the railroad companies wielded enormous political and economic power. The railroads were engines of economic growth in their own right, consuming locally-produced timber and coal and employing labor in railroad construction. [7] They even had the ability, through their popular advertising posters and brochures, to mold public attitudes toward the national parks. [8] Finally, branch lines affected land use and settlement patterns in the vicinity of Mount Rainier.

Washington's railroad history began in 1853, when the territory's first governor, Isaac I. Stevens, journeyed west to take up his new post in Olympia. Stevens actually wore three hats when he came west: besides governor, he was Superintendent of Indian Affairs and leader of the survey of the northern route for a transcontinental railroad. Stevens' role in making treaties with the Indians has been noted; his transcontinental railroad survey was one of four which Congress authorized with a view to binding the far western territories to the nation and improving commercial access to Asia. Due to growing sectional differences between North and South, however, the federal government delayed action on the transcontinental railroad schemes until the Civil War. Congress then passed a law which chartered the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific (1862) and the Northern Pacific (1864), the latter to follow the approximate route of the Stevens survey. [9]

The government provided the Northern Pacific with an enormous land grant, the largest of any land-grant railroad, with which to pay for construction. The grant consisted of a strip of land 200 feet wide as a right of way, plus a swath of alternate sections along the railroad's entire length, ten miles to either side of the railroad in the states and twenty miles in the territories. As the original charter provided that the railroad would cross the Cascade Range by way of the Yakima River, the Northern Pacific's grant covered the area of the future Mount Rainier National Park. The company, however, could not claim title to the land until it built the railroad and surveyed the lands, so to help the company out of financial straits Congress modified the charter such that the railroad could mortgage its land grant beforehand. [10] When the Northern Pacific went bankrupt in 1873 without having completed the line, Washington residents demanded that the grant be rescinded so that the lands would be open for other uses. But the Northern Pacific retained these lands, and popular resentment toward the railroad and the land grant continued to be very strong for many years. [11]

The coming of the Northern Pacific Railroad spurred an intense competition between Tacoma and Seattle to be chosen for the terminal city. Seattle lost. In 1870, the company modified its plan so that the main line would follow the Columbia River to Portland, utilizing an existing

twenty-mile railroad section belonging to the Oregon Steam Navigation Company, and then go north up the west side of the Cascades to Tacoma, thereby acquiring an additional 2 million acres of timber land along the Columbia and Cowlitz valleys. [12] Though the line from the Columbia River to Tacoma was completed before the company went bankrupt, it still did not link the city by rail to the eastern United States or give Tacoma much assurance that it would become the queen city in western Washington. Seattle fought hard in the 1870s to hold its ground as the most populous settlement on Puget Sound, attempting among other things to build its own railroad over the mountains to eastern Washington using local capital and labor. Both cities had to wait nearly another decade for their long-sought railroad connection to the eastern United States. In 1881 railroad financier Henry Villard brought all the existing railroads in Oregon together with the Northern Pacific and the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company and completed the transcontinental connection through Idaho and Montana two years later.

The completion of the Northern Pacific Railroad in 1883 began a period of economic boom in Washington state's history. This period was punctuated by the completion of three more transcontinental lines over the next two and a half decades. In the mid-1880s, the Union Pacific constructed a branch from its main transcontinental line known as the Oregon Short Line. This line went from Ogden, Utah through southern Idaho and eastern Oregon to the Columbia River, and made the Union Pacific the second transcontinental to reach the Pacific Northwest. [13] In 1889, railroad magnate James J. Hill inaugurated a plan to construct another transcontinental—the Great Northern—further north, relying on many local feeder lines rather than federal land grants to help finance it. This time Seattle, with the help of its short, pre-existing railroads, secured the prize of western terminal. The railroad's golden spike was driven at Stevens Pass in 1893. [14] In 1909, still one more transcontinental line was built to Puget Sound: the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul (known as the Milwaukee Road) completed the only electrified line from the Midwest to Seattle. Later these four transcontinental railroads—Northern Pacific, Union Pacific, Great Northern, and the Milwaukee Road—would figure prominently as potential financiers in the development of Mount Rainier National Park.

Branch railroads were almost as important as the transcontinentals in shaping the cultural landscape around Mount Rainier. Branch lines linked Seattle and Tacoma to coal fields in the Cascade foothills, stimulated agricultural development, and determined the location of outlying farm communities. The rail connections between the Puget Sound cities and the coal fields were essential to the development of western Washington's coal mines, which supplied the steamships engaged in the timber industry. Seattle businessmen were particularly aggressive in getting rail connections to the coal beds, for it was largely coal exports which enabled the small city of about 1,000 residents to maintain its lead over Tacoma in population growth during the late 1870s and early 1880s. The development of the Seattle and Walla Walla Railroad, built as far as Renton in the 1870s, gave the city an early advantage over Tacoma in attracting the coal trade, while the Columbia and Puget Sound Railroad pushed from Renton to the Black Diamond coal mines in 1882 and into the Cedar River Valley in 1884. [15]

Further south and nearer Mount Rainier, Northern Pacific surveyors discovered coal beds in the Carbon River drainage in 1875 while surveying the Northern Pacific's eventual route over the Cascades via Stampede Pass. Years before it completed its main line over the Cascades, the Northern Pacific built a branch line from Tacoma through South Prairie to these coal beds, giving rise to the mining town of Wilkeson at the end of the line. As the Northern Pacific began construction of its main line over the Cascades in 1884-85, it stimulated interest in the timber resources on the plateau between the White and Puyallup rivers and the clearing of bottomlands for agriculture. New towns sprang up along the railroad. Enumclaw was platted between 1885 and 1890 and had a population of nearly 500 by 1900. [16] The

Orting townsite was filed in 1887, while the platting of South Prairie and Buckley followed the next year. The former enjoyed steady growth as the Puyallup Valley was turned into farmland; the latter thrived as fruit growers moved into the White River Valley. [17]

Both the Northern Pacific and the Milwaukee Road took an interest in developing branch lines to tap the timber and mineral resources in the upper Nisqually and Cowlitz valleys. In 1890, the Milwaukee Road incorporated the Puget Sound, Mt. Tacoma and Eastern Railroad Company, whose tracks were to run southeast from Tacoma past Lake Kapowsin to the Nisqually River, and then up that valley toward Mount Rainier. As the depression of 1893 delayed construction, the initiative temporarily passed to the Northern Pacific, who sold an option on its extensive timber holdings in the upper Nisqually and Cowlitz valleys to the St. Paul and Tacoma Lumber Company in exchange for that company's promise to build a line into the area. By 1896, this railroad, the Tacoma, Orting and Southeastern Railroad, had reached the western shore of Lake Kapowsin but was running into financial difficulty. The Northern Pacific, more interested in selling its timber holdings than gaining the additional traffic over its system, backed the Puget Sound, Mt. Tacoma and Eastern Railroad instead. [18] In 1902, the so-called Tacoma and Eastern reached the new town of Eatonville, and two years later reached as far as Ashford, seven miles from the new national park boundary. [19]

These railroads were built primarily to exploit the timber and coal resources in the Cascade foothills rather than to profit from passenger traffic to Mount Rainier. However, the railroads were always looking for additional sources of income for their lines and they were certainly not blind to the possibility of developing a lucrative tourist business, as the Tacoma and Eastern's subsequent investments in Mount Rainier National Park would demonstrate. After 1899, the Northern Pacific would repeatedly consider the possibility of extending its line from Wilkeson into the northwest corner of the park with this purpose in view. Yet, defying expectations, Mount Rainier National Park never developed as close a relationship to the major railroad companies as some other western national parks did. The simple explanation for this is that tourism was incidental to the area railroads' main objectives, which were timber and coal. More importantly, however, the relationship between the railroads and this national park was tempered by the proximity of Seattle and Tacoma. These two cities would prove to be the real driving forces of Mount Rainier National Park's development, providing local initiative for road and hotel construction and a concentrated population of park users with an effective political voice.

THE CITIES

Surpassing the influence of both Washington's timber industry and the railroads, the growth of a major metropolitan area on Puget Sound became the most important feature of Mount Rainier National Park's cultural setting. The cities of Seattle and Tacoma provided much of the stimulus for the establishment of Mount Rainier National Park and much of the capital for its development. The cities' chambers of commerce boosted the national park and involved themselves deeply in its administration, both through the state's senators and congressmen and through their self-appointed Rainier National Park Advisory Board. Residents of Seattle and Tacoma accounted for a large proportion of the park's visitors, many of whom found a voice for influencing park administration through outing clubs like The Mountaineers. The proximity of Mount Rainier National Park to the two cities made the park increasingly oriented to weekend and day use by automobilists. Arguably, the relationship of this park to its nearest cities was more pronounced than that of any other national park in the United States. [20]

Puget Sound cities made Mount Rainier into an icon. In this 1878 etching the Northern Pacific Railway Company 's terminal city of Tacoma and Mount Rainier appear bound together by destiny. Only the tideflats separate the city and the wilderness.

Even before the establishment of Mount Rainier National Park, citizens of Seattle and Tacoma laid claim to the mountain as a symbol of the good life in the Pacific Northwest. The beauty of Puget Sound's forests, lakes, tidewater, and mountains was a source of civic pride, and the image of Mount Rainier looming on the horizon beyond Seattle's Lake Washington or Tacoma's Commencement Bay was the most commonly used symbol of that pride. This is evident from the booster literature of the period. Boosters were the advertising professionals of their day; they were sensitive to public tastes and attitudes. Boosters for Seattle and Tacoma, of which there was no shortage in the late nineteenth century, were probably not being unrealistic when they perceived western Washington's scenery as a selling point for attracting immigrants, investment capital, and tourists to their cities. But Seattle's and Tacoma's boosters were not simply describing the way things were; they were crafting an image of their respective cities which would have far-reaching consequences for the development of Mount Rainier National Park.

In describing Mount Rainier's natural beauty, boosters generally implied that the mountain had a tonic effect on the cities' residents even as they viewed it from Seattle or Tacoma. One offering by the Seattle Chamber of Commerce described the city's setting as "magnificent," with the Cascades visible to the east and the Olympics to the west, while to the south, "even these grand features are dwarfed by the stupendous Mt. Rainier." [21] A souvenir edition by the Seattle Daily Times in 1900 asserted that Puget Sound possessed greater scenic attractions than any place in the country, "and it is very much doubted if any other spot on earth can excel it." [22]Crawford & Conover Publishers averred, "The Scenery on Puget Sound, and especially that in the immediate neighborhood of Seattle, is truly grand. This adds not a little to the pleasure of living in this favored region." [23] To drive home the connection between the Puget Sound cities and the mountain scenery, these works frequently used a view of Mount Rainier for their frontispiece. [24] Scenic appreciation became such a motif in the booster literature on Seattle and Tacoma that it eventually provoked the otherwise incomprehensible book title, You Still Can't Eat Mt. Rainier! [25]

Seattle's appropriation of the mountain's image reached a climax with the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition of 1909. The city's boosters intended to demonstrate that Seattle had arrived as one of the great cities of the nation, and the AYP fair featured exhibitions on Alaska and the Orient, underscoring Seattle's importance as a port city. Seattle invested $10

million on the buildings and grounds near Lake Washington, on what would become the University of Washington campus, and advertisements projected an image of a sophisticated "Ivory City" in a land of Eden.

Like Tacoma, Seattle tried to incorporate Mount Rainier into its own image. In 1909 Seattle's Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition featured a view of Mount Rainier down Rainier Vista. Note that this is a composite photograph in which the mountain and forest appear closer to the city than they really are. *(Frank Nowell photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. Nowell 1040A.)*

> On every hand stretch green lawns, shaded walks and glowing flower beds. In every nook and corner the cactus dahlias, rhododendrons and flowering shrubs of the big woods of Washington are massed in profusion. Down Rainier Vista, across the sparkling blue waters of Lake Washington, majestic Mt. Rainier raises her massive head among the clouds, and over all, the blue sky and balmy air of summer on the Puget Sound make of the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition a veritable fairyland. [26]

Rainier Vista formed the main axis of the fairgrounds, so that the view of Mount Rainier was framed by beautiful buildings down either side of the promenade and the play of Geyser Fountain in the center foreground. This was the scene around which the whole complex was oriented.

While the 1890s and 1900s marked the heyday of Seattle's identification with Mount Rainier, Tacomans had been trying to lay claim to the mountain's symbolism for much longer. Indeed, their city took the name Tacoma from the Indian word for "snow peak," which it was said the Indians applied specifically to Mount Rainier, and much of the boosters' efforts to identify their city with Mount Rainier focused on getting the name of the mountain officially changed to Mount Tacoma. The effort dated from as early as 1873, though it reached fever pitch on three subsequent occasions: in 1890 and 1917, when it was twice brought before the United States Geographic Board, and in 1925, when it briefly claimed the attention of Congress. The desire of Tacomans to capitalize on this name association was, of course, the real basis for the feud over the mountain's name, even though the debate focused mainly on the authenticity

of the Indian name "Tacoma" and the allegedly unpatriotic and prosaic flavor of the official name "Rainier." [27]

According to testimony given to the United States Geographic Board in 1917, the founder of Tacoma, one Morton M. McCarver, decided to change the name of his new townsite from Commencement City to Tacoma on the advice of a visitor who had just read Theodore Winthrop's Canoe and Saddle and had been struck by Winthrop's use of the Indian name "Tacoma" for Mount Rainier. [28] McCarver's whole object in founding Tacoma was to select a townsite which the Northern Pacific Railroad would choose as its western terminus, and naming his town for the region's most prominent landmark was shrewd. When the Northern Pacific did choose Tacoma, it too saw the advantage of linking the mountain to the city by name association. In 1883, the company announced in its Northwest Magazine:

> The Indian name Tacoma will hereafter be used in the.. .publications of the Northern Pacific Railroad.. .instead of Rainier, which the English Captain Vancouver gave to this magnificent peak when he explored the waters of Puget Sound in the last century. [29]

Ironically, the railroad's decision probably did more than anything else to perpetuate the use of "Mount Tacoma" even while it gave opponents their strongest evidence that the name change was a promotional scheme. [30]

The controversy over the mountain's name revealed how both Puget Sound cities, through their symbolic use of the mountain's image, were trying to claim a kind of proprietary interest in it. It was symptomatic of the two cities' keen competition not only to become the most well-known city in the Pacific Northwest, but also to gain the best railroad connections, capture the most hinterland, and even (as will be seen in later chapters) secure the best access roads to Mount Rainier. Mount Rainier historian Arthur D. Martinson has written, "in hindsight, it seems strange, perhaps silly, that Seattle and Tacoma spent an inordinate amount of time trying to prove which one owned Mt. Rainier. By the same token, beneath all the flimflam carried out in the newspapers and other publications, the controversy showed some enduring western characteristics: local pride, developmental patterns and, above all, love of landscape." [31] That the name of the mountain could stir such strong partisan feeling for so many years was proof of the boosters' claims that residents of Seattle and Tacoma genuinely cherished their mountain scenery.

The cities' boosters were right about the local inhabitants in another respect: residents of Seattle and Tacoma came to view a trip to the mountain as a favorite destination for country outings, and a climb to its summit as the supreme physical challenge in the region. As late as the 1880s, a trip to the mountain was still almost an expeditionary event, but in the last decade of the nineteenth century it evolved fairly rapidly into a more commonplace activity. By the early twentieth century, the new national park was already experiencing the kind of visitor use pattern that would become more and more pronounced as time went on: the weekend day-trippers had arrived.

Aubrey Haines has told the history of Mount Rainier's pioneer climbs in Mountain Fever (1963), while Dee Molenaar has carried the story into the twentieth century in The Challenge of Rainier (1971). Haines in particular has shown how early climbing expeditions fostered local interest in the mountain and even contributed to the national park movement. Many of the pioneer climbers subsequently played important roles in the campaign to establish the park. Among the first four men to reach the summit—Hazard Stevens and Philemon B. Van Trump in August 1870, and Samuel F. Emmons and A.D. Wilson in October 1870—two of them, Van Trump and Emmons, actively supported the national park campaign in the 1890s. Other pioneer climbers who later worked on behalf of Mount Rainier's preservation included

George B. Bayley, who reached the summit with Van Trump and James Longmire in 1883; John Muir and Edward S. Ingraham, who climbed the mountain in 1888; Ernest C. Smith, Fay Fuller, and Eliza R. Scidmore, who publicized their climbs in the early 1890s with writings, lectures, and lantern slide presentations; and Israel C. Russell and Bailey Willis, members of a geological party who were the first to traverse the mountain's summit in 1896.

Mount Rainier climbers formed the Washington Alpine Club in 1891, and its long-lived offspring, The Mountaineers, a few years later. Seattle and Tacoma newspapers followed the climbers' exploits with avid interest. The return of a mountain climbing party was cause for much excitement, as when Ingraham's party of thirteen men and women paraded down the street in Tacoma in 1894, attired in alpine clothing and alpenstocks in hand, looking "like a band of warriors." [32] According to a newspaper account, the Ingraham party drew a crowd of one hundred or more onlookers, and obviously courting the attention, shouted in unison to the crowd:

> We are here!
> We are here!
> Right from the top
> Of Mount Rainier!

Such antics seem silly one hundred years later, but they were indicative of the unique cultural setting being formed in the Puget Sound cities. The local mountaineers would play a substantial role in the national park's founding. Some of the individuals in the Ingraham party, for example, would shortly engage in a vigorous debate in the Tacoma Ledger over the source and extent of vandalism at Paradise Park and what ought to be done about it.

Closely akin to the mountain climbing expeditions in this era were the horseback riding, fishing, and camping parties who visited Mount Rainier. As early as the 1880s, the Northern Pacific Railroad found that sufficient demand existed to run excursion cars from Tacoma to Wilkeson, where tourist parties hired horses and guides for trips into the Carbon River highcountry. The best-known guide for the northwest approach to Mount Rainier was George Driver, proprietor of the Valley Hotel in Wilkeson. [33] Meanwhile, on the southwest side of the mountain, Yelm mountain guide and pioneer James Longmire, seeing the future in tourism, found an attractive site by a mineral springs on which to develop his own hotel and spa. In 1884, with the help of some Indians, Longmire cleared a wagon road from Succotash Valley (Ashford) thirteen miles to the springs (Longmire), where he built a rough cabin. [34] In 1887, he filed a mineral claim of twenty acres, and the following year his son Elcaine built a second cabin outside the mineral claim. By 1889, the Longmire family had two bathhouses and some guest cabins completed and were advertising their health spa in the Tacoma newspapers, and by next season they were operating a rustic two-story hotel. [35]

James Longmire looked to the cities not only for business but for help in developing Mount Rainier's tourist potential. In 1891, he addressed a joint meeting of the Washington Alpine Club and the Tacoma Academy of Science, proposing the construction of a road from Kernahan's ranch (Ashford) to Paradise Park (Paradise) "so that a buggy might get up there." [36] Tacomans reacted favorably to the idea. They saw an opportunity to detain in Pierce County a portion of the summer tourists who visited the Puget Sound region each summer. Moreover, it was rumored that King County was sending out surveyors to locate a route from Seattle to Mount Rainier. As one member of the Tacoma Chamber of Commerce remarked to the Board of County Commissioners, "We want to be known the world over as a park city . . . why should we not profit by this—one of our great natural resources?" [37]

As it turned out, Tacomans were not as generous as they initially indicated that they would be, and Longmire built the road with his own money and with a gang of laborers whom he

hired locally. Nevertheless, the incident reflected how like-minded Tacoma businessmen and the business-minded Longmire were about the commercial possibilities of scenic appreciation. The idea that Mount Rainier's scenic grandeur was a commodity which could be packaged and sold came to be shared by many people in Tacoma and Seattle in the course of the next century. It would form an important part of the national park's cultural setting.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART TWO: FOUNDING YEARS, 1893-1916

III. ESTABLISHMENT OF MOUNT RAINIER NATIONAL PARK

INTRODUCTION

Mount Rainier National Park was the nation's fifth national park. Established by an act of Congress in 1899, it followed Yellowstone in 1872 and Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant National Parks in 1890. [1] Mount Rainier had a significant part in the founding of the National Park System. Even more than the three California parks which preceded it, Mount Rainier National Park served to differentiate the idealistic purposes of national parks from the more utilitarian functions of national forests, or "forest reserves" as they were known at the time. As the first national park established after the founding of the national forest system in the 1890s, Mount Rainier demonstrated that the emerging national park idea was not to be subsumed by the burgeoning conservation movement, whose central goal was to increase efficiency in the use and development of the nation's resources. The establishment of Mount Rainier National Park reaffirmed the nation's intent to set aside certain areas of outstanding scenic and scientific value for the enjoyment of present and future generations. The arguments that were marshalled in support of Mount Rainier National Park during the 1890s helped shape the national park idea at a crucial time.

The legislation which established the park was in some ways precedent-setting. Mount Rainier was the first national park to be created from lands that were already set aside as forest reserves, forming a precedent for numerous national parks established in the twentieth century. Lands within the park boundary which had been granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company were reclaimed under the act in order to make the national park whole. This insistence on federal ownership of the land became another hallmark of American national parks in the twentieth century. In other respects, the act which created Mount Rainier National Park followed the Yellowstone prototype and reinforced an emerging pattern of national park legislation. For these reasons, it is appropriate to examine the origins of Mount Rainier National Park in a national context.

It needs to be noted, however, that the founding of Mount Rainier National Park was very much a local affair. Unlike the campaign for Yellowstone National Park, much of the impetus for the park came from the local populace. Local mountaineering clubs, newspaper editors, businessmen's associations, and University of Washington faculty all voiced support for the national park. Without their sustained interest, it is doubtful that Washington state's senators and congressmen would have shown such perseverence in pushing the legislation through Congress. After 1900, Seattle and Tacoma businessmen were unusually aggressive in seeking congressional appropriations for the park. Seattle and Tacoma pleasure-seekers increasingly traveled to the park by automobile, establishing a pattern of visitor use in Mount Rainier National Park that would persist throughout the twentieth century. Thus the park's

founding years also reflect the growing influence of Seattle and Tacoma on their western Washington hinterland.

The campaign for Mount Rainier National Park cannot be neatly characterized or narrated. It involved many disparate elements. No single figure stood out as the leader of the campaign, nor did any single organization coordinate it. A handful of scientists who had had personal experience with Mount Rainier might be considered the driving force behind the campaign. They were scattered all around the nation, knew each other professionally, and used the opportunity of professional meetings to form committees and prepare memorials to Congress setting forth the reasons for a national park. A few dozen mountaineers, most of whom resided in the Puget Sound area, could also be considered the driving force behind the campaign. It was largely due to their infectious enthusiasm for the mountain, which they communicated through public talks and letters to the local newspapers, that Washington state's senators and congressmen came to view the national park campaign as a popular cause. The Northern Pacific Railroad Company could also be credited with helping to spawn the park idea in 1883 and finally bringing the national park legislation to fruition in the late 1890s. Its shadowy role in the long legislative history of the bill was crucial in the end.

The campaign was also prolonged. In a loose sense of the term the "campaign" dates from 1883, when a party of prominent Europeans traveled via the Northern Pacific Railroad to Wilkeson and the Carbon River area, and afterwards urged that the mountain and its glaciers be set aside as a national park. Nothing came of this early proposal, however, and if the campaign is viewed as a concerted effort to push the idea in Congress, it really dates from the summer of 1893. Most of the arguments in support of the national park were advanced around this time. In still another sense, the campaign reached its crucial phase at the end of the decade, when some political horse-trading gave the establishing act its specific form.

This chapter examines the campaign for Mount Rainier National Park from three angles. First, who was involved? What was the relationship of the scientific community to the mountaineering community? What was the relationship of the national campaign to the local campaign? Second, how did the campaigners justify and define the national park and what did they contribute to the national park idea? In particular, how did they help to articulate the difference between national parks and national forests? Third, why did the legislation take the specific form that it did? How did it compare with other national park bills? What was the Northern Pacific Railroad's role in this legislation?

ELEMENTS OF A NATIONAL PARK CAMPAIGN

National park historian Alfred Runte has described the "pragmatic alliance" which the western railroads formed with the national park movement. [2] Railroad company officials saw a potential for increased passenger revenue as the federal government began to establish national parks in the West. Railroad companies lobbied for national park bills, financed and operated national park hotels, and promoted tourism to the parks. In return, national parks attracted tourists from the eastern United States who might otherwise spend their leisure time in Europe. The association of national parks and railroads also improved the railroad companies' public relations.

The Northern Pacific was the first railroad company to cultivate this partnership. As early as 1871, farsighted promoters of the Northern Pacific took an active interest in the legislation to establish Yellowstone Park, although it was not until 1883—the year that the transcontinental was completed—that the railroad offered service to Yellowstone via a short spur in south central Montana. That same year, the Northern Pacific began to promote the scenic attractions of Mount Rainier. It announced in its March issue of Northwest Magazine that it would

henceforth use the Indian name Mount Tacoma in all its publications, and it followed this with an article on Mount Tacoma in its April issue written by geologist Bailey Willis. [3] As a further part of its publicity campaign, the Northern Pacific invited a party of distinguished gentlemen from England and Germany to accompany Willis on an excursion to the Carbon River highcountry on the northwest flank of Mount Rainier. The party included Professor James Bryce, a writer and member of the British Parliament and Professor Karl von Zittel, a geologist. Duly impressed, these gentlemen returned the railroad's favor by putting their good names behind the first proposal for Mount Rainier National Park. They exclaimed over the glacier and woodland scenery of Mount Rainier in a public report which concluded with the hope "that the suggestion will at no distant date be made to Congress that Mount Rainier should, like the Yosemite Valley and the geyser region of the Upper Yellowstone, be reserved by the Federal Government and treated as a national park." [4] That same summer, Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont also took advantage of the new railroad connections to make a trip to Mount Rainier. "I would be willing to go 500 miles again to see that scene," the senator wrote in the Portland Oregonian. "This continent is yet in ignorance of the existence of what will be one of the grandest show places, as well as a sanitarium." [5]

The sponsorship of these trips was as visible a part as the Northern Pacific would ever take in the campaign for Mount Rainier National Park. It campaigned for the park through surrogates, and it later lobbied the Congress for an amendment to the park bill through discrete channels. Its role can be inferred but not directly documented. The company's surreptitious approach is easily explained. The Northern Pacific had received an immense land grant in Washington, which included the area of Mount Rainier. It had managed to retain the land grant in spite of many delays in the construction of the railroad and dubious modifications of its charter. The people of Washington deeply resented this and suspected that the company had used corrupt means to hold onto the land. Whatever genuine interest the Northern Pacific might have in scenic preservation, therefore, local people would inevitably see its support of a national park as nothing more than a greedy ploy to exchange worthless property in the Cascade Mountains for valuable timber land elsewhere. Consequently, the Northern Pacific had no overt role in the Mount Rainier National Park proposal. When the suggestion of a national park campaign in 1883 went nowhere, the Northern Pacific seems to have retired from the field. [6]

Yet the Northern Pacific was not irrelevant to the campaign that began in 1893 and eventually succeeded with the establishment of Mount Rainier National Park in 1899. The link between the Northern Pacific's stillborn park proposal in 1883 and the campaign in the 1890s was the former Northern Pacific geologist, Bailey Willis. Born in 1857 in Idlewild-on-Hudson, New York, the son of poet Nathaniel Parker Willis, he attended a boarding school in Germany and Columbia University in New York, where he received degrees in mining engineering and civil engineering. In the early 1880s, the Northern Pacific employed Willis to search for coal deposits north of Mount Rainier, introducing the young man to a wilderness country that claimed his interest for the rest of his life. [7] During these years Willis cut a trail up the Carbon River to Spray Park, and as noted above, led the Northern Pacific's party of dignitaries into the Carbon River highcountry in 1883. Willis joined the U.S. Geological Survey in 1882. He was still with the Survey in 1893 when he renewed the proposal for Mount Rainier National Park at the annual meeting of the Geological Society of America, held that year in Madison, Wisconsin. The Geological Society of America appointed a committee to memorialize Congress about the need to establish a national park around Mount Rainier. This marked the beginning of the successful national park campaign.

The campaign quickly gained support from many quarters. At a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, also in Madison, another committee was formed for the same purpose. Two months later the National Geographic Society, meeting in Washington, D.C., appointed a committee on the Mount Rainier National Park proposal, and

over the winter of 1893-94 both the recently-formed Sierra Club and the Appalachian Mountain Club, meeting in San Francisco and Boston respectively, formed like committees. These five committees combined their efforts in preparing a detailed memorial to Congress setting forth the reasons for the national park. This was the nucleus of the national park campaign. [8]

The first thing that stands out about this movement was the strong showing of scientists, particularly geologists. The Geological Society of America's committee consisted of three esteemed geologists in the U.S. Geological Survey: Dr. David T. Day, Samuel F. Emmons, and Bailey Willis. Day's prior connection with Mount Rainier, if any, is unknown. Emmons had climbed Mount Rainier in 1870 with A.D. Wilson—the second successful ascent of the mountain—at the conclusion of the Geological Exploration of the Fortieth Parallel, and had written a report on the volcanoes of the Pacific Coast. A protege of the first director of the U.S. Geological Survey, Clarence King, Emmons was head of the Survey's Rocky Mountain Division from 1879 until his death in 1911. Bailey Willis had explored the northwest side of Mount Rainier in the early 1880s while looking for coal deposits for the Northern Pacific. He would subsequently make the first reconnaissance of Mount Rainier's glacier system with Israel C. Russell and George Otis Smith in 1896. A specialist in mining geology, Willis's career with the USGS spanned from 1882 to 1915. [9] The American Association for the Advancement of Science, meanwhile, included two geologists on its committee: Russell, who had recently left the USGS to take a professorship at the University of Michigan, and Major John Wesley Powell, the USGS's current director. The USGS's support of the national park proposal was crucial, for it gave credibility to the argument that the area around Mount Rainier contained no significant mineral wealth. Other scientists on the AAAS's committee included Professor Joseph LeConte, a botanist; Bernhard E. Fernow, chief of the Forestry Bureau; and Clinton Hart Merriam, chief of the Biological Survey. This was a roll call of the politically powerful scientists of the day.

The National Geographic Society committee took the lead role among these organizations. The committee chairman was the president of the Society, Gardiner G. Hubbard, and its other members included Washington Senator Watson C. Squire, John W. Thompson, Mary F. Waite, and Eliza R. Scidmore. Squire introduced a park bill in the U.S. Senate on December 12, 1893. Hubbard hosted several of Squire's Senate colleagues at a National Geographic Society dinner at his home, where they were regaled with lantern slides and a lecture by veteran Mount Rainier climber Ernest C. Smith. [10]

The second notable feature of this campaign roster is the partnership of the scientific organizations with the mountain clubs. Men and women who had been to the top of Mount Rainier enjoyed great stature in the park movement and provided much of its drive. The two mountain clubs' committees included four individuals who had climbed Mount Rainier. Philemon B. Van Trump of the Sierra Club had accompanied Hazard Stevens on the first successful ascent of Mount Rainier in 1870. George B. Bayley. another member of the Sierra Club, had climbed the mountain with Van Trump and James Longmire in 1883. John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club and chairman of the committee on Mount Rainier, had made the ascent with Edward S. Ingraham of Seattle in 1888. The Appalachian Mountain Club committee included Ernest C. Smith, a Tacoma clergyman who had climbed the mountain with Ingraham in 1888 and two years later had led the party that included Fay Fuller, the first woman to make the ascent. All of these individuals campaigned for the national park by writing articles and giving lectures on Mount Rainier. Their involvement in the campaign underscores how much the Mount Rainier National Park idea was rooted in the physical and aesthetic experience of climbing the mountain. This is the point which Aubrey L. Haines makes convincingly in Mountain Fever: Historic Conquests of Rainier (1962).

The third significant feature of this campaign was its timing. The impetus for the campaign

was the proclamation by President Benjamin Harrison on February 20, 1893 of the Pacific Forest Reserve. The Pacific Forest Reserve embraced an area approximately forty-two miles long by thirty-six miles wide, centered on the crest of the Cascade Mountains. To the dismay of preservationists, this left Mount Rainier at the extreme western edge of the reserve, with its western glaciers extending outside the boundary. Moreover, some preservationists were skeptical about whether the forest reserve designation would afford Mount Rainier adequate protection from vandals or bring the desired government expenditures for road development. The purpose of the forest reserve was to protect timber and watershed values, not scenic values. Publicity on the Pacific Forest Reserve's shortcomings inspired the campaign for a national park. [11]

Local newspapers and mountain clubs in Seattle and Tacoma brought this issue into focus. Mount Rainier enthusiasts in the two cities were alert to these problems because they had been involved in an increasingly impassioned discourse on Mount Rainier for the past four to five years. Not only did the name of the mountain excite debate between the two cities, but other controversies involving Mount Rainier raged in the newspapers and mountain clubs: complaints about the appropriateness of new place names introduced on a map of Mount Rainier by Fred G. Plummer of Tacoma, dubious claims that Lieutenant August V. Kautz had attained the summit in 1857, and allegations of vandalism to trees by campers in Paradise Park. The rivalry between the two cities even caused a schism in the Washington Alpine Club, with Tacomans forming their own Tacoma Alpine Club in 1893. [12] As parochial as these issues seemed, they set the stage for the national park campaign. Between 1890 and 1893, Van Trump, Plummer, and various other local Mount Rainier enthusiasts proposed a national park, but their ideas got no further than the local newspapers. With the proclamation of the Pacific Forest Reserve on February 20, 1893, the area finally achieved the national recognition that these local interests coveted. Within a year of the proclamation, a national park bill was before Congress and petitions from the faculties of the University of Michigan, University of Wisconsin, and University of Washington were sent to Congress in support of the bill.



Pacific Forest Reserve and proposed Washington National Park. This map accompanied the memorial to Congress in 1893.

In summary, diverse interest groups successfully combined their efforts in the campaign for Mount Rainier National Park. These groups included scientific organizations and mountain clubs, university faculties and chambers of commerce, people of national stature and local newspaper editors. Their statements of support for the park were idealistic and public-spirited and showed no trace of suspicion that their interests might conflict with one another. That the campaign eventually succeeded was not due to any single compelling personality, but to all the campaigners' collective efforts and forthrightness.

ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL PARK

Even at its genesis, Mount Rainier National Park represented different things to different people. It would serve inspirational, educational, and recreational purposes. It would be of value to science. It would preserve the environmental quality of several large watersheds. It would stimulate tourism. Campaigners for the national park argued all of these points, often in combination. It is misleading to look for a single value at the core of the national park idea. The national park idea is more aptly construed as a shifting constellation of values.

This goes against the rhetoric of preservation. The rhetoric of preservation came out of the turn-of-the-century schism between preservation and conservation. Preservationists traditionally held that a national park was the "highest use" to which land could be put, in contrast to the "wise use" of multiple resources (or "multiple use," as it later came to be known). The rhetoric of preservation tended to imply that the national park idea had an irreducible core, that preservationists had a common purpose.

Some national park historians have tended to follow this lead. Joseph L. Sax, in his stimulating book Mountains Without Handrails: Reflections on the National Parks (1980) suggests that the core of the national park idea can be found in the nineteenth century writings of Frederick Law Olmsted. Sax interprets Olmsted's notion of the inspirational quality of scenic landscapes to mean that the core purpose of national parks is to promote "contemplative recreation." For Sax, the idea that contemplative recreation improves the self is the credo of all preservationists. This shared belief is their defining characteristic. Alfred Runte, meanwhile, argues in National Parks: The American Experience (2nd rev. ed. 1987) that the kernel of the national park idea can be found in the American people's "cultural anxiety" in the nineteenth century—the sense of impoverishment they felt when they compared American cultural attainments with the architectural monuments and works of art of Europe. This gave rise to "scenic nationalism" and an effort to showcase the nation's natural wonders in national parks. The parks provided an alternative expression of cultural richness. The problem with both these interpretations is that they misrepresent preservationists as a homogenous group with a unified philosophy. As we have seen, the Mount Rainier National Park campaign was a coalition of scientists and mountaineers, national figures and local interests—all with somewhat different ideas about what the national park should be.

Mount Rainier enthusiasts liked to trace the roots of their national park movement all the way back to Theodore Winthrop's Canoe and Saddle (1862). This book was a recollection of an 1853 trip from Puget Sound over the Cascades to the Columbia River by Washington Territory's original sightseer, and it contained some remarkable passages about Mount Rainier. Campaigners for the national park found in Winthrop's aesthetic response to the mountain a worthy, if old-fashioned, expression of their own nature appreciation. "Studying the light and the majesty of [Mount] Tacoma," Winthrop had written, "there passed from it and entered into my being, to dwell there evermore by the side of many such, a thought and an image of solemn beauty, which I could thenceforth evoke whenever in the world I must have peace or die." [13] Winthrop, like his contemporary, Frederick Law Olmsted, was

suggesting that scenic appreciation cultivated the mind and improved the soul. Although Winthrop himself stopped short of advocating a national park—the idea had scarcely been conceived at the time—he did intimate that the mountain possessed public value. "Up to Tacoma, or into some such solitude of nature, imaginative men must go, as Moses went up to Sinai, that the divine afflatus may stir within them," he wrote. [14] While Winthrop's response to the mountain was no doubt atypical of Puget Sound settlers in the 1850s, his book was important because it gave the national park movement in the 1890s a sense of history. [15]

The romantic notion that such a grand mountain presented an irresistable attraction to "imaginative men" also appealed to the veteran Mount Rainier climber Philemon B. Van Trump. He referred to the "contagion of mountain-climbing." Mount Rainier had the power to infect or cast a spell over people. And there was no doubt in Van Trump's mind that this enriched humanity. For Van Trump, mountaineers possessed the same heroic qualities as explorers: an indifference to danger or physical pain and an indominable will to conquer the unknown. Meditating on the pain that he still suffered from frostbite received many years earlier during a night on the summit of Mount Rainier, the pioneer climber wrote:

> Does any skeptic suppose that a true mountaineer regrets any heroic mountain exploit because of some mishap, or of some after pain or suffering entailed by reason of its accomplishment? Does he suppose that any of the many zealous navigators who sailed in that vain quest, the discovery of the mild open sea about the North Pole, bewailed the suffering he endured or the brave efforts he made? Does he imagine that man will ever cease his attempts to unravel the mystery of the North Pole, or to reach the summit of unconquered peaks, simply because of possible mishaps and sufferings attendant thereon? [16]

Van Trump advocated a national park beginning in 1891. Like Winthrop, what Van Trump admired most about Mount Rainier was what the mountain did to the men and women who tried to scale it. It made them better human beings.

Others in the campaign for Mount Rainier National Park emphasized the area's inspirational value not only for mountaineers but for the large numbers of tourists who would be drawn to the mountain's lower slopes. The geologist Israel C. Russell asserted in an article for Scribner's Magazine that to visit the mountain and its surrounding natural parks was to breath free air, renew one's health, and cultivate "the aesthetic sense that is awakened in every heart by an intimate acquaintance with nature in her finer moods." [17] Similarly, Carl Snyder wrote in The Review of Reviews that all those who visited the mountain would "gain a new pleasure, a larger artistic sense, and a higher inspiration from the contemplation of the grandeur and beauty" of Mount Rainier. [18] The nature experience would, like a good education, make a positive and lasting impression on each individual. "Its educational advantages would be of unspeakable value," claimed Senator Squire on the floor of the Senate. [19] For this reason, it was good public policy to preserve the mountain's inspirational value in a national park.

The most important early statement of Mount Rainier National Park's values, aside from the park's establishing act, was the memorial to Congress which Bailey Willis crafted on behalf of the five committees. The area, the memorial declared, contained "many features of unique interest and wonderful grandeur, which fit it peculiarly to be a national park, forever set aside for the pleasure and instruction of the people." [20] Here was a coupling of scenic and scientific values, of recreational and educational purposes. As might be expected, however, this document emphasized points of scientific interest. It described Mount Rainier's volcanic origins, vast glacier system, and unique assemblage of wildlife and plants. In an arresting phrase that would become the hallmark for how this park was interpreted, Willis

characterized Mount Rainier as "an arctic island in a temperate zone." He explained:

> In a bygone age an arctic climate prevailed over the Northwest and glaciers covered the Cascade Range. Arctic animals and arctic plants then lived throughout the region. As the climate became milder and glaciers melted, the creatures of the cold climate were limited in their geographic range to the districts of the shrinking glaciers. On the great peak the glaciers linger still. They give to it its greatest beauty. They are themselves magnificent, and with them survives a colony of arctic animals and plants which can not exist in the temperate climate of the less lofty mountains. These arctic forms are as effectually isolated as shipwrecked sailors on an island in mid-ocean. There is no refuge for them beyond their haunts on ice-bound cliffs. But even there the birds and animals are no longer safe from the keen sportsman, and the few survivors must soon be exterminated unless protected by the Government in a national park. [21]

Senator Squire reiterated this theme in a speech to Congress on July 26, 1894. The geologist Israel C. Russell, describing his traverse of the summit of Mount Rainier with Willis in 1896 in his article for Scribner's Magazine, attested to the mountain's geologic significance as a laboratory for the student of volcanism or glaciology. The idea was that a national park would not only protect natural features for scientific study; it would also ennoble the scientists. The national park was both a laboratory and a stage for American science. [22]

The campaign for Mount Rainier National Park also marshalled evidence that the area's scenic and scientific features were superlative examples of their kind in the nation and the world. Mount Rainier enthusiasts felt compelled to answer the question, why this mountain and not some other? There were inevitable comparisons with the Swiss Alps. All of Switzerland's glaciers, it was said, could not match the quantity of ice on Mount Rainier. Nor could Mont Blanc or any of the Swiss Alps match the impressiveness of this solitary mountain. How much this rhetoric stemmed from what Runte calls "scenic nationalism" and how much it simply owed to most educated Americans' greater familiarity with the glaciers and scenery of Europe is open to debate. Preservationists were struggling to develop a language of scenic appreciation in the nineteenth century. This language would be used to describe land values for Congress and the American people that were not easily quantifiable or comparable with other land values. It was this problem that inspired the phrase "highest use." It should not be assumed that every comparison between American landforms and the most famous landforms in the world was a reflection of "cultural anxiety" or scenic nationalism. Mount Rainier was also compared to Mount Saint Elias in Alaska, while its glaciers were compared to Alaska's famous Muir Glacier. The mountain was thought to be the tallest in the United States. [23] The main object of such comparisons was not to build up pride in American scenery, but to place Mount Rainier on a scale with the world's other scenic wonders. It was a part of the great reconnaissance of the American West.

Still, scenic nationalism played a role in such comparisons. Descriptions of America's natural wonders and scenic landscapes were often chauvinistic. Directed at tourists, these descriptions often amounted to boosterism on a national scale. Years before the western railroads popularized the slogan "See America First," the idea had become a common theme of American travel literature. Vermont's Senator Edmunds, who traveled to Mount Rainier on the Northern Pacific in 1883, wrote in the Portland Oregonian:

> I can not help saying that I am thoroughly convinced that no resort in the United States will be so much sought after as this when once people come to know that what men cross the Atlantic to see can be seen in equal splendor, if not surpassed, at home.

> I have been through the Swiss mountains, and I am compelled to own that incredible as the assertion may appear, there is absolutely no comparison between the finest effects that are exhibited there and what is seen in approaching this grand isolated mountain. [24]

Edward S. Ingraham of Seattle was even more blunt: "It is un-American to visit other shores when our own country contains so many places of interest." [25]

Still another argument for establishing a national park around Mount Rainier was to protect the public's access to it. Mount Rainier National Park advocates wanted to make sure that the popular high country parks such as Paradise Park were not "captured by private interest." [26] They also wanted to make sure that private interests did not gain control of the approaches to Mount Rainier. "If the gateways to Mount Rainier and the beautiful natural parks on its sides pass into the ownership of individuals or syndicates," Russell warned, "toll may be charged for breathing the free air." [27] Toll roads and private inholdings would detract immeasurably from the feeling of freedom that nature bestowed on the Mount Rainier visitor.

One of the most pressing concerns of the national park advocates was to protect the area from vandalism. As the number of recreationists taking the trail up to Paradise Park increased in the early 1890s, so too did the reports of desecration of animal and plant life. It was said that hunters were wantonly killing the mountain goats and bears on Mount Rainier. Even more disturbing were the reports of forest fire damage. [28] The actual extent of the damage was disputed; one person stated that two-thirds of Paradise Park was recently burned over, another found fire-killed trees in only two small sections of Paradise Park in addition to some green trees that had been felled by campers to construct shelters. [29] But regardless, the outlook was not bright as long as there was no supervision of the area. The federal government showed no intention of providing anything more than paper protection for the Pacific Forest Reserve. The problem of vandalism demonstrated as clearly as any other issue why the proclamation of the forest reserve around Mount Rainier failed to satisfy preservationists.

The issue of vandalism was also significant because the few score Mount Rainier enthusiasts in Seattle and Tacoma who accounted for most of the visitors to Paradise Park in the early 1890s were arriving at the remarkable insight that they themselves were the cause of Paradise Park's degradation. This insight did not come without a struggle. There was finger-pointing back and forth between the Seattle and Tacoma mountain clubs. And the fact that they defined the problem as vandalism showed that they wanted to hold certain aberrant individuals responsible. But these distractions notwithstanding, it was the consensus of the Seattle and Tacoma recreationists that unrestricted public use of the high mountain meadows around Mount Rainier would lead to their ruin. There had to be a public authority present to protect the area from the pleasure seekers themselves. This was their primary motivation in calling for the creation of a national park. [30]

The kind of public authority they sought was rudimentary. Ingraham wanted the Pacific Forest Reserve placed under regulations similar to those for Yellowstone National Park. [31] Van Trump proposed that the federal government could post guards in the most heavily used mountain parks during the summer season. These guards could also man high-altitude weather stations and note annual changes in the fauna and flora. [32] The editor of the Tacoma Daily Ledger suggested that a few soldiers from Fort Vancouver stationed in the Nisqually Valley or patrolling the trail to Paradise Park would be adequate to discourage vandalism. [33] As modest as these proposals were, it is significant that the very people who were frequenting Mount Rainier already saw the need to regulate public use of the place.

This emphasis on recreational use and public order indicated that the local perspective on Mount Rainier National Park was essentially an urban perspective—in contrast, for example, with Yellowstone, where ranching communities surrounded the park. To the people of Seattle and Tacoma, Paradise Park was a part of the Puget Sound cities' recreational domain. One Tacoma citizen referred to the mountain as "our joint inheritance" [34] Seattle's superintendent of parks, Edward O. Schwagerl, asserted, "It is not foreign to the mission of the city's park commission to be informed of some of the facts relative to the United States reservation created and designated as the 'Pacific Coast Park Reserve.'" Schwagerl urged the park commission to petition the Secretary of the Interior to take steps to protect the area from vandalism. [35] The fact that local opinion about the Mount Rainier wilderness was urban and preservationist certainly helped the national park campaign come to fruition. It is no coincidence that the nation's fifth national park was located so near to one of the West's leading urban areas.

The campaign for Mount Rainier National Park included a cluster of arguments which addressed the relationship of the national park to economic development. These arguments involved the likely growth of tourism, the conservation of the water supply for irrigation, and the minimal adverse impact that the park would have on grazing and mining interests. If economic considerations were not the preservationists' main concern, nor were they ignored. Indeed, the close alliance between local preservationists like Van Trump and Ingraham and national figures like John Muir, the National Geographic Society's Gardiner G. Hubbard, and federal bureau chiefs John Wesley Powell, Clinton Hart Merriam, and Bernhard Fernow would not have been possible had the campaigners thought that the national park would hinder regional economic development.

The campaigners assumed that the national park would be a magnet for tourists. Whether it was primarily the task of the federal government, the western railroads, or local entrepreneurs to develop tourist accommodations in such a park still remained to be worked out, but preservationists agreed that the purpose of a national park was to preserve the scenery for the enjoyment of the people. This was the sharpest distinction between a national park and a forest reserve. For this reason, preservationists regarded the proclamation of the Pacific Forest Reserve as merely a first step in making Mount Rainier a national park. "The park is without hotels, without roads, almost without trails," wrote one preservationist. "A railway has been projected, the Tacoma and Eastern, and partly constructed, which will place the park within a delightful two hours' ride from the city. . . .Once in the government's care and made accessible to the traveler by means of the projected electric railway, its fame will widen with the years." [36] Senator Squire even suggested that tourist business would eventually cover the cost of administering the park. "The outlay of money required for the establishment of the park is very small," he told a skeptical Congress. "Concessions can be leased for hotels, stage routes, and stopping places; the proceeds of which will provide for maintenance of the park." [37] Though they were fairly vague on how it would be accomplished, preservationists made it clear that a national park entailed both protection and development.

Squire also contended that Mount Rainier National Park was needed to preserve the mountain forests, which served to delay the spring runoff and thereby lessened the occurrence of flooding and summer drought in the lower portions of the watersheds. This was precisely the argument advanced in support of forest reserves. Since the government had already proclaimed the Pacific Forest Reserve, Squire's argument might have been redundant but for the fact that the reserve's boundary failed to take in the western slope of Mount Rainier. The proposed national park would correct this problem and protect the upper watersheds of the Puyallup, White, and Nisqually rivers. "This view of the case strongly affects the farming interests of my State," Squire said. "The high mountain and glacial lands are totally unfit for cultivation. The Government alone can protect the rich lower lands from ruin if it acts promptly." [38]

Finally, preservationists argued that the establishment of a national park around Mount Rainier was good economic policy because the land showed little potential for agriculture, stockraising, or mining. Runte has demonstrated that preservationists resorted to this negative strategy over and over again in campaigning for national parks. Indeed, as the "worthless lands" argument became a litmus test for national parks in Congress, preservationists allowed the worthless lands rhetoric to control the size, shape, and permitted uses of national parks at their inception. Its chief legacy, Runte has contended, was to force preservationists to draw national park boundaries narrowly around the features of principal interest. [39] Certainly this was true of Mount Rainier National Park, as the leading memorial to Congress makes clear: "The boundaries of the proposed national park have been so drawn as to exclude from its area all lands upon which coal, gold, or other valuable minerals are supposed to occur, and they conform to the purpose that the park shall include all features of peculiar scenic beauty without encroaching on the interests of miners or settlers." [40] This left the eastern slope of the Cascades outside the national park. Mineral and water development took precedence over scenic preservation in the eastern half of the forest reserve. When one examines the origins of Mount Rainier National Park, it is difficult to argue with Runte's worthless lands thesis except to point out that Runte focused primarily on Congress and the legislative process, where the dubious worthless lands rhetoric reached its finest expression.



Mount Rainier National Park in 1899, shown in relation to the Mount Rainier Forest Reserve boundary.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MOUNT RAINIER PARK ACT

Between 1893 and 1898, Washington State's senators and congressmen introduced legislation in six consecutive sessions of Congress looking to establish a "Washington National Park." The long and bumpy road which this legislation traveled in Congress is revealing of the apathy and skepticism which confronted preservationists prior to the turn of the century. There was little organized opposition to Mount Rainier National Park on the part of grazing or mining interests. Rather, the legislation languished for five years primarily because Congress could not be persuaded that it was the responsibility of the federal government to

create a national park like Yellowstone in the state of Washington. The establishment of Mount Rainier National Park in 1899 helped launch a national park system. It would be followed by Crater Lake (1902), Wind Cave (1903), and Mesa Verde (1906).

The long time getting this bill through Congress was significant for another reason. Experience has shown that the longer Congress deliberates on a national park bill, the more exceptions and qualifications are apt to be attached to it. The Mount Rainier National Park Act exemplifies this pattern. In most ways, the bill that Congress passed in 1899 was weaker than the original bill introduced in 1893. To follow the legislation's permutations through six sessions of Congress is to highlight the growing strength of opposition to the park. This is important in understanding what might be termed, from a partisan standpoint, the national park's "birth defects."

On December 12, 1893, Senator Watson C. Squire introduced S.1250, a bill to establish a "Washington National Park." The bill essentially sought to redesignate the Pacific Forest Reserve as a national park. The boundaries of the park described in Squire's bill were no different from the boundaries of the reserve. Like many others in his home state of Washington, including Seattle's Chamber of Commerce, whose memorial he submitted together with the bill, Squire believed that President Harrison had proclaimed the Pacific Forest Reserve the previous February with a view to its subsequent conversion to a national park. [41] Squire's bill was referred to the Senate's Committee on Public Lands. Three weeks later, on January 4, 1894, Representative William H. Doolittle introduced an identical bill in the House (H.R. 4989), which was referred to the House's Committee on Public Lands. [42]

Most of the language in Squire's bill came practically verbatim from the Yellowstone Park Act of 1872. Section 1 described boundaries and declared that this area would be "dedicated and set apart as a public park, to be known and designated as the Washington National Park, for the benefit and enjoyment of the people." Section 2 stated that the park would be administered by the Secretary of the Interior, under regulations looking to the "preservation from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural condition." The secretary could, at his discretion, lease small parcels of land for the purpose of erecting buildings to accommodate visitors. The secretary would "provide against the wanton destruction of the fish and game found within said park, and against their capture or destruction for the purposes of merchandise or profit." [43] Significantly, Squire's bill did not deviate from the model Yellowstone Park Act on the problem of enforcement, providing only that persons who violated park regulations would be removed for trespass, even though there had been several attempts to amend the Yellowstone Park Act and impose fines for the killing of wildlife in that park. (Congress would finally pass such a law for Yellowstone in 1894, but the people who framed the Mount Rainier National Park Act would fail to take heed of the Yellowstone experience.) [44]

On July 10, 1894, seven months after submitting S.1250, Squire introduced S.2204, which differed from the earlier bill only in its boundary description. The new boundaries followed exactly the recommendations of the joint committee of the Geological Society of America, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the National Geographic Society, the Sierra Club, and the Appalachian Mountain Club. The new boundaries added to the park the western flank of Mount Rainier and eliminated from the park all that portion of the Pacific Forest Reserve east of the Cascade Crest and south of the Tatoosh Range, together with a narrow strip along the north. The reason for the addition was obvious; the deletions, Squire explained to the Senate, were designed to exclude from the park all coal, gold, and minerals which were supposed to exist. It was at this time that Squire made his one significant speech to the Senate on the Washington National Park. The speech mostly drew upon the joint committee's memorial. It elicited no debate of the national park bill on the Senate floor. [45]

Neither of Squire's bills nor Doolittle's bill were reported back from committee. Doolittle failed to introduce a second bill along the lines of S.2204, and the discrepancy between the House and Senate versions no doubt hurt the legislation's chances. For some reason, Squire and Doolittle did not resolve this discrepancy when each of them introduced new Washington National Park bills early in the first session of the fifty-fourth Congress, in December 1895. These two bills (S.164 and H.R.327) likewise died in committee. It is unclear whether the lack of coordination between the two Washington State members of Congress was due to oversight or disagreement. In any case, after Doolittle heard from the Committee on Public Lands that his bill would not be approved, he introduced another, H.R.4058, which further constricted the boundaries. [46] Doolittle's bill drew the boundaries inward on all sides, and reduced the size of the park from approximately twenty-four miles by twenty-six miles to approximately eighteen miles square. These were the boundaries described in the Mount Rainier National Park Act as finally enacted. [47]

Doolittle's H.R.4058 deserves close analysis, because it became the blueprint for the eventual Mount Rainier National Park Act. In addition to the new boundary description in Section 1, H.R.4058 included two new sections. Sections 3 and 4 provided that the Northern Pacific Railroad Company's grant lands which fell within the national park would be cancelled, and that the company would be able to select an equivalent number of sections in lieu of these lands in any state served by the railroad. The generous concessions made to the Northern Pacific strongly suggest that the railroad company influenced this legislation by one means or another, though company officials would vigorously deny this for years afterward. [48]

The generous consideration given to the Northern Pacific's interests was embarrassing to the bill's supporters. To the preservationists' chagrin, the new boundaries cut some three hundred square miles of forest land out of the park. [49] What angered so many citizens, however, was not the park's diminished size but the fact that the legislation paid for the Northern Pacific's land inside the park with public domain timber lands elsewhere (mostly in Oregon, as it turned out, much to the ire of the people of that state). This was too good a deal to have been achieved without bribery, contemporaries assumed. [50] Certain proponents of the bill were roundly criticized for the provisions covering the Northern Pacific land grant, and Washington's Senator John L. Wilson and Congressman James Hamilton Lewis, who shepherded the legislation through the next four sessions of Congress, had to answer for it in their reelection bids. [51] Whatever the railroad's precise role in seeing the legislation through Congress, its effect was to cast a pall over the act. The lesson of the Mount Rainier National Park Act appeared to be that in any "pragmatic alliance" between western railroads and preservationists, the railroads would exact considerable tribute for their political support.

On May 11, 1896, H.R. 4058 was reported back from committee with the recommendation that it be passed, with three significant amendments. In Section 2, the maximum term of lease of lands on which to erect visitor accommodations was increased from ten to twenty-five years. Rights of way could be granted for the construction of railways or tramways through the forest reserve and into the park. And most important, a new Section 5 allowed mining in the forest reserve and the park. [52] These concessions answered, in part, objections that the commissioner of the General Land Office and the secretary of the Interior had made to earlier versions of the Washington National Park bill.

These three concessions to development pointed up the fact that the national park idea was now in competition with the new forest reserves, and that the Cleveland administration was definitely more inclined toward the latter type of land management regime. In hindsight, the creation of three new national parks in California in 1890 followed by the passage of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 appear to mark, as NPS historian Barry Mackintosh has written, "the fork in the road beyond which national parks and national forests proceed separately." [53] Each new national park entailed an act of Congress; each new forest reserve required

only a stroke of the President's pen. To contemporaries, however, it was yet unclear how parks and reserves would differ from each other, if at all. John Muir, for one, hoped that the forest reserves would be managed in the same way as national parks. The well-known forester, Gifford Pinchot, meanwhile, argued that by placing the new forest reserves under scientific forestry management the federal government would obviate the need for national parks. In this context, park proponents thought the concession to mining was a small price to pay. It was more important to secure the federal government's recognition of Mount Rainier's extraordinary scenic and scientific interest so that, like Yellowstone, the area would receive a greater degree of protection. [54]

Even these concessions were not enough for some members of Congress who objected to the national park primarily on the basis of expense. Representative John F. Lacey of Iowa, chairman of the Committee on Public Lands, suggested that the national park designation was redundant since the area had already been withdrawn as a forest reserve. Representative Joseph W. Bailey of Texas thought the people of Washington should pay for the park's administration. When Doolittle suggested that the people of his state would "make the necessary improvements, for the benefit of all the people of the country" and only wanted assistance from the secretary of the Interior in protecting the area from vandals, Bailey reminded the Congress of the cost of administering Yellowstone, and sarcastically noted, "the difficulty I have is that I have not learned how it is possible to maintain a park by any government without expense." He then obtained Doolittle's assurance that the Washington congressman would not "ask a dollar from the Government in the way of an appropriation." With that, Bailey withdrew his objection and the bill was passed.

With the three amendments duly approved by the House, H.R.4058 came very close to the final form of the Mount Rainier National Park Act. But the progress of the bill through Congress was slow. On June 10, 1896, the Senate referred the bill to the Committee on Forest Reservations and Protection of Game. [55] Eight months later, on February 17, 1897, the bill was reported back with the recommendation that it be passed without amendment. In March it passed the Senate only to be pocket vetoed by President Cleveland as he left office. Senator John L. Wilson introduced an identical bill (S.349) in the next session of Congress, but apparently because no companion bill was introduced in the House, it never returned from committee. On December 7, 1897, Wilson introduced the same bill in the next session of Congress (S.2552), and one week later Representative Wesley Jones introduced a Washington National Park bill in the House (H.R.5024). As this bill became stalled in the Committee on Public Lands, Representative Lewis introduced the same bill again (H.R.9146) on March 14, 1898. [56] Finally, in February 1899, the bill reached one final snag.

The story of the bill's final hurdle comes from Seattle businessman John P. Hartman, who later claimed to have been closely involved in drafting the legislation. This seems unlikely, since Hartman's account begins not with Doolittle but with Wilson and Lewis in 1897. In any case, Wilson and Lewis summoned Hartman to Washington, D.C. in order to help them overcome the objection of the powerful speaker of the House, "Uncle Joe" Cannon.

> I reached the National Capitol [sic] early in February, and very shortly was ushered into the presence of Mr. Cannon, piloted by Colonel Lewis. As usual, Mr. Cannon was smoking his big, black cigar, ensconsed in a swivel chair, with his feet on the jamb above the little fireplace where coal was burning cheerily in the grate. After preliminaries Mr. Cannon said, addressing me, "I have a notion to kill your Bill, and I have the power to do it." Of course, I wanted to know the reasons and he said, "It is all right to set these places aside but for the fact that in a year or so you will be coming back here seeking money from the Treasury to improve the place, and make it possible for visitors to go there, which things we do not need, and we haven't the money therefor, and I think I will kill it." I said

> to Mr. Cannon, "I promise you, Sir, that if this Bill is passed I will not be here asking for money from the Federal Treasury to operate the place so long as you shall remain in Congress." With that statement, he said, "I will take you at your word and let the measure go through, if otherwise it can travel the thorny road." [57]

Shortly after this meeting the bill was reported back and the House passed one minor amendment recommended by Lewis, which gave settlers in the national park the same right as the railroad to claim other public lands in lieu of their lands in the park. In a final amendment, the House dispensed with the politically sensitive but dull "Washington National Park" and named the new national park after the mountain. (Ironically, it was misspelled Mount Ranier National Park.) The bill passed both houses of Congress on March 1, and was signed by President McKinley on March 2, 1899. [58]

Despite its flaws, the Mount Rainier National Park Act was an important triumph for the national park idea. With Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant all designated as "forest reserve lands" even though the legislative intent was that they be administered as national parks, and with the future of a national park system called into question by the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, Mount Rainier stands as the first national park to be modelled unambiguously after the prototype Yellowstone National Park. The creation of Mount Rainier National Park resolved any lingering doubts that the nation would develop two distinct systems for preserving its natural heritage.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART TWO: FOUNDING YEARS, 1893-1916

IV. THE NEW PLEASURING GROUND

INTRODUCTION

The establishment of the nation's fifth national park was a local rather than a national news story. The national park designation added to Mount Rainier's local renown and led more campers and sightseers to seek out its highcountry meadows. Before the park had any regulations in place or a ranger staff to enforce them, local entrepreneurs descended on the park to offer visitors guide services and saddle horses, tent accommodations at Paradise Park and hotel accommodations at Longmire Springs, and a variety of other amenities. Even as the federal government began to establish the rudiments of a park administration and to construct a park road after 1904, it remained a step behind the visiting public and local entrepreneurs. Rising visitor use and public demand for services set the pace for the park's development.

The total number of visitors climbed from 1,786 in 1906 (the first year that the park staff kept an official count) to 7,754 four years later to 15,038 four years after that. In 1915, the first full summer season in which travel to Europe was interrupted by World War I, the number of visitors leaped to 34,814. While these numbers were still small by later standards, it must be born in mind that most public use was concentrated in the southwest quarter of the park and that only one or two rangers were assigned to patrol this area during the same span of years. [1]

Besides the upward trend in numbers of visitors, public use of this new "pleasuring ground" exhibited two other notable characteristics. First, visitors overwhelmingly chose to make Paradise Park either their destination or base of operations. Thus, Paradise Park was established as the center of visitor activity in the national park even before it could be reached by road or adequately patrolled by rangers. Second, public transportation between Puget Sound cities and Mount Rainier National Park evolved rapidly and somewhat chaotically. By 1911, the park's gatekeeper was recording the numbers of people arriving by foot, horseback, wagon, bicycle, stage, and automobile—all of whom shared the same narrow, mountain road to Longmire Springs and beyond. [2]

This chapter considers the changing pattern of visitor use in the new national park and how that influenced the Department of the Interior's administration of the park. The first section of the chapter profiles the park visitors in this era: how they got there, what they did while they were in the park, what kind of problems they posed for management. The second section focuses on the concessioners and the various services they offered. The third section considers efforts by The Mountaineers and the Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee to develop the park, both through volunteer labor (in the case of trail construction) and lobbying of Congress (in the case of road construction). The theme of the chapter is that the development of Mount Rainier National Park in this era was largely spontaneous. The Secretary of the Interior provided minimal direction. The basic

infrastructure of the park—the road to Paradise, the concentration of visitor services at Longmire and Paradise, the multiple access roads and entrances, the park's orientation to the automobilist and day visitor—developed without benefit of a master plan.

VISITATION: AN EVOLVING PATTERN

Only one road went all the way to the new national park. The so-called Mountain Road was built by James Longmire and a crew of Indian laborers in 1893, and went from Kernahan's Ranch (Ashford) to Longmire Springs. At first use of the road was restricted to wagons whose axles could clear the dozens of stumps that still needed to be rooted out from between the parallel wheel ruts, but by 1896 the road was open to stages. Beginning in that year the Tacoma Carriage and Baggage Transfer Company took tourists to Mount Rainier via an overnight stop in Eatonville. The second popular approach to Mount Rainier at the time of the establishment of the national park was to take the Northern Pacific railroad from Tacoma to Wilkeson, from which the old Bailey Willis Trail led up the Carbon River to Moraine Park. This trail was passable only to foot and horse traffic.

During the first four to five years after the park's creation, upwards of 500 people visited the mountain each summer season. While some visitors were content to remain at the Longmire Springs resort and enjoy the mineral baths and the view of Mount Rainier from there, most wanted to get a closer view of the glaciers and experience the mountain's famous alpine meadows. [3] Paradise Park was the most common destination, but an alternative destination was Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. [4] Both were about six miles by trail from Longmire Springs. On the northwest side, Spray Park and Crater Lake (Mowich Lake) offered popular alternatives to Moraine Park. [5]

Some parties traveled on foot and carried their own bedrolls. The typical visitor, however, came equipped with little more than a few articles of extra clothing in a luggage bag. Most of them hired a packer and saddle horses for the trail, either in Ashford or at Longmire Springs, and rented blankets and a tent when they camped out. Tent space could be rented from a concessioner at Camp of the Clouds in Paradise Park through most of the summer. On the northwest side of the mountain, pack trips had a more expeditionary flavor for there were no tent camps awaiting the traveler in the Carbon River highcountry. [6]

In 1905, the Sierra Club (based in San Francisco) and the Mazamas (based in Portland) organized large expeditions to Mount Rainier. At that time these were the only two well-organized mountain clubs in the western United States. Seattle and Tacoma mountain enthusiasts made several sputtering attempts to form their own mountain club, and finally succeeded with the founding of The Mountaineers Club in 1906. These groups were affiliated and all shared the same basic purpose: to promote outdoor recreation and nature preservation. Each club organized at least one major outing every summer, generally featuring an ascent of one of the Pacific Coast's volcanoes. [7] Although these clubs did not represent the whole gamut of people who were attracted to the national parks, they spoke for a substantial portion of them. The Mountaineers would play an important advisory role in Mount Rainier National Park policy.

Members of these mountain clubs tended to be well-educated, middle-class professionals. The Sierra Club expedition to Mount Rainier in 1905 included a large contingent of college students from Stanford and Berkeley as well as several scientists and professors. The two hundred Mazamas included a dozen or more female college students from Seattle as well as college alumni from twenty-one different American institutions. A common feature of the mountain club outings was to hear campfire talks from the educators in the group, a tradition which prefigured the evening campfire programs provided by the Park Service many years

later. During the two weeks that the Sierra Club and Mazamas camped at Paradise Park in 1905, they heard campfire talks by Dr. Charles E. Fay, president of the Appalachian Mountain Club; Joseph N. LeConte of the University of California; Washington State geologist Henry Landes; W.D. Lyman of Whitman College; Dr. Marcus W. Lyon of the Smithsonian; C. Lombardi of Portland, who lectured on his native Swiss Alps; and Samuel Collyer of Tacoma, "who explained the legendary and poetic injustice of naming the mountain Rainier." [8] The mountain clubs, like the Park Service later, believed that nature appreciation needed to be inculcated through cognitive teaching as well as through outdoor recreational experience.

The mountain clubs each had their own rituals and antics, and their simultaneous expeditions to Mount Rainier in 1905 sometimes had the flavor of a cultural exchange. When the large summit party of the Sierra Club passed the four companies of Mazamas on the snowfield between Paradise Park and Camp Muir, they paused to exchange greetings: "Hi, Hi! Sierra, Sierra, Woh!" and "Wah, Hoo, Wah! Wah, Hoo, Wah! Billy goat, Nannie goat, Ma-za-ma!" In Paradise Park itself, the trail between the two camps "saw many a fantastic procession of mountaineers winding its way by moonlight among the giant fir trees" to play some new prank on their fellow mountaineers. At the end of their two-week sojourn the two clubs held a campfire wedding ceremony between a Sierran groom and a Mazama bride, the latter "gowned in white outing flannel, en train, and flowing veil of mosquito netting." [9] The symbolism of the wedding ceremony amounted to something more than a night's amusement. In an era when middle-class professionals were rapidly organizing themselves into national professional associations to consolidate their position in American society, it was not surprising that these middle-class preservationists saw a need to form a national network of mountain clubs to further their goals. The mountain clubs were the forerunners of national organizations like the National Audubon Society and National Wildlife Foundation.

The pattern of use that soon established itself in Mount Rainier National Park—the stage service to Longmire Springs, the hiring of outfitters, the use of highcountry tent camps, the popularity of Paradise Park, the occasional large-group outings like those in 1905—was not, as some members of Congress had hoped, going to be self-regulating. A variety of inquiries, complaints, recommendations, and applications for permits dribbled into the office of the Secretary of the Interior after 1899. There was, for example, the problem of issuing permits to legitimate guides and outfitters who would not defraud the tourists or lead them into danger. It might have seemed to Secretary of the Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock as if every local settler who had ever led a party up to Paradise Park was now claiming to be an oldtimer in the business. Each one wanted to secure an outfitter's or hotel keeper's permit and take advantage of their proximity to the national park before they got squeezed out by "new men who may wish to take holt of this business." [10] Two men, Henry Carter and Walter A. Ashford, used their seasonal residency on the Longmire property inside the national park as reason to be preferred over the others. Another, Henry S. Hayes of Ashford, tried to use Washington Senator Addison G. Foster's influence with the Secretary of the Interior. A third party, Joseph Stampfler, claimed to have fourteen years of experience as a guide associated with the Longmire operation. A fourth, John L. Reese of Ashford, requested a permit and two-acre lease to continue his tent hotel at Camp of the Clouds. [11] The secretary apparently responded to all of these applications in the same way: until Congress appropriated funds for the administration of the park, he would not issue rules or regulations or permits. [12]

More troubling was a 1902 report from a forest ranger to the forest superintendent of Mount Rainier Forest Reserve, routed through the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the secretary, which alleged that John S. Hayes was charging pack trains and tourists a toll for using the trail from Longmire Springs to Paradise Park. A private toll obviously violated the spirit of the law in setting aside a public park. Underscoring the fact that the national park was under the Secretary of the Interior's direct authority and not the General Land Office's,

Commissioner Bing Hermann allowed that he had only had the matter investigated because he mistakenly believed the trail lay in the forest reserve. "Inasmuch as the administration of national parks is under your immediate jurisdiction," Hermann wrote to Secretary Hitchcock, "this matter is referred without recommendation." [13] Soon afterwards, the Department of the Interior informed locals, including the Longmires, that no tolls could be collected in the national park. [14]

Aside from the problem of regulating local entrepreneurs who sought to provide services to the visiting public, the campers themselves required supervision. With some 500 people camping at Paradise Park each summer, it quickly became evident that the public must be given some guidelines about how to make camp or else the fragile meadow and its small stands of alpine firs would soon be laid to waste. Even the Sierra Club needed to be educated. The club's secretary, William E. Colby, wrote to the Secretary of the Interior in 1905 for permission for his group of 150 to 200 people who would be camping at Paradise Park to "cut half a dozen or so small trees for poles for our large tents and tables." [15] Apparently the club had received permission to do this the previous year in Yosemite. Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen pointed out to Colby that this would set a ruinous precedent and refused the club permission. [16] That summer, Allen ordered the arrest of another camper, Henry Beader of Tacoma, for cutting green timber in Paradise Park. Although the charges were dropped, Allen thought the arrest had made the correct impression on the public. [17] What was becoming clear from these encounters was that the camping public, no matter how well-intentioned, needed direction from park rangers or else it would unwittingly destroy the natural conditions" that the park was intended to preserve.



Campers at Mystic Lake. Note the timbers that have been cut and used for tent poles. *(Asahel Curtis photo courtesy of University of Washington.)*

Sport hunters were another concern. Most campers expressed strong support for the principle that there should be no hunting in the national park. Most sportsmen did not disapprove of it

either, for they still had an opportunity to shoot the deer and elk that inhabited Mount Rainier when these animals left the park for their winter range. Inside the park, the biggest threat to wildlife came not from sport hunters but from local settlers or "pot hunters" who would enter the park in the fall after the tourists were gone in order to procure wild meat for their larders. Efforts to deal with this problem are discussed in a later chapter on the protection of resources; suffice it to say here that increasing visitor use of the park did bring into the area a small number of sport hunters who were either ignorant or contemptuous of the hunting ban. This problem appears to have been limited to the more remote Carbon River section, where some locals kept hunting dogs outside the park and were "always ready, for a small remuneration, to assist the more disreputable sportsmen of Tacoma and Seattle in their hunting expeditions." [18]

Additional problems related to visitor use arose with the coming of the day visitor a few years after the establishment of the park. It would be difficult to overstate the significance of the day visitor on the development of national parks, especially Mount Rainier National Park. The day visitor had very different needs and expectations from either the camper or the hotel sojourner. Park administrators would never be entirely comfortable with the day visitor. How this kind of tourist could be satisfied with a quick look around in a place of such sublime beauty and natural interest would always be something of a mystery to park staff. Yet, while the left hand tried to slow down the day visitor, the right hand inevitably catered to his or her breathless pace. In the era before the advent of the National Park Service, day visitors were known as "transient tourists." The fact that park superintendents were required to record the relative numbers of "transient tourists" and "people who camped in the park for three or more days" indicates at least a degree of bafflement about how to deal with these two distinct user groups. [19]

The day visitor first appeared in Mount Rainier National Park in the summer of 1904, following the completion of the Tacoma and Eastern Railroad to Ashford, and the simultaneous inauguration of a connecting stage service over the remaining thirteen miles to Longmire Springs. These transportation improvements made it barely feasible for tourists to travel from Tacoma to Mount Rainier and back in one day. In the long run, however, the excursion train was far less important than the automobile in bringing the day visitor to Mount Rainier. In 1907, three years after the first train load of visitors entered the park, the first convoy of automobilists were motoring up the newly constructed government road to Longmire Springs. In 1910, nearly twice as many people came to Mount Rainier by car as by train and stage. Automobilists held the advantage over train passengers in numbers even as the outbreak of war in Europe brought a huge increase of out-of-state tourists to Mount Rainier in 1915. Not everyone who came to the park by car turned around and went home the same day, of course. [20] But if the correlation between automobilists and day visitors was not perfect, it was well known that the train passenger was much more apt to sojourn at a hotel than the automobilist.

Park administrators greeted the advent of the automobile in Mount Rainier National Park with ambivalence and uncertainty. On the one hand, they recognized that cars were the wave of the future. They were well aware that Pierce County was spending as much on improvement of the road from Eatonville to the park boundary as the federal government was spending on reconstruction of the road from the boundary to Longmire Springs. [21] They were able to read the signs of the automobilists' growing political clout in the success of their "good roads movement" in Washington state. [22] On the other hand, they saw problems that the national park should not necessarily entertain. Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen thought automobiles should be prohibited from the park for the time being, arguing that "the presence of these contrivances would be a source of great annoyance and some danger to the public generally." [23] And the Secretary of the Interior seemed prepared to issue an order to that effect in 1907. [24] Instead, bowing to pressure from the automobile clubs, the secretary

authorized Allen to open the park to cars, and 117 permits were issued in the first season (1908).

Regulations governing automobile use in the park appeared the following March. The regulations held automobiles to a speed limit of six miles per hour, except on straight sections where no horse teams were visible, where the speed limit was fifteen miles per hour. Teams always had the right of way over automobiles, and when teams approached, the automobile driver was to take a position on the outer edge of the roadway and remain at rest until teamsters were satisfied as to the safety of their teams. Each automobile required a permit from the superintendent. Use of the automobiles in the park was restricted to the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. and further restricted above Longmire Springs to the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. [25] Clearly, cars were admitted into the park with a great deal of trepidation. It is worth noting that Mount Rainier National Park was the first national park to admit cars; cars did not enter Yellowstone for the first time until 1910.

The biggest concern over automobiles was the safety of visitors. The road contained innumerable blind curves and steep embankments and many narrow bridges. Even the rutted and muddy surface of the road required the driver's vigilance. As Superintendent Allen remarked, there would be no particular danger if automobilists observed the speed limits, hours, and rules for passing. But there were violations and accidents. One car went over the side of the road and the driver broke his arm. [26] A stage wagon containing several passengers was overturned in a near collision with an automobile. [27] Automobiles introduced a whole new area of law enforcement into the national park setting. Inevitably, the need to patrol the roadway competed more and more with the care of the popular camping areas. Automobiles tended to make roads the focal point not only of the park's development but of the management of park visitors.

Cars raised questions about aesthetics. It was not that cars were unaesthetic to the non-automobilist, for there were, in fact, very few complaints from the public. [28] Rather, it was an open question whether the automobilist derived more enjoyment from driving his machine than he did from observing the scenery. Officials in the War Department who were in charge of road design and construction thought that the joy of the road should be embraced as an integral part of the nation's new pleasuring ground. [29] But Superintendent Allen, among others, argued that automobile use should be encouraged only insofar as it provided a more affordable means of transportation into the park. [30] Others thought that conservative speed limits in the national park would be sufficient to put automobile drivers in the proper frame of mind. One person admonished readers of the Overland Monthly, "You with your high-power cars may well picture the exhilaration of that ride from Tacoma to the foothills; and it is well to take it while one may, for the foothills reached, the Government road begins and the speed glory must give way to calmer glories of nature." [31] Despite these differences of opinion, however, all agreed that the automobile would change the national park experience; it would change the way people related to nature.

The coming of the day visitor had a pervasive effect on the campers and hotel sojourners in the park. Although people of this era did not phrase it in so many words, day use of an area tended to diminish the area's wilderness quality for those who were camping or sojourning there. Sleeping out in the highcountry or staying at the rustic accommodations at Longmire Springs became an act of volition instead of a requirement; therefore, it too had to be pleasurable. The effect of the "transient tourists" on the people who remained in the park for three or more days was unmistakable: those who mingled with the day visitors at places such as Longmire Springs and Paradise Park demanded better and better accommodations for their overnight stay, while those who really wanted to enjoy a primitive camping experience had to go farther and farther afield from the park road. This was the beginning of the division of the national park into "front country" and "backcountry."

From the perspective of the late twentieth century, it might seem that the day visitor had a more adverse effect on the camper than on the hotel sojourner. Certainly in recent times the inundation of Mount Rainier National Park with day visitors has challenged the ingenuity of park administrators in being able to provide enough backcountry solitude to satisfy the seekers of wilderness. But in the period from approximately 1910 to 1930, quite the opposite was true. Park administrators were chiefly concerned with upgrading facilities in the front country in order to improve the experience of hotel guests and car campers. Not only did the new ease of travel between Mount Rainier and the Puget Sound cities bring more people into the park on weekends than the hotels and tent camps could accommodate, but the appearance of so many people out for a day in the country made the hotels seem unbearably shabby and the few services that were available inadequate. Park administrators seemed aware of the fact that "transient tourists" were in some ways undermining the experience of those who remained in the park for two or more nights. Their solution was to develop the park with first-class hotels and other amenities of the city. Yet such improvements could never be made fast enough. If hotel guests and front country campers still composed the most numerous group of park users in this era, they were also the hardest to satisfy.

LODGING AND OTHER SERVICES: A CHANGING DEMAND

Tourist facilities in this era were confined to the south side of the park and consisted of two hotels and two tent camps. The Longmire Springs Hotel and the National Park Inn were both situated at Longmire Springs, while tent camps could be found at Paradise Park and Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. In addition, the Department of the Interior issued permits to a medley of shopkeepers, transportation companies, and guide services, most of whom hung out their shingles at Longmire Springs. Taken as a whole, these tourist facilities proved unsatisfactory to the public. The park administration would place all visitor services under a single park concession after 1916.

Longmire Springs Hotel

At the time Mount Rainier National Park was created, the Longmire family had already pioneered a tourist business at the foot of the mountain. James Longmire, the family patriarch, had led the first wagon train over Naches Pass in 1853, settled with his wife and children at Yelm Prairie, near Olympia, and guided both the Stevens-Van Trump-Coleman party and the Emmons-Wilson party to the base of Mount Rainier on the first two successful ascents of the mountain in August and October 1870. After his own first ascent of Mount Rainier with Bayley and Van Trump in 1883, James Longmire discovered the mineral springs and natural clearing that would later bear his name and conceived the idea of developing the springs as a resort. By 1885 he had cleared a trail up to it, built a cabin, and was accommodating a few adventuresome visitors. By 1889, Longmire had some guest cabins and two bathhouses completed and was advertising "Longmire's Medical Springs" in a Tacoma newspaper. The next year he opened a small, two-story hotel with a lobby downstairs and five guest rooms on the second floor, and began adding bams and other outbuildings to the property to support a growing outfitting business for parties of campers or climbers who were heading on up to Paradise Park. In the 1890s, this old denizen of the mountain built the original wagon road to Longmire Springs. He supported the movement to create a national park, though he did not live to see it accomplished. He died in 1897. [32]

The Longmire Springs Hotel became an anomaly as soon as the national park was created. Now under the management of James Longmire's son Elcaine and his wife Martha, the hotel and bathhouses occupied an 18.2-acre mineral claim which James had patented in 1892. It was the only patented land within the national park. Proponents of the national park generally

assumed that the federal government should acquire this land. Some distrusted the Longmires, considered their mineral claim to be fraudulent, and thought the federal government should purchase the property and then lease it to a hotel operator in order to protect the public from the Longmires' "extortionate" prices. [33] Others thought the Longmires were running a credible operation. [34] In 1902, the Secretary of the Interior declined an offer by James Longmire's widow, Virinda, to sell the property to the government for $60,000. [35]

Relations between the Longmires and the government began to sour in 1905 after the government provided the Tacoma and Eastern Railroad Company with a five-year lease of two acres immediately south of the Longmire claim on which to build a second hotel. The Longmire family now tried several stratagems that were intended either to hold their new competition at bay or to persuade the government to buy them out. First, Robert Longmire opened a saloon on the property. Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen thought the saloon would be a "public nuisance" and immediately closed the place down. Robert appealed to Senator Francis W. Cushman for help but Cushman was unsympathetic and the saloon apparently remained closed. [36] Next, Virinda Longmire filed for a 160-acre homestead claim around the 18-acre mineral claim. She argued that her husband had built their original cabin some distance apart from the mineral springs in the belief that he could make a homestead claim, only to find out that a homestead claim could not be made on unsurveyed land. Now the land was surveyed and the cabin did not fall within the 18-acre mineral claim. Acting Superintendent Allen interceded at the General Land Office, and the application was denied. Virinda tried unsuccessfully to appeal it. [37]

Longmire Springs Hotel. The earliest tourist accommodations predated the national park.
(Crawford Scrapbook photo courtesy of University of Washington.)

While this case was under appeal, the Longmires enclosed a small portion of the desired homestead claim with a rough fence and pastured some stock there. Once again, Acting Superintendent Allen found the Longmires' action objectionable. He recommended that Elcaine Longmire be informed that the family could not graze stock on this tract and that the fence be destroyed or confiscated by the government. Finally, after the secretary of the

Interior denied Virinda's appeal in the spring of 1907, Allen directed a ranger to evict Elcaine from the cabin located on the tract in question and then burn the cabin. Elcaine apparently tried to forestall this action by encouraging his sister-in-law, Susan Hall, to occupy the cabin with her children that summer. But the following winter, Ranger H.M. Cunningham went up to the Longmire property, found the cabin empty, and burned it down. Cunningham reported to Allen:

> I did this at night so as to avoid any possible personal conflict with the Longmires. They—Ben and Elcaine Longmire—were still staying at the Springs on their patented land. I was on good terms with them and they had not said any thing about resisting the removal of the cabin, but I do not think they were staying at the springs so late in the season for any other purpose than to prevent the removal of the cabin. They had removed their effects from the homestead cabin long before —about the first of August. [38]

This ended the Longmires' attempts to expand the property.

If the Longmires had been concerned about losing business to the Tacoma and Eastern Railroad Company's new hotel venture, they soon discovered that the increasing tourist travel to the park was more than even the two hotels could accommodate. They built an addition to the hotel, making a total of twelve guest rooms, and erected tents behind it. During the 1908 tourist season the Longmire Springs Hotel registered 925 guests, or nearly one-third of the total park visitation for that year. [39]

Park administrators characterized the Longmire Springs Hotel as a second-class hostelry. Noting that its rates were somewhat lower than those of the neighboring National Park Inn, they considered the hotel an advantage to the public. But they regretted the shabby appearance of the place which, being on private property, they could do nothing about. The buildings were very rough, and the wire fence which ran around the property was hung with signs and advertisements. The little shanty that had served for a short time as a saloon had been turned into a pool hall. [40] There were rumors, year after year, that the Longmires planned either to refurbish or sell the enterprise, but as the place only deteriorated it became more and more of an embarrassment. Finally, in 1916, the family leased the property to the Longmire Springs Hotel Company, which made the long-awaited improvements the next year. These included a new two-story, seventeen-room hotel, sixteen new cottages in place of the tents, and a new sulphur plunge. In 1920, the Rainier National Park Company bought the lease and made a twenty-year contract with the family. The original hotel was burned, and the new building was moved across the road where it became the National Park Inn Annex. [41] The Longmire family would eventually sell their vacant property to the government in 1939.

National Park Inn

Mount Rainier National Park's second hotel, called the National Park Inn, opened for business on July 1, 1906. The long, two-story building, located opposite the Longmire Springs Hotel, contained thirty-six rooms and had a capacity for sixty guests. On the grounds beside the building a number of tents with wood floors, walls, doors, and electric lights could accommodate another seventy-five guests. The National Park Inn's modern physical plant consisted of an electric lighting and refrigerating unit powered by water from the Nisqually River. Built and operated by the Tacoma Eastern Railroad Company, the hotel provided elegant meals supplied by the commissary of the Chicago, Milwaukee and Puget Sound Railway Company in Tacoma, and generally tried to be a first-class hotel. This gave park visitors a choice between upscale hotel service and the rustic Longmire establishment across the road. As one writer compared the two,

> There are two hotels here, one catering to plain and simple abundance, the other boasting a French chef. With a big bonfire on the grounds one appeals to the love of out of doors; while the other entertains the guest through the evening with music before the open fire-place in the social hall. There are the usual hotel accommodations, and also the well patronized tents in connection. Across from the hotels are the springs, iron and sulphur bubbling side by side.
>
> There are, of course, bath houses, and this is a resort to which many come for a day, or a week, or a month, and some never go further. It satisfies them. [42]

Unlike the Longmire Springs Hotel, the National Park Inn occupied leased ground and operated under contract with the government. The contract was the responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior, who was still feeling his way in this area of national park policy. The legal arrangements for hotel concessions seemed to require a balancing act between the need to maintain control of the operation on the one hand and the need to attract sound investment capital on the other. Secretary Hitchcock did not want Mount Rainier National Park to be the graveyard for a string of undercapitalized hotel enterprises, nor did he want to turn all the tourist business over to a railroad monopoly. His choice of the Tacoma and Eastern Railroad Company was safe and politically astute because it was a well-capitalized subsidiary of the Milwaukee Road and already had a large investment in its line from Tacoma to Ashford, yet had a local cast. Refusing the company's request for a fifty-year lease, Hitchcock wisely held the company to a five-year lease, which could be renewed subject to modifications that the government saw fit to make. [43]

The concession got off to a bumpy start. Just weeks before the National Park Inn was set to open, both Secretary Hitchcock and Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen received letters from one John S. Kloeber, implying that he had an unauthorized sublease agreement with the Tacoma Eastern Railroad Company. Kloeber wanted permission to graze horses on the property and to serve hard liquor. Hitchcock directed Allen to refuse both requests, and then stated as a matter of policy that the Department would not recognize anyone in the management of the hotel other than the lessee, nor permit the lessee to sublet any part of the lease. Evidently embarrassed, the Tacoma Eastern's Vice President John Bagley denied that the sublease with Kloeber had ever been finalized. [44] Nevertheless, Bagley hired Kloeber to manage the new hotel during its first three seasons. Kloeber never won the confidence of Acting Superintendent Allen. Perhaps at Allen's suggestion, the company replaced Kloeber with a new manager in 1909. [45]

There were a number of other minor problems with the original concession contract that the Secretary of the Interior sought to correct when it expired in 1911. First, federal officials had found that they had too little control over the construction and maintenance of the buildings. Although the company had submitted drawings of its proposed hotel in 1905, no specifications had been written into the contract. Allen had not been entirely pleased by the appearance of the National Park Inn. He found the main building "rather attractive," but complained that the grounds were "ill kept and disfigured by rough unpainted buildings used for stables and other purposes. [46] In the new contract, the Secretary of the Interior required the Tacoma Eastern Railroad Company to submit a detailed list of improvements and repairs that it expected to make over the next five years. [47]

Another deficiency in the original contract was its lack of provision for a sublease. The railroad company proposed to set up a holding company, the National Park Inn Company, to run the park concession. The Secretary of the Interior required that a copy of this holding company's articles of incorporation and a list of its stockholders and officers accompany the new lease agreement. [48]

The Secretary of the Interior also added to the contract a "usage tax," assessed at the rate of twenty-five cents per guest during the season, to be paid to the U.S. Treasury at the beginning of the following season. This was modelled on the contract with the Yellowstone Park Hotel Company. The usage tax was on the order of $400 per year, whereas the original lease involved a flat fee of only $100 per year. Finally, the secretary required metes and bounds for a 2-acre addition to the leased tract at Longmire Springs, and for a 7.1-acre tract in Paradise Park on which the company proposed to build a second hotel. The Paradise Park plan was later dropped. [49]

The visiting public knew nothing of such refinements in the concession agreement, of course, but it did demand one other change: an improvement of sanitary conditions at Longmire Springs. The National Park Inn maintained that the bath houses and rundown hotel across the road were the source of visitors' complaints. As early as 1909, however, Superintendent Allen had complained that the National Park Inn's kitchen disposed of waste in the Nisqually River, and had recommended that the company be required to do something else with its garbage. Two years later, Asahel Curtis of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce reported on the unsanitary conditions found at the park, noting specifically that "large piles of manure are taken out of the stables at Longmire Springs and scattered over the ground." [50] In the fall of 1911, Superintendent Edward S. Hall had a sewer system installed at Longmire Springs and required both hotels to put in connecting lines.

Ironically, these improvements may have served to heighten public concern that conditions in the park were unsanitary. In the spring of 1912, there were rumors that typhoid fever prevailed in the park. The National Park Inn Company feared that the rumors would depress business and wanted to find the source of the reports. Superintendent Hall knew of only one case of typhoid fever in the park, though many cases of dysentery had been reported at Longmire Springs and in the tent camps, as well as in all the towns from Ashford to Eatonville. [51] It seemed that the crowded conditions in the mountain camps and in the overflow tent accommodations at the two hotels in Longmire Springs were making a poor impression on the public. The tent camps and hotels had become, in Hall's words, "entirely inadequate" to accommodate the increasing number of visitors to the park. [52]

Camp of the Clouds

Most visitors to Mount Rainier in the 1890s and early 1900s were not content to end their trip at Longmire Springs or even the Nisqually Glacier; they wanted to break out of the timber and experience the panoramic views and wildflower-strewn meadows for which Paradise was renowned. From Longmire Springs they took the trail built by Leonard Longmire and Henry Carter in 1892—paying a small toll for the privilege—and proceeded upwards, usually making rest stops at Carter Falls and Narada Falls on the way. Some made the magnificent timberline park their destination; others passed through Paradise Park on their way to the mountain's summit.

As early as 1895, sufficient numbers of people were visiting the area to give rise to two small business ventures. Charlie Comstock of Elbe, Washington opened a coffee shop, which he called the Paradise Hotel, on Theosophy Ridge, and Captain James Skinner established a tent camp on the east shoulder of Alta Vista. [53] In 1898, John L. Reese of Ashford, Washington combined the tent camp and the meal service into one operation, located on Theosophy Ridge, and named it Camp of the Clouds. [54]

The steady growth of Reese's camp provides a rough index to the increasing popularity of Paradise Park. In 1903, Reese had seven tents and a cook tent. Camp of the Clouds increased to thirty tents in 1906, forty tents in 1909, sixty tents in 1911, and seventy tents in 1914. By then, Reese also had moved the kitchen and dining room into two wood- frame buildings. As

the operation expanded, it took considerable effort to pack in supplies in June when the trail was still snow-covered. Encountering snow depths of twelve to thirty feet as late as mid-July, Reese would use horse-drawn road scrapers and dynamite to clear the wet, condensed snow from the tent sites. [55] This hard work was necessary in order to maximize his returns during the short summer season.

Camp of the Clouds received very little supervision from the Department of the Interior. For the first three summers after the national park was created, Reese packed in his supplies and set up camp each July just as he had before. In 1902, at the request of Forest Superintendent D.B. Sheller, Reese obtained a permit for his camp from the Secretary of the Interior. This permit was renewed from year to year until 1916. The permit authorized Reese to occupy two acres on Theosophy Ridge and to provide tents, bedding, and board to tourists. Intermittently, the permit authorized Reese to graze two milk cows and six horses in Paradise Park. [56] Park officials all held Reese in high regard and considered his camp to be an asset not only from the visitors' standpoint but also from the standpoint of protecting the resources. Reese's camp concentrated use in one area, thereby reducing the fire hazard and slowing down the consumption of firewood. Reese himself kept a close watch on campfires and helped enforce the park regulations in the area. [57]

The public was generally satisfied with Camp of the Clouds. There were few complaints about the rates. Despite the camp's relative inaccessibility, Reese's rates remained competitive with those at Longmire Springs. In 1914, they were as follows:

Two persons occupying one tent, per day, each, with board	$2.50
Two persons occupying one tent, per week, each, with board	14.00
Tent occupied by one person, per day, with board	3.00
Tent occupied by one person, per week, with board	16.00
Breakfast, 50 cents; lunch, 75 cents; dinner, 75 cents. [58]	

What complaints there were focused on the camp's rustic character and poor sanitation. People wanted nicer accommodations and were willing to pay more for them. Public demand for better sanitation increased in 1911, the first full season that it was possible to take horse drawn vehicles all the way to Camp of the Clouds. [59]

Park officials sometimes acted on visitors' complaints by directing Reese to make specific improvements in the camp's sanitation. Overall, however, they thought Reese was doing very well with what he had. In 1914, Superintendent Ethan Allen defended Reese's camp against a particularly sharp complaint by a Seattle man, Martin Korstad. When the Secretary of the Interior confronted Allen with Korstad's letter, Allen assured the secretary that Reese had made fair progress on the requested improvements. He had added screens to the kitchen and dining room to keep down the insects, and had installed flush toilets (for the women only, promising that more would follow for the men). [60]

Reese sold his camp outfit to the Rainier National Park Company in 1916, which used it to house construction crews as they worked on the new Paradise Hotel. While both the company and the National Park Service would continue to provide campgrounds at Paradise, public interest would focus much more on the first-class hotel after 1916.

Wigwam Hotel

Beginning in 1908, George B. Hall and Susan Longmire Hall ran a second, smaller mountain camp near Indian Henry's Hunting Ground called the Wigwam Hotel. This camp's marginal success reflected more on the access trail than it did on the beautiful setting which the camp

occupied. The trail from Longmire Springs to Indian Henry's was approximately the same distance as the trail to Paradise, but it did not enjoy the mystique of the Paradise trail, which led past Nisqually Glacier to the main climbing route up the mountain. Never accessed by road, the camp at Indian Henry's did not grow like Reese's camp but remained fixed at fifteen tents until it was closed in 1916. [61]

Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen favored the establishment of this camp for the same reasons that he supported Reese's camp. It would serve the visiting public and assist with the prevention of forest fire and trespass. "The danger from fire is much less when the tourists are provided for at a summer resort than when they are in scattered camping parties," Allen advised the Secretary of the Interior. [62] The Halls' permit was similar to Reese's, involving a year to year "tent camp privilege" on a two-acre tract for a nominal fee of $2 per tent. [63] The permit prohibited the cutting of timber but did allow the grazing of two milch cows and six horses. [64]

Park officials received the same complaints about poor sanitation in this camp that they heard in connection with the Camp of the Clouds. In 1913, Superintendent Ethan Allen supplied the Halls with detailed specifications for improving the kitchen, dining room, tent floors, and toilets, but received no cooperation from them. [65] Allen was evidently piqued by the Halls' "audacity" in maintaining that the camp toilets were adequate, describing the same to the Secretary of the Interior. "These arrangements consist of four poles stuck in the ground in the semblance of a square, and around these poles are drawn 'gunny' sacks. Inside is a bench." The Halls, unable to comprehend how the superintendent could become so worked up over a little backcountry inelegance, suggested that he had a vendetta against them and wanted to drive them out of business. [66] But Allen had a perfectly legitimate motive: park visitors were rapidly becoming more fastidious.

Other Services

Beginning about 1908, the Department of the Interior issued year-to-year permits to numerous smaller business concerns in the park. All of these permits were cancelled after 1916 when the National Park Service determined that the best way to provide visitor services was through a single park concession. These permits were generally granted to individuals. They are of interest for two reasons: first, the services that they provided to the public reveal interesting details about the visitor experience in these early years; and second, in the aggregate, these small businesses created a clutter in the park and an administrative burden which the National Park Service's concession policy sought to do away with.

Most visitors to Mount Rainier National Park in this era had contact with at least one park concessioner. If they took the excursion train to Ashford, they normally held a through ticket to Longmire Springs, boarding one of the Tacoma Carriage and Baggage Transfer Company's wagons or later, one of the company's touring cars to go the remaining thirteen miles. If they came by private automobile or bicycle and did not trust the condition of the road past Ashford, they likely purchased a ride on one of George B. Hall's wagons or pack trains. Both outfits provided this service under permits from the Department of the Interior. [67] If park visitors wanted a ride up the road beyond Longmire Springs, they normally had to take one of Hall's wagons or saddle horses, whose permit was supposed to give him this exclusive privilege. If, however, the park visitors arrived by one of the Tacoma Carriage and Baggage Transfer Company stages, they might have been sold tickets enroute to Longmire Springs for a trip on up the road to Nisqually Glacier and Narada Falls. [68] After 1910, people bound for Mount Rainier could rent a seven-passenger touring car from one of four car rental companies that were licensed to enter the park. [69] Or they could purchase a seat in an eleven-passenger jitney from the DeLape Tours Company ($7 round-trip or $4 one way from Tacoma). [70]

After registering with the gatekeeper at the park entrance (and after buying a $5 license if they came by private automobile, or a $1 license if they were on a motorcycle), park visitors usually proceeded to Longmire Springs, where they found not only the two hotels and their assortment of outbuildings, but an array of tents and advertising signs, too. George Hall leased a large tract for his horses and wagons on which he had a barn and stable. James Patterson ran a barber shop, Fred George had a confectionary and camp grocery store, and L.G. Linkletter sold scenic photographs. [71]

Linkletter not only sold his own photographs, he also took tourists' portraits while they were in the national park. To provide this service he would load his photographic equipment onto his motorcycle and ride to some desired place such as the Nisqually Glacier or one of the scenic overlooks on the road to Paradise, where he would meet, pose, and photograph his clients. He would then return to his workroom at Longmire Springs and develop the pictures for the visitors to pick up as they left the park. In 1915, Linkletter received permission from the Secretary of the Interior to set up a studio for this purpose at the foot of the Nisqually Glacier, despite Superintendent Allen's opinion that it would mar the scenery. [72]

Linkletter's permit, however inconsequential in itself, was emblematic of the problems that the Department of the Interior faced in managing park concessions in this era. During the time that Linkletter carried on his summer business in the park, a rather large correspondence accumulated between this University of Washington instructor and the Department of the Interior. Some of the correspondence concerned the makeshift appearance of Linkletter's shop, which appears never to have evolved beyond the original canvas-walled tent. [73] Most of the correspondence dealt with Linkletter's competition. Linkletter believed that his license carried an exclusive privilege to sell photographs in the park, and he complained whenever photographs were sold at the National Park Inn, Camp of the Clouds, Wigwam Hotel, or even outside the park if the scenes were of Mount Rainier. [74] Concerning both issues—building standards and business competition—a virtual absence of policy made it difficult for the Department to deal effectively or coherently with the steady stream of hassles that arose from the Linkletter permit.

The difficulties of managing competition in the park extended to the transportation concessions as well. The Department of the Interior tried to prevent the Tacoma Carriage and Baggage Transfer Company from monopolizing the service between Ashford and Longmire Springs by giving George Hall an exclusive privilege above Longmire Springs; this proved difficult to enforce. [75] An assistant to the Secretary of the Interior considered a proposal to require $100 licenses for rental cars to match the $100 licenses for jitneys, but rejected it for "administrative reasons." [76] In 1916, the National Park Inn Company tried to wrest business away from the Tacoma-based jitney drivers, saying that it needed the "full transportation concession or this property loses its value." [77] The picture that emerged from all of this was one of chaos and drift. The Department of the Interior lacked clear policy guidelines to assess what developments were in the public interest, how much each business should pay for the privilege of operating inn the park, and whether or not each concession carried an exclusive privilege. The Department of the Interior made little progress toward a consistent approach to park concessions in this era, but dealt with them instead in a piecemeal fashion. [78]

ROADS AND TRAILS: A CITIZEN EFFORT

When Mount Rainier National Park was created, federal officials generally assumed that private enterprise would take the lead in developing visitor services while the government would undertake the more expensive task of developing roads and trails. In the early years, the government divided up responsibility for roads and trails between two executive

departments. The War Department oversaw the work of surveying and constructing the park road, while the Department of the Interior handled road maintenance and all trail development.

But Mount Rainier had a tradition of local initiative in road and trail development that pre-dated the park, and this tradition carried into the park's early years. Notable citizens' accomplishments included the clearing of trails, the construction of a shelter cabin at Camp Muir, and the making of preliminary road surveys. While all of these achievements paled in comparison to the government's work of building the road to Paradise (see Chapter V), they nevertheless contributed to the development of the park. Moreover, these developments were more important for their political than their practical significance, for they tended to reinforce the sense of proprietorship with which many people in Seattle and Tacoma viewed Mount Rainier National Park.

One private citizen came to personify this tradition of local initiative and proprietorial interest in the development of the park. He was Asahel Curtis of Seattle. Like his better known brother Edward, Asahel Curtis was a professional photographer. Both the Curtis brothers began their professional lives selling scenic photographs of Mount Rainier, Edward moved on to win fame for his portraiture of American Indians, while Asahel remained in Seattle to become locally famous for his Pacific Northwest landscapes, particularly his picture albums of Mount Rainier. More to the point, Asahel Curtis came to thrive on the politics of scenic preservation. For years he served as chairman of the Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee (later the Rainier National Park Advisory Board). He is an interesting figure in the administrative history of Mount Rainier National Park because he left an ambivalent legacy after nearly three decades of involvement in the development of the park. He combined an artist's appreciation for the scenic beauty of Mount Rainier with a businessman's keenness for boosting the park and making it into one of the Pacific Northwest's great attractions. Sometimes a friend of the park administration and other times a burr under its saddle, Curtis was easily the most active and informed private citizen during the first fifty years of Mount Rainier National Park's existence.

Although Asahel Curtis applied unsuccessfully for the position of park superintendent in 1918, he seemed to enjoy his role and vantage point outside the government. [79] Active in The Mountaineers during its founding years, he might have dominated that organization had the club not already been under the capable leadership of Professor Edward S. Meany. Instead, with T.H. Martin of Tacoma, Curtis co-founded the Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee in 1912, an organization dedicated to the "development and exploitation of Mount Rainier National Park." [80] For many years, Curtis straddled the increasingly divergent philosophies of these two organizations. In the 1920s and 1930s, he came more and more to represent the business interests of Seattle and Tacoma in demanding further road development in the park while The Mountaineers called for less. Then, in the mid-1930s, Curtis parted company with The Mountaineers, the National Park Service, and even his fellow members on the Rainier National Park Advisory Board when he opposed the establishment of Olympic National Park. This breach severely compromised the Rainier National Park Advisory Board and effectively ended Curtis's influence on the development of Mount Rainier National Park.

Though his legacy was mixed, Curtis's vision for the park's development was remarkably consistent. His ideas were already discernable in 1908-09, when he organized and led the third annual outing of The Mountaineers. On this outing about seventy-five Mountaineers set out from the Northern Pacific railhead at Fairfax and went up the Carbon River to Moraine Park, on the north flank of the mountain, from which they made an ascent of the summit by way of the Winthrop and Emmons glaciers. [81] For Curtis, the expedition had a definite public purpose: to bring publicity to the north side of the mountain. "It is the hope of the club

to not only open this region for the Mountaineers trip," Curtis wrote, "but to do as we have done with the Olympic mountains and Mt. Baker, permanently open the north side of the mountain to tourist travel." [82] Even the elaborate preparations for the expedition had a promotional quality, as Curtis reconnoitered the route in 1908 and recommended trail improvements to the acting superintendent. Curtis also sent a prospectus to the Sierra Club, dangled the club's list of supplies before a couple of prospective packers, and solicited support from the Pierce County Board of Commissioners for trail repairs outside the park boundary. [83] Shortly before the trip, Curtis invited Secretary of the Interior Richard A. Ballinger to join The Mountaineers' camp at Moraine Park while he was out west that summer. "We will be camped for three weeks on the Northern side of the mountain, in a region that has not been visited by many people for years, and it is a region that we feel deserves more attention than it is receiving at the present time in comparison with the Southern side." [84] Curtis wanted to make the national park accessible from all directions so that it would benefit all the people of the state. [85] He wanted The Mountaineers to get behind the effort to induce easterners to take vacations out west rather than abroad. [86] And with other preservationists, Curtis wanted to spread what John Muir called the "glacier gospel"—the secular faith that nature appreciation humbled and improved the human spirit. In his account of the Mount Rainier outing, Curtis wrote:

> He is a poor mountaineer indeed who has not returned to his home the better for the many lessons learned in the solitudes. The trivial things of life; the petty cares that to us seem so great slink back in the presence of this majestic mountain. It is as if one heard from out the solitudes a voice: "Why all this haste? Why all this fret and care? A thousand years ere your impatient feet first trod the earth this same beauty smiled, unknown to man. The same flowers bloomed content to bloom and die, adding their mite to nature's hoard of mold. The same streams of ice coursed their way down mountain slopes in awful majesty. A thousand years after your slumber in that last great sleep, your petty deeds and purposes unknown bear their message to other sons of man, who as restless and resistless as yourself found here a curb to their impatient witless will. [87]

It was a unique feature of this era that a man like Curtis could express both the glacier gospel of John Muir and a kind of chamber-of-commerce boosterism without the least bit of cant in either case.

In 1910, Curtis helped organize a committee of The Mountaineers on Mount Rainier National Park. The committee sought the appointment of a park superintendent, government licensing of mountain guides, and the construction of a climbers' shelter at Camp Muir. It succeeded in the first two objectives within the year; the shelter took a little longer. Superintendent Edward S. Hall, appointed that fall, was the first park superintendent able to devote all his energy to the park. (His predecessor, Grenville F. Allen, was forest supervisor of the Mount Rainier Forest Reserve as well.) In his annual report for 1911, Hall described the newly implemented guide system:

> Four persons were authorized to act as guides in the park during the season of 1911, one of whom was not permitted to guide to the summit of Mount Rainier nor across any glacier. Those authorized to guide to the summit are mountaineers of known ability. . . .While the present guiding system in the park is crude compared with that of the Swiss Alps, the number and class of tourists attempting the summit does not appear to warrant, at this time, a system and regulations that would add greatly to the expense of making the ascent, but the number in each party should be limited to eight persons. [88]

The recommendation of a shelter at Camp Muir had been made more than a decade earlier after the first climbing fatality on the mountain, and had been renewed in 1908 by Major Hiram Chittenden of the Army Corps of Engineers. [89] The Mountaineers committee suggested two climbers' shelters, the first to be erected at Camp Muir and a second to be built at a later time on the wedge between the Winthrop and Emmons glaciers (Steamboat Prow). Two years later, Curtis informed Superintendent Hall that "a well known man of the state" was prepared to donate funds for the construction of a shelter, and the Interior Department approved the plan, but it never materialized. [90] About three years later, in March 1915, The Mountaineers took up the issue again, this time with the desire to commemorate the recently deceased naturalist and Sierra Club founder, John Muir. With the enthusiastic support of Stephen T. Mather (then an assistant to the Secretary of the Interior), the shelter was constructed in 1916 at a cost to the government of $573.00. It was built according to specifications provided by club member Carl F. Gould. [91]

While The Mountaineers were accomplishing these limited objectives through the cooperation of the Department of the Interior, Curtis had begun to think more grandly about a system of park roads. In 1911, he received advice from Secretary of the Interior Walter L. Fisher that the full program of road and trail development that he had in mind would require action by Congress, and that he ought to "take it up with the people in the State of Washington who are interested and see what can be done to secure from Congress the necessary legislation and appropriations." [92] Armed with this letter from the secretary, Curtis contacted prominent individuals in the business communities of Seattle and Tacoma, and persuaded them to lay aside their mutual suspicions and rivalry to form an intercity committee on Mount Rainier National Park. The committee appointed Curtis as chairman and T.H. Martin, a Tacoma businessman, as secretary. Its member organizations included the Seattle Commercial Club, New Seattle Chamber of Commerce, Tacoma Chamber of Commerce and Commercial Club, Rotary Club of Seattle, and Rotary Club of Tacoma. "An important part of our work," Curtis announced to Secretary Fisher in March 1912, "will be an effort to have Congress authorize the construction of trails and roads and to appropriate funds for that purpose. In this I believe that the united action of Seattle and Tacoma will have much greater weight than their divided action has had in the past." As the work proceeded, Curtis added, the committee would "bring in other parts of the state interested in the park." [93]

The Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee proposed a nine-point program of development. It called for surveys of a complete system of roads and trails; improvement of the south-side road and its extension to the eastern boundary of the park; roads from Longmire Springs to Indian Henry's Hunting Grounds and from the Carbon River to Moraine Park and Spray Park; protection of timber in the national forests along the approach roads to the park; a better sanitation system; a climbers' shelter at Camp Muir; a better system of park patrol; and the establishment of a "Bureau of National Parks." The nine-point program was signed by representatives of all the member organizations. [94]

In December 1912, the committee appointed Samuel C. Lancaster of Seattle to lobby in the national capital for the desired park appropriation during the upcoming short session of Congress. As soon as he arrived in Washington, D.C. in January 1913, Lancaster began laying the necessary groundwork with all of Washington state's senators and congressmen. Lancaster scored his greatest success when he obtained a meeting with President William H. Taft. The President showed a keen interest in the committee's program for the development of Mount Rainier National Park. Fortuitously, he had first-hand knowledge of the park and the government road from his visit to Mount Rainier in October 1911. After Lancaster's visit, Taft directed Secretary Fisher to prepare a supplementary estimate of $175,000 for Mount Rainier National Park—$25,000 for surveys and $150,000 for road construction—and rush it to the Senate before the Appropriations Committee ended its current deliberations. Congress balked at the administration's last minute correction, and approved a mere $10,000 for road

surveys over and above the administration's original request of $13,400 for salaries and maintenance. Still, despite this disappointment, Lancaster and the Seattle-Tacoma Committee looked forward to larger appropriations in coming years. It was also a valuable learning experience; henceforward, the committee would take pains to track the budget process from its inception, beginning with the park superintendent's estimate to the Secretary of the Interior for the following fiscal year. [95]

But the committee did not stop there. With the approval of Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, who visited Mount Rainier National Park in August 1913, it hired two experienced road engineers to prepare plans and cost estimates for the completion of the park road system. On the basis of the road engineers' report, the committee recommended an estimate of $43,708 for the first year's road work and $12,500 for survey of a north-side road, both to be included in the budget for 1914. It recommended further that the road to the east boundary of the park follow a low-elevation route, beginning at a point near Longmire Springs and proceeding through the Cowlitz Valley to the Ohanapecosh Valley, then up the east boundary of the park to a point near the center, where it would connect (over Chinook Pass) with a state and county road out of Yakima. (The latter road was now under construction and was supposed to be completed to the east boundary of the park in 1914.) Because this low-elevation route went south of the park into the national forest, the committee also recommended a revision of the park boundary to encompass it. [96]

The details of the Seattle-Tacoma Committee's road survey were less important than the fact that the committee had had one made. The committee members well knew that the Department of the Interior had its own surveyors' reports; Inspector E.A. Keys had prepared detailed specifications for widening and macadamizing the road to Paradise in 1911, and a survey of the proposed road from Longmire Springs to the east boundary of the park was already funded under the sundry civil appropriation act of June 23, 1913. [97] These reports, not the report by the committee, would serve as the basis for a park road construction program. But the work of the committee put pressure on Congress to act. It added weight to the Interior Department's appropriation request for Mount Rainier National Park when that request was stacked against others for Yellowstone, Yosemite, and Glacier. This was one of the lessons that the committee had learned from its lobbyist in Washington, D.C. The national parks were all on their own, each one relying on its own small circle of support to educate members of Congress about its needs. Other parks, such as Glacier and Grand Canyon, enjoyed a great deal of "free" advertising by railroad companies. In the competition for congressional funding, publicity and demonstrable local support were critical. [98]

It was to end this bidding war between the national parks that so many local groups like the Seattle-Tacoma Committee avidly supported the establishment of a Bureau of National Parks. Lancaster pushed this idea when he returned from Washington, D.C. in 1913. "Our Inter-City Committee should co-ordinate and co-operate, or get into actual working touch with similar bodies in the cities of Denver, Salt Lake City, Reno, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Oakland, Phoenix, Santa Fe, Albuquerque, El Paso, Oklahoma City, Cheyenne, Boise, Portland, Spokane, Helena and possibly Hot Springs Arkinsaw [sic]," Lancaster advised the committee. [99] Together, they would put forward the following program:

1. Adequate representation on the necessary congressional committees, especially House appropriations.
2. Adequate appropriations for all the national parks.
3. A complete study of the "See America First" movement, bearing in mind estimates that Americans vacationing in Europe spent some $400,000,000 to $600,000,000 annually.
4. Establishment of a Bureau of National Parks.

As Lancaster envisioned it, the sole purpose of the Bureau of National Parks would be to

publicize the national parks through traveling photograph exhibits and a staff of public lecturers. A federal bureau with responsibility for advertising the parks would tend to level the playing field.

> The great Northern Ry. is expending money freely to advertise Glacier National Park, and is getting practical results. The Northern Pacific has done the same thing for Yellowstone, and other transcontinental lines are working for Yosemite, the Grand Canyon and other parks. All of these forces should unite as suggested with the commercial bodies of the cities named, and by co operating, these National Recreation parks can be made to yield results as yet but little dreamed of. . . .The Swiss Government has learned this lesson well and they are selling more scenery each year than any country of like area. . . .We must meet this competition. The State of Washington has scenery that fully equals that of Switzerland; we only need to make it accessible and to see that our guests are comfortably cared for when they come to visit us. [100]

The movement for a Bureau of National Parks found its champion in Stephen T. Mather, the California mountain climber, national park enthusiast, and self-made millionaire who accepted Secretary Lane's famous offer in 1914 to come on down to Washington and run the parks himself. [101] Mather quickly assumed leadership of the double-barrelled effort to get more people into the national parks and to get Congress to enact legislation that would establish a new bureau in charge of them. In 1915, Mather visited Mount Rainier on his tour of the national parks, where he was joined by members of the Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee on a pack trip around the rugged west side of the mountain. Camped at Spray Park under a brilliant full moon, the party listened with rapt attention to a recitation of a Robert Service poem by Asahel Curtis. The next day they descended to the Carbon River and followed it out of the park. Afterwards, Mather gave his pitch to a gathering of business leaders—Thomas H. Martin, Chester Thorne, Henry A. Rhodes, Alex Baillie, David Whitcomb, William Jones, Sidney A. Perkins, Joseph Blethen, Everett Griggs, John B. Terns, Herman Chapin, Samuel Hill, Charles D. Stimson—at the Rainier Club in Seattle, and talked them into forming a Rainier National Park Company and building an inn at Paradise. [102]

Mather's pack trip with Seattle and Tacoma businessmen was not the only notable expedition in the park that summer. About the same time Mather's party was in the park, some ninety Mountaineers with a pack train of fifty horses made a complete circuit of the mountain on what would soon become known as the Wonderland Trail. As Superintendent DeWitt L. Reaburn described it, "The trip around the mountain can be made in about seven days, with an average march of 20 miles over the trail." [103] Mather does not appear to have met with The Mountaineers during his visit to Mount Rainier and the Puget Sound cities. His attention was fixed on getting a modern hotel built at Paradise in order to bring more people into the park, and enlisting local investment capital to accomplish that goal.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART TWO: FOUNDING YEARS, 1893-1916

V. RUDIMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION

INTRODUCTION

After passing the Mount Rainier Park Act, Congress showed little enthusiasm for appropriating funds with which to administer the new national park. Not until 1903 was the park placed under the nominal supervision of Mount Rainier Forest Reserve Supervisor Grenville F. Allen, and not until 1910 did the park have its own superintendent. Yet in spite of these limitations, park officials established the rudiments of administration during the first decade and a half of the park's existence. They built up a ranger force, cleared trails, constructed administrative buildings, and strung telephone lines. With the help of the state legislature and Congress, they resolved all doubts about their authority to enforce regulations within the jurisdiction of the park. They helped coordinate the efforts of the General Land Office, the Geological Survey, and the Forest Service on a variety of land issues. These included the disposition of the Northern Pacific's land grant inside the park, the marking of boundaries, the completion of Mount Rainier's first topographical survey, and the maintenance of the park access road where it crossed a three-mile strip of national forest land.

Congress was a little more generous in appropriating funds for road development in the park. As it had in Yellowstone, Congress assigned this work to the War Department. The work included two surveys in 1903-04—one from the west entrance to Paradise, and the other from the east side of the Cascades to Cowlitz Park—followed by construction of the road to Paradise between 1906 and 1910. In 1913, Congress transferred responsibility for the road from the War Department to the Interior Department. The latter agency oversaw the ongoing work of widening, resurfacing, and repairing it.

This chapter examines how the government accomplished the task of building the park's basic administrative organization and infrastructure in the period 1899-1915. It is divided into sections on the development of a ranger force, development of the park road, the problem of jurisdiction, and land issues.

DEVELOPMENT OF A RANGER FORCE

The early national park "ranger" had two lines of ancestry. One line could be traced back to the military troops who were stationed in Yellowstone, Yosemite, Sequoia, and General Grant national parks beginning in the 1880s and 1890s. The military influence was recognizable in the Park Service's early emphasis on a centralized, paramilitary organization. The other line of ancestry went back to the forest rangers who were hired to patrol the forest reserves beginning in 1897. The Forest Service influence could be seen in the development of a ranger mystique that revolved around such nonmilitary virtues as independent judgment,

self-reliance, and versatility. As the nation's fifth national park, Mount Rainier confronted government officials, politicians, and preservationists with the choice of employing troops or rangers to enforce the law. Their decisions affected not only Mount Rainier but the emerging national park system as well.

Local preservationists called for troops to protect the Paradise meadows as early as 1893, after the area had been set aside as the Pacific Forest Reserve. [1] At that time Congress had made no provision for the protection of forest reserves, and the only examples of natural reserves that were being protected with force were Yellowstone and the three national parks in California. With these precedents in view, local opinion appeared to favor the use of troops for the protection of Mount Rainier. But no action resulted. These local demands were renewed after 1900. [2]

On December 4, 1901, Senator Addison G. Foster of Washington introduced a bill (S.270) that would have authorized the Secretary of the Interior to request a detail of troops for Mount Rainier National Park. It had the support of Secretary of the Interior Ethan A. Hitchcock as well as Secretary of War Elihu Root. The bill was reported favorably by the Committee on Military Affairs and was passed by the Senate, but it failed in the House. [3] As events would have it, Mount Rainier National Park emerged as the first national park to be patrolled exclusively by rangers, without resort to troops. To contemporaries, however, the concept of a park ranger force was still so inchoate that calls for troops did not seem inappropriate. Indeed, another bill providing for a detail of troops to Mount Rainier National Park was introduced in 1910 and once again garnered the support of the Secretary of the Interior, though it too did not pass. [4]

Meanwhile, the new "forestry service" provided some nominal protection of Mount Rainier visitors and resources. The Forest Reserve Act of 1897 authorized the Secretary of the Interior to appoint forest supervisors and rangers to patrol the forest reserves. Under the new "forestry service," the Commissioner of the General Land Office appointed a forest supervisor to take up headquarters in a town near each forest, and the forest supervisor in turn hired rangers to patrol districts within the forest and enforce the regulations locally. [5] Beginning in 1898 or 1899, the forest supervisor of the Mount Rainier Forest Reserve detailed a single ranger to visit Paradise Park periodically and keep a watchful eye on campers. [6] This was the first instance of "visitor protection" in Mount Rainier, and must have been among the first such ranger assignments in the nation.

The call for a permanent ranger force in Mount Rainier National Park originated with the Allen family of Ashford, Washington. In the early 1890s, O.D. Allen, a Yale University botany professor, moved to the Pacific Northwest for the benefit of his health, and established a homestead about two miles east of Kernahan's Ranch (Ashford). Over the next ten years, Allen and his sons, Edward and Grenville, made innumerable botanical expeditions to Mount Rainier, producing the first notable scientific collection of Mount Rainier's flora. [7] By the 1900s, the Allen sons possessed what Edward described as "an intimate personal knowledge of all the southern slopes of Mt. Rainier." Though Edward Allen had been in every state west of the Mississippi, nowhere else had he "seen a region so beautiful and more unique." [8] In 1903, Edward and Grenville Allen assumed two of the most influential forestry positions in the region, Grenville as supervisor of the Mount Rainier Forest Reserve and Edward as the General Land Office's forest inspector. Grenville had investigated the unauthorized charging of a toll on the trail to Paradise Park the previous year when he was a forest ranger, and both men recognized the need for more rangers to patrol the national park. [9]

In March 1903, Forest Inspector Edward Allen made a report to the Secretary of the Interior urging that the recent appropriation by Congress for improving the park should be used for

protection as well as road development. Allen's report was the first official overview of the resources of the new national park. It reiterated Bailey Willis's conception of the park as an arctic island in a temperate zone. "The extent of this truly high mountain territory has preserved conditions such as were widespread immediately after the ice age more perfectly than has any other region in the United States," the report stated, "and there still exist many species of Arctic fauna and flora extinct elsewhere except in the inaccessible North." Forest Inspector Allen recommended specifically that at least two forest rangers be assigned to the park, one in the Paradise-Longmire vicinity and the other in the Spray Park-Carbon River area, "to perform fire and game protection work from July 1 to the coming of heavy snow, usually in November." [10] The Secretary of the Interior concurred with this recommendation and authorized Forest Supervisor Grenville Allen to assume charge of Mount Rainier National Park and assign two men to the northern and southern sections of the park beginning that season. [11] This marked the real beginning of ranger protection in Mount Rainier National Park. It is notable that one Allen son recommended it while another saw to its implementation, and that both men were officials of the new forestry service (now the U.S. Forest Service).

Grenville Allen

Grenville Allen served as acting superintendent of Mount Rainier National Park from 1903 to 1910 and was responsible for founding the ranger force. He appears to have had in mind from the outset that this ranger force would be made up of trustworthy, self-motivated, professional men. The qualities he looked for in these rangers were firmness, discretion, business ability, and of course, woodcraft skills. It is not known how Allen recruited his rangers, but in some cases he secured their service year after year. Still, as he pointed out to his superiors, the seasonality of the work made it difficult to get competent men. In 1908, with the opening of the park to automobiles and the resulting increase in park revenues, he urged that some of the ranger positions be made permanent. "The organization of an efficient ranger force requires the permanent employment of men who can be depended upon to be thoroughly devoted to their occupation," he wrote. "On the whole, it seems to me that most of the rangers in the park should be employed throughout the year, and I believe that their exertions during the summer would compensate for the periods of enforced idleness during the winter." [12] The following year, the first two permanent ranger positions were created at Mount Rainier National Park.

Two years into Allen's acting superintendency, the young forestry service was transferred from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture. Formerly a division of the General Land Office, the forestry service now became a separate bureau, the U.S. Forest Service, under Chief Forester Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot laid a strong emphasis on professionalism, esprit de corps, and decentralization of authority. These initiatives influenced the development of Mount Rainier's ranger force. They not only influenced Allen's recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior to create permanent ranger positions, but probably inspired his suggestion of a uniform for park rangers and his push to construct ranger cabins in the park. [13] Mirroring the pattern of administration on forest reserves (renamed national forests in 1907), Allen divided the national park into ranger districts, putting each ranger in charge of a specified area. Allen also showed a preference for local men. His first two recruits, William McCullough and Alfred B. Conrad, were from Ashford and Eatonville respectively. [14] Whether his decision to recruit local men was merely expedient or deliberately in keeping with Forest Service policy is not known.

The rangers performed virtually all of the field work involved in administering the park. Their primary function was patrol. By patrolling the more frequently visited areas of the park, rangers were able to suppress poaching and the more brazen acts of vandalism, such as the cutting of green timber to construct temporary shelters or the making of bonfires using whole

trees. Regular patrol also aided in the suppression of forest fires, and enabled the rangers to keep track of prospectors and grazers either inside or bordering on the park boundary. (These activities are discussed in more detail in Chapter VI on protection of resources.)

In the few weeks at either end of the tourist season when weather permitted, the rangers turned to road and trail repairs and new trail construction. The principal aim of trail development was to facilitate patrol and thereby improve the protection of park resources. A secondary aim was to open new areas of the park to backcountry users, although this was not without risk, as Allen explained in his annual report for 1904:

> A very small portion of the area included in the national park is frequented by tourists. This portion is, however, peculiarly attractive, and is extensive enough for the needs of all who are likely to enter the park for many years. The mountainous and broken nature of the country, its high altitude, and the absence of trails, prevent the other parts of the park from being frequented by tourists. These conditions are a natural protection to the park. It would not be advisable to extend a system of trails into the remoter parts of the reserve unless the force of rangers was at the same time so increased as to enable such patrol to be maintained as would protect the region thus opened from forest fires and the destruction of game. [15]

During Allen's superintendency, trail development was limited to the north and south sides of the park. Rangers rerouted and improved the trail to Indian Henry's Hunting Ground, extended the Carbon River trail over to the White River, and improved the trails to Crater (Mowich) Lake and Spray Park. There were existing hunters' trails on the west and east sides, but these remained unimproved. Visitors made what would today be called a "social trail" from Paradise Valley past Sluiskin Falls to the Cowlitz Glacier. [16] It was probably a good indication of Allen's administrative priorities that the first two trails built primarily for their scenic value to tourists were completed after Superintendent Edward Hall took charge in 1910. These were the trails to Eagle Peak and Rampart Ridge, both commencing at Longmire Springs. [17]

As dedicated as Allen was to the protection of the national park, his responsibilities as supervisor of the Rainier National Forest seriously divided his time. Two of his biggest concerns, fire suppression on the drier eastern slope of the Cascades and management of grazing permits on the national forest, largely drew his attention away from the park. In 1906, the Secretary of the Interior tried to enter an agreement with the Department of Agriculture whereby a portion of Allen's salary would be paid from the Mount Rainier National Park budget, but an 1885 law prevented this. Instead, Allen continued to draw his entire salary from the Forest Service while serving as acting superintendent for the national park. Local organizations such as The Mountaineers protested this arrangement, and in 1910 Congress finally approved the Department's request for an appropriation to cover a superintendent's salary as well as the salaries of a force of rangers. [18]

This was no panacea for improving the administration of the park, however. Until the creation of the National Park Service, national park superintendents were customarily selected according to the spoils system. This meant that the political party which controlled the executive branch of government used these salaried positions to reward the party faithful, giving little consideration to job qualifications. From 1910 to 1916, Mount Rainier National Park had four superintendents (called supervisors from 1914 to 1916, after Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane appointed a general superintendent for all the national parks), and only the last in the series had appropriate training. Edward S. Hall, a Republican Party stalwart who served from January 1910 to July 1913, capably guided the park administration through the early years of expanding visitor use and concessions development, but his

reputation finally suffered due to some questionable dealings with a timber sale contractor who operated inside the park (see Chapter VI). In the summer of 1913, after the Democratic Party captured the White House for the first time in sixteen years, Hall was among more than half a dozen national park superintendents who found himself without a job. He was replaced by a loyal Democrat, Ethan Allen (no relation to Grenville Allen), who resigned after eighteen months and was succeeded by another political appointee, John J. Sheehan, in January 1915. When Stephen Mather met Sheehan at the third National Parks Conference that spring he was singularly unimpressed, and afterwards had him removed from office. [19] Sheehan's removal touched off another scramble for political patronage. This caused some disgust among the friends of the national park in Washington state who were following the matter and thought the national parks deserved more professional stewardship. [20] But the last pre-NPS superintendent was Mather's choice: DeWitt L. Reaburn, a USGS topographical engineer, with railroad-building experience in Alaska and South America and, according to Mather's biographer, "more of credit in his record than the bulk of the political superintendents combined." [21] Reaburn served for nearly four years and really belonged to the new era that began with the formation of the National Park Service.

Beginning in 1910, the superintendent maintained an office at the park entrance and a "gatekeeper" was duty-stationed in the same building to handle automobile permits and compile a record of everyone entering the park. Superintendent Hall started in 1910 with a ranger force of six men—two permanent and four seasonal, including the gatekeeper. The two permanent rangers were assigned to the north and south sides of the park respectively. This force fell to five in 1911 and 1912, rose to seven in 1913 and 1914, and reached nine in 1915. Superintendent Reaburn gave a full picture of the distribution of the ranger force in that year:

> During the season there were employed in the park service nine park rangers: Thomas E. O'Farrell, chief park ranger, stationed on the Carbon River at the northwest corner of the park, from which point he directed the patrol, trail, and telephone construction work on the north side; Prof. J.B. Flett, park ranger, stationed at Longmire Springs in charge of traffic, camp grounds, and the distribution of park literature, general information concerning the flora, trees, shrubbery, etc.; Rudolph L. Rosso, park ranger, stationed at Paradise Valley, in charge of Paradise Valley and Indian Henry's Camps; Arthur White, temporary park ranger, stationed on White River in the northeast corner of the park; Herman B. Burnett, temporary park ranger, stationed at Ohanapecosh Hot Springs in the southeast corner of the park; Earl V. Clifford, temporary park ranger, stationed at the park entrance, in charge of registration of visitors and issuing automobile permits; Archibald Duncan, L.D. Boyle, and M.D. Gunston, temporary park rangers, stationed at Nisqually Glacier, Narada Falls, and Paradise Valley, respectively, as traffic officers, under the supervision of Chas. A. Clark, general foreman of road improvement work. [22]

It is worth noting that with the opening of the road for automobiles all the way to Paradise Park, fully one third of the ranger force was now assigned to traffic control. In a sense, this marked the coming of age of Mount Rainier National Park.

Building an Infrastructure

Still another duty performed by rangers in these early years was the construction of ranger cabins. Each ranger was given a "station" as well as a district to patrol; this was the site to which he normally returned at the end of his working day. Ranger stations preceded cabins, and rangers must have made do with mere tent accommodations at first. In 1913, for example, Superintendent Ethan Allen indicated that "the Indian Henry's Hunting Ground

Station is in need of ranger quarters." [23] Understandably, rangers were eager to build cabins as soon as they could get authorization to do so. The first ranger cabin was built by the gatekeeper at the main park entrance in 1908, and by 1916 every ranger station in the park was furnished with a log or frame building. These ranger stations were distributed as follows: Nisqually Entrance, Longmire, Paradise Park, Indian Henry's Hunting Ground, Carbon River, White River, and Ohanapecosh (cabins), and Nisqually Glacier and Narada Falls (frame buildings) [24]

The Oscar Brown cabin. The Interior Department 's chief clerk, Clement S. Ucker, recommended that this cabin serve as a model ranger cabin for other national parks. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

The first cabin, known locally as the Oscar Brown cabin after the ranger who built it, is the only one from this era that still exists. [25] With the exception of the Oscar Brown cabin and the cabin at Longmire Springs, which both served as family residences, these cabins were simple, one-room structures, which apparently went up with little administrative oversight. [26] In the case of the Oscar Brown cabin, Acting Superintendent Grenville Allen provided Ranger Brown with a building plan, and Brown apparently built the cabin with Ranger McCullough's help in the early spring of 1908. Five years later, this cabin caught the eye of the Interior Department's chief clerk, Clement S. Ucker, who thought it was "an ideal cabin for the national park service." Ucker requested Superintendent Hall to send him a photograph of the cabin, a drawing of the floor plan, and its approximate cost. He then directed that the plan be redrawn by a draughtsman and distributed to the other park superintendents with the suggestion that it be adopted as a model ranger cabin. It is not known what became of this plan, though the requested photographs were in fact preserved in the department's files. [27]

The structure which absorbed the most official attention was the log archway over the main park entrance. Arguably, the archway represented the first effort to beautify Mount Rainier National Park with a structure of rustic design. (The Oscar Brown cabin was older, but officials showed little interest in its aesthetics until later.) The idea for the archway originated with Secretary of the Interior Ballinger, who visited the park in 1910 and found the entrance unattractive, with a dry riverbed on one side of the narrow road and jumbled rock on the

other and nothing marking the boundary except the ranger's cabin and a painted signboard. At Ballinger's request, Superintendent Hall submitted a plan and cost estimate. Hall's idea was "to use the largest cedar logs obtainable for this work." It would consist of "two uprights on each side of the road with cross pieces to bind them together at the top and one or two heavy logs to run from the uprights across the road." [28] Ballinger approved $250 for labor and materials, stipulating that the plans should include "a gate of rustic design constructed of cedar poles. The gate to be of somewhat similar design to that at the entrance of the home of Superintendent Hall but larger." [29] The archway was erected in the spring of 1911. From the arch a three-foot diameter log, planed on two sides, was suspended by heavy chains with "MT. RAINIER NATIONAL PARK" chiselled into its face. [30]

Another innovation in this period was the introduction of telephone communications between ranger stations, road construction camps, and the superintendent's headquarters. The first telephone line in the park was built by the Tacoma and Eastern Railroad Company under a special use permit dated April 29, 1911. Park officials used this line to communicate between Longmire Springs and the park entrance. In 1913, the government constructed its own single-wire telephone line from the park entrance to Paradise Park, with intermediate stations at Kautz Creek, Longmire Springs, Nisqually Glacier, and Narada Falls, at a cost of $750. By connecting with Forest Service lines south of the park, communication between the park headquarters and the Ohanapecosh Ranger Station was also established. [31] In 1915, the line was extended over the west-side trail from Longmire Springs through Indian Henry's all the way to Carbon River, providing the first direct telephone link between the north and south sides of the park. [32] Later that summer, the department authorized a $900 expenditure for construction of a line from boundary post no.66 (White River Entrance) to Glacier Basin, linking the last ranger station at White River into the system. [33] This gave the park a total of ninety miles of government telephone line in addition to the six-mile Tacoma and Eastern telephone line from the park entrance to Longmire Springs. The system brought the whole ranger force into direct telephone communication with the superintendent's headquarters at Nisqually Entrance.



The archway at the Nisqually entrance. Note the National Parks Highway sign on the left.
(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)

ROAD CONSTRUCTION

The people of Washington state generally agreed that the first need of Mount Rainier National Park was to get an adequate road built, presumably to Paradise Park. In August 1900, Washington's Representative Francis W. Cushman requested the U.S. Geological Survey to make a preliminary survey and cost estimate. The USGS report, completed that fall by Fred G. Plummer, suggested that a road from the southwest corner of the park to Paradise Park could be built for $90,000. In January 1901, Cushman forwarded this report to the Secretary of the Interior with the suggestion that the department request an appropriation in the next sundry civil appropriation bill. The Sundry Civil Act of March 3, 1903 included the following item:

> Mount Rainier National Park: To enable the Secretary of War to cause a survey to be made of the most practicable route for a wagon road into said park, and toward the construction of said road after the survey herein provided for shall have been made, ten thousand dollars. [34]

This was the first appropriation made for Mount Rainier National Park.

The road to Paradise Park was surveyed in 1903 and built between 1904 and 1910, after which improvement work continued for another five years. This constituted the first of three main bursts of road building in the park's history, and the only one undertaken by the War Department. [35] Although the War Department would turn the road work over to Interior in 1912, the War Department had an important influence on the park's administration and development for the nine years it was present in the park.

Eugene Ricksecker

The War Department's legacy was enhanced by the dedicated service of Eugene Ricksecker, the assistant engineer who designed and supervised construction of the road and maintained a lively interest in all phases of the park's development until his death in 1911. [36] The department's chain of authority down to Ricksecker may be briefly described. Secretary of War William H. Taft assigned the initial task of surveying, and the subsequent task of road construction authorized by Congress in 1904, to the Army Corps of Engineers, under Chief of Engineers Alexander Mackenzie. Mackenzie, in turn, put the Corps' Seattle District Office in charge of the work. The Seattle District Office was headed by four different men in this nine-year span; these men were Eugene Ricksecker's direct superiors. Major John A. Millis headed the office from 1903 until the summer of 1905. He was followed briefly by Lieutenant F.A. Pope, then by Captain Hiram M. Chittenden beginning in the spring of 1906. Finally, Major Charles W. Kutz assumed charge of the Seattle District Office from Chittenden in 1908. For most of this period, Ricksecker had his main office in Tacoma and a field office at Longmire Springs. [37]

In the spring of 1903, Ricksecker canvassed local people on various existing routes into the park and easily settled on the Nisqually River Valley as the best alternative. He gave two reasons for this choice: it was the most popular among tourists owing to the fact that a road and trail already existed to Longmire Springs and Paradise Park, and it was the approach used most often by climbers, since it led to the easiest route of ascent of the mountain's summit. [38] Ricksecker then initiated the preliminary survey, beginning with actual topographical mapping of the area from the southwest corner of the park to the upper

Nisqually River and entire Paradise Valley. He gave the head surveyor, Oscar A. Piper, instructions to take the road past two outstanding scenic attractions, the Nisqually Glacier terminus and Narada Falls, and as many other points of interest as possible. This was accomplished between July and November 1903. The route was 24.5 miles long. It included two additional points of interest: Christine Falls and a dramatic overlook of the Tatoosh Range from "Gap Point," later renamed Ricksecker Point in honor of the engineer. Rather than taking the direct route up Paradise Valley, as the trail did, it started climbing the 2,800 feet from Longmire Springs to Paradise Park by a series of "loops" or switchbacks on the flank of Rampart Ridge. [39]

Ricksecker emphasized that the road would be designed "solely as a pleasure road." A pleasure road was a rare specimen of engineering in that era, made all the more unusual by the mountain topography. The road would not only give access to the highcountry, but would harmonize with the landscape and itself give pleasure to the traveler. Writing about his general design for the road's curves, for example, Ricksecker explained:

> The intention is to generally follow the graceful curves of the natural surface of the ground, as being most pleasing and far less distractive than the regular curves laid with mathematical precision. It is not proposed, however, to avoid all through cuts as this would in some instances introduce curves of entirely too short radii. The least radius permissable is fixed at 50 feet; the shortest aimed at is 75 feet. Curves of this radius will obtain only at a very limited number of places, principally at loops. Very few and quite short tangents will occur. The traveler will thus be kept in a keen state of expectancy as to the new pleasures held in store at the next turn. [40]

Ricksecker specified a generous width of clearing of sixty feet, or about fifteen feet on either side of the road, in the timbered sections, to ensure adequate exposure to sunshine so that the road surface would dry out after summer rainstorms and so that the snowpack would melt quickly in the spring. But to diminish the sense of barrenness and artificiality that this swath through heavy timber would create, a few large trees would be left standing. No unsightly borrow pits would be made, guardrails would be made of native rubble, and wherever possible drainage would be accomplished with ditches leading along the road to some natural stream rather than by introducing a large number of culverts. [41]

What stamped this as a scenic road above all was the gentle gradient, which added considerably to the road's length. The object was not to find the shortest practicable route between two terminals, Ricksecker stressed, but to make it a pleasing drive. With his emphasis on the joy of the road, one might presume that Ricksecker was thinking of the dawn of the automobile age, but he seems to have had motorless vehicles chiefly in mind. In justification of the road's light gradient, Ricksecker wrote:

> Steep stretches where teams must walk soon become monotonous and pall upon the senses. Light grades offer no excuse for the teamster to walk his horses and insinuate "Here's a good place to walk." It is generally conceded, I believe, that about a 4% gradient is the steepest up which teams can trot; that they will walk almost as rapidly ascending an 8% gradient as a 4%; that the descent of grades steeper than 8% becomes rapidly more dangerous as the gradient increases. Grades steeper than 5% cannot be ascended with reasonable effort, by cycles. [42]

Although Ricksecker only lived to see the south side of the park developed (he died at age fifty-two), he had a vision that Mount Rainier National Park would one day have a very extensive system of roads. He thought that the many access routes known to local people

should eventually be improved with roads, and that as many of these roads as possible should connect within the park. [43]He thought there should be a scenic road around the mountain, built as near the permanent snow line as possible in order to maximize the open vistas. "The diversified and changeable scenery to be obtained at a high elevation far outweighs a route at a lower elevation, passing through a forest that becomes more or less monotonous," he wrote. [44] In a burst of enthusiasm, he even suggested that the road to Paradise Park be extended to Camp Muir. [45]

Ricksecker's ideas contrasted with the next generation of park road engineers in the 1920s and 1930s, who were trained in landscape architecture and showed more sensitivity to the threat of overdevelopment and the scarring of the landscape that roads entailed. Perhaps it is unfair to judge Ricksecker's vision by the standards of a later era; given his keen sense of aesthetics, it is likely that he would have modified his views over the years. But is it worth considering the extent to which Ricksecker defined the park visitor's experience in relation to vehicles. The view from the road framed Ricksecker's whole sense of aesthetics. The next generation of park road engineers would take a broader perspective and consider, too, the visual impact of the road as seen from a distance. Ironically, due to the lay of the land, it was the main roads designed and built by this latter generation—the road to Sunrise, the Westside Road over Round Pass, the Stevens Canyon Road (begun in the 1930s but not completed until 1957)—that caused the worst visual scarring in the park. Consequently, Ricksecker's reputation for beauty engineering has held up very well over the years, while his original road alignment has scarcely been changed.

Ricksecker's record of administration of the road construction is a little less glowing. In the first place, his original cost estimate of $183,000 proved to be quite low. Congress appropriated $30,000 in 1904 with which to complete the survey and begin construction, and made additional allotments each year which saw the road to completion for a total cost of $240,000. However, Ricksecker had found it necessary almost at the start to reduce the width of the road from sixteen to twelve feet, and in places it narrowed to ten. Moreover, the road remained unsurfaced. According to an Interior Department inspector who investigated the road in 1911, it would cost an additional $325,000 to widen and macadamize the road according to Ricksecker's original specifications. [46]

Ricksecker also had difficulty getting the work started. Initially the government contracted the work to one A.N. Miller, whose company was to commence with the difficult four-mile stretch leading out of Longmire Springs. The work proved much more expensive than anticipated; disastrously, only one mile was completed during the whole 1905 construction season. Chief of Engineers Mackenzie annulled the contract and reassigned Captain Hiram Chittenden, builder of the Yellowstone road system, to the Seattle District to take the Mount Rainier road project in hand. Chittenden made three major changes to Ricksecker's plan. First, he insisted that reconstruction of the seven miles of existing road from the park entrance to Longmire Springs must precede the extension of the road to Paradise Park. (He informed Mackenzie, "The existing road built by private parties is, I think, without exception the worst I have ever traveled over.") Second, the per-mile cost of the road had to be sharply reduced. "I found upon visiting the work already done that it is of a very elaborate character, such as cannot possibly be carried over the entire line of road for many years to come," Chittenden reported. "The roadway is 25 feet wide and built with an elaborate system of berms and drains and other refinements of road construction that are more suitable to a city highway than to a road in this wild and rough country." Chittenden directed that the clearing be narrowed from sixty to thirty feet, and the roadway narrowed from sixteen to twelve. Third, opting to forego any more contracts, Chittenden put Ricksecker directly in charge of the work. This was "in modified form, the system under which work was done in the Yellowstone." [47]

In 1907, the road was completed from the park entrance to Longmire Springs, and for the first time automobiles were admitted into the park. In 1908, the road was opened to Nisqually Glacier—the first road in the United States, it was said, to reach a glacier. [48] In 1909, it was completed to within a few miles of Paradise Park, and in 1910 the last difficult stretch above Narada Falls was built. President Taft, who had been Secretary of War when the project was initiated, received the honor of being pulled to the top in a horse-drawn automobile in October 1911. A car reached Paradise Park under its own power in 1912, but the road was so narrow above Narada Falls that it was not opened to cars generally until 1915. [49]

Ricksecker spent nearly seven years supervising the construction of this impressive road—one of the earliest scenic mountain roads in the national park system. With his field office located at Longmire Springs, it is no exaggeration to say that from 1903 to 1910 he spent more time in the park than Acting Superintendent Allen. Ricksecker cared deeply about the park. He brought to Allen's attention the fact that Virinda Longmire was trying to secure a homestead patent and that Robert Longmire had opened a saloon in the park. [50] He recommended a boundary extension to Secretary of the Interior James R. Garfield in order to protect the park's wildlife, and he protested the sale of timber along the road in the southwest corner of the park. [51] He may have been the first to urge the development of a bridle trail around the mountain (the future Wonderland Trail), and the first to recommend that the government acquire the Longmire tract. He suggested that the government build climbers' shelters at Camp Muir and the summit crater. [52] At a time when the Department of the Interior had scant information on conditions in the park, Ricksecker was an important administrative presence.

Other Road Surveys

The Sundry Civil Appropriation Act of April 28, 1904 included $6,000 for a survey of a second wagon road into the park, beginning at the eastern boundary of the forest reserve. This small sum allowed only a very cursory survey to be made. It was accomplished that summer and fall by Junior Engineer John Zug of the Corps of Engineers. Zug traced a route up the Naches and American rivers to Bear Gap (just south of Chinook Pass), then along the main "ridge" between the Cascade Crest and Mount Rainier as far as Cowlitz Park. Zug found this "ridge" too broken to be a practical route. Moreover, Zug had hoped to complete the survey from Cowlitz Park around to Paradise Park, but decided there were too many intervening snowfields and canyons to continue. [53]

The cost estimates that accompanied the Zug survey were so arbitrary as to be useless, but Zug's report on the terrain did plant a few seeds. First, the report provided a clearer picture as to the practicability of punching a road over the Cascade Mountains via the Naches and American rivers. This was of singular interest to the people of Yakima. Second, Zug assumed that the eastside road would terminate at some alpine park, just as the southside road did. He chose Cowlitz Park; later planners would look again at this possibility, together with Ohanapecosh Park and Summerland, before finally settling on Yakima Park. Third, Zug doubted that a high-elevation road was possible around the southeast side of the mountain, and suggested that a road connecting the east and west sides would have to swing well south of the park boundary. Ricksecker took exception to this, arguing that the road should maintain all the elevation it gained between Longmire Springs and Paradise Park. [54] The Department of the Interior conducted two more road surveys on this side of the mountain in 1913 and 1916, the first more or less following Zug's suggested route south of the park, the second going by way of Reflection Lakes and Stevens Canyon to Ohanapecosh Hot Springs. [55] This debate between high-elevation and low-elevation routes in the southeast quadrant of the park would perplex park planners all the way up to the 1930s.

For some years, it was proposed to build a road to Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. The Corps of Engineers staked a route that started from the main park road near Christine Falls, went over Rampart Ridge, and traversed around the head of the Kautz Creek drainage within view of the snout of Kautz Glacier (once again, aiming for an eventual high-elevation road around the whole mountain). [56] In 1911, Interior Department Inspector Edward A. Keys tried to walk this route but found it too vaguely marked to follow. In any case, he recommended that the Indian Henry's Road not be undertaken for the time being, since the department would have enough to do widening and macadamizing the road to Paradise. [57] This was the last time the Indian Henry's Road was seriously considered.

Transfer of Jurisdiction for the Park Road

The War Department's mandate in the park was limited to road survey and construction. With the appointment of a park superintendent in 1910, and the completion of a serviceable road to Paradise, Interior Department officials began to negotiate with War Department officials for the transfer of jurisdiction of the park road. In 1910 and 1911, Superintendent Edward S. Hall used a portion of Interior's park appropriation for road repairs and in his annual report for 1911, Superintendent Hall recommended that the road "should be transferred from the War Department to the Interior Department, placed under the control of the park superintendent, and appropriations be made for its upkeep and repair." [58] That fall, Secretary of the Interior Ballinger dispatched Inspector Edward A. Keys to Mount Rainier to prepare appropriation estimates for the department.

In his report, Keys stressed that the Interior Department would be taking on a large project. "While the road has been put through," he cautioned, "the actual work of making a first-class macadam road is not much over half completed, and the cost of widening and macadamizing the present road is going to be expensive." [59] Keys made detailed estimates of the cost of widening and surfacing the road. These came to $160,915.19 and $164,076.00 respectively, for a total of $324,991.19. [60] Keys' report was too late to be included in the department's budget estimate for the coming fiscal year. But ten months later, in the fall of 1912, the Interior Department prepared to take over the road work. The Secretary of the Interior accepted a transfer of camp outfit, tools, and other equipment from the Corps of Engineers to the park superintendent. [61] And at the secretary's request, Superintendent Hall submitted a budget estimate of $343,400 for the next fiscal year. [62]

At this point the transfer of jurisdiction from War to Interior ran into a couple of snags. In the first place, the Interior Department unexpectedly slashed the park's budget estimate from $343,400 to $13,400. Investigating how this fiasco had occurred, the Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee's lobbyist in Washington, D.C. learned that it was the handiwork of Assistant Secretary Samuel Adams, whom President Taft had directed to come up with $11,200,000 in cuts from the department's annual Book of Estimates five days before it had to be submitted to Congress. Though the Secretary of the Interior and the department's chief clerk were both familiar with Mount Rainier National Park and the uncompleted road, both had been away from the capital when the cuts were made. [63] Informed of this situation in February, President Taft sent the following letter to Secretary Fisher:

> My Dear Mr. Secretary:
>
> I wish you would at once prepare a supplementary estimate for the making of roads in the Mount Rainier National Park in Washington—$25,000 for the surveys and $150,000 for road construction. Send it to me and I will approve it and forward it to the Treasury Department.
>
> I promised that this should be done when I was in Washington the last time. The

> proximity of this great National Park, with its beautiful mountain scenery, to two large cities like Tacoma and Seattle justifies an immediate expenditure for bringing the Park within the reach of the humblest citizen. It differs so widely from Yellowstone Park and the Yosemite in its accessibility if we only construct these roads, that I think immediate and generous action is fully justified.
>
> The matter is under consideration by the Appropriations Committee now, and the estimate ought to be prepared at once.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> (signed) Wm. H. Taft. [64]

The estimate was duly prepared and submitted, belatedly, to the House Committee on Appropriations. But then a second obstacle arose. Congressman Stanton Warburton of Washington, trying to dramatize the national park's woes to his colleagues in the House, rashly introduced an amendment to the sundry civil appropriations bill which would transfer title for Mount Rainier National Park back to the state of Washington. His strategy backfired. He only succeeded in provoking the park's supporters back home. The Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee sent a telegram informing members of Congress that Warburton's action did not represent the desires of the people of the state. Further, the committee got Governor Ernest Lister to go on record against the transfer of title. [65] Warburton's humiliation merely convinced the House to ignore the department's revised estimate for Mount Rainier National Park. As a result, the Corps of Engineers pulled out of the park and left road construction at a standstill. Even when the Interior Department resubmitted its estimate one year later, Congress saw fit to reduce the amount to $51,000. [66]

The second snag which prevented a smooth transfer of jurisdiction involved the muddle over the short section of road from the west boundary of the Rainier National Forest to the west boundary of Mount Rainier National Park. This three-mile stretch of road had been more or less "orphaned" by the fact that Pierce County would only improve the original Mountain Road as far as the national forest boundary, while the Interior Department would only maintain and repair the road beginning at the park entrance. Though Chittenden had directed Ricksecker to improve this section in 1908 (Ricksecker had wanted to make a completely new alignment, but the cost was prohibitive), the War Department's jurisdiction did not extend to maintenance. During the winters of 1910-11 and 1911-12, the road was practically ruined by the pounding it received from heavy trucks hauling away logs from the small timber sale operation being conducted in the southwest corner of the park. President Taft complained of the road's condition in October 1911, and by the following spring, dozens of Washington citizens were writing letters to their senators and congressmen protesting that the road was "like a hog mire," a "shame and disgrace," and "practically impassable." One citizen cabled Congressman Warburton, "Careless lumberjacks have ruined Mount Tacoma Road in forest reserve; vehicles sink in mire to hub... .We believe Government should fix it". [67] Bills were introduced in 1911 and 1912 to make a special appropriation for the War Department to repair this section of road, or alternatively, to transfer jurisdiction of the entire road (including this three-mile section through the national forest) to the Department of the Interior. Neither bill got out of committee. [68]

The three-mile section of road was nominally under the jurisdiction of the Rainier National Forest, but the Department of Agriculture would not authorize any expenditures for its upkeep. Further complicating the picture, the road passed through five forest homestead claims belonging to W.A. McCullough, O.D. Allen, A.A. Mesler, George Uhly, and Edward S. Hall. [69] The government's right-of-way through these claims had not been perfected.

[70] When Congressman Warburton made a speech on the floor on behalf of his Mount Rainier road bill, there were objections that the federal government should not be maintaining a road that went through private property, or alternatively, that the Interior Department should not be given responsibility for a road through a national forest. [71]

For their part, Interior Department officials wanted the Forest Service to take care of it. When Thomas H. Martin of the Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee broached this problem with officials at the National Parks Conference in Yosemite in 1912, he was encouraged to seek the cooperation of the Forest Service. The Forest Service proposed to distribute its available road maintenance funds among some twelve to fifteen projects in Washington state, including the three-mile section across the Rainier National Forest. But the Tacoma-Seattle Rainier National Park Committee protested that this would be a waste—"a few hundred dollars here and there would be absolutely no good." Instead, the committee negotiated an agreement between the Pierce County commissioners and the Forest Service. Both parties would contribute $12,700 toward repairs on the three-mile section of Mount Rainier road. [72]

These adjustments of jurisdiction over the government road paralleled the issue of federal and state jurisdiction in the park with regard to law enforcement. While the two problems were technically distinct and demanded separate resolutions, they played off one another in the public's mind. Nothing demonstrated the problem of muddled jurisdiction more forcefully for the park visitor than the controversy over this three-mile section of road. When this situation finally received the attention it deserved, it set the stage for Congress's long-delayed consideration of that other problem of jurisdiction, law enforcement.

THE PROBLEM OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

All federal reservations require some kind of division of jurisdiction between federal and state law enforcement officials. Today the national park system contains three forms of federal-state power-sharing; these are known as exclusive, concurrent, and proprietary jurisdiction. Although in recent times the direction has been toward concurrent jurisdiction (that is, overlapping federal and state policing authority) in Mount Rainier National Park the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction. This is a legacy of the early years of the national park system when exclusive jurisdiction appeared to be the only effective alternative. In order to understand why this was so, it is necessary to consider how the national park rangers' authority to make arrests evolved in this era. National park law enforcement involves a combination of jurisdiction and authority.

Origins of Law Enforcement Authority

The origins of the park ranger's law enforcement authority, like the origins of the ranger force itself, can be traced to the new forestry policy that the nation pursued in the 1890s. As the Secretary of the Interior moved to establish a "forestry service" under the Forest Reserve Act of 1897, it soon became apparent that the field agents in this service were seriously hampered by the fact that they did not have authority to arrest persons caught violating the law. Instead, this authority rested with U.S. marshals and the judicial branch of the federal government. Thus, when a forest ranger caught someone violating the law—cutting timber or grazing livestock without a permit, for example—he had to obtain an arrest warrant from a U.S. marshal before he could stop the illegal activity.

Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock raised this issue with the Justice Department in April 1899, inquiring whether Justice would suggest that U.S. marshals be asked to deputize forest supervisors and rangers. Attorney General John W. Griggs replied in part:

> The statutes for the protection of these forest reserves seem singularly deficient in that they do not provide any efficient means for the arrest of persons violating the laws or the rules and regulations for the protection of these reservations. These laws, rules, and regulations afford little of the protection intended without some provision for the speedy arrest of persons violating them. The protection of these large territories is a difficult matter at best, and is substantially impossible without authority for the speedy arrest of persons committing depredations thereon or otherwise injuring them, for in most cases, and in the worst, before complaint could be made, a warrant obtained, and officer to serve it, the damage would be done and the offender beyond reach. [73]

Attorney General Griggs advised that the Interior Department could not expect the U.S. marshals to deputize its field agents, for the separation of powers under the Constitution prevented it. Rather, the solution was for Congress to enact a law that would give forest supervisors and rangers the authority to make arrests.

More than five years later, the Interior Department finally obtained this authority when Congress passed the following act:

> Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States Congress assembled, That all persons employed in the forest reserve or national park service of the United States shall have authority to make arrests for the violation of the laws and regulations relating to the forest reserves and national parks, and any person so arrested shall be taken before the nearest United States commissioner, within whose jurisdiction the reservation or national park is located, for trial; and upon sworn information by any competent person any United States commissioner in the proper jurisdiction shall issue process for the arrest of any person charged with the violation of said laws and regulations; but nothing herein contained shall be construed as preventing the arrest by any officer of the United States, without process, of any person taken in the act of violating said laws and regulations. [74]

Yet park officials still found that the public was skeptical about their authority to police the park. That summer, one Henry Beader of Tacoma was caught cutting down a green tree and throwing it on his campfire, but resisted arrest by a park ranger. The ranger went to the U.S. commissioner in Tacoma and identified the accused, bringing the sawed-off tree stump to the hearing for evidence, but the commissioner still refused to place the defendant under bond to appear in court. Relating this incident to the Secretary of the Interior, Acting Superintendent Allen expressed regret that "the validity of the Act of February 6, 1905, was questioned," but added, "the fact of the arrest will to some extent prevent similar offenses in the future." [75] Possibly this incident did instill greater respect for the park ranger's authority among campers, for no more cases of vandalism were reported.

More doubtful was the ranger's authority to enforce the prohibition against hunting in the park. The regulations prohibited the killing of game and the carrying of firearms without the prior permission of the acting superintendent, but Allen and his rangers found that they were unable to enforce this ban in the courts. The situation was made more difficult by the fact that many miners entered the park to work their claims, which were legal under Section 5 of the Mount Rainier Park Act. The question arose whether these people could be forceably removed from the park for trespass when they were caught in possession of firearms. Assistant Secretary Frank Pierce advised Allen that until Congress accepted the exclusive jurisdiction over Mount Rainier National Park, or enacted a law providing for punishments for the killing of game in the park, rangers should only report violations of the game laws of the state of Washington. [76] In response to a further request for clarification from Allen, the

assistant secretary detailed the ranger's police powers. The letter is worth quoting at length because it presents a clear picture of the constraints under which rangers operated:

> Trespassers upon the park lands should be removed as soon as discovered, using only such violence for that purpose as may be necessary with an admonition not to repeat the offense. Tourists and other persons in the park who properly observe the regulations of the reservation are to be received at all times and treated with courtesy.
>
> You are not authorized to either imprison persons or give them any sustenance at the Government's expense, nor will it be advisable for you to seize horses or other property for the purposes of confiscation...
>
> You will take up all firearms found in the possession of any person or persons within the metes and bounds of the park, unless they have a permit from you authorizing the carrying of the same. This instruction applies not only to the Government lands but the lands covered by the patent to Longmire. Firearms taken up should be returned to the owners upon application at the end of the season.
>
> As to authority to search wagons, carriages, and other vehicles and packs for firearms and game, and to enter patented lands for the purpose of taking up firearms...in cases where you have well-founded suspicions that firearms have been brought into the park in violation of the regulations, or that game has been killed in the reservation, you can make the desired search and also enter upon the patented lands in a peaceable manner for the purpose of determining the existence of firearms there, by whom they were brought in and by whose authority. Where game has been found which has been killed in violation of the laws of the State of Washington, the matter should at once be reported to the proper authorities, with a view to the institution of proceedings under the State laws....
>
> It is not to be understood, however, that the regulations governing the park are to be enforced in a harsh or arbitrary manner or so construed as to work a hardship or loss of property, where an effort has been made to reasonably comply with the terms thereof; all persons entering the park, and especially those owning patented lands or who have valid mineral entries in the park, should be handled in a tactful manner in order that their cooperation in the management of the park may be secured, rather than their enmity....
>
> During the summer months, no doubt, parties will be found bringing sheep, cattle, horses, and other stock upon the Government or park lands for purposes of grazing; in such cases it will be your duty to advise the persons in charge of the animals that they are trespassing upon the park lands and require them to immediately depart with their stock from the reservation; upon failure on their part to do so, after this warning, they should at once be ejected, with such force, as in your judgment the circumstances surrounding the case may require. While acting, however, with firmness, seeing that your orders for their departure from the park are being complied with, discretion and good judgment should be exercised to the end that neither bodily harm nor bloodshed may possibly ensue. [77]

This letter seemed to settle the matter as far as Acting Superintendent Allen was concerned. But until the federal government accepted exclusive jurisdiction over the national park,

rangers had difficulty enforcing the park's rules and regulations in the courts. What was needed was a means of holding court expeditiously in the park so that poachers and trespassers would more likely be convicted.

Exclusive Jurisdiction Obtained

The Mount Rainier Park Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe rules and regulations for its care and management; thus it placed the park under the secretary's jurisdiction. But Congress did not have the power to terminate the state's jurisdiction; this the state of Washington had to do. On the assumption that dual federal and state jurisdiction undermined the federal authority, Secretary Hitchcock refused to promulgate rules and regulations for the national park until the state ceded its part in the dual jurisdiction. [78] In March 1901, the legislature and governor of the state of Washington enacted such a law, provided that the cession was to take effect only when the federal government notified the governor that the U.S. was assuming "police or military jurisdiction" over the park. [79] With Congress not yet having made an appropriation for the administration of Mount Rainier National Park, Secretary Hitchcock held that it was impossible to accept the state's cession on those terms, and he did not push the matter. Thus the state's offer of cession was left standing. [80]

Nearly a decade later, in December 1910, Washington's Senator Piles introduced a bill to accept exclusive federal jurisdiction according to the state's terms. Representative Humphrey of Washington introduced the same bill in the House. It is unclear what caused this long delay; in the intervening decade, other national parks had been created and the federal government had moved expeditiously to establish exclusive jurisdiction over them. In any case, this bill still faced a difficult road. The Department of the Interior offered a number of strengthening amendments, aimed principally at making the bill conform to an Act of May 7, 1894, titled "Act to Protect the Birds and Animals in Yellowstone National Park," which had set that park up as a part of the U.S. judicial district of Wyoming and provided a list of punishments for various offenses. [81] Though both this Mount Rainier bill and another, introduced in the next Congress, died in committee, the department's amendments were incorporated into a similar bill for Glacier National Park in Montana, which was passed on August 22, 1914. [82] This act then formed the model for the Mount Rainier bill, introduced by Washington's Senator Wesley L. Jones on January 25, 1916. After minimal debate, Congress finally passed this bill on June 23, 1916. [83]

The principal features of this act were its detailed schedule of misdemeanor offenses, all of which were punishable by a maximum $500 fine and six-month prison sentence, and its directive to the U.S. District Court for western Washington to appoint a commissioner who would reside in the park and hold trial for any case involving violations of the park laws, rules, and regulations. [84]

LAND ISSUES

With the creation of Mount Rainier National Park, the Secretary of the Interior had jurisdiction over a large area of unsurveyed, poorly mapped terrain. Certain routine matters of land management had to be accomplished, beginning with the relinquishment of all Northern Pacific land grant holdings within the park as prescribed in Sections 3 and 4 of the Mount Rainier Park Act. The park boundaries needed to be surveyed, and the rugged topography needed to be mapped.

The Northern Pacific Land Grant

Sections 3 and 4 of the Mount Rainier Park Act described a two-step process: the Northern Pacific Railway Company would relinquish all of its grant lands in the park and the forest reserve to the United States, and then it would select an equivalent amount of lieu lands elsewhere. Public criticism of this overly generous deal, instead of abating with the passage of time, slowly mounted as the process of selecting lieu lands progressed. Although the act's sting landed elsewhere, particularly in the state of Oregon where the company took most of its lieu selections, the land exchange was not without significance to Mount Rainier National Park. [85]

The public's ire gave rise to many inaccuracies concerning the passage of the Mount Rainier Park Act and the land exchange. A congressman once said that the Northern Pacific unloaded 450,000 acres of worthless lands within three days after the Mount Rainier Park Act was signed. [86] This was part of the legend of the federal government's shady deal. In fact, the relinquishment was held up for several months by the Central Trust Company of New York (the trustee of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company's general first mortgage), who demanded payment from the Northern Pacific for the estimated value of the land before it would lift its mortgage on the land. [87] Another congressman later claimed that the Northern Pacific had exchanged "barren lands" for timber lands worth $10 million. [88] This was inaccurate, too, for a large proportion of the relinquished lands in the national park and forest reserve were heavily timbered, and the timber value of the lieu lands did not approach $10 million. Washington's Governor Marion E. Hay lambasted the Northern Pacific for selecting lieu lands that were unsurveyed, and therefore untaxed. [89] Pacific Northwest politicians scored easy points by attacking the Northern Pacific's land grant.

In response to this public criticism, the Secretary of the Interior made a modest adjustment of the Northern Pacific's claim in 1912. The secretary ruled that all odd-numbered sections in the park that were covered by glaciers could not be claimed by the Northern Pacific for the basis of lieu selections. [90] The ruling was based primarily on the Supreme Court case of Bardon v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, which held that "public land" was only that land that the government intended to make available for public sale. Glacier-covered land would never be sold. Since the railroad grant embraced alternate square miles of non-mineral, public lands within a specified distance of the railroad, the glacier-covered land in Mount Rainier National Park had never been a part of the railroad grant. This ruling pruned 17,318 acres from the Northern Pacific's 454,458.52-acre relinquishment, but it hardly assuaged the public's bitterness.

Ironically, two small boundary extensions in the northwest and southwest corners of Mount Rainier National Park in 1926 would make the Northern Pacific Railway Company an inholder once again. These small inholdings should not be confused, however, with the Northern Pacific's original relinquishment of grant lands in 1899. The significance of the Northern Pacific's land grant was that it left a bitter legacy; the land exchange did not impinge directly on the administration of the park, but it created an animus in the public's mind toward the Northern Pacific's early involvement with the national park.

Boundary Survey

Section 1 of the Mount Rainier National Park Act defined the boundary of the park by township and range. None of the townships covered by the park had yet been surveyed, and the precise location of the park boundary was therefore not known. The boundary needed to be marked so that field agents of the Department of the Interior would be able to protect the park against trespassers, and so that the Secretary of the Interior could verify that the boundary was reasonable. (There was some concern that the western boundary of the park was too high up on the flank of the mountain and did not take in all of the Puyallup and Tahoma glaciers.)

The business of surveying township lines belonged to the General Land Office (GLO). The GLO usually contracted with private parties for township surveys, and in mountainous regions it was not unusual to find a series of surveyors abandon their contract before the work was finally accomplished. So it was with the townships overlapping the boundary of Mount Rainier National Park. On March 3, 1900, the GLO contracted for the survey of the exterior boundaries and subdivisions of two townships, covering the south and west boundary of the park. But the contractor failed to execute the survey and the GLO commissioner cancelled the contract. On January 23, 1903, the GLO awarded this contract to two other surveyors, and at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the U.S. surveyor general in Olympia, Washington directed his examiner of surveys, M.P. McCoy, to follow up this work with a survey of the entire park boundary. But owing to delays in the execution of the township surveys, Acting Commissioner J.H. Fimple redirected McCoy in the fall not to attempt the boundary survey. [91]

The entire park boundary was finally surveyed by W.H. Thorn in the fall of 1908. By then, the western boundary had been established by township surveys, but the eastern boundary (which then ran down the middle of Townships 15, 16, and 17 North, Range 7 East) was definitely located for the first time. As a result, the Secretary of the Interior learned that the eastern boundary of the park fell considerably short of the crest of the Cascades and awkwardly intersected the White River a number of times. [92] (The eastern boundary would be extended to the Cascade Crest in 1931, and modified slightly in 1988.)

The boundary survey aided in the protection of the park. The boundary was a deterrent against trespass by poachers and graziers. Two years after the 1908 boundary survey, the Department erected a wire fence along the western boundary north and south of the park entrance to prevent loose stock from ranging into the park. It was another example of Mount Rainier National Park's pioneer beginnings that the first nine years of park administration were accomplished in the absence of a surveyed boundary. [93]

Topographical Survey

Next to having the boundary surveyed, park officials were eager to have a topographical survey of the park accomplished as well. Not the least important objective of a topographical survey was to establish the precise elevation of Mount Rainier, which was generally assumed to be the highest point in the United States outside Alaska. This task fell to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). In 1911, the USGS began a topographical survey of the park. Surveyors mapped the park on the ground, using a plane table on a tripod and an alidade (a special surveyor's tool which combined a telescope, level, and vertical arc in one device). The elevation of Mount Rainier was first ascertained by means of triangulation from various lower Cascade peaks. The broken-topped configuration of Mount Rainier's summit made this work especially difficult, however, and it was not until August 20, 1913 that the summit platform was mapped and the elevation of Columbia Crest was determined to be 14,408 feet above sea level (later adjusted to 14,410 feet, and more recently to 14,411 feet). The man who in 1913 accomplished this work had the improbable name of Colonel Claude H. Birdseye. [94]



Map of Mount Rainier National Park, 1914

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART TWO: FOUNDING YEARS, 1893-1916

VI. RESOURCE PROTECTION IN THE EARLY YEARS

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no other aspect of national park history has stirred such lively interest as resource protection, or what is now called natural resource management. As set forth in the acts creating the early national parks, the essence of the national park idea was to preserve nature for the enjoyment of the people. The National Park Service Act of 1916 refined and codified this idea with its classic formula that the purpose of national park management was "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein, and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." But the preservation of nature for the public's enjoyment is a deceptively simple mandate. Nature itself is culturally defined, and concepts of nature have changed markedly over the course of the twentieth century. Consequently, the National Park Service's guiding star changed position over the years; the service took a new compass reading from time to time and adjusted its course accordingly. The history of natural resource management must therefore begin with an understanding of how the goals which shaped policy have shifted over time.

Prior to the creation of the National Park Service, natural resource policy in the national parks emanated from each park's establishing act and from the Secretary of the Interior. The institutional framework for developing national park natural resource policy was very weak. Interior Department officials generally responded to natural resource issues as they arose in each park, making little effort to formulate system-wide policy guidelines. When such an effort did occur, it was invariably feeble. A good illustration of this was Secretary of the Interior Walter L. Fisher's reliance on one "expert lumberman" for advice on how the department should handle the logging of dead and down timber in Glacier National Park in 1911. A copy of this memorandum was placed in the department's files on Mount Rainier National Park, where a similar timber sale was already in progress (and drawing criticism for its sloppiness and doubtful legality). The five-page memorandum constituted the most in-depth analysis that the department ever undertook on this seemingly vital issue. [1]

Natural resource policy in the national parks was also weakened in this era by the ascendancy of utilitarian conservation, or "Pinchotism," named for its leading exponent, Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot's ideology has been interpreted in various lights, but at root it was a modernization of the age-old conceptualization of nature as a storehouse of riches for humankind to develop and use—modernized in the sense that Pinchot wanted humankind to apply its scientific understanding of nature in order to ensure an efficient, or "wise," use of nature's bounty. Appointed chief of the new U.S. Forest Service by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, Pinchot made the Forest Service aggressively utilitarian, or use-oriented, in its outlook and aims. His philosophy of conservation soon pervaded all the other federal land management agencies. He declared the preservation of scenery to be a waste, and proposed that the

national parks be brought under the administration of the Forest Service. Although preservationists like John Muir, Horace McFarland (who led the long fight for a national parks bureau) and Stephen T. Mather were able to prevent Pinchotism from overtaking the national park idea, there was an increasing tendency by the Secretary of the Interior during this era to accommodate utilitarian objectives in the national parks.

Given this institutional and philosophical context, much natural resource policy in Mount Rainier National Park's early years developed at the local level. This was partly by default, partly by design. All of the superintendents appointed to Mount Rainier National Park before 1916 were local men, sensitive to the economic interests of the local population. All were themselves utilitarian conservationists to one degree or another. Their utilitarian values molded the way they perceived (and managed) natural beauty. Green timber excited them. Insect-damaged trees, old bums, and "overmature" stands appeared to them to mar the scenery. Cutting down and removing these blighted trees enhanced the park. They wanted "game" (not wildlife) to be plentiful, and they took steps to eliminate predators in order to increase the number of deer and mountain goats in the park. They referred to all developments such as roads, trails, and buildings as "improvements," revealing their traditional image of nature as something inert, awaiting the creative hand of humankind to make it beneficial.

This chapter examines how the above influences shaped natural resource policy in Mount Rainier National Park from 1899 to 1916. The chapter is divided into four sections on mining and prospecting, water development schemes, forests, and wildlife.

MINING AND PROSPECTING

Following consultation with James Longmire and other local people in the late 1890s, the authors of the Mount Rainier Park Act decided there would be little harm done by accommodating miners and prospectors in their bill. [2] Thus, a brief two lines were added to the end of the bill, which provided that the park would remain open to mineral location under the Mining Law of 1872. This feature of the bill raised no objection in Congress, and even the Secretary of the Interior waited until after the law was passed to criticize this section in his annual report for 1899.

Yet the provision for mining in Section 5 of the Mount Rainier National Park Act flatly contradicted Section 2 of the act which declared that all mineral deposits (together with other specified features) would be preserved from injury or spoliation and retained in their natural condition. The only explanation for this blatant contradiction in the law was the fact that Section 2 had been copied directly from the Yellowstone Park Act when the bill was first drawn in 1893, while Section 5 was introduced late in the evolution of this bill. After the law was passed it quickly became obvious that the provision for mining and prospecting not only made it impossible for the Department of the Interior to protect mineral deposits in the park, but compromised the department's ability to protect other natural resources in the park, too. [3]

Under the Mining Law of 1872, a prospector could locate a mineral claim wherever he could show there was a reasonable prospect of mining precious metals. His claim gave him the right to dig tunnels or holes in the earth, divert water from streams for sluicing, and cut down trees with which to frame his diggings and erect buildings. The mining law did not give the prospector the right to bear arms, much less hunt in the park, but park officials nevertheless showed some reluctance to separate the prospector from his gun whenever he requested permission to take a gun into the park. Thus, the allowance of prospecting and mining in the park set up a peculiar double standard between prospectors and other park users while

placing trees, water courses, and wildlife, together with mineral deposits themselves, at risk.

Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen tried to give a picture of the extent of prospecting in his annual reports. Allen reported that 90 prospectors were known to have entered the park in 1905, and that the number of new claims filed with the Pierce County auditor rose from ten in that year to 104 in 1906 and 165 in 1907. It could readily be seen that the park attracted a significant number of prospectors and that it was soon peppered with claims. Probably Allen ceased giving the number of prospectors after 1906 because they were becoming harder to distinguish as a group from pleasure seekers. "In most cases," he wrote in 1907, "the claimant makes a summer camping trip, does a few days' nominal assessment work, and returns to his usual vocation." [4] By and large these were not professional miners or prospectors. The vast majority of claims consisted of no more than four blazes on trees, the posting of a notice of the location, and the filing of it in the office of the county auditor. [5] Often the claim notices bore such vague descriptions that the park administration had no idea where the claims were located, Most of the significant claims were located in Glacier Basin (northeast of the mountain), above Longmire Springs, and in the Carbon River area. [6]

At first Allen was inclined to regard the prospectors as no more than a nuisance. He reported that most of the claims were made in good faith, and judging by the dearth of successful mines in the vicinity of Mount Rainier National Park he did not think any paying mines would ever eventuate inside the park; therefore, it might be expected that prospecting in the park would fade over time. The prospectors themselves seemed "on the whole to be careful of their fires, and to desire to comply with the regulations." [7] But with the huge number of new claims in 1906 and 1907, Allen changed his mind. Many so-called prospectors used their claim locations to build unsightly cabins, and no doubt came back to these cabins to hunt the park's game in the fall. Furthermore, many of these claimants left slash lying around wherever they built cabins or cut trails, increasing the fire hazard. These conditions would only grow worse. Consequently, Allen recommended a thorough examination of the mining districts in the park with a view to invalidating all claims that showed no mineral values so that these claimants could be removed from the park for trespass. It could then be ascertained whether conditions warranted consideration by Congress of a law to repeal Section 5 of the Act of March 2, 1899. [8]

Assistant Engineer Eugene Ricksecker made much the same recommendation in a long letter to Secretary of the Interior Garfield on October 18, 1907. [9] Congress should be asked to amend the Mount Rainier Park Act, and a USGS geologist and mining expert, Ricksecker urged, should be detailed to the park to report on all existing claims. Ricksecker's letter followed Allen's report by just a few weeks, and probably reflected some discussion and agreement between the two men on the park's most important needs. (They offered similar recommendations for improving wildlife protection, too.) This was not the first time that the Corps of Engineers had complained about the policy of allowing mining and prospecting in the park, nor was this a new concern for the Secretary of the Interior. [10] Yet it seems probable that the combined effect of Allen's and Ricksecker's advice in the fall of 1907 made a crucial difference, for the desired amendment to the law was inserted in the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act approved by Congress on May 27, 1908. [11]

This law only prevented the location of new claims, however. It made no provision for the elimination of existing claims. The Department of the Interior still had to cope with dozens of prospectors who already had claims in the park. Over the next three years, numerous claims were invalidated by the General Land Office because they were inadequately described in the notice of claim, or they were not marked on the ground, or the claimant failed to do the necessary annual assessment work. A few claims persisted, however, and would cause trouble for the park for decades to come. Thus the problem of mining in the park changed after 1908, but did not go away. Park officials no longer had to cope with a yearly horde of prospectors,

but they now had to try as best they could to contain the damage as the claimants carried out their annual assessment work and built "improvements" on their claims.

The change in the law raised two underlying legal and administrative issues for park officials that would frame the issue of mining for as long as any claims remained in the park. First, inasmuch as the mining claims were all marginal, park officials had to assess at what point it became worthwhile for the administration to challenge each claim and attempt to have it annulled. Second, the new park regulations that accompanied the 1908 law restricted the claimants' right to dig, divert water, cut timber, and erect buildings, to the confines of his or her claim without the permission of the Secretary of the Interior. But in practical terms, a successful mining operation required timber for the mine, an access road for getting supplies in and the ore out, and a staging area for buildings (known as a mill site, whether or not the ore was actually milled there). All of the significant mining operations after 1908 either attempted to claim a mill site or requested permission to build a road, or both. Two mining operations received permission to cut timber. The law was ambiguous as to how much the department needed to cater to these marginal mining operations in permitting such ancillary developments on park lands.

The Department of the Interior's response to these requests varied with each mining operation. Park officials attempted to assess whether mill site claims and applications for timber cutting or road construction were in "good faith." Their assessments varied. Another important variable related to the location of the mining operation relative to the park administration and the center of visitor activity. The mineral area near Longmire Springs was under the close eye of the park superintendent and the Corps of Engineers' Assistant Engineer Eugene Ricksecker. The mines in the Carbon River Valley were under the surveillance of a permanent district ranger. But those in Glacier Basin had very little oversight in this era. The department's treatment of these different concerns grew noticeably more lax the farther they were from the park administration and the center of visitor activity. Discussed below are three mining operations in the Longmire area, two in the Carbon River Valley, and one in Glacier Basin. These were the major mining concerns in the park, though in a couple of cases they would lie virtually dormant until a later era.

Short Canyon Mining Company, Longmire

Frank and Emma Hendricks and three Hendricks brothers located four quartz-lode mining claims (named the Pete, Eagle, Discovery, and Hendricks) around 1902. The claims were situated on the west bank of the Nisqually River about one half mile above Longmire Springs. [12] It appears that neither Acting Superintendent Allen nor Assistant Engineer Ricksecker was even aware of the claims when Frank Hendricks asked for permission to build a short road connecting the claims to the park road above Longmire Springs. The newly surveyed park road, it seemed, went directly through one of the claims. [13]

This situation disclosed how the provision for mining in the national park could work against the public interest, and it provoked Major John Millis of the Army Corps of Engineers, Seattle District, to urge special legislation that would exempt the park from the mining law. [14] Acting Superintendent Allen immediately detailed Ranger J.M. Schmitz to report on the validity of the claims. Schmitz found a showing of minerals on each claim. On the Discovery claim, Frank Hendricks had sunk two shafts, one 12 feet deep and the other 42 feet deep, and had dug a tunnel 10 feet deep. He had also built a 12 x 24-foot cabin and an 8 x 10-foot blacksmith shop. [15] Allen forwarded the reports to the Commissioner of the General Land Office with the comment that the claims appeared to be made in good faith but that if they ever went to patent they would probably be used for a hotel site—just like the Longmire family's placer claim nearby. [16]

As long as the claims remained valid, the possibility existed that the land would be patented and alienated from the park. The Hendricks family continued to work these claims for many years. In 1913-14, Superintendent Ethan Allen identified their mining concern as the Short Canyon Mining Company. The Hendricks sold their interest in the company to a group of Seattle investors in 1915 and apparently assessment work on these claims all but ended after that. In 1923, the abandoned claims were annulled. [17]

Eagle Peak Copper Mining Company, Longmire

Mary A. Long filed a location notice for the Aldula claim on July 10, 1904, and her husband Baker Long and son Robert Wheelock filed notice for the adjoining Paradise No.1 claim on August 10, 1906. The family formed the Eagle Peak Copper Mining Company, with a capital stock of $150,000, on May 21, 1908. These claims were situated at the base of Eagle Peak, below the confluence of the Nisqually and Paradise rivers, and a short distance above Longmire Springs. [18]

The park administration's quandaries began when the company filed a location notice for a mill site claim in 1910, two years after the Mount Rainier Park Act had been amended. Superintendent Hall requested instructions, advising his superiors that the company had previously built some cabins on this site in connection with the development of the Aldula and Paradise No. 1 claims. Without actually challenging the mill site claim, the Interior Department took the position that the company could use the land only as the department saw fit to permit, and that it did not object to the continued use of the land for "camping purposes." Three years later, in March 1913, Superintendent Hall informed the secretary that the company had maintained a permanent "camp" on this mill site since June 1, 1911. He found the camp unobjectionable except insofar as it might give the company "some claim to the land." [19] There was no reply from the department. In 1918, the company announced plans to develop the mill site with machinery and ore bins so that it could transport ore across the Nisqually River and then out of the park. The Interior Department recognized that the mill site claim was of doubtful validity, yet it permitted the company to invest the site anyway.

Paradise Mining and Milling Company, Longmire

Two brothers, Ike and Sherman Evans, located the Iva Henry No.1 and Iva Henry No.2 claims some time prior to the 1908 amendment of the Mount Rainier Park Act. The claims were situated at the base of Eagle Peak nearly adjacent to the Aldula and Paradise No. 1 claims. In September 1909, a mineral expert with the General Land Office reported "certain irregularities" in the way the claims had been located, but apparently no further action was taken to invalidate the claims at this time. In the spring of 1911, the Evans brothers applied for a permit to build a wagon road across 400 feet of park land and to construct an 800-foot cableway across the Nisqually River to a point approximately 750 feet from the park road. On June 2, 1911, the Department of the Interior advised Superintendent Hall not to permit this construction until further advised. [20] Apart from some limited assessment work on the claims, this mining operation lay virtually dormant until the First World War. As in the case of the Eagle Peak Copper Mining Company, the park administration evidently hoped that these claims would be abandoned. It was probably indicative of the park administration's low level of concern that the correspondence on both of these mining operations had to be reconstructed in 1917-18, and that none of this material survived in the park's administrative files.

Carbon River Valley Mining Operations

Two short-lived mining operations in the Carbon River Valley caused the park administration

some concern in 1907-10, mainly because their location just inside the park boundary coincided suspiciously with a stand of the largest cedar found anywhere in the park and perhaps in the region. Some of the trees measured ten to twelve feet in diameter. [21]

The Hephizibah Mining Company had six adjoining claims starting at an elevation of about 1,800 feet and going up the side of Sweet Peak to about 4,000 feet elevation. Late in the year 1908, the company filed notice for a five-acre mill site claim at the foot of Sweet Peak, and in April 1909, the company cut and slashed a line in the heavy timber around this claim. During that same winter, a logging railroad was constructed from Fairfax, located five miles from the park boundary on the Northern Pacific line, up the Carbon River to a point in the Rainier National Forest within three miles of this claim. To Ranger O'Farrell, the mill site claim did not appear to be made in good faith but rather appeared to be an attempt to acquire the large trees. In answer to a report from Acting Superintendent Allen on the mill site claim, the department ruled that the claim was invalid and that any further cutting of timber on the mill site would constitute trespass. Park officials were advised to inform both the local land office and the company accordingly. [22]

But the matter did not end there. In 1910, the Hephizibah Mining Company filed papers with the General Land Office seeking to perfect three mining claim locations and the mill site in exchange for relinquishment of the other three mining claims. A General Land Office mineral expert, sent to inspect, reported that the lands were "mineral in character" and the claims were valid. Secretary Ballinger replied that the General Land Office's report was glib and inadequate; if the company wished to apply for patents, further examination was necessary. [23] At this point the Hephizibah Mining Company practically vanishes from the historical record; apparently the company was discouraged from trying to take the claims to patent. In 1923, a mineral examiner found that the officers of the company had died or moved away, and the General Land Office annulled the claims. [24]

The second mining operation in the Carbon River area was that of the Washington Mining and Milling Company, which had located some thirty claims about one mile inside the park boundary on the south side of the Carbon. [25] In 1907, the company's manager, William Colgrove, applied for a permit to construct a wagon road across park land. Colgrove indicated that the road would be twelve feet wide and would continue beyond the park boundary some five miles down the Carbon River Valley to Montezuma, about one-half mile east of Fairfax, where it would connect with an existing county road. The department approved a permit with the understanding that the road would be government property. O'Farrell reported his disappointment with the results in the fall; the road was barely passable and extended only from the company's workings to the park boundary. Moreover, he found twenty-eight large cedar, spruce, and hemlock stumps—indicating the removal of far more board feet of timber than the company could account for in the bridge construction and corduroying that occurred here and there along the road. [26]

For about a twelve-month period in 1908-09, the Washington Mining and Milling Company took a keen interest in the claims, employing from seven to fifteen laborers. One tunnel reportedly reached a depth of 250 feet. By the spring of 1911, however, Superintendent Hall was able to report that the company had relinquished twenty-one of its claims. At this time the company still claimed fourteen locations, and Hall thought these, too, should be cancelled as they were probably being held for the merchantable timber on them. [27] The record is incomplete, but the remaining claims appear to have been forfeited a few years later.

Mount Rainier Mining Company, Glacier Basin

The most significant mining operation in Mount Rainier National Park was that of the Mount Rainier Mining Company. Though this mining concern was finally no more successful than

any other mining concern in the park, it involved more road-building, logging, building construction, and subsurface workings than all the others combined, and was the only one to take its claims to patent.

During the summers of 1897 and 1898, prospectors discovered signs of copper ore deposits on the east flank of Mount Rainier, between the Emmons and Inter glaciers, in a place called Glacier Basin.[28] In the summer of 1902, Peter Storbo of Enumclaw and B.P. Korssjoen returned to the basin and staked forty-one claims, and in 1905 they formed the Mount Rainier Mining Company. The first recognition of this mining operation by park officials apparently occurred in 1906, when the Interior Department granted permission to Storbo and Korssjoen to improve the trail from the park boundary up the White River and the Inter Fork to their camp in Glacier Basin.[29]

The earliest indication that this mining operation's remoteness would pose special administrative problems came in the acting superintendent's annual report for 1908, in which Allen stated that he had reason to believe that in the summer of 1907 the prospectors in Glacier Basin had killed a number of mountain goats in the area. [30] The following year Allen reported that Ranger O'Farrell had confiscated rifles from the miners' cabins; now he was more certain that the miners had wiped out the goat population in the basin. Allen described the expanding operation as follows:

> The mining claims are all contiguous and are located in the basin and on the ridges that surround it. The mining is done on the claims in the upper end of the basin and the tunnels run in the direction opposite to that by which the other claims would be reached. The lower claims in the group are in the timber. A sawmill with an estimated daily capacity of 10,000 board feet is operated by water power to produce timbers and lumber for the mine. The development work includes one tunnel 700 feet long, one tunnel 73 feet long, and a prospect hole 13 feet deep. Two cabins, 14 by 22 feet and 15 by 30 feet, a barn, 18 by 25 feet, and a blacksmith shop, 16 by 18 feet, have been built. [31]

In 1913, the Mount Rainier Mining Company relinquished its claim to thirty-two of the forty-one locations, retaining nine mining claims (for which it would eventually obtain patents). In exchange for these relinquishments, the department granted the company a permit, renewable each year, for two campsites, two existing tunnels, an existing sawmill and waterpower site, and the privilege to build a road up the White River into the basin. The permit stipulated that no timber was to be cut without separate authorization from the Secretary of the Interior. The company would pay an annual fee for the permit, the amount to be adjusted as the Secretary of the Interior deemed appropriate. [32] On paper, the department seemed to retain a lot of control through this agreement, but as things worked out over the next three years, the mining company was allowed considerable license.

The main reason for this was that the company's road construction promised to open up the east side of the park to tourists, a development which park officials regarded as positive even if the road would be an inferior one. At the time of this agreement, State Road No. 1 (today's Highway 410) terminated at the confluence of the White and Greenwater rivers, several miles north of the park boundary. Between 1914 and 1916, the Mount Rainier Mining Company constructed a wagon road from that point all the way up the White River to Glacier Basin, a distance of more than twenty miles. At the beginning of 1915, the company had already expended $25,000 on this project, and was employing a donkey engine, seven horses, and a crew of thirty to forty men, whose camp was situated just outside the park at the mouth of Silver Creek. [33]

Horse party in Glacier Basin where the Mount Rainier Mining Company had mining works.
(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)

In 1915, the company also received permits from the Department of the Interior to cut green timber in Glacier Basin with which to construct two more buildings and a flume. The timber sales were small (the first was for 25,000 board feet and the second for 50,000 board feet, at $2.00 per thousand) but not insignificant considering the relatively sparse forest in Glacier Basin. Again, the department appeared to be motivated partly by the thought of opening up the east side for tourists that much sooner. One of the two buildings which the mining company proposed to build was a tourist hotel for the anticipated throng of automobilists once State Road No. 1 was completed. [34]

When all was said and done, the privileges which the department granted to the Mount Rainier Mining Company seemed unreasonably generous. The "improvements" did not yield much benefit in the way of public use. The road was so steep beyond the mouth of the Inter Fork (with grades of up to thirteen percent) as to be nearly impassable to motor vehicles, while the rest of the road required extensive regrading by the Park Service before it was opened to automobile traffic. The "hotel" remained incomplete and never saw any guest use. [35] Afterwards, however, the company was able to make an adequate case that it had made sufficient investment in the mining claims to have them patented. Once patented, the mining property in Glacier Basin would stand as the only alienated land in the park for many years.

WATER DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES

In the early 1900s, various water development schemes threatened the integrity of Mount Rainier National Park. To two of the nation's pioneer hydroelectric developers, Charles Stone

and Edwin Webster of Boston, Mount Rainier's immense volume of snow and ice, the precipitous descent of rivers and streams down its flanks, and the proximity of the mountain to Seattle and Tacoma, combined to make Mount Rainier an attractive field for hydroelectric development. [36] To a pair of Tacoma speculators, John W. Browne and William Colgrove, Mount Rainier appeared to be a favorable site for the development of storage reservoirs to supply the city of Tacoma with water for domestic use. To another Tacoman, W.F. Lamson, the glacial run-off on the east side of Mount Rainier could feasibly be diverted through the Cascade Mountains to irrigate the Yakima Valley. And for still another entrepreneur, the opening of the road to the Nisqually Glacier prompted an application for a lease for the business of quarrying ice to be hauled to Seattle and Tacoma. [37] Although none of these proposals for tapping water sources inside the national park got very far, they are significant because they were the first test of the Secretary of the Interior's resolve to preserve the resources in a natural condition even in the face of specific demands for their use. The secretary's response to these schemes takes on additional significance when it is compared with the secretary's concurrent decision-making in the notorious case of the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park, where water development interests prevailed.

In 1903, the Boston firm of Stone & Webster organized the Puget Sound Power Company and constructed the West Coast's first major hydroelectric plant on the Puyallup River. The development consisted of a dam and reservoir situated about ten miles west of the park boundary, below the confluence of the Puyallup and Mowich rivers, from which a flume conducted the water about ten miles farther west to the penstocks, turbines and powerhouse site. With a generating capacity of 20,000 kilowatts, the plant distributed electrical current to the street and interurban railway systems, industries, and illumination in Tacoma, Seattle, and other Puget Sound communities with a total population of some 200,000 people. This rivalled the hydroelectric development at Niagara Falls, completed four years earlier, as one of the first impressive demonstrations of large-scale electric power generation. [38]

On June 5, 1903, the Puget Sound Power Company applied to the Secretary of the Interior for permission to investigate the potential of damming the outlets of Mowich and Eunice lakes as well as Meadow Creek—all located within the national park—in order to form upstream reservoirs for the company's new hydroelectric plant on the Puyallup River. [39] This application reached the Secretary of the Interior on the heels of another application—perhaps fortuitously, for it demonstrated that one concession would doubtless lead to another.

On November 3, 1902, John W. Browne of Tacoma and William Colgrove of Orting formed the Mt. Tacoma Water Supply Company and filed a claim to a water right for the use of 10,000 cubic feet of water per second flowing from Crater (Mowich) Lake. On April 23, 1903, Browne and Colgrove applied to Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock for permission to build flumes and pipelines from Mowich Lake to the edge of the national park and across the strip of forest reserve which lay to the west of the park. While awaiting the secretary's reply, they filed additional claims to the waters of Meadow, Voight, and Crater creeks and for the right to use the bed of Eunice Lake as a reservoir. At this time Browne and Colgrove also located the Crater and Crater No.2 mining claims. Their location notices, recorded in the office of the auditor of Pierce County, stated that the water rights were for mining and manufacturing purposes and for the purpose of supplying the city of Tacoma and other cities of Pierce and King counties with fresh water. [40]

Acting Secretary Thomas Ryan turned down both applications on July 8, stating that the Mount Rainier Park Act made no provision for the granting of rights of way over the park lands for flumes and pipelines nor for the creation of reservoirs. This ended the matter as far as the Puget Sound Power Company was concerned, but Browne and Colgrove proved to be particularly tenacious. By virtue of their two mining claims, the Crater and Crater No.2, they insisted that they had a prior water right and a legitimate reason to be making

"improvements" in the area. Clearly they were speculating on the possibility of attracting interest in the site by the city of Tacoma, to whom they would then sell their alleged water right. The Department of the Interior's inability to remove these two speculators summarily demonstrated how vulnerable the national park was to exploitative schemes.

That summer of 1903, Secretary Hitchcock directed Forest Supervisor Grenville F. Allen to assume responsibility for the national park and to assign two forest rangers to the area. On August 24, Hitchcock instructed Allen to prevent any party from making a preliminary survey with a view to constructing reservoirs or diverting water from streams in the park. [41] Allen detailed Ranger Alfred B. Conrad to the Carbon River area and requested that he determine the validity of the Crater and Crater No.2 mining claims. Conrad found one log cabin "bunkhouse" on the claim together with a single, shallow prospect hole. The cabin was occupied by the claimants' hired man, John R. Lahzis. When Conrad asked what their supposed gold and copper ore had assayed for, Colgrove told the ranger that none had been assayed, while Browne said it had assayed for $5 to $12 per ton. The ranger concluded: "I do not believe that this is a valid mining claim, in my opinion this claim is taken on a supposed water right on Crater Lake." [42] Allen forwarded this report to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, noting that "the intrusion of these people seems to be a wilfull [sic] trespass," and requested further instructions. [43]

Browne and Colgrove reacted aggressively to the negative finding in Ranger Conrad's validity determination. First they put up notices near Mowich Lake (in violation of the park regulation that prohibited posting of private notices or advertisements) announcing their various water right claims and plans for diversions. For good measure, they posted notices underneath these stating that they would prosecute to the full extent of the law anyone who removed their notices. [44] Second, Browne wrote to Secretary Hitchcock suggesting that Conrad was unqualified to determine the validity of their mining claim. [45] Finally, Browne renewed his and Colgrove's request for a permit, on the grounds that Congress might soon pass a law that would grant the secretary this authority. With unintended irony, he added that the company might "pay a reasonable rental for the use of the water...the funds so derived to be used for the further preservation and improvement of the Forest Reserves and National Parks." [46] Browne enclosed a letter from the mayor of Tacoma to Secretary Hitchcock that outlined the city's population growth and existing water supply and stated that it would be only a short time before the city required additional water sources. [47]

There was a grave precedent involved here. Only months before, Secretary Hitchcock had rejected a request by the city of San Francisco for a permit to turn the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park into a reservoir and city water supply. (Hitchcock's successor, James R. Garfield, would reverse that decision, setting the stage for one of the most bitter conservation battles in American history. In 1913, Congress would pass a law authorizing the infamous Hetch Hetchy reservoir project to go forward.) [48] The parallel with Hetch Hetchy did not escape Washington's Senator Foster, who requested an outline of all of Hitchcock's rulings on water development proposals in national parks, particularly with respect to Yosemite National Park. [49] Interior Department officials thereupon analyzed the various statutes involved, including the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, Washington State water rights law, and federal and state mining laws, and determined that the department did not recognize water rights "of the character of those sought...by Messrs. Browne and Colgrove...in connection with mining claims." [50]

This laid the matter to rest—almost. Three years later, the Mt. Tacoma Water Supply Company requested a permit to take water from Chenuis Creek for the purposes, once again, of providing a water supply for the city of Tacoma. Chenuis Creek is a tributary of the Carbon River on the extreme north edge of Mount Rainier National Park. It drops into the Carbon at Chenuis Falls. To divert the water from Chenuis Creek would result in the

reduction or elimination of the scenic waterfalls. On May 8, 1907, Secretary of the Interior Garfield requested a report on this situation from Acting Superintendent Allen. Allen reported that the Chenuis Creek proposal was another speculative venture like the company's earlier Mowich Lake scheme, and recommended against granting the permit. But he added the following caveat:

> However, if it could be shown that the proposed flume line would be a work of great public utility, that it was desired by the city of Tacoma, and that its use would be a benefit to them, I should recommend that the water be taken from Chenuis Creek, notwithstanding the circumstance that to do so would destroy the waterfalls. [51]

Here was the precise thinking that would lead Secretary Garfield, one year later, to sacrifice Hetch Hetchy to the needs of San Francisco water users. Fortunately for Mount Rainier National Park, the city of Tacoma looked elsewhere for additions to its water supply. It would seem that Mount Rainier's escape from any large water development project in this era was more an accident of geography than it was a result of the Interior Department's natural resource policy.

Mount Rainier and Tipsoo Lakes. Some regarded the snow-capped mountain as a potential resource for water development schemes. *(Asahel Curtis photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. Curtis 58797.)*

One more water development proposal in this era is worth noting. In 1915, W.F. Lamson of Tacoma quietly laid before Washington's Senator Miles Poindexter an ambitious scheme by which the meltwaters of the Emmons and Fryingpan glaciers would be diverted to the east side of the Cascade Range. Lamson's idea was to build an earthen dam across the main fork of the White River, creating a reservoir in the upper White River Valley. The water would be conveyed by tunnel, about two miles in length, through the crest of the Cascade Mountains,

and then down either Morse Creek or Rainier Fork to the American River. From that point the water would descend through a series of hydroelectric dams and storage reservoirs, and ultimately feed into irrigation projects in the dry Yakima Valley. Lamson reasoned that the diversion of water to the east side would not only generate power and benefit Benton and Yakima county agricultural interests, but would solve the problem of flood control on the White River and reduce the need for dredging of the Puyallup Waterway in the Tacoma Harbor as well. [52]

It is not known whether Senator Poindexter ever publicized Lamson's scheme. Evidently he at least gave it a sympathetic hearing. What is interesting about Lamson's scheme is that he touted it at the same time that he pursued the position of national park supervisor (superintendent). Apparently he saw no conflict of interest between the two objectives. Less than a month after detailing his water diversion scheme for Senator Poindexter, he asked for the senator's help in gaining the government post being vacated by Supervisor John J. Sheehan. While Poindexter delicately refused this request, Lamson did obtain an endorsement from the Pierce County Women's Democratic League. The League informed Secretary of the Interior Lane, perhaps naively, that Lamson was "in hearty and intelligent accord with your National Park policy, and altogether a gentleman of such high character and ability that we not only feel sure that his appointment would result in great good in the Park in service, but a credit to your administration." [53] How Lamson planned to proceed with his water development scheme had he become supervisor of the national park remains unclear, but the mere fact of his candidacy shows how frail was the preservation ethic in this era.

FORESTS

Natural resource policy in Mount Rainier National Park originally laid stress on the preservation of objects (timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities) rather than biological communities. Forest policy focused on the care and management of healthy trees, because the underlying conception of a forest was that it consisted of so many individual, preferably green, trees (hence the term "timber" in the Mount Rainier National Park Act). Early park superintendents only dimly acknowledged the ecological relationships between dead and living, old and young, or diseased and healthy trees, or between trees and undergrowth. A good forest, in their view, was a forest unblemished by bums, insect infestations, blowdowns, and the like. "While there are considerable tracts on which the trees were killed by fire many years before the creation of the park," wrote Grenville F. Allen in one of his annual reports, "the timber is on the whole in a thrifty condition." [54] Allen assumed that market values and aesthetics neatly coincided, that park visitors admired big, harvestable trees. Commenting on the fire danger caused by the presence of many dead cedars along the Nisqually and Carbon rivers, Allen wrote, "The removal of these unsightly snags should add to the attractiveness of the park." [55]

Most of the early park superintendents were themselves involved with the Forest Service or the lumbering industry. Grenville F. Allen served in a dual capacity as acting superintendent of the park and supervisor of the surrounding national forest. Edward S. Hall, who had a homestead claim nearly adjacent to Allen's in Ashford, owned and operated the Rainier Mill on his own property before assuming the job of superintendent in 1910. Ethan Allen, manager of a Tacoma printing company prior to his appointment as superintendent in 1913, was certainly no stranger to the timber industry, either. All of these men viewed the forests of Mount Rainier National Park with a timberman's eye. Ethan Allen noted in his two annual reports of 1913 and 1914:

> The timbered areas have never been cruised with a view to determining

> quantities and values, but such a cruise would furnish valuable information, particularly on which to base a reasonable annual expenditure for protection against fire. It would also serve to show the extent and value of mature, dead, and down timber which could be disposed of commercially without injury to the natural beauty of the forest and which is now a serious menace to that timber which is most desirable to have preserved. [56]

In these years, forest policy in the national park bore strong similarities to forest policy in the adjoining national forest. The early park superintendents concerned themselves primarily with suppression of all forest fires and elimination of trespass and vandalism. When time permitted, they thought about ways that the forest could be "improved," by fighting insect infestations or clearing out dead or "overmature" trees so that new growth could come in. Though they were certainly cognizant of the forest's scenic and scientific values, their background sometimes led them to manage the forest as if it were so much timber on the stump.

Forest Fire Suppression

Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen characterized the fire danger in Mount Rainier National Park as low throughout most of the summer, but "very great" during the month of August. According to Allen, rangers and local settlers were aware of the high fire hazard in August and were generally conscientious about putting out their campfires, but tourists often did not know better. Unattended or abandoned campfires were a serious problem. Park regulations permitted campers to use dead or fallen timber for fuel, and stipulated that fires would be lit only when necessary and completely extinguished when no longer required. But many campers either did not know the regulations or chose to disobey them. [57]

The most important element of fire protection in the park was ranger patrols. Rangers tried to educate campers about the need to extinguish their campfires, and in many cases they put out unattended campfires themselves. Rangers also organized ad hoc crews of firefighters when necessary. The following report by Ranger William Sethe provides a clear picture of how this would occur:

> Ashford, Wash., Sept. 21, 1909
>
> Acting Superintendent,
> Mt. Rainier Natl. Park
> Orting, Wash.
>
> Dear Sir:
>
> On Saturday September 18th about 4.30 P.M. it was reported to me at Longmire Springs that there was a fire burning in the old burn along the Paradise river a little below Carter Falls.
>
> I at once took three men and started notifying [miners] Baker Long and Frank Hendericks [sic] on our way towards the fire.
>
> When we reached the fire I seen at once that we would need more men to control the fire. Leaving what men I had to do the best they could I went up to the Gov. camp at Narada Falls and imployed [sic] ten men to help fight the fire.
>
> After a lot of hard work we managed to get it under control at midnight after that until 7 o'clock A.M. the men were all kept busy watching and putting out small fires.

> One man was imployed besides three miners and myself held it in check through the day.
>
> Heavy rain set in about six o'clock P.M. the fire was left is now about out.
>
> As to how the fire started is not known at present.
>
> A list of names of the men employed is inclosed.
>
> Yours truly
> [Signed] William Sethe
> Park Ranger. [58]

Next to patrol, the most important part of fire protection was trail development, which improved the rangers' prospects of reaching a fire before it got too big to suppress. Of course, trail development also tended to disperse campers and thereby spread the fire danger over a wider area. For this reason, Acting Superintendent Allen was of two minds about trail development. Initially he considered the absence of trails to be a "natural protection to the park" and urged that no more trails be built until the park had an adequate ranger force to patrol them. [59] By 1907, however, he was recommending an extension of the trail system into the northern and eastern sections of the park. In part his change of mind was a concession to public use; in part it was an acknowledgement of the fact that a growing number of prospectors were dispersing all over the park with or without a good trail system anyway, and the slash they produced when felling timber for their small cabins created fire hazards all over the park. [60]

At one point Allen thought he might make use of these prospectors. Many of them applied for permission to carry firearms in the park, and Allen thought the department should issue each gun permit in the form of an agreement specifying that the applicant would assist in fighting forest fires and inform the district ranger of any park violations that he observed. Allen also suggested that the park be supplied with fire boxes, so that shovels and axes could be stowed at various points along the road and trails. Neither suggestion was acted upon, however. [61]

As logging operations moved up the Nisqually Valley and indeed right into the national park in the period 1910-13, a new fire danger arose. This was the danger from "slash." The woody debris left behind by logging made uncommonly good fuel for forest fires. Some of the slash was piled alongside the road in the park, some of it was on the Rainier National Forest under Forest Service supervision, and some of it was on Northern Pacific land under no one's supervision. Ethan Allen described the situation shortly before taking over the job of park superintendent in June 1913:

> As far as I have been able to see, there are no [logging] operations in progress by private parties within the Rainier National Park, and none within a reasonable distance of the Park line at this time, but the unclean condition of patented lands adjoining, and others near, constitute a serious menace to Park timber. This is a condition which has existed for several years past.
>
> The control or influence the Interior Department may be able to exert, however, is a serious question. Perhaps the owners may be proceeded against in the Washington State Courts for permitting a nuisance to exist, which constitutes a danger and a menace to Government property. Undoubtedly these old cuttings are dangerous, and, indeed, may at any time conduct a fire into the Park timber and inflict great loss. [62]

As luck would have it, no such large-scale fire eventuated. Forest fires in this period were generally small, burning no more than a few acres. The largest on record occurred on August 26-27, 1906 in Paradise Park, burning about twenty-five acres and destroying about ten acres of green trees. It started when a party of campers left their campfire unextinguished. [63] Despite the growing number of campers from year to year, the incidence of fire did not increase, suggesting that park rangers were more or less successful in educating the public about the need to put out their campfires.

Disposal of Dead and Down Timber

In the fall of 1908, there came a request from one Beall Foster of Tacoma to remove a quantity of dead and down cedar that lay about fifty feet of the park road and about two miles inside the park entrance. Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen forwarded Foster's application to the Secretary of the Interior, stating that he did not know the policy of the Interior Department with regard to the sale of dead timber on national park lands, but in this case thought the sale would be "desirable." [64] Two weeks later, Assistant Secretary Frank Pierce authorized the timber sale, informing Allen simply that it was "the desire of the Department to dispose of all such dead timber within the limits of the park." [65] The decision appears to have been without precedent. Subsequently, two national parks (Glacier and Lassen Volcanic) would be established with provision made in the law for the sale of dead and down timber under rules and regulations devised by the Secretary of the Interior, but no such provision obtained in the Mount Rainier National Park Act. Critics would soon charge that the timber sale violated the law.

Unfortunately, the department's thinking on this issue is impossible to trace. Was the timber sale authorized to raise revenue? Reduce the fire hazard? Improve the appearance of the forest? It should be pointed out that logging was not a new activity in Mount Rainier National Park; a considerable amount of merchantable timber had already been removed incidental to the clearing and widening of the roadway in 1905-08. But the timber removed during road construction was not sold directly by the government for revenue; rather, its commercial value was factored into the contractors' bids for clearing the ground. Thus, it represented an offset to the War Department's expenditures in the park and did not affect the Interior Department's park budget. [66]

The timber sale soon acquired a momentum of its own. Beall Foster's offer to purchase 200 cords of dead cedar for shingle bolts at $.85 per cord was superseded by Edward S. Hall's application to purchase 1,000 cords at $1.10 per cord. Hall then lost out to the Big Creek Shingle Company, which topped his offer with $1.30 per cord. The department approved a contract with the Big Creek Shingle Company on June 7, 1909. That summer, while the company installed a mill near Ashford and cleared the trees along the Nisqually River to make a suitable landing, Acting Superintendent Allen assigned Ranger William Sethe to scale and mark the timber inside the park. Sethe's estimate came to 5,235 cords, for a total stumpage value of $6,805.50. As of the end of 1909, the Big Creek Shingle Company had paid the Interior Department $3,600 for this sale. [67] Thus, before the logging operation in the park was even underway, its projected scope had already increased by more than twenty-five fold. And it would grow larger still. No wonder that two members of The Mountaineers who were appointed to investigate the sale declared that the contract was "only an entering wedge, and if the work is not stopped at once, may lead to the cutting of all the timber in the park." [68]

In spite of some objections to the sale by the Seattle and Tacoma chambers of commerce, Acting Superintendent Allen remained enthusiastic. In his annual report for 1909, he suggested that the logging should be extended to dead, standing timber as well as dead and

down material.

> Along the Carbon and Nisqually rivers there is a considerable amount of dead cedar. The removal of this material, if conducted in a proper manner, will be a decided advantage to the park. It will to some extent reduce the fire danger. The greatest difficulty in extinguishing small fires arises from the presence of dead standing timber. The fire burns to the top of the dead trees and the sparks are blown to a great distance. The stumps should be cut very low, so that they will be concealed by the growth of vegetation. The debris should be carefully cleaned up. The removal of these unsightly snags should add to the attractiveness of the park, and the clearing up of the fallen timber and building of the wood roads will make many pleasant camping grounds along the bank of the river. The work should be constantly supervised by one of the park officers, in order to prevent damage to undergrowth and standing timber. [69]

In the spring of 1910, the new park superintendent, Edward S. Hall, also expressed support for the sale, in spite of mounting criticism of it. Responding to complaints that the Big Creek Shingle Company was cutting down green timber, and that much underbrush was being killed in the process of taking out the dead timber, Hall conceded that a number of trees with "one or two green branches" had been taken, but these were so far gone that they were "of no more material beauty to the Park than the other dead standing timber which the Department decided it was advisable to have removed." Noting the additional revenue derived from these trees, he thought it was a "good plan to remove them as they increase the fire risk very much." [70]

Both The Mountaineers and Assistant Engineer Eugene Ricksecker sharply attacked the timber sale in May 1910. A report by two Mountaineers charged the superintendent with collusion in stretching the definition of "dead trees" to include all cedars with dry tops. "If a dry top is counted a dead tree, ninety-nine per cent of the cedar in Mount Rainier National Park can be cut." The Mountaineers' report alleged that the cutting was in violation of the contract, and the contract was in violation of the Mount Rainier National Park Act. [71] Ricksecker, for his part, described the damage in poignant terms:

> Where the road was well shaded and the surface protected, as for instance across the sandy river bottom just east of Tahoma Fork, the sun now penetrates, drying the sand, and making travel heavy. Where the forest growth was so thick it was impossible for the eye to penetrate a distance of one hundred feet beyond the limits of the road the country is now opened for distances of eight hundred to a thousand feet... .This portion of the road passes thru the largest body of uniformly large cedars that exist in this part of the country. It was said to have few equals; no superiors. Its natural wildness, undisturbed by man, was its beauty and constituted a feature of this Park retention of which should have been jealously guarded. [72]

Following his receipt of these letters, Secretary Ballinger dispatched a special inspector to Mount Rainier to investigate the logging operation and Superintendent Hall's role in it. Special Inspector Edward W. Dixon confirmed that Hall had ordered the ranger in charge to mark all cedars with dry or "spiked" tops, even though this would classify as dead "practically all the standing cedar in the National Park." But he defended the superintendent, saying that Hall had admitted "poor judgment" in the matter and that he was an intelligent man and would make an acceptable officer in charge. As for the general policy of removing dead timber from the park, Dixon advised that the small amount of revenue from the sale of dead cedar did not compensate the government for the destruction of young growth and damage to live trees that inevitably resulted, nor for the increased fire risk from the

accumulation of slash. [73]

The problem remained of how to terminate the logging operation. The department's chief clerk, Clement S. Ucker, investigated the legal precedents and found that the law was clear about what constituted dead timber; therefore, the company could be held liable for damages for violating its contract. [74] After making a personal inspection late in the summer, Secretary Ballinger decided to charge the company for double stumpage on the green timber it had cut, plus the cost of the timber cruiser, plus the cost to the government of piling the slash so that it could be burned. He wanted the company to pay a cash settlement and get out of the park immediately. If the department wanted to remove dead and down timber from the park in the future, Ballinger told Ucker, it should be done by government employees under the direct supervision of the superintendent. [75]



Sketch map of the timber sale area in 1909

This timber sale probably stands as one of the most egregious mistakes in the administrative history of Mount Rainier National Park. If the contract did not technically violate the Mount Rainier National Park Act (the secretary's regulations of June 10, 1908 prohibited the cutting or injury of any timber growing on the park lands), it was certainly illegal in its execution. What was most remarkable about the incident was the fact that all the hard criticism came from outside the Interior Department—from the Seattle and Tacoma chambers of commerce, The Mountaineers, and the Army Corps of Engineers. One wonders if Interior officials would have eventually called a halt to the logging in the absence of such a public outcry, or whether Ricksecker was correct when he announced grimly that spring, "It is with keen regret that I report that the blight of commercial greed has fastened itself upon the southwestern corner of the Park with no uncertain grip." [76]

Forest Infestations

Early park superintendents regarded tree disease as injurious to the forest resource, but they acknowledged that there was little they could do except monitor it. Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen reported in 1906 that there were some instances of tree disease in the park. He noted that alpine fir and mountain hemlock were frequently attacked by a fungus or

injured by some other cause which affected the leaves, but he did not think the problem was serious. He reported that western white pine was attacked by an insect borer which could be quite destructive. He thought the insect was increasing, but he did not know of any way to check the spread of this infestation. [77]

Prevention of Trespass and Vandalism

The Mount Rainier Park Act provided that the "timber" in the park would be protected from "injury or spoliation." [78] The Secretary of the Interior's regulations for the park further defined this provision by declaring that "no person shall cut, break, remove, impair, or interfere with any trees, shrubs, plants, growing timber, curiosities, wonders, or other objects of interest on the Government lands in the park." [79] This language was born of a desire to protect the natural resources from acts of "vandalism" and "trespass." These were the terms contemporaries used to describe a range of willful acts on the public lands. Trespass meant any use of the national park that was unauthorized by the land laws such as logging, grazing, hunting, trapping, and, after 1908, prospecting. Vandalism referred to the defacement or destruction of natural objects, principally trees, underbrush, wildflowers, and wildlife. There was a significant overlap between vandalism and trespass, but generally speaking, acts of vandalism were associated with people who were in the park purely for pleasure and who harmed the natural resources out of sheer malice or ignorance. As indicated by the repeated calls for troops to patrol the park, preservationists generally regarded the prevention of trespass and vandalism as the most important task of park administration. [80]

The park administration's concerns about vandalism naturally focused on the popular highcountry areas on the south side of the mountain. Wherever there were concentrations of campers, there was apt to be some vandalism. Moreover, damage to the resources in these high mountain meadows was especially conspicuous and the vegetation was slow to regenerate. Acting Superintendent Grenville F. Allen remarked in 1908, "In Paradise Valley and in the other mountain parks trees require from one hundred to one hundred and fifty years to attain a diameter of 12 inches. Since their destruction would be a permanent injury to the park, the utmost care should be taken to prevent them from being cut or killed by fire." [81]

It is interesting to note that even in these early years, park officials appreciated the fact that crowds of campers in the alpine sections of the park tended to degrade the environment. The chief difference between their outlook and that of modem natural resource managers was the way they laid stress on gross violations of the park rules, or so-called acts of vandalism, rather than on the cumulative effects of so many people overloading a fragile environment. Considering the low level of environmental consciousness among the camping public in that era, the early park officials' emphasis on vandalism was probably not misplaced. One ignorant person with an axe could do a lot of damage; one abandoned campfire could set a forest on fire. When a camper was arrested in Paradise Park for cutting down a tree with which he wanted to make an overnight shelter, park officials hoped that such a negative example would serve to teach other campers that the park rules were not to be violated. [82] Rangers were dealing with a camping public that, judging by the standards of a later era, often lacked the most basic environmental ethics.

So undeveloped were the ethics of highcountry camping in this era that park administrators were sometimes one step ahead of the mountain clubs in their efforts at consciousness-raising. When the Sierra Club's secretary, William E. Colby, wrote to Secretary of the Interior Hitchcock for permission for his large party to cut a few green trees for fuel wood at Paradise Park in 1905, he received this enlightened response from Acting Superintendent Allen:

> I am not authorized to permit the cutting of green timber. While the falling of a few small trees by your party might be no great injury to the natural attractions of the Park, the precedent established would be likely to result in indiscriminate cutting by others and to seriously embarrass the rangers in enforcing the regulations. [83]

Such sound logic did not always prevail, however. In 1914, no less venerable a Mount Rainier preservationist than Edward S. Ingraham requested permission for a party of 200 Campfire Girls and their guardians to pick wildflowers at Indian Henry's Hunting Ground for a floral display at the San Francisco Exposition. Ingraham thought the rule against cutting plants should not apply to wildflowers. "From what knowledge I have of floriculture," Ingraham wrote to the superintendent, "I understand that the plucking, prunning [sic] and thinning out of flowers, adds to their vigor of growth and beauty. It is only by such cultivation that species can be made to reach their highest perfection." [84] Whether or not the department accepted Ingraham's dubious floricultural theory, Assistant Secretary Lewis G. Laylin consented in this instance to waive the park regulation. [85]

Park officials had relatively little trouble with "timber trespass" in the narrow sense of the term, meaning the unlawful use of natural resources for private gain. The probable cutting of trees for sale to lumber interests by mining companies in the Carbon River area has already been mentioned. There was one unlawful squatter in the northwest corner of the park who was noteworthy mainly because he was the only one of his kind. [86] Park officials perceived the greatest danger of timber trespass to be from stockmen who might attempt to graze their sheep or cattle in the mountain meadows in late summer. Some grazing had occurred in the high meadows on the east side of Mount Rainier prior to 1899, causing the Seattle Times to comment that the creation of the park "will effectively keep the sheep herders with their countless flocks out of these wonderful alpine meadows." [87] But the threat of trespass by stockmen soon receded as better range management and a shift from sheep to cattle raising in the Yakima Valley lessened the attractiveness of Mount Rainier National Park's distant and mostly snowbound meadows to stockmen. [88]

Meanwhile, park officials had to determine whether or not to permit grazing by saddle and pack horses in the park. Here, economic considerations were allowed to take precedence over environmental concerns; the horses kept on hand at Longmire Springs for hire by tourists had to be fed hay brought from outside the park, but the hotel camps at Paradise Park and Indian Henry's were each permitted to graze four milch cows and an indefinite number of horses because of the difficulty of shipping hay bales to these remote locations. [89] As a result, the alpine meadows around these two camps were heavily grazed.

WILDLIFE

The Mount Rainier National Park Act stated that the Secretary of the Interior would provide against the "wanton destruction" of game in the park, and against their "capture or destruction for the purposes of merchandise or profit." Significantly, this rather cumbersome wording spelled out something less than a prohibition against all hunting. The idea that national parks were the nation's most inviolate game sanctuaries, where no hunting whatsoever was allowed, would evolve later. As with the park's deep forests and marvelous displays of alpine wildflowers, the Department of the Interior regarded the park's wild animals as objects which increased the park's appeal to the public. The idea that the totality of plants and animals in a given area, together with soil, water, sunlight, and climate, formed a complete ecosystem, and that this was what the national park should aim to preserve—that idea still lay more than thirty years in the future. The protection of wildlife in Mount Rainier National Park in the period 1899-1916 was based on a different set of assumptions.

The department's policies were attributable to three distinct ideas about Mount Rainier National Park's wild animals. First, it was commonly observed that many species of Mount Rainier's fauna were unusual and interesting animals because of their adaptation to an alpine habitat. These included the mountain goat, ptarmigan, marmot, and pika. The park's founders had noted this (and stretched the point a little) when they described the mountain as "an arctic island in a temperate zone." They assumed that various animal species found on the higher slopes of Mount Rainier constituted remnant populations which had retreated upward rather than northward at the end of the last ice age. As Forest Inspector Edward T. Allen wrote in 1903:

> The extent of this truly high mountain territory has preserved conditions such as were widespread immediately after the ice age more perfectly than has any other region in the United States and there still exist many species of Arctic fauna and flora extinct elsewhere except in the inaccessible North. The importance of preventing the wanton destruction of such objects which has hitherto been unrestricted is obvious. [90]

This conceptual model not only gave the mountain special significance, but it also suggested that the island populations of wildlife were vulnerable to extermination. Mountain goats, in particular, needed protection.

The second idea was that virtually all species of wildlife in the park were in a depleted condition when the park was created in 1899. This was no doubt an accurate view. A second major goal of wildlife protection, then, was to restore the wildlife to its former abundance. The possibility that some populations might eventually become overabundant did not seem to concern park officials in this era. Recognizing that the park only took in the summer range for some animals like deer and elk, officials focused on the problem of protecting the animals in their winter range outside the park and remained oblivious to the potential problem of overgrazing of summer range inside the park. The operational idea, here, was that the park could be "stocked" with game, while any surplus population would take care of itself by overflowing into the surrounding country where it would be trimmed down to size by sport hunters. [91]

The third idea which underpinned the department's national park wildlife policy in this era was that the value of wild animals could be based solely on aesthetics. Park visitors generally liked large and majestic animals such as deer, elk, and mountain goats, or small and cute ones like raccoons and chipmunks. They were not inclined to admire, much less have an opportunity to observe, predators like the cougar, wolverine, or fisher. Therefore, it seemed like good policy to eliminate predators and thereby increase the number of desirable animals in the park. The gradual reversal of popular attitudes and public policy toward predators stands as one of the most intriguing and contentious episodes in the history of wildlife management, but it is important to understand that this, too, lay in the future during the era now under discussion.

The Department of the Interior managed Mount Rainier National Park's wildlife resources with the overall goal of satisfying the park visitors' desire to see wild animals. As with its management of the park's forest resources, the department made little attempt to differentiate national park from national forest wildlife policy. In an era when "game management" in the United States owed less to an understanding of animal ecology than it did to the experience of European gamekeepers on their hunting estates, park officials sought to employ three standard tools in order to increase the park's "game." These tools consisted of the elimination of poaching, the elimination of predators, and restocking the park with game animals brought from elsewhere.

Elimination of Poaching

Illegal hunting and trapping was so prevalent in the park's early years that it posed a real menace to the wildlife populations. Beaver and otter were thought to have been entirely trapped out by 1905. The mountain goat had long been a prized quarry of sport hunters; the population fell off considerably in the 1890s, and probably continued to decline in the early 1900s. [92] Deer and bear were also relatively scarce. Unfortunately, estimating game population trends in the park was at best difficult. Official estimates were based on an impressionistic summation of many people's reports, which were in turn highly impressionistic. Park rangers patrolling on foot, for example, gained a different impression of wildlife abundance or scarcity than officials who spent most of their time on the park road. Eugene Ricksecker's description of wildlife conditions in the park to Secretary of the Interior James R. Garfield gives a good idea of the quality of data which officials had to work with. "The noticeable scarcity of game in the Rainier Park is a subject of comment," Ricksecker wrote.

> I have made some forty trips into this Park during the last five years and have seen but one lynx, one deer, and two or three ptarmigan. A small herd of elk are said to frequent some portions of the Park; deer and bear signs are visible here and there and several bands of mountain goat, fast disappearing, have been seen. Quite recently a goat weighing 300 lbs. was killed by a person in the Park who is said to have shot it just outside the boundary. [93]

It was unclear to the park staff whether deer and mountain goat were becoming scarce throughout the whole park or whether they were moving into the backcountry; and they debated whether the scarcity was due to poaching, predation by cougars, or the frequent blasting involved in road construction which might be chasing the animals into the highcountry. Sightings of deer by automobilists on the park road were very rare, yet deer were thought to be abundant on the west side between the Puyallup and Mowich rivers. Poaching seemed to take the heaviest toll in the Carbon River area, where local residents in the town of Fairfax were not in sympathy with either the state or federal game laws. Some residents kept hounds for running deer and would hire themselves out as guides "to the more disreputable sportsmen of Tacoma and Seattle" as soon as the ranger patrols ended for the season. [94]

The amount of poaching diminished sharply after about 1910. A park ranger arrested one poacher for killing a deer in 1909 and the park secured a conviction and a fine of $100. [95] More important than this single negative example to the public, however, was the public's growing acceptance of the hunting ban on principle. Acting Superintendent Allen noted the willingness of most park visitors to comply with the prohibition against taking firearms into the park. [96]The growing size of the park ranger staff and increasing effectiveness of patrol no doubt helped to suppress poaching, too, although the determined poacher could evade the entire force of park rangers without difficulty if he took precautions. [97]

Bearing in mind that estimates of wildlife populations were very rough, there seems to have been a general upward trend for most big-game species after about 1910. Park superintendents attributed the increase to several factors: the virtual elimination of poaching, the elimination of several cougars from the park, and the two mild winters of 1913-14 and 1914-15. By the end of the era, deer were considered to be abundant and mountain goats were making a very encouraging comeback. The reappearance of a band of goats in Van Trump Park, a few miles above Christine Falls on the road to Paradise, in 1914, suggested that the goats had in fact been driven out of the area by the noise of dynamite explosions some six years earlier. [98] Probably the mountain goats were acclimating to the increased human presence in the area.

Elimination of Predators

Cougars were thought to be an important factor in the depleted condition of deer and mountain goat populations in Mount Rainier National Park. Wolves, coyotes, wolverines, and fishers were also regarded as a menace to the park's wildlife. According to popular thinking, these predatory animals could all be classified as "varmints," or noxious pests, to be destroyed whenever possible, so that more desirable species like deer and mountain goat could flourish in their absence. [99] Even though the popular attitude toward predators was shaped mainly by material considerations—a desire by western stockmen to reduce their losses of cattle and sheep, a desire by sportsmen's clubs to increase the supply of game for sport hunting—federal officials saw no reason to buck the popular sentiment toward predators in the context of national parks. Later generations of Americans would assume, almost reflexively, that the commitment to preserve wildlife in national parks in a "natural condition" meant the preservation of natural predator-prey relationships, but officials in the early twentieth century construed this commitment to mean simply that the public would be able to view wild animals in a natural setting, or against a scenic backdrop. They saw nothing intrinsic in the national park legislation that required the preservation of predators.

Rangers hunted cougars and other predators in the park during the winter when they had little else to occupy their time. They were permitted to sell the furs and skins for additional income. The park administration sometimes employed local men to hunt and trap predatory animals, too. [100]No complete record of their kills survives, but occasional references in the annual reports of the superintendent indicate that park staff thought the predator control work was effective. Park staff killed two cougars, two "wild cats" (bobcat or lynx), and twenty-five marten in the winter of 1913-14, in what was presumably a good year. [101]

In December 1914, Ranger Rudolph Rosso caught two men trespassing in the park with steel traps and a 25-20 caliber Winchester rifle. He seized the traps and rifle, but because the men insisted that they had "no intention of trapping any game in the park except varmint which infest it," he recommended that these articles be returned and the matter be dropped. The park supervisor referred the matter to Stephen Mather, then assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, who approved the recommendation. The incident was revealing of the distinction which park officials made between "good" and "bad" animals. [102]

Mather also stipulated in his reply, "Whenever it is necessary to do any trapping for carnivorous animals or varmint this work will be performed by park rangers under the direction of the Supervisor of the park." This ended the practice of hiring local men to kill predators in the park. It was also a minor but timely indication of the professionalization that Mather would soon bring to the National Park Service. Although predator control would continue in the park into the 192Os, it would be conducted solely by park rangers or an agent of the Bureau of the Biological Survey. This was an important change, because it insulated the subsequent debate over predator control from local economic interests.

Restocking the Park

One of the favorite tools of game management in this era of reduced game populations was to take surplus game from one area and release it in another area where the game had been wiped out. Yellowstone National Park was a favorite source of game for many such transplants. In Washington state, sportsmen clubs were particularly interested in restocking the Cascade Mountains and eastern Washington with Yellowstone elk. Due to the elk's habits of gathering in open areas and bugling during the rutting season, hunters had practically wiped out the elk in the state by the end of the nineteenth century. The only significant population remaining was the herd in the Olympic Mountains. In 1905, the Washington state legislature passed a law that prohibited the hunting of these elk or any other remnant

populations in the state for twenty years. Washington state sportsmen's clubs generally supported the moratorium on elk hunting, and wanted to use this period to make numerous transplants of elk from Yellowstone National Park.

In 1911, Superintendent Hall recommended that some Yellowstone elk be released in Mount Rainier National Park, because "it is believed that elk would thrive in the park." [103] The Washington Game Protective and Propagation Association supported the proposal and Washington's Senator Stanton Warburton soon raised the issue with the Department of the Interior. Governor Ernest Lister and the Elks Club of Tacoma endorsed the proposal, too, expressing the opinion that it would be "eminently proper" for the Department of the Interior "to transfer its surplus herds from one National Park to another." [104]

Some wildlife conservationists urged caution in making transplants of game, claiming that many species were being introduced into areas outside of their original range. They objected that sportsmen's clubs were sponsoring transplants without doing the necessary historical research into whether the transplanted animals had formerly existed in the area. They insisted that regional variations in a game animal like the elk constituted separate speciation, and that bringing closely related species together through haphazard restocking programs would lead to hybridization, or even degeneracy.

One such controversy revolved around the Roosevelt and Rocky Mountain elk. The Roosevelt elk, named after Theodore Roosevelt by the noted taxonomist C. Hart Merriam, was larger and stockier than the Rocky Mountain variety, and it had narrower antlers. [105] When Superintendent Hall proposed that Yellowstone elk be used to restock Mount Rainier National Park, he probably had no idea whether this variety of elk was actually native to the park and did not himself think it was important. At the time, scientific understanding of the Roosevelt elk was sketchy. Asked by the Secretary of the Interior for an opinion on the speciation of elk in Washington state, the Bureau of the Biological Survey averred that the Roosevelt elk was a separate species from the Rocky Mountain elk and that the Roosevelt elk's former range extended along the coastal mountain ranges from British Columbia to northern California. Therefore, it advised the Secretary of the Interior that no transplants of Rocky Mountain elk from Yellowstone National Park should be made west of the Cascade Mountains. [106]

Ironically, by the time the Bureau of the Biological Survey rendered this opinion, the first shipment of Yellowstone elk to Washington state had already been completed; some elk were released in the national forest near the town of Sultan, in Snohomish County, north of Mount Rainier. Moreover, two additional shipments of Yellowstone elk arrived at North Bend and Enumclaw, in King County on January 1, 1913, after the Biological Survey had gone on record against any more transplants of Rocky Mountain elk in the area. By the time the Department of the Interior's chief clerk, Clement S. Ucker, conveyed the Biological Survey's opinion to the Secretary of Agriculture, however, these animals had already been released in the national forest. The elk in the latter shipment were released on Grass Mountain, north of Mount Rainier National Park. [107] Still more transplants were made on the east side of the Cascade Range in 1914 and 1915. These elk were released on Bethel Ridge, west of Yakima. [108] In 1914, park officials observed a small elk herd in the east central portion of the park. The sighting was "unusual," according to Superintendent Ethan Allen, but he did not comment on whether the elk were thought to be native or reintroduced animals. [109]

The Biological Survey's opinion did come in time to kill the proposal to transplant a herd of about forty Yellowstone elk directly inside Mount Rainier National Park. Both the American Game Protective and Propagation Association and the Biological Survey recommended that the plan should be modified such that the restocking of former elk range in Mount Rainier National Park should be done with Roosevelt elk captured in the Olympic Mountains. [110]

Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson concurred. [111] Unfortunately, the Olympic elk were much less accessible and subject to capture than the Yellowstone elk. For the time being, the plan was abandoned.

Nevertheless, the attempt by officials in the Biological Survey and the Department of the Interior to preserve the genetic purity of western Washington's elk held some definite implications for national park wildlife policy. It implied first of all, that if biological and historical data were to have a bearing on wildlife preservation efforts anywhere, it should influence wildlife policy in national parks. National parks were not to serve simply as game farms; rather, they would preserve wildlife in a condition that had occurred in the past. Thus, the controversy over the elk transplant represented an early movement toward a new definition of what was entailed in preserving national parks in a "natural condition." Secondly, the controversy highlighted the fact that when natural resource policy in national parks and forests diverged, political boundaries would not always succeed in protecting the park from environmental changes occurring around it.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART THREE: YEARS OF PROMISE, 1915-1930

VII. MISSION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION

INTRODUCTION

With the establishment of the National Park Service in 1916 a new era began in the history of Mount Rainier National Park. The park ceased to be a separate entity under the loose supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, becoming instead a unit in a system under the direct control of park professionals.

Prior to 1916 there had been some semblance of a national park system as the legislative acts creating the several national parks bore strong similarities and put all the parks on roughly the same footing. But preservationists began to argue the need for a separate national parks bureau to strengthen the parks' administration. The Sierra Club, the American Civic Association, the National Geographic Society, and numerous other groups campaigned for the new bureau. Secretaries of the Interior Walter L. Fisher and Franklin K. Lane strongly supported the measure, and called interested citizens together for a national park conference nearly every year beginning in 1911. Congress finally responded to public demand by passing the National Park Service Act on August 25, 1916. The National Park Service Act led to the professionalization and esprit de corps of a park service, an end to stopgap administration of some parks by the Army, and a significant growth in park appropriations. Historian Donald C. Swain has stated that the campaign for this legislation marked the emergence of the aesthetic conservationists, or "preservationists," as a countervailing influence to Pinchotism and an effective, organized force within the national conservation movement. [1]

Another factor which distinguished these years as a distinctive era in the history of the park was the forceful leadership of Stephen Tyng Mather, who served as the first director of the NPS from 1916 to 1929. Mather had the support of a highly competent assistant director, Horace M. Albright, who would succeed him as the second director of the NPS from 1929 to 1933. Both Mather and Albright took a keen interest in the administration of Mount Rainier National Park—more than subsequent NPS directors, with the possible exception of Conrad L. Wirth. Mather personally directed the reorganization of the park concessions in 1916, while Albright involved himself deeply in the planning process in Mount Rainier National Park in the late 1920s. More than in the previous era, Mount Rainier park policy was made in Washington, D.C. by the men at the top: Mather, Albright, and the expert landscape architects whom they had on their staff.

Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane recruited Stephen T. Mather to work for the national parks. Mather had no prior experience in government. He was a self-made millionaire, philanthropist, and mountain enthusiast. He and Secretary Lane were old acquaintances from Mather's college years in California. In the fall of 1914, Mather wrote to Lane complaining about the administration of the parks. Lane was sympathetic toward the demand for a national parks bureau, but he needed someone who was a good organizer and

promoter to take the matter to Congress and the people. He replied to Mather: "Dear Steve, If you don't like the way the national parks are being run, come on down to Washington and run them yourself." [2] It took some further arm-twisting before Mather accepted an appointment as Assistant to the Secretary in January 1915, and then some additional cajoling to convince Mather to become the first director of the NPS nearly two years later.

Mather promised to build a strong national park system. He developed high standards by which new national park proposals were judged before they were recommended to Congress. He pursued worthy park proposals aggressively and deflected numerous others into the state park movement instead. He wanted to expand the national park system by adding new units that possessed superlative scenic and scientific values or were representative of a distinct geological or biological phenomenon, but he did not want redundancy. For this reason, Mather rejected proposals to create national parks around Mount Hood or Mount Baker, since Mount Rainier already served as the superlative example of a Pacific Northwest volcano; but he supported the addition of three other new units featuring recently active volcanoes (Hawaii and Lassen Volcanic national parks in 1916, and Katmai National Monument in 1918). [3]

Mather promised as well to create a model agency for administering the national parks. Mather's idea of a model agency was one that would be tightly focused on its mission of park development and protection. Whenever possible, he pledged, the NPS would secure technical assistance from other agencies in the federal government rather than duplicate their capabilities in another bureau. The NPS would turn to the Biological Survey for help with floral and faunal inventories and predator control, to the Geological Survey for topographic work, to the Public Health Service for sewer- and water-system planning and construction, to the Bureau of Entomology for insect control. In all, Mather named thirty-six agencies that the NPS could tap for technical help. At the same time, the NPS would develop two areas of expertise that were unique in the federal government: park landscape engineering and interpretation. The agency's tight focus would allow park administration to be lean and efficient. It would foster esprit de corps. Ten years after commencing his work for the government, Mather could write: "I believe that today the National Park Service is a model bureau from the standpoint of efficiency in expenditure of public monies, adherence to the federal budget system, individual output of employees, cooperation with other government bureaus, low overhead expenses, and high morale and public spirit of personnel." [4]

This chapter looks at how the administration of Mount Rainier National Park evolved from 1916 to 1929, when Mather was director of the NPS. The first section of the chapter looks at the organization and growth of the park staff, the park administration's use of expertise based outside the park but inside the NPS, and improvements in staff housing and working conditions which tended to enhance employee morale. The second section examines the beginnings of the NPS interpretive program in Mount Rainier National Park. The third section considers various natural resource issues for which the park administration sought expert guidance from other federal agencies.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

During the seventeen years of park administration under the Secretary of the Interior, Mount Rainier National Park had acquired its own superintendent, a staff of two or three permanent rangers, and an additional force of rangers during the tourist season. Beginning with his appointment as Assistant to the Secretary in 1915, Mather began to make changes in the park's administrative organization either directly or through his superintendents. These changes were evolutionary. Taken altogether, they revealed a definite trend toward professionalization.

Superintendents

In the early years, park superintendents had reported directly to the Secretary of the Interior. From 1914 to 1916, park "supervisors" had reported to a superintendent of national parks, who in turn answered to the Secretary of the Interior. Beginning a few months after passage of the National Park Service Act, park "supervisors" resumed their earlier title of park "superintendents," and reported to the NPS director. [5]

The first change that Mather sought in the administration of parks was in the quality of superintendents. Prior to 1915, the national parks were staffed according to the spoils system: when Republicans or Democrats won an election, park superintendent jobs were dispensed as gifts to the party faithful, often without regard to the qualifications of appointees. When Mather traveled to the many parks in 1915, he found good superintendents and bad. He was particularly displeased with the recently appointed superintendent at Mount Rainier, John J. Sheehan. He replaced Sheehan with DeWitt L. Reaburn, a topographic engineer from the Geological Survey. Reaburn demonstrated competent administrative ability over the next three years. After Reaburn came Roger W. Toll, a Columbia University-trained engineer, charter member of the Colorado Mountain Club, and former major in the Army during World War I. Mather recruited Toll in 1919. He served as superintendent at Mount Rainier for sixteen months, his first tour of duty in what turned out to be a stellar career with the Park Service. After Toll, Mather handpicked two more civil engineers: William H. Peters, who transferred to Mount Rainier from Grand Canyon National Park in 1920, and Clarence L. Nelson, who had many years of experience with the Geological Survey. These four men were typical of Mather's superintendents; he preferred men with road-building or engineering expertise to training in the biological sciences. He wanted government career men; he got most of his recruits from the Geological Survey and the Army.

Mather's last appointee to Mount Rainier was a military man and another auspicious choice. Mather met Owen A. Tomlinson in Reno, Nevada, where he was in charge of a station in the new U.S. Air Mail Service. Tomlinson had proven his executive ability during twenty years of service in the Philippines. There he had risen to the rank of major in the Filipino constabulary overseeing a variety of public works from mountain trails to bridges, buildings, and irrigation projects. [6] Mather persuaded Tomlinson to become superintendent of Mount Rainier National Park in 1923. Tomlinson remained there for eighteen years, and continued to have a hand in the park's administration as director of the Western Region for nearly ten years after that.

These strong appointments notwithstanding, Mather expected his superintendents to defer to himself and his assistants on important policy matters. The director and his assistant directors, especially Horace M. Albright and Arno B. Cammerer, took a much closer interest in policy issues at the park level than any Washington-based Interior officials had done prior to 1916. Mather, Albright, and Cammerer all made numerous visits to Mount Rainier and the Puget Sound cities. Most sensitive or precedent-setting issues were resolved at the top administrative level, as Mather and his assistants sought to develop system-wide policies and standards. Thus, the superintendent became more of a policy advisor than a policy maker in this era. On the other hand, the superintendent administered a larger budget, managed a larger park staff, and enjoyed more technical assistance from engineers and landscape architects than before. On most routine matters, the superintendent could act with greater discretion and self-assurance than was possible when the superintendent had been directly responsible to the Secretary of the Interior.

Rangers

Mather inherited a national-park ranger force that had already been several years in the

making. Following in the tradition of the Forest Service, the original park rangers at Mount Rainier were local men whose main job qualifications were that they were competent woodsmen and could tolerate primitive housing arrangements. Most of the early hires at Mount Rainier continued in the job for more than one year; some, such as Sam Estes and Tom O'Farrell, stayed on the park staff well after the establishment of the Park Service. [7]

Shortly before Mather joined the Department of the Interior, Secretary Lane's first superintendent of national parks, Mark Daniels, drafted a set of regulations defining the qualifications and duties of the park ranger. The regulations provided for a standard uniform and called for rangers to write monthly reports of their activities. Rangers had to be between twenty-one and forty years of age, of good character, physically fit, and tactful in handling people. They had to have a common-school education, be able to ride and care for horses, know how to handle a rifle and pistol, and have some knowledge of trail construction and fighting forest fires. Mather approved the regulations and distributed them to all the parks. [8]

But this was only a start. Mather wanted to create a professional ranger force. He wanted to attract young men to the service who would think in terms of permanent careers. He sought to raise educational standards, to introduce entrance examinations, and to facilitate the transfer of rangers from park to park. [9] Even before these standards could be bureaucratically instituted, park superintendents sought to professionalize the ranger force along the lines Mather had in mind. Mount Rainier, like other parks, began to employ college students during the summer months, and gradually to work them into the service on a full time basis. The college students tended to be idealistic and resourceful. Often they brought to their job a knowledge of natural history which could be shared with the park visitors. The following excerpt from a letter by Superintendent Clarence L. Nelson to Chief Engineer George E. Goodwin illustrates this process.

> We also have a new ranger whom I feel we should care for. He has graduated in forestry and park administration from the University at Syracuse, New York, and has proved very competent here at Longmire this Summer. He is a type of man rare in the Service, and one who should be encouraged in every way to remain. His nature lectures in our public camp ground at Longmire have had the hearty approval of our visitors here. He has also been quite willing to do the trail work and other manual labor whenever it was necessary. His name is Floyd W. Schmoe. [10]

Schmoe became Mount Rainier's first park naturalist in 1924 and served in that year-round position until 1928.

The early park rangers had to do a little of everything, for the ranger force constituted practically the whole park staff. They performed backcountry patrol, traffic control, entrance fee collection, road maintenance, building and trail construction, fire-fighting, predator control, clerking, and search and rescue. Beginning in 1921, park rangers began to give guided nature walks and to provide information to the public. As the park staff grew, more specialization was possible. In 1922, the park superintendent had a chief clerk and four permanent rangers; during the summer season this force was augmented with fourteen seasonal rangers, two clerks, two telephone operators, and a labor force for construction and maintenance of roads and trails. [11] By the end of the decade the permanent staff had increased from six to eighteen employees, while the summer hires had increased to sixteen rangers and three ranger-naturalists. The seasonal road crew now numbered 140 men. [12]

The NPS ranger force achieved a high level of esprit de corps by the end of the Mather years. With their distinctive uniforms, high public profile, and enviable work environment, NPS

rangers developed what Horace M. Albright described as "the ranger mystique." Their search and rescue activities sometimes received a large play in the local press. In 1929, Ranger Charlie Browne was awarded the first citation for heroism ever issued by the Department of the Interior for his leadership in the rescue of three climbers and the recovery of two bodies following a climbing accident on the Gibraltar route of Mount Rainier. [13]

On a lighter note, Albright once commented to Tomlinson on the number of rescues reported out of Mount Rainier that involved young college-age women in distress. Tomlinson replied that despite appearances from the press clippings, his rangers were quick to assist all injured or imperiled park visitors without regard to age or sex. As for the reports that Albright alluded to, he felt that the rangers were "living up to the best traditions of our Service and the time honored chivalrous male attitude of 'hastening to the aid of beauty in distress.' " Tomlinson added, "I am sure that if you could but enjoy the experience of watching a Sunday crowd of beautiful lady skiers at Paradise Valley the gallant attitude of the Mount Rainier rangers would be highly commended." [14] Tomlinson's relationship to his ranger staff was like a good army officer's relationship to his men: respectful, responsible, and authoritarian. To Park Service rank and file, Tomlinson was always "The Major."

Young women engaged in summer snowplay was a common theme used in Rainier National Park Company publicity photos such as this. *(O.A. Tomlinson Collection photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. 1574.)*

Engineers

A new aspect of national park administration after 1916 was the periodic visits by various engineers, who reported to the NPS director on specific features of the park's infrastructure and recommended improvements. The most important of these experts were the landscape, road, and sanitation engineers. These individuals were members of the new NPS bureaucracy. Their field offices were located in the West in order to better serve the western national parks.

Mather appointed Charles P. Punchard, Jr. as the Park Service's first landscape engineer in 1918. Punchard made a four-day inspection of Mount Rainier in May 1919, supplying Mather with early recommendations on how to clean up Longmire, improve the appearance of the roadways, and develop the two main administrative sites at Longmire and Nisqually Entrance. [15] Although Punchard was able to devote relatively little time to Mount Rainier before his death in 1920, he was able to lay a foundation for subsequent landscape work in the park. Landscape architecture historian Linda Flint McClelland has described Punchard's influence as vital, for he translated the landscape policy of the NPS into practices that would influence the character and management of all the parks. "Punchard's work," wrote McClelland, "followed the state-of-the-art principles for developing natural areas that had evolved out of the American landscape gardening tradition." [16] Mather gave close attention to Punchard's opinions and recommendations.

After Punchard's death, his assistant, Daniel R. Hull, was promoted to chief landscape engineer. Hull maintained his office in his home city of Los Angeles, serving until 1927, when Mather decided to consolidate all field divisions in a western field office in San Francisco. At that time Hull resigned and was succeeded by his first assistant, Thomas C. Vint. Vint oversaw the expansion of the Park Service's Landscape Division. He hired additional landscape architects and assigned them to different parks. Vint assigned landscape engineer Ernest A. Davidson to work in Mount Rainier, Yellowstone, and Glacier. [17] Davidson had a large influence on landscape design in the park and the development of Longmire and Sunrise in particular. Vint himself played a key role in the development of Mount Rainier's first master plan between 1926 and 1928. [18]

Another important specialist on whom the park superintendent relied for expertise was the NPS chief engineer, George E. Goodwin. Mather met Goodwin in Crater Lake National Park, where he was in charge of road development by the Army Corps of Engineers. With the establishment of the NPS in 1916, Mather hired Goodwin, gave him a field office in Portland, and put him in charge of all national park road building. Goodwin continued in this position until 1925, when he resigned and Mather negotiated with the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads to assume this task. [19]

Although the NPS Engineering Division was relieved of its function of road building, it continued to assist each park with all other improvements. The work included buildings, trails, public campgrounds, and minor road projects. Bert H. Burrell succeeded Goodwin to the post of chief engineer in the summer of 1925. Beginning in 1927, R.D. Waterhouse was assigned to Mount Rainier each summer as acting resident engineer. [20]

Another expert who had a hand in Mount Rainier's administration in this era was Harry B. Hommon, sanitary engineer with the U.S. Public Health Service. Assigned to the national parks, he quickly established a reputation for excellent work. He helped design water and sewer systems, prescribed methods for garbage disposal, and worked with park concessions in improving sanitation standards in hotel and camp kitchens. He visited Mount Rainier twice in the summer of 1921 and made a detailed report on sanitation in Mount Rainier National Park in 1922. [21] Later he assisted with the designing and planning of sewer systems at Yakima Park, Paradise, and Longmire. [22] Hommon continued to serve the national parks for twenty years. [23]

At the end of the 1920s, national park management had become so diversified as to warrant the designation of several administrative departments within each park. Departmentalization was a system-wide initiative. In Mount Rainier National Park, there were now six departments: protection, maintenance, educational, engineering, landscape engineering, and electrical. Heading the departments were the chief ranger, maintenance foreman, park naturalist, resident engineer, resident landscape engineer, and park electrician, respectively.

[24]

Improvements in Office and Housing Conditions

Park rangers were generally expected to live in the park in government-subsidized housing. Most of the staff lived in Longmire or at Nisqually Entrance. Both places tended to be dark and damp in the off-season, and the residence requirement could be a hardship, particularly for permanent employees with families. At first, new building construction did not keep pace with increases in park staff. As late as the mid-1920s, some permanent rangers and their families were still living in tent cabins through the winter at Longmire. [25] These miserable housing conditions were not conducive to building up a dedicated ranger staff As the situation was slowly rectified during the 1920s, Longmire grew from a few government buildings into a small employee village. To the existing ranger residence, ranger station, warehouse, community kitchen (the present-day library), and first park administration building, were added four small residences in 1923, another residence in 1926, and three more residences together with a large community building, the latter located on the other side of the Nisqually River, in 1927. The following year, the NPS completed a handsome new administration building in the rustic style using plans provided by the Park Service's new Western Branch of Landscape Design in San Francisco. Tomlinson enthused that this building was "one of the finest ever constructed with National Park funds." [26] Together with the landscaped grounds, rock-lined plaza, and numerous plant beds, all laid out under the direction of landscape engineer Ernest A. Davidson, the new administration building gave the Longmire complex an air of spit-and-polish government efficiency.

Longmire became a more livable place in one other important respect. Beginning in the winter of 1925-26, the NPS made arrangements with the Rainier National Park Company to open a school at Longmire, setting up desks, blackboards, and other schoolroom furnishings in the National Park Inn during the off-season. The NPS paid half of the teacher's salary and parents paid the other half, and the teacher was employed through the Pierce County school superintendent. In the first year there were fourteen children in the Longmire vicinity who attended the Longmire school. [27]

As the untidy, unsanitary, and somewhat commercialized appearance of Longmire gave way to a neat, orderly, official-looking place in the 1920s, it was easier for the resident rangers and their families to feel a sense of esprit de corps or professional pride. The development of the government village at Longmire signified the park administration's transformation into a professional organization.

Telephone Communications

All electronic communications between park staff in this era were conducted by telephone; radio did not come into use until the 1930s. The earliest telephone service in the park was built under special use permit by the Tacoma Eastern Railroad Company in 1911. In 1913, the Department of the Interior allotted $750 for construction of a government line between the Nisqually entrance and Paradise Valley. [28] For this project the government adopted the single-wire grounded system used by the Forest Service: the line was suspended from tree to tree (loosely, so that it would give up slack when struck by a windthrow) with the ground completing the circuit. Over the years, the government telephone system was extended to all ranger stations in the park. Soon it encircled the mountain. By 1920, it was possible to make calls from the park to any city on the West Coast. [29]

In October 1918, the Tacoma Eastern Railroad Company sold its telephone line to the NPS. The park administration then operated not only the telephone system in the park but the line from the park entrance to National (one mile west of Ashford). As a courtesy, the NPS

allowed the park concession and local residents to use this government line free of charge. The system was soon overburdened. As many as 6,000 calls would be made each summer, all of them handled through a switchboard in the superintendent's office. In 1920, the NPS persuaded the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company of San Francisco to take over the telephone exchange at National, but it could not induce the company to purchase the line beyond that point to the park entrance. The reason was that local residents west of Ashford challenged the right-of-way for the telephone line, claiming that they had only agreed to a right-of-way for the road. As a result, the NPS had to continue to operate the line outside of the park as far as National. It charged the concession and local users a toll, and two telephone operators were added to the park staff each summer beginning in 1922. [30]

By the end of the 1920s, the park's telephone system was showing its age. Superintendent Tomlinson described the system in his annual report for 1929:

> Two metallic and one ground circuit to Paradise Valley and the commercial circuit outside the park were maintained in addition to the 125 miles of single grounded wire encircling the mountain and connecting all of the ranger stations with the telephone switchboard at Longmire. Due to the poor type of construction, considerable difficulty was experienced in maintaining the telephone service sufficient to take care of the greatly increased business between Paradise Valley and the commercial lines. During the fire season it was necessary to send a special lineman and a small crew entirely around the park to repair and improve the grounded circuit which had become in such a bad condition that the service was unreliable.
>
> All wires have been strung on trees and during severe winter conditions frequent interruptions of service are caused by the falling and swaying. Many breaks have also necessitated constant splicing and repairing, making it necessary to replace a great deal of wire. [31]

These troublesome conditions set the stage for the park's early experimentation with radio (see Chapter XII).

INTERPRETATION

The idea that national parks were places of outdoor learning as well as recreation had roots in the nineteenth century, but the creation of the National Park Service in 1916 gave the idea new impetus. [32] One of the chief distinctions between national parks and national forests, Mather emphasized, was the significance of the former as "national museums of native America." [33] The idea quickly took hold that one of the essential functions of the NPS would be to enhance the educational value of national parks through the dispensing of informative pamphlets, the offering of guided nature walks, the development of museum collections, and other appropriate means. These varied activities eventually came under the term "interpretation." The NPS would interpret the park's natural and cultural features for the public.

Publications

A serious deficiency of national parks during the years they were administered directly by the Secretary of the Interior was the dearth of published information available to the park visitor. Many national park areas were featured in scientific studies, particularly in USGS bulletins and professional papers, but these writings were generally too obscure and technical to be of much use to the general public. As the department's chief of publications, Laurence F.

Schmeckebier pointed out in 1912, there was an urgent need for a series of short pamphlets that would provide the traveler with basic information on transportation, accommodations, and points of interest in each park. Beyond that, wrote Schmeckebier, a national parks bureau should be established with a view to promoting the educational value of national parks. One of the bureau's chief functions would be "to arrange a series of publications that will deal clearly and in general terms with the geology, the botany and the zoology of these great reservations that are being administered by the government for the benefit of the people." [34]

The fledgling NPS produced two informative books on the national parks in 1916: Glimpses of our National Parks and National Parks Portfolio. The latter was an elegant picture-book that the department put together with financial assistance from the railroads. These works were followed by pamphlets on specific parks: Geologic Story of the Rocky Mountain National Park by Willis T. Lee; The Volcanic History of Lassen Peak by J.S. Diller; and Wild Animals of Glacier National Park by Vernon Bailey, among others. [35] Three government pamphlets appeared in quick succession on Mount Rainier National Park: F.E. Matthes, Mount Rainier and its Glaciers (1914), John B. Flett, Features of the Flora of Mount Rainier National Park (1916), and Grenville F. Allen, Forests of Mount Rainier National Park (1916). Meanwhile, Professor Edmund S. Meany produced an anthology of writings covering the human history of Mount Rainier, titled Mt. Rainier: A Record of Exploration (1916). The idea that was basic to these semi-popular tracts was that tourists would derive more pleasure and benefit from their visit if they knew "the story behind the scenery."

The need for a guide book to Mount Rainier's wildlife led to a cooperative agreement between the NPS, the Bureau of the Biological Survey, and the State College of Washington (now Washington State University) in 1919. Dr. W.P. Taylor of the Biological Survey and Professor W.T. Shaw of the State College of Washington collaborated on a faunal survey with the assistance of park ranger and botanist John B. Flett and Oregon state biologist and photographer William Finley. The plan was that the NPS would publish the book in a popular format, similar to the book on Glacier's wildlife written by Vernon Bailey. [36] However, the book did not come out until 1927.

Thus, the park did not have a good, popular work on natural history until the appearance of Our Greatest Mountain by Floyd W. Schmoe in 1925. [37] This 366-page handbook ably served the purpose. It not only provided descriptive material on all roads and trails in the park, but contained chapters on human history, geology, fauna and flora. Schmoe was park naturalist when he wrote the book. Although it was published by a private publishing house, it was a semi-official publication. Schmoe drew upon park records for much of his material, and Superintendent Tomlinson gave Schmoe some duty time in which to write it. [38]

Another type of national park publication initiated during the 1920s was the regular publication of "nature notes." Schmoe began producing Mount Rainier Nature Notes in 1924. It was one of the earliest such publications in the NPS, and followed the example set by Yosemite Nature Notes, which began in 1922. Yellowstone National Park began to publish nature notes in 1924, Grand Canyon in 1926, and Zion, Crater Lake, and Rocky Mountain in 1928. [39] Mount Rainier Nature Notes continued to come out in mimeographed form each month for more than a decade.

Nature Guide Service

The concept of assigning park rangers to interpretation evolved fairly quickly after the creation of the NPS in 1916. As in other national parks in this period, the Mount Rainier park administration worked in close collaboration with the park concession to create a nature guide service. By the mid-1920s, the NPS and the Rainier National Park Company worked

out separate and compatible functions: the company handled the mountain guide service, while the park's educational department conducted nature walks. The NPS officials who led these walks wore the regular park ranger uniform but were called park naturalists to distinguish them from the ranger force.

The collaboration between the park administration and the Rainier National Park Company was not immediate. In 1916, Superintendent Reaburn reported the establishment of an "information bureau" at Longmire—an entirely unilateral development. Ranger John B. Flett, a Tacoma high school biology teacher who had been working at Mount Rainier each summer since 1913, was assigned the task of informing tourists about points of interest, assigning them places to camp, and answering their questions. "Prof. Flett's intimate knowledge of the flora, trees, and points of scenic interest in the park was a source of much interest," Reaburn wrote. "This information was sought by large numbers of visitors." [40]

The Rainier National Park Company, for its part' hired the longtime Mount Rainier National Park booster, Asahel Curtis, to supervise the handful of mountain guides who now entered the employ of the single park concession, to manage sales of photographs and souvenirs, and to give campfire talks at Paradise. The company employed Curtis from June 15 to September 15, 1917, for a monthly compensation of $250. [41] The following year, the company expanded the guide service to include "flower walks" and guided tours onto the Paradise and Nisqually glaciers. Otis B. Sperlin, a Tacoma high school teacher, replaced Curtis as head of the guide service. Alma Wagen, Mount Rainier's first woman summit guide, was hired that year. The company's popular guide service drew accolades from Mather in his annual report for 1918:

> Trail trips were under the efficient guidance of trained mountaineers, one or two of whom were women. Illustrated lectures on the park, its glacial system, its wild flowers, and trails were given regularly by the chief of the guide service, an able and enthusiastic high school professor possessing a deeply rooted devotion to the mountain. Guides, principally women, were also employed to conduct studies of the wild flowers and other plant life while making short walking trips from the hotel and camps in Paradise Valley. [42]

Mather predicted that the demand for "these outdoor teachers" would grow rapidly. The guide service in Mount Rainier was modelled on that developed the year before in Rocky Mountain National Park, where the NPS exercised some control through a system of examinations and licensing. [43]

The park administration inaugurated its own nature guide service in 1921. On the recommendation of Professor Edmund S. Meany, Superintendent Peters hired Charles Landes, a high school biology teacher from Seattle, as a seasonal park ranger and nature guide. Landes was assigned to Paradise, where he led visitors on nature walks and gave nightly lectures illustrated with lantern slides. Landes also prepared a collection of cut flowers and plants numbering about 100 species for display. [44] Landes was rehired the following summer, and Acting Superintendent Nelson reported at the end of the season that the nature guide service had been continued "in the way of an experiment" and was proving very popular. The evening lectures, which were moved to the new Guide House, were attended by capacity crowds. [45] Rehired again in 1923, Landes set up a naturalist's office at Paradise with exhibits on flora, fauna, and geology and gave talks to an estimated 15,000 visitors in the course of the summer. It was clear that popular demand exceeded what the small interpretive program could deliver, and Superintendent Tomlinson recommended the creation of a permanent park naturalist position the next year. [46]

The following summer, the interpretive program was expanded to include one other

"naturalist" in addition to Landes. Floyd W. Schmoe, a graduate of the Syracuse University School of Forestry and former guide to the Rainier National Park Company, was assigned to this work. A similar educational service to what was provided at Paradise was inaugurated at Longmire, with lectures given in the "Sylvan Theater" in the public campground and guided walks conducted on the trails out of the area. In the fall, Landes returned to his teaching responsibilities in Seattle, and Schmoe was appointed the first permanent park naturalist of Mount Rainier National Park. In his annual report for 1924, Tomlinson stated that the nature guide service had become "one of the most appreciated features of the park." [47]

Schmoe had three assistants beginning in 1925. The four naturalists worked in pairs at Longmire and Paradise. During the next two years, the interpretive program came to encompass guided walks and campfire programs at White River, new self-guided nature trails at Longmire and Paradise, and regular measurements of the recession of the Emmons Glacier. Schmoe resigned at the end of the 1928 season. C. Frank Brockman was appointed park naturalist that November, and continued in that position until March 1941.

While the park administration's interpretive program took shape in the 1920s, the concession s guide service evolved in a different direction. Two Swiss alpinists joined the guide service in 1919 and stayed with it for several years. The company constructed a Guide House at Paradise in 1922, which doubled as a visitor auditorium and an employee dormitory. It is not clear whether the guide service continued to conduct so-called flower walks, but it is certain that it was increasingly oriented to glacier tours and summit climbs. The professionalism of the mountain guides drew consistent praise from the superintendent. While this splitting of visitor services developed to everyone's satisfaction, the commercial guides and the park rangers still collaborated on occasional mountain rescues.

The Longmire Museum

A basic function of the park naturalist in these years was to collect and inventory biological specimens. Ranger John B. Flett made the first official botanical collection in the park, and assisted in 1919 with an official faunal survey by the Biological Survey. Naturalist Charles Landes made an extensive collection of flowers. Park Naturalist Schmoe was given a cougar that had been killed in the park so that it could be stuffed and mounted. (This old specimen may still be seen in the museum at Longmire.) [48] As these things accumulated, the need grew for a suitable museum building in which to display them to the public. In 1925, small exhibits were set up in the new stone ranger station at Paradise and in the superintendent's house at Longmire. These were temporary arrangements. In 1927, NPS Chief Naturalist Ansel F. Hall assisted Schmoe in planning and preparing exhibits for an eventual park museum. [49]

With the completion of the new administration building in 1928, the old administration building was vacated and converted into the first museum in Mount Rainier National Park. (The museum is still in use and contains some components of the original displays.) [50] The following year, the museum display at Paradise was moved into the new community building. In 1931, the first of two ranger's blockhouses to be located in front of the administrative building at Sunrise was completed, and this became the naturalist's headquarters. That same year, the Longmire Museum was refurbished with modern lighting and new historical and anthropological exhibits were developed with the assistance of the Washington State Museum in Seattle. [51]

NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION

The advent of the Park Service brought qualitative changes to natural resource protection in

Mount Rainier National Park. Few natural resource policies were changed in the Park Service's early years, but natural resources were protected with greater fervor than they had been before. This was not surprising, for the protection of natural resources lay at the heart of the National Park Service mission. That mission was "to faithfully preserve the national parks for posterity essentially in their natural state." [52] No other agency in the Department of the Interior had such a succinct and focused mandate as that which Congress provided for the NPS in the organic act of 1916. The agency's crisp mandate was a decided advantage in the formation of a professional organization. Superintendents, rangers, and engineers could be inculcated with a shared sense of mission. The agency could become the recognized authority in specialized fields such as preservation, interpretation, and landscape architecture. The one professional goal that all administrative divisions of the NPS had in common was the protection of natural resources. [53]

Park administrators dealt with a somewhat narrower range of natural resource issues in this era than they had during the park's founding years. There were no prospectors in the park, only a few persistent mining claimants. There were no more timber sales. The threat to wildlife from poachers diminished. The threat from grazing interests resurfaced briefly during the First World War and then subsided. By and large there was little innovation in natural resource protection, only a deepening of commitment. The one decisive change in natural resource policy in this era was in the treatment of predators, and that came at the end of the 1920s.

Grazing

The national call to arms in the spring of 1917 led many westerners to demand the throwing open of public reservations ostensibly for the war effort but really for short-term economic gain. One of the most brazen requests was to allow the shooting of Yellowstone elk and buffalo in order to increase the nation's food supply. While the head of the U.S. Food Administration, Herbert Hoover, promptly slapped down that proposal, demands to open the national parks to sheep grazing in order to increase the meat supply were a good deal more persistent. As Mather phrased it rather dramatically in 1918, "this danger, like the sword of Damocles, hung over both the scenic features and wild life of the parks." [54]

Much to their chagrin, preservationists were forced to accept a provision for grazing in the National Park Service Act of 1916. Grazing was permitted in national parks where such use would not interfere with the primary purpose for which the park was created. For many years preservationists had drawn a sharp distinction between cattle and sheep grazing, for the latter was much more destructive to the vegetation, and this distinction was carried into the NPS regulations following passage of the organic act. Sheepmen saw an opportunity in 1917 to reverse that decision and gain equal access with the cattlemen to national parks. Though there was no coordinated campaign, state wool-grower associations in Washington, Oregon, California, and Montana demanded much the same thing at this time. [55] Demands for entry into Mount Rainier National Park were of more than local significance and drew the close attention of Assistant Director Albright. [56]

In October 1917, Washington state's commissioner of agriculture E.F. Benson requested that the NPS allow stockmen to pasture 30,000 to 50,000 sheep in Mount Rainier National Park. Benson was himself engaged in sheep raising with Howard Nye of Yakima, and incredibly, he saw no conflict of interest in making this "official" request. [57] Albright replied to Benson in no uncertain terms. The NPS did not allow sheep grazing under any circumstances because: 1) sheep would utterly destroy wildflowers, 2) sheep were obnoxious to tourists, 3) sheep would frighten the wild animals, which were otherwise becoming tame and relatively easy for tourists to observe, and 4) sheep would destroy trails and greatly increase the cost of maintaining and protecting the park. The policy applied to all national parks, but was all the

more applicable to Mount Rainier National Park, which was renowned for its beautiful wildflower displays in the high meadows where sheep would be most apt to pasture. [58]

Dissatisfied with this reply, Benson went to the press to try to rally public opinion. He ridiculed Albright's letter, and volunteered to pay a higher premium for grazing privileges for his own sheep, if the Department of the Interior required it, "in order to stimulate wool and mutton production to meet war necessities." One sympathetic Seattle newspaper reproduced the correspondence between Benson and Albright and headlined the story, "Sheep Scare Bears, Eat Pretty Flowers." [59] The Mountaineers, meanwhile, came to the Park Service's defense, advertising that the club members would pasture sheep on their own lawns for the war effort before they would condone opening the national park to sheepmen. [60]

Benson secured Governor Lister's support. The governor wrote to Hoover of the Food Administration. Albright immediately went to work on Hoover, and on January 9, 1918, finally received the unequivocal statement he was looking for: "The U.S. Food Administration concurs with the Department of the Interior that the Government's policy should be to decline absolutely all such requests." [61] Albright and Mather were thrilled by this response; it effectively ended the sharp struggle to open the park to sheep grazing.

Cattle grazing continued to be a menace to the park's resources, though it was regarded as less serious than the threat from sheep grazing. In March 1917, Superintendent Reaburn received a standardized questionnaire on the feasibility of grazing cattle and horses in Mount Rainier National Park for the duration of the war. Reaburn took this official questionnaire as a cue to inform livestock interests in the state that the park administration would likely confer grazing permits that summer. For this indiscretion he received a reprimand from Mather, who insisted that action on grazing applications would only be taken in Washington, D.C. [62]

By then, however, Reaburn had already granted a permit to R.T. Siler and J.E. Batson of Morton, Washington, to graze 200 head of cattle on the Cowlitz Divide during the summer of 1917. Late snows did not allow Siler and Batson to utilize their permit that year; nevertheless they applied for a permit the following year to graze 200 to 500 head in the park. Mather decided to grant this privilege. [63] A few months later, Mather authorized another permit for Henry J. Snively, Jr., this one for 500 head to graze in Yakima Park. Both areas were grazed during the summer of 1918. Snively's permit was reissued in 1919 and 1920, after which Mather informed the cattle owner that the war emergency had passed and the privilege was therefore being withdrawn. [64]

The limited amount of cattle grazing that was permitted on the east side of the park in 1918-20 caused visible damage to the vegetation as well as soil erosion. It is quite possible that the grazing permits would have been renewed indefinitely under the prior administration by the Secretary of the Interior. It is probably fair to say that the termination of these grazing privileges (and the prevention of sheep grazing) indicated a more protective stance on the part of park officials, which owed something to the new environmental ethos being fashioned within the Park Service.

Mining

Park officials had to contend with the possibility that significant mining operations could begin at any time on any of the existing mining claims in the park. Such mining operations could, of course, have serious repercussions for the park's natural resources. As it turned out, the only mining activity in the park in this era consisted of the small amount of yearly assessment work that was required to maintain the various valid mining claims. In two cases —the Hephizibah group of mining claims and the Lorraine group of mining claims—General Land Office agents detected that the assessment work was not being done and adverse

proceedings were undertaken against the claimants. By these means two potential mining operations were eliminated from the park in 1923 and 1927 respectively. [65]

In the case of the Mount Rainier Mining Company operation in Glacier Basin, a General Land Office investigation of the company's forty-one claims may have prompted the company's officers to consolidate their claims. In 1924, a year after the investigation, eight of the claims went to patent and all the others were relinquished. On balance, this was not good news for the park administration. Now the eight claims were alienated—constituting another private inholding in the park. Like the Longmire property, they would have to be acquired through purchase or donation.

The story of the Mount Rainier Mining Company took a strange twist in this era, and as it turned out, the NPS missed a favorable opportunity to eliminate this inholding. In 1928, the company's stockholders filed a complaint against the company president, Peter Storbo, for misrepresenting the value of the company's stock. Storbo and his associate, Orton E. Goodwin, were charged with use of the mail service to defraud the stockholders. Two years later they were convicted, fined $1,000 each, and sentenced to eighteen months in the federal penitentiary. [66] The patented claims were sold at a sheriffs auction in 1932, in the depths of the Great Depression, for a mere $500. The high bid was made by one Thomas E. Engelhorn of Churches Ferry, North Dakota. Apparently no effort was made by the NPS to acquire the claims at this time. After the Depression (and after Engelhorn was dead) the Mount Rainier Mining Company would rise again, reconstitute a threat to the park's natural resources, and detract from the park's integrity until the claims were finally acquired by the government in 1984. [67]

Forests

The attitudes of park administrators toward the forest resources in this era might be described as transitional. The habit of judging the forest's aesthetic value in terms of its market value, which so dominated the thinking of the park's early superintendents, receded in the 1920s. No cutting was permitted except in connection with road and building construction and for the clearing of scenic vistas at key points along the roadway. But park superintendents still viewed the forest as so many trees to be protected, rather than as a living community. Fires, forest diseases, and insect infestations were regarded as purely destructive, an unmitigated blight, rather than natural events in the life of the forest. It was NPS policy to fight all three of these scourges to the fullest extent that funds would allow. Funds for forest protection remained relatively modest, however, until the end of this period.

Park officials regarded wildfire as the biggest threat to the forest. Although wildfire was much less prevalent around Mount Rainier than east of the Cascade Divide, owing to the area's high precipitation, park officials were still mindful of the potential for runaway fires. Evidence could still be seen of forest fires that predated "the advent of the white man" in the area. Silver snags from an old burn on the Muddy Fork of the Cowlitz, for example, covered approximately twenty square miles within the park. Numerous old burns in the higher elevation forests were attributed to the Indians, who had deliberately set fires in order to encourage the spread of huckleberry patches and to make hunting easier. Even some of the slow-growing subalpine stands in the upper mountain hemlock zone showed evidence of fire damage which had been caused by careless campers around the turn of the century. [68]

If Indians no longer set fires in the park, there were numerous other causes of fire that park officials now had to contend with, and the general perception was that in the absence of a system of forest protection the fire danger would mount over time. The sheer numbers of park visitors were a prime threat. "Increased travel unfortunately brings increased fire hazard due to a certain percentage of visitors who are careless in the disposal of burning matches

and tobacco or who fail to extinguish their campfires," observed the NPS's fire control expert, John D. Coffman. The extensive road clearing and slash disposal occurring in this era also entailed added risk of fire. The increasing amount of logging taking place outside the park posed a threat, as fires which started in the national forest could burn into the national park. For all of these reasons, the policy was to fight all fires, regardless of origin. Even lightning-caused fires were to be put out as quickly as possible. [69]

With the growth of the ranger staff, the park administration was able to put more men on forest patrol each season, and to bolster those numbers during periods of extreme fire hazard or after a lightning storm. Indeed, superintendents often cited the need for more firefighting capability in order to obtain additional ranger positions for the next year. (This request played well in the House and Senate appropriations committees—better to ask for more firefighters than for more traffic controllers or nature guides.) Over the years, the park administration was also able to scrounge together a large cache of fire suppression tools, Evinrude pumps, several thousand feet of fire hose, and scores of bed rolls for firefighters. This equipment was cached at Longmire, the Nisqually entrance, and the district ranger stations at Carbon River, White River, and Ohanapecosh. [70]

For the first quarter century of its existence, Mount Rainier National Park experienced no large forest fires. In the summer of 1914 there were seventy-five consecutive days without rain, and forest fires were so prevalent outside the park that the heavy pall of smoke discouraged people from visiting the park during August. But no significant fires occurred within the park. After another dry summer in 1925, Mount Rainier experienced a run of serious fire years. On June 9, 1926, the National Park Inn was destroyed by fire. Though the building was lost, park personnel prevented the fire from spreading to the neighboring forest. In August 1927, thirteen lightning-caused fires and two human-caused fires burned an estimated 334 acres of park lands. The worst fire of 1928 started from the road-clearing operation on the west side and burned about 200 acres on Klapatche Ridge. [71] During the 1929 fire season, park rangers suppressed twenty-five fires: twenty-one within the park, two that began outside the park and spread into it, and two that threatened the park but were controlled entirely outside. Sixteen of the fires were lightning caused and nine were human-caused. [72] One of the more sizable fires was started by the Westside Road construction crew and burned another forty acres of forest on Klapatche Ridge. [73] In October 1930, road-clearing operations on the Westside Road sparked yet another fire which crowned more than 8,000 acres in the Sunset Park area and killed about 3,000 acres of forest. [74]

Expenditures for fire suppression in Mount Rainier National Park grew dramatically from less than $200 in 1925 to more than $18,000 in 1930. [75] In the course of several serious fire seasons, the park obtained valuable training and equipment. Park rangers attended a USFS fire school at Cispus, in the Rainier National Forest, in 1929. They received a three-day course in fire control from the NPS's fire control expert, John D. Coffman, in 1930 and again in 1931. [76] Coffman also prepared a report on forest protection requirements in Mount Rainier National Park. Coffman's report marked a watershed in the park's forest protection policy, as the NPS moved toward a system of fire lookouts in Mount Rainier National Park in the early 1930s.

Up to 1930, Coffman wrote, the park had depended almost entirely on the Forest Service for its lookout service. (Park rangers would sometimes occupy observation points after an electrical storm, but that was the extent of the park's own lookout system.) There was but one permanent lookout station within the park—at Anvil Rock, 9,584 feet high on Mount Rainier's southern flank—and this had been established by the Forest Service back in 1917, and manned by the Forest Service each summer under a cooperative agreement with the NPS. The park received the benefit not only of this lookout but several other lookouts in the surrounding Rainier National Forest. "It is only fair that the park should bear its share of this

lookout service," Coffman advised. Thus, he opined, the NPS should take over the Anvil Rock Lookout and construct two or three additional fire lookouts on and around Mount Rainier. [77] The development of this lookout system is discussed in Chapter XII.

The serious fire seasons of 1926-1930 generated interest in other forest protection problems in Mount Rainier National Park, namely forest-tree disease and insect control. In October 1928, NPS Assistant Forester C.C. Strong surveyed the park's white pine with P.S. Simcoe of the Office of Blister Rust Control, Bureau of Plant Industry, Department of Agriculture. White pine trees were not abundant in Mount Rainier National Park, but in some areas of the park they were of "inestimable scenic value." The survey found that white-pine blister rust was a serious menace to these scattered stands of white pine. [78]

White-pine blister rust is an introduced, canker-forming, forest-tree disease caused by the parasitic fungus Cronartium ribicola. The organism has two dependent phases, one on the white pine trees and the other on currant or gooseberry bushes of the genus Ribes. The disease is communicable from the trees to the ribes bushes for up to 150 miles, but from ribes bushes to tree the windborn spores travel at most about 900 feet. It was found that the forest blight could be fought effectively by eradicating the ribes bushes in the white pine stand and in a limited zone around it.

The disease was introduced from across the Atlantic in 1909, first appearing in white pine in New York. It was introduced on the West Coast one year later, at Vancouver, B.C., on a shipment of white pine seedlings imported from France. The disease spread inland from both coasts during the next forty years. It spread fairly quickly in the Pacific Northwest because of the abundance of ribes bushes. In the mid-1920s, the U.S. Forest Service and timber-owning companies decided against making any effort to control this disease in the relatively minor stands of white pine in western Washington, where Douglas fir predominated. Their decision was based on economics rather than aesthetics. The investigation of blister rust in Mount Rainier National Park by Strong and Simcoe came a few years afterwards, and demonstrated an interesting divergence of forest policy between the national park and the surrounding public and private timberlands. [79]

Mount Rainier National Park received an initial allotment of $5,200 for blister rust control in 1930. Work commenced in mid-June on the clearing of wild currant and gooseberry bushes in the Longmire area and in the Silver Forest (on the road to Narada Falls). At the same time, a more intensive survey was initiated to identify other stands of white pine in the park that might also be protected. [80] This was the beginning of an effort that would continue for more than twenty years, much of it being accomplished by the Civilian Conservation Corps during the 1930s.

The inauguration of blister rust control in the park brought with it the first significant effort at insect control. Numerous red-topped white pines were found to be infested by the white pine beetle (Dendroctonus monticola), and as Coffman pointed out, it would be incongruous to undertake blister rust control if the white pine were still allowed to succumb to a beetle infestation. [81] An entomologist from the Bureau of Entomology made an examination of insect-damaged white pines near Longmire in the fall of 1929 and recommended an allotment of $500 to treat these trees. About 300 trees were either burned or peeled in the Longmire and Ohanapecosh areas in 1930. [82]

Fish Stocking

NPS officials regarded Mount Rainier National Park's lakes and streams as recreational resources. The lakes would naturally attract boaters, swimmers, and fishermen; the streams, when they ran clear and did not contain glacial flour, would make attractive fishing places.

To preserve these bodies of water in a natural state was to protect the public's access to them, keep their shores and banks in a pristine condition, and prevent their spoliation by water development schemes or the dumping of pollutants. It was not part of the preservationist creed at this time to consider lakes and streams as distinct biological communities. Stocking these waters with fish, even if the fish did not occur in them naturally, was thought to be a good thing. [83]

Park officials did not stock the lakes themselves, but they welcomed fish plants by state and county fish wardens. The first such fish plant was made in September 1915 in the northwest corner of the park by Pierce County Fish Warden Ira D. Light. The warden planted 25,000 eastern brook trout fingerlings, and the park administration put a four year closure of the waters in effect. At the end of the period, the fish in Mowich Lake were eighteen inches in length. This was followed by a second plant, in 1917, of 25,000 fingerlings by Pierce County wardens, apportioned between Louise Lake, Reflection Lakes, Golden Lakes, Lake George, and Fish Creek. These areas were likewise closed to fishing for four years. In the summer of 1920, an additional 10,000 fingerlings were planted in Louise Lake and Reflection Lakes, both of which would soon become the most popular and heavily fished lakes in the park. [84]

By 1923, Mount Rainier National Park was acquiring a local reputation for good sport fishing. At Lake George, it was reported that nearly everyone who dipped their line in the water was catching the limit of ten fish per day. The State of Washington Fish and Game Commission now joined the Pierce County Game Commission in providing fish fry from nearby hatcheries—and in larger numbers. Under a cooperative agreement with the NPS, the state and county game commissioners deputized four park rangers as fish wardens, who then assisted state and county wardens with fish plants in their respective districts: 60,000 in Mowich Lake and Golden Lakes, 30,000 in the White River district, 52,000 in the Ohanapecosh district, and 15,000 in the vicinity of Longmire. [85] Additional plants of 180,000 to 200,000 fingerlings were accomplished in 1924 and 1925, and trout fishing was reported to be excellent in Lake George, Louise Lake, and Reflection Lakes. [86]

If these fish plants were large by earlier standards, however, they were still nowhere near what the park required, in Superintendent Tomlinson s view. [87] With Mather's backing, Tomlinson applied to the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries for 500,000 Montana black spotted trout (cutthroat) fry in the spring of 1928. The somewhat cumbersome procedure was to obtain eggs from Yellowstone National Park, have them shipped to hatcheries in Pierce County, and then have the fry delivered to the park by the Pierce County Game Commission. [88] As a result of this effort, 274,500 rainbow, eastern brook, and Montana black-spotted trout were planted in park streams in the fall of 1928. [89]

Due to the rising demand for fish fry in national parks, the Bureau of Fisheries and the NPS made a cooperative agreement in 1929. The bureau's Commissioner Henry O'Malley visited Mount Rainier that summer and authorized his local representative, J.R. Russell, to work with park officials in fully stocking Mount Rainier National Park's lakes and streams. It was thought that the most expeditious way to accomplish this would be to develop a fish hatchery inside the park. Russell inspected several possible sites with fish culturalist Joe Kemmerich, who was superintendent of the Birdsview Hatchery, and Landscape Engineer Ernest A. Davidson. A site on Fish Creek, in the southwest corner of the park, was given close consideration; Davidson requested that preliminary plans be submitted for action by the Landscape Division. [90] After further negotiations between the NPS and the Bureau of Fisheries, the latter built a new fish hatchery at Silver Springs, just outside the northeast corner of the park. Tomlinson expressed hope that with the help of this hatchery, they would be able to "bring the number of fish in the park up to the point where anglers will be anxious to come to the park for the fishing." [91]

With the assistance of the Bureau of Fisheries, there was a marked increase in the number of fish planted during the early 1930s: 290,000 in 1930, 320,000 in 1931, 450,000 in 1932, 511,000 in 1933. Moreover, new areas were stocked, including Lake Eleanor, Green Lake, Ghost Lake, and several creeks. After four years of cooperative effort, Tomlinson felt confident that the fish plants would produce much better fishing in the park within a few years. [92]

Wildlife

The 1920s was a time of transition in national park wildlife policy. A growing number of scientists and conservationists urged the Park Service to establish a distinct wildlife policy for national parks. That policy would aim to preserve natural assemblages of wildlife rather than stock the national parks like zoos. As early as 1916, Joseph Grinnell and Tracy Storer of the University of California Museum of Vertebrate Zoology wrote that national parks should serve as examples of the North American environment as it existed before the advent of Europeans. The main thrust of Grinnell's and Stacy's argument concerned the need to preserve the natural balance between predators and prey. They posited that the best way to restore a natural balance was to let nature take its course, terminate predator control programs, and allow the relationship of predator and prey populations to regulate itself. NPS officials were receptive to this idea, as evidenced in the yearly superintendents' conferences during the 1920s. The idea of natural regulation challenged and eventually overturned the common public perception that all predatory animals were "varmints." In 1931, Director Albright declared unequivocally that "predatory animals have a real place in nature, and all animal life should be kept inviolate within the parks." [93]

Visitors in a company stage give a bear a handout. The NPS did not discourage this behavior until the 1930s. *(O.A. Tomlinson Collection photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. UW1573.)*

At the beginning of this period predator control in Mount Rainier National Park was

primarily a ranger activity during the winter season. Monthly reports by the superintendent record occasional kills; for example, Superintendent Peters made this entry for February 1921:

> Ranger Tice bagged a large female cougar and three wild cats during the month, the cougar being killed quite close to the Carbon River Ranger Station.
>
> Some cougar signs have been observed near Narada Falls and it is hoped that Park rangers will succeed in catching one or more of the large cats near that point. [94]

In the fall of 1920, Stanley G. Jewitt of the U.S. Biological Survey made an investigation of predatory animal conditions in Mount Rainier National Park, found evidence of cougar and coyote on the south side of the park, and recommended that the NPS and the U.S. Biological Survey share the cost of employing a professional hunter in the park during the winter. Superintendent Toll initially balked at this arrangement, but apparently it was implemented in some form during the next four winters. [95]

The NPS began to scale back predatory control activity in the national parks as early as 1924. That fall Mather and Cammerer discussed the need for predator control in Mount Rainier specifically. They requested Superintendent Tomlinson's view on whether predator control should be discontinued altogether or left entirely to park rangers under the direction of the superintendent. Tomlinson apparently favored the latter course. In his annual report for 1926, Tomlinson stated that fewer predatory animals were reported than for several years, "indicating that the control work which has been carried on in cooperation with the Biological Survey is bearing results." [96] In 1929 Tomlinson reported that cougar were scarce while bobcat and lynx were "holding their own." [97] It is unclear precisely when NPS officials terminated the predator control program at Mount Rainier, but certainly it received less emphasis as the decade progressed.

TABLE: POPULATION ESTIMATES OF MAJOR ANIMAL SPECIES

Animal	1926	1929	Population Trend
Deer (Columbia black tail)	450	550	increasing
Goat (white mountain)	250	275	increasing
Bear (black)	225	275	increasing
Wolf (timber)	10-20	10	decreasing
Coyote, bobcat or lynx	300	—	—
Cougar	18	6-12	decreasing
Eagle	50	20-40	decreasing

Poaching continued to be a significant concern. In 1920, Superintendent Toll renewed earlier proposals for the establishment of a game reserve bordering the park. Initially, Toll suggested that an area of 457 square miles be set aside as a game reserve. The reserve would completely surround the park and constitute an area nearly half again as large as the national park itself. Nearly all of this would be Northern Pacific or national forest land. After extensive contacts with the Pierce and Lewis County game commissions, Washington Sportsman's Association, Pierce County Sportsman's Association, Washington State Department of Game, and U.S. Forest Service, as well as the two prominent Washington conservationists, Asahel Curtis and Herbert Evison, Toll agreed to a more modest game reserve along the park's southern boundary. [98]

Toll's efforts bore fruit three years later when the Lewis County Game Commission

cooperated with Forest Supervisor Grenville F. Allen in establishing this game reserve. The Cowlitz Game Preserve prohibited hunting in an area six miles wide by fifteen miles long, or more or less spanning the Tatoosh Range. Acting Superintendent Clarence L. Nelson commended the game commission for its foresight in giving Mount Rainier's deer population "the best winter range on any of the park borders." With the county's cooperation in protecting the game on its favorite winter range, park officials could now expect the deer population to increase. "More game in the park will, of course, add to the enjoyment of our visitors," Nelson wrote. [99]



The Lewis County Game Commission designated four and a half townships bordering the park as the Cowlitz Game Preserve.

MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART THREE: YEARS OF PROMISE, 1915-1930

VIII. THE PARK UNDER CONSTRUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Mount Rainier National Park was profoundly influenced by the general prosperity of the nation in the period 1916-1929. The people's enthusiasm for the automobile, the generous support of the federal government for road-building, and the national mood of exuberance that propelled so many people to explore the outdoors, all contributed to make this period a time of development for the park. The number of park visitors grew from 30,000 in 1915 to 250,000 in 1929; road construction spread from the southwest corner to the southeast and northwest corners; hotel and campground construction proliferated.

During these years Mount Rainier was a park under construction. Each summer, road construction crews were at work in at least two sections of the park, sometimes on roads that were already opened to the public. Road crew camps were nearly as conspicuous as public campgrounds. During the typical construction season, the sound of blasting could be heard on many days of the week. On the road to Paradise, construction crews worked at night to avoid the crush of daytime traffic.

The construction involved an unprecedented amount of planning and coordination between federal and state agencies and the private sector. It involved not only road development in the park, but the construction of county roads and state highways all around the park, too. By the end of this era, it was estimated that the development projects at the park would cost a total of $31 million. Washington state would spend $15 million on access roads, the federal government would spend $11 million on road and campground construction and administration, and the Rainier National Park Company would invest $5 million in hotels and other facilities. [1] The exact figures were disputable, but contemporaries clearly regarded the development of the park as a combined effort.

Road building in the 1920s permanently divided the park into front country and backcountry. In 1920 most of the park was still roadless; at the end of the decade all of the roads that exist in the park today were either built or surveyed. Road building involved more public debate and consumed more of the park's annual budget than most other aspects of park administration in this era combined.

THE POLITICS OF ROAD DEVELOPMENT

To understand the intensity of the public debate over road building in Mount Rainier, it is necessary to consider briefly the wider context of road building in the United States in this era. The rapid spread of the automobile in the early twentieth century focused public attention on the need for better roads. A public debate developed over how the roads would be built

and improved—whether it would be by federal or local initiative, and whether federal aid should be used to develop a system of national highways or should go to the improvement of country roads that were almost impassable by automobile. Heading this debate were the many automobile clubs, whose campaign for greater public investment in roads was known as the good roads movement. A landmark act of Congress in the nation's highway policy was the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916, which made the first large appropriation ($75 million) for the improvement of rural post roads. This was followed by the Federal Highway Act of 1921, which appropriated an initial $75 million for the development of an interstate highway system. These were massive federal spending programs by the standards of the day. Meanwhile, states formed their own highway departments (as required in order to receive matching funds under the Federal Aid Road Act). By the 1920s, federal and state spending on roads was outpacing that of most counties. [2]

As increasing numbers of middle-class families acquired automobiles and took summer vacations to the national parks in the West, the good roads movement formed a natural alliance with the promoters of national parks in the See America First movement. Two associations were emblematic of this alliance: the National Parks Highway Association, based in Spokane, Washington; and the National Park-to-Park Highway Association, based in Cody, Wyoming. Stephen Mather carefully cultivated grass-roots support for the national parks through these and similar organizations. With Mather's help and the support of the American Automobile Association, the National Park-to-Park Highway became an officially-designated interstate route in 1920. Mather hailed the new "highway" as an important milestone in his effort to make the national parks an integral part of the economic life of the nation. The National Park-to-Park Highway, Mather asserted, would not only make the parks more accessible "but would aid in the further development of the West by bringing its remarkable industrial resources vividly to the attention of the traveling public and cause many tourists to settle there." [3] The good roads movement saw road development as a catalyst for economic growth. National park boosters like Mather saw the development of access roads as being of vital importance if the national parks were to succeed at being what he called the "scenic lodestones" of the West.

At the local level, the Mount Rainier National Park boosters and the good roads movement coalesced in the Rainier National Park Advisory Board (originally the Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee). The organization's chairman, photographer Asahel Curtis, epitomized the close relationship between scenic preservation and road development. Serving as chairman of the Advisory Board until the mid-1930s, Curtis mediated between the automobile clubs, chambers of commerce, and the state highway commissioner on the one hand and NPS officials, the RNPC, and The Mountaineers on the other. Indeed, at times during his long tenure as chairman of the Rainier National Park Advisory Board, Curtis also served as chairman of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. It was said that the main purpose of the Rainier National Park Advisory Board was to coordinate the development of state and county access roads with park roads and to bring various western Washington entities together so that the development of Mount Rainier National Park would not be waylaid by petty rivalries at the local level. [4]

The Rainier National Park Advisory Board tried to influence the park's road development at every step in the process, from the conceptualization of a road network, to the allocation of funds and prioritization of surveys and construction contracts, on down to the inclusion of design features such as scenic turnouts. Certainly the NPS had the dominant part in formulating the park's road development plans, but it received an enormous amount of input from Curtis and the Advisory Board. Where the board occasionally proved useful to the NPS was in lobbying members of Congress during the park appropriations process. The board also lobbied state and county officials on behalf of the access roads to Mount Rainier. Despite the board's commercial orientation and Curtis's rather prickly personality, Mather, Albright,

Cammerer, and the park superintendents all treated the Advisory Board with respect.

Another factor in the politics of road building was the transfer of administration from agency to agency. It will be recalled that the Army Corps of Engineers turned over road construction to the Department of the Interior in 1911 (see Chapter V). The new NPS inherited this responsibility in 1916, and one year later Mather set up an Engineering Department under former Army engineer George E. Goodwin. From his main office in Portland, Goodwin kept in close touch with road planning at Mount Rainier. But Mather eventually grew dissatisfied with Goodwin, partly in connection with his foot-dragging over the Westside Road in Mount Rainier National Park, so he transferred responsibility for road design and construction over to the Bureau of Public Roads. [5] The transfer of administration was also consistent with Mather's pledge to keep the NPS tightly focused and to draw on the expertise of other government bureaus where needed. Henceforth, the NPS decided generally where the roads would go and the Bureau of Public Roads surveyed and designed the roads. NPS landscape engineers continued to have input on all phases of the work, however.

It was the park superintendent's job, meanwhile, to recommend overall road development plans and to oversee road construction contracts. It was no accident that four of Mather's five superintendent appointees at Mount Rainier were experienced road builders. Superintendent Dewitt L. Reaburn (1915-18) was a former USGS topographic engineer with railroad building experience in Alaska and South America. W.H. Peters (1920-22) was a civil engineer by background and superintendent of Grand Canyon before transferring to Mount Rainier. C.L. Nelson (1922-23) was also formerly an engineer with the USGS. These men had experience in the political landscape associated with road building. Mount Rainier s longest-serving superintendent, Owen A. Tomlinson (1923-41), had built roads and trails during his twenty years of service in the American-occupied Philippines.

The politics of road building involved so many entities and interests that no one factor can be singled out as a predominant influence in shaping Mount Rainier National Park's road network in this era. Rather, Mount Rainier's road network may be seen as a product of several competing influences. These may be summarized as follows:

1. A desire to open up the four corners of the park for use. While not everyone agreed on the desirability of a high road encircling the mountain, everyone did agree that there should be road access to each corner of the park. At this minimum level of development, established usage by local interests practically dictated the location of roads. In the northwest corner of the park, the Carbon River was the obvious and well-established route used by tourists since the 1880s. In the northeast corner, the existing wagon road up the White River to Glacier Basin laid the groundwork for subsequent road development. In the southeast corner, local people had already cut a trail up the Ohanapecosh River to the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs. In each instance, the question was not whether these routes would be improved for automobile access, but when.

2. A desire to retain sections of the park in a primitive condition. As early as 1924, Mather stated that it was not the Park Service's intention to "gridiron" the national parks with roads. [6] Eventually the idea would form that Mount Rainier's north side should be spared any road development. The idea of retaining a large primitive area within the national park served as a brake on Mount Rainier road development.

3. A desire to relieve congestion. Opening up other corners of the park would relieve pressure on Paradise in the short term, but ultimately the park required connecting roads between these points. "Stub-end roads," as Superintendent Tomlinson referred to them, created more congestion than through-roads. [7] Park administrators saw roads not only as a way of giving the public access to scenic points, but for keeping the public circulating through the park.

These would be scenic roads, allowing many visitors to experience the national park through their car windows or from scenic turnouts.

4. A need to cooperate with state and county road planning. The state and county roads leading to Mount Rainier National Park had a profound effect on the evolution of the park's road net. NPS officials had limited ability to influence where these access roads went. It was necessary to adjust park planning to developments outside the park. While the construction of a state highway over Chinook Pass (State Route 410) tended to intensify development of the east side of the park, the languishing effort by Pierce County to build a road from Fairfax toward the northwest corner of the park had the exact opposite effect on the park's westside development.

5. A need to expend park road appropriations efficiently. The short construction season in Mount Rainier, as in most national parks, necessitated careful planning in letting contracts for road building. Just as opportunities to receive federal funds could be missed if plans were not in place in time, money could also be squandered by letting construction contracts prematurely, when preliminary survey and design work was incomplete. Congress approved a series of three-year programs for national-park road construction in 1921, 1924, and 1927. Each new three-year program was much larger than the last. Furthermore, each program entailed a season of planning and survey work before road construction could be commenced efficiently. Thus, the appropriations process stamped Mount Rainier National Park's road development with a rhythm that did not necessarily correspond to local developments. The Rainier National Park Advisory Board tended to push for road contracts sooner rather than later, while the government engineers insisted on a more measured approach.

THE PROGRESS OF ROAD DEVELOPMENT

For the reasons outlined above, most of the park administration's road construction efforts focused on one road at a time, while the overall picture of road development changed from year to year. Superintendent Peters provided Mather with a three-year plan in 1922, and Tomlinson did the same in 1925, while Albright took a close interest in park road planning at the end of the decade. To follow the shifting components of these plans would be confusing and repetitious. This section traces the development of each of the park's roads separately but in the political context outlined above.

Nisqually Road

The road from Nisqually Entrance to Paradise continued to be a priority item in the national park budget throughout this era. As completed by the War Department in 1915, the road narrowed to a one-lane road above Narada Falls. Rangers manned checkpoints at either end of the one-lane section, where they restricted traffic first to one direction and then the other throughout each day. [8] By 1920, the checking system was creating a severe bottleneck. To make matters worse, when the limited amount of parking space at Narada Falls and Paradise filled up, visitors simply pulled off along the edges of the road. Even before road funds could be expended to open up other corners of the park, it was thought that this road must be widened and improved and parking spaces made to alleviate the congestion. [9]

Modest appropriations allowed the Park Service to make only piecemeal improvements on the road from 1916 to 1921. In 1921, the park's budget was significantly enlarged to allow more extensive improvements to the Nisqually Road, as well as construction of the Carbon River Road. [10] It was decided to build a second road between Narada Falls and Paradise, with the original road to be used for uphill traffic and the new road for downhill traffic. The new road was opened to the public on June 25, 1924. [11]

Passage of the National Park Highway Act of April 9, 1924 led to a second round of construction on the Nisqually Road beginning in 1925. Now the emphasis was on surfacing and widening the existing road, improving the bridges, and increasing the available parking at Paradise. New bridges, mostly built in a rustic style that was intended to harmonize with the landscape, included the lovely, stone-faced, arch bridges at Narada and Christine falls. [12]

Carbon River Road

It had long been assumed that the northwest corner of the park should be developed next after the southwest corner. Not only did the Carbon River area lie closer to Seattle than the southwest section of the park, but it was suggested from time to time that the Northern Pacific Railroad Company might be interested in developing the area. Furthermore, the steep north face of Mount Rainier, the broad alpine parks and dense lowland forests that were characteristic of the north side, and the impressive Carbon Glacier terminus made the area perhaps the most scenically grand in the park. What made the Carbon River Road so problematic was the fact that no access road existed between the town of Fairfax, where the Northern Pacific's branch line terminated, and the park boundary. Nearly half of this stretch lay across privately-owned timber land, and the remainder traversed the national forest. To develop the whole length of road required the cooperation of the NPS, the Forest Service, Pierce County, Washington state, and the land-owning timber company. It proved to be an unwieldy enterprise. That this corner of the park is even today the least developed is proof that the evolution of the park's road net was influenced to a large extent by the development of access roads outside the park.

From the first, the divided land ownership leading up the Carbon River made this project a tangle of local politics. Outside the park, the Manley-Moore Lumber Company had a logging railroad some distance up the valley beyond Fairfax, but the only public access as far as the park boundary was a horse and foot trail. Inside the park, the Washington Mining and Milling Company had built some three miles of wagon road along the Carbon in 1907, but as the road was never extended down to Fairfax it quickly fell into disuse and became overgrown. In 1915, a road survey was made of the route from the northwest corner of the park to Carbon Glacier, and it was estimated that the seven-mile stretch of road would cost about $100,000. [13]

Superintendent Toll and Mather urged construction of this road in 1919 and 1920, but Congress was unwilling to commit funds to new road construction in the park until the access road from Fairfax was under construction. During the early part of 1921, several conferences were held to get public and private funds dedicated to this project. Irving Clark of The Mountaineers and Asahel Curtis of the Rainier National Park Advisory Board pressed Forest Service officials to begin work on the three-mile section across the national forest, and the two lobbied Pierce County's board of commissioners to authorize construction of the few miles out of Fairfax. [14] The Natural Parks Association of Washington, founded with Mather's encouragement two years before, went into action to save the roadside timber from Fairfax to the park boundary; with "fine public spirit," reported Mather later that year, the Manley-Moore Lumber Company pulled out its railroad and logging equipment in exchange for timber contracts elsewhere. [15] Meanwhile, Mather urged the Northern Pacific to improve the plan of the gateway town of Fairfax in preparation for the automobile traffic. [16]

As a result of this combined effort, Congress appropriated $150,000 for Mount Rainier National Park in 1921—an "epoch making" sum in the jubilant words of Mather. Construction of the Carbon River Road began that summer and continued over the next three years. In 1924, Superintendent Tomlinson reported that the contractor had completed the road to within one mile of the glacier terminus, though the last three miles were one-lane.

Flooding of the Carbon River had damaged portions of the road, however, and some revetment work was required. Moreover, Pierce County's road builders had left about one mile of road uncompleted. For these reasons, visitor use of the Carbon River Road remained light. In 1925, the NPS's chief engineer, George Goodwin, recommended that the NPS focus attention elsewhere as long as Pierce County fell short of completing the access road. [17] At the end of this era, the Carbon River Road remained relatively primitive.

White River Road

In contrast to the Carbon River area, where the need for development of an access road outside the park actually retarded roadwork inside the park, eastside development was pushed along by road development outside the park. The outside road in this case ran up the White River Valley to Cayuse Pass, then over Chinook Pass and down the American and Naches rivers to Yakima. The state road was some fifteen years in construction. The section of the road through the national forest and national park would later be designated State Route 410 and the Mather Memorial Parkway. The construction of this highway between 1916 and 1931 had a large influence on the timing and placement of the White River, Yakima Park, and Eastside roads. The first of these new park road developments was the White River Road.

Prior to 1916, the Mount Rainier Mining Company had built a wagon road up the south bank of the White River. Reaburn described this existing road in his annual report for 1916:

> It follows practically the water grade of White River, which runs from 2 1/2 per cent in the lower sections to 13 1/2 per cent at the extreme upper end. Only one or two short sections are over 11 per cent. It is a single track wagon road, graded to a uniform grade, 12 feet wide inside of ditches. The bridges and culverts are 16 feet wide and are well constructed. A considerable portion of the road has been surfaced and the company is now operating an auto truck over it. [18]

Intrepid motorists began bumping up this road as early as 1918. They found the road impassable due to washouts and slides in 1919, but back in service the next year, when State Route 410 was completed as far as the park boundary. (Prior to the extension of the park boundary eastward to the Cascade Crest in 1931, this road remained outside the park; the White River Road, taking off where the White River Valley angled toward the mountain, entered the park near the site of the present-day White River entrance station.) In 1921, the Rainier National Park Company opened its White River Camp approximately seven miles inside the park boundary. In 1924, the NPS relocated part of the road away from the edge of the river to reduce the problem of flood damage. Meanwhile, the last three miles of wagon road up to Glacier Basin were allowed to revert to the condition of a trail. With the development of the Yakima Park area in 1929-31, all but the last mile of the White River Road became part of the new road to Sunrise. [19]

Ranger station and entrance arch on the White River Road. *(Lloyd G. Linkletter photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. UW7935)*

Westside Road

Once public roads had been built into the southwest, northwest, and northeast corners of Mount Rainier National Park, the NPS began to lay plans for the first connecting road, a "westside road" that would begin just inside the Nisqually entrance at Tahoma Creek and extend north to the Carbon River Road. It was believed that the Westside Road would allow motorists starting from Seattle or Tacoma to make a loop through the park and take pressure off of the Paradise area. It would open up the rugged backcountry on the west side of the park. Though the road would be expensive to engineer, it would be one of the "scenic highways of the world." [20] Finally, it would be the first leg in an eventual around-the-mountain road. [21] Such was the original conception of the Westside Road.

Like the Carbon River Road, the history of the Westside Road was one of steadily diminishing expectations. The root of the problem, once again, stemmed from the inadequacy of state or county support for access roads to the northwest corner of the park. But in this case, the problem was compounded by the rugged topography along the intended route and the formidable cost of the park road itself. Before construction even began, it was decided that the anticipated route over Ipsut Pass between Mowich Lake and the Carbon River was too steep to be practicable. [22] Instead, the Westside Road would leave the park west of Mowich Lake, descending via another county or state access road to the town of Fairfax. This preserved the idea of a scenic loop drive originating somewhere near Tacoma and Seattle, but it placed a greater burden on the state or county to build that second road out of Fairfax. Still another factor that worked to undermine the original conception of the Westside Road was that soon after it was put under construction in the mid-1920s, the idea of an around-the-mountain road was superseded by the thought that the north side of the park should be kept roadless. [23] For all of these reasons the Westside Road was never completed beyond the North Puyallup River.

Park promoters began discussing the Westside Road as soon as funds were dedicated to the Carbon River Road in 1921. With passage of the National Park Highway Act of 1924, the Rainier National Park Advisory Board and other groups immediately began lobbying for a

sufficiently large allocation of funds to Mount Rainier National Park to pay for this ambitious project. It was argued that the government must build the Westside Road in order to "keep faith" with the people of Washington state, who had invested more than $7 million in access roads to the park. [24] This distorted the situation somewhat, since most of that investment had gone to the highways leading to the southwest and northeast corners of the park, not to the northwest corner. But the fact remained that federal officials had long stressed the need for cooperation between state and federal road building efforts. "If it can be shown to the people of Washington that the building of the road up the Carbon River will be a start toward the proper development of a road around the mountain," Mather advised Curtis in 1921, "I am sure they will see the necessity of cooperation. If we have a completed road to the Carbon Glacier in the next two years we will have a strong argument for the highway link around the west side of the mountain, but if this work drags out over several years it puts off the bigger work just that much longer." [25] Now that the Carbon River Road had been completed on schedule, park promoters insisted, it was time for the NPS to deliver on that promise.

Had it not been for this circumstance, NPS officials might have postponed and then cancelled the whole Westside Road project. Superintendent Tomlinson repeatedly expressed doubts that the route surveyed in 1922 was truly feasible. But the Rainier National Park Advisory Board pushed for a resurvey and demanded that the Westside Road be given top priority. On August 12, 1925, a conference took place at the Winthrop Hotel in Tacoma. Present were two NPS civil engineers, Burt H. Burrell and R.N. Kellogg, NPS Chief Landscape Engineer Thomas C. Vint, Superintendent Tomlinson, and Asahel Curtis and Herbert Evison representing the Rainier National Park Advisory Board. Working with a three-year allotment for the park of a little more than $1 million, Curtis and Evison prevailed on the NPS to revamp the budget so that nearly sixty percent of the road development funds would be allotted to construction contracts for the Westside Road. [26] Mather and Albright conferred with Burrell afterwards and agreed to resubmit the agency's budget estimates for Mount Rainier along the lines that the Advisory Board recommended. [27] Two weeks after the August 12 meeting, Curtis, Vint, two engineers with the Bureau of Public Roads, an NPS publicity agent, a cook, and a packer set out on a resurvey of the Westside Road, beginning with Ipsut Pass. [28] This was probably the most influential moment in the Advisory Board's career. Ironically, the decision to go full speed ahead with the Westside Road project was one that Albright would come to regret.

An interesting sidelight of this deliberation was its role in bringing about the formal transfer of road building that fall from the NPS to the Bureau of Public Roads. As early as the spring of 1925, the Rainier National Park Advisory Board was instrumental in putting NPS officials in touch with engineers in the Bureau of Public Roads to discuss the possibility of a resurvey. This was a sensitive negotiation, since it implied a lack of confidence in the NPS's own Engineering Department. Ostensibly, Chief Engineer George Goodwin opposed further development of the Westside Road for the time being because of the lack of cooperation he had received from Pierce County officials, but it was also true that the deliberations over the Westside Road were tending to highlight Goodwin's antiquated standards of road engineering. When he resigned that summer, there was no love lost between him and the Advisory Board. Indeed, when Mather formalized the new arrangement with the Bureau of Public Roads that fall, Asahel Curtis bluntly advised the director that it was the most important decision he had made in recent years. [29]

The first construction contract for the Westside Road was let in 1926. For the next three seasons, the route up Tahoma Creek and over Round Pass was the scene of a major construction effort, employing hundreds of men. Meanwhile, a location party, consisting of fifteen to twenty men, brushed a trail northward into the canyon of the South Puyallup River, around Klapache Ridge, into the canyon of the North Puyallup River, up through Sunset

Park, and across the Mowich River to a "west entrance" near Mowich Lake. In 1927, the route was extended to Spray Park. [30] Only about half of the Westside Road would ever be built, though the whole design would figure in the park's first master plan in 1928.

At the end of this era, the Westside Road was opened to the public from its point of departure on the Nisqually road northward as far as Round Pass. The ostensible reason why this important route was not completed was the failure of the state of Washington to provide for an approach road from Fairfax to the "west entrance," making it difficult to work on both ends of the road at once. [31] Equally significant, however, was the high cost of construction over this route and the growing emphasis on eastside development instead.

Yakima Park Road

One of the first tasks assigned to the Bureau of Public Roads in Mount Rainier, after the relocation of the Westside Road route, was the surveying of a route from the White River up to Yakima Park. Superintendent Tomlinson's idea was to develop Yakima Park as an alternative destination point in the park and thus take pressure off of Paradise. Mather concurred in this plan, and requested the survey immediately in order to have the data available for the making of the next three-year development program, which would likely commence in 1928 or 1929. [32]

The development of Yakima Park was hailed as the most coordinated planning effort by the NPS and a park concessioner to date. No sooner would the road be completed than the physical plant would be in place and new hotel construction would be underway. In 1929, four separate road construction contracts were let on the Yakima Park Road, and while these were reaching completion during the following year, a power plant, water supply, and sewege system were installed at the new development site. NPS landscape architects were given unprecedented scope in working with engineers in the Bureau of Public Roads. They designed scenic turnouts, rustic guardrails, and handsome bridges. The bridge over the White River—a sixty-foot concrete arch with stone facing and railing and a four-foot bridle path—received special praise from the road engineers and the public. The wide-radius switchback at Sunrise Point, which featured parking on the inside of the horseshoe curve and pedestrian bays around the perimeter where visitors could get away from their cars and behold one of the most panoramic views in the park, was state-of-the-art. [33]

Stevens Canyon/Eastside Road

If park administrators saw road development as their best means of controlling visitor access and circulation, they were also quick to acknowledge that road development created new problems and administrative challenges. This paradox, inherent in all national park development, was acutely a feature of Mount Rainier National Park, where so much population lived within a half day's drive of the Pacific Northwest's most renowned scenic wonderland. The relationship of the Stevens Canyon and Eastside roads to the Yakima Park Road was a case in point. The Yakima Park development took pressure off of Paradise, but it also added to the administrative complexity of the park and necessitated a connecting road between the southwest and northeast corners of the park. Tomlinson described the new situation this way in 1930:

> With the throwing open to automobile travel of the Yakima Plateau area in 1931 the administrative problems of the park will be doubled. There will be practically as much travel and as many activities in Yakima Park as there are now in Paradise Valley. Due to the great distance from park headquarters and lack of telephone or other rapid communication facilities it is essential that a full force of rangers, ranger naturalists, and other personnel be provided in order to protect

> the area and serve park visitors. The only means to reach Yakima Park from Longmire by automobile requires a detour of 135 miles over State roads. Being separated by this distance makes practically two parks as far as administration and operation are concerned. It is essential that construction work on the east side road be started at the earliest practicable date and prosecuted with the utmost dispatch so that a connecting road can be made available as soon as possible. On account of the physical difficulties to overcome, such a connecting road can not possibly be completed in less than six or seven years. By that time it is estimated that the travel to Yakima Park will have almost equaled the total number of visitors that now come to the park. [34]

It will be recalled that road surveys had been made across the southern side of the park as early as 1904 and again in 1915-16. The standards for road construction had changed so much during the 1920s that these past surveys were of no more than historical interest when the NPS took up the question of a suitable route in 1926. [35] Over the next five years, several surveys and reconnaissances were made of this large section of the park. Director Albright selected the eventual route in 1931.

There were two major topographical features that influenced the alternative routes. The first was the east-west trending Stevens Ridge and Stevens Canyon, which presented a stark choice between a traverse of the canyon wall or a "high line" along the top of the ridge. The second topographical feature was Cowlitz Divide, which ran north and south exactly athwart the remaining distance to Cayuse Pass. This presented another stark choice: either a right-angle bend to the south, necessitating a long dogleg out of the park around the end of this ridge; or a right-angle bend to the north, up Cowlitz Divide and through the broken highcountry surrounding Cowlitz and Ohanapecosh parks. Three routes in the latter direction were surveyed in 1927 and 1928. [36] At Albright's request, the longer route around the south end of Cowlitz Divide was surveyed in 1931. [37] The longer route to the south was the route that Albright selected. [38] The final location and construction of this road would be one of the major road developments of the 193Os.

Numerous factors weighed in Albright's decision. As the choice of routes essentially boiled down to a high line with spectacular views or a low line largely in forest, Albright had to weigh the scenic splendor of the high route against the lesser amount of scarring that the low route would entail, and the shorter season of the high route against the longer mileage of the low route. There was the additional complication that the low route necessitated a swing outside the park boundary into the national forest—or else a boundary extension to encompass the new road. Furthermore, the state of Washington planned to build a road up the Ohanapecosh River to join Naches Pass Highway (formerly called McClellan Pass Highway), and it was unclear when this would be built and how the park road could most advantageously tie in with it. Albright's choice of the lower, more circuitous route was linked in part to his successful negotiation with the Forest Service of a major boundary revision on the east and southeast edges of Mount Rainier National Park. It also signalled his growing sensitivity to charges that the national parks were becoming too cut up by roads. [39]

Paradise Scenic Road (Proposed)

>While survey teams were investigating the possibility of a high road around the southeast flank of Mount Rainier, an even higher road was under consideration above Paradise. The idea was to build a one-way scenic loop road starting at Paradise, going up to Timberline Ridge at 6,300 feet, and ending on the south end of Mazama Ridge near the Reflection Lakes. Although the road would syphon away some traffic from the Paradise parking lot, it was not the road's main purpose to improve visitor circulation. Rather, its purpose would be to give automobile-bound tourists a better view of glaciers and alpine meadows. [40] The

road proposal raised the philosophical question of just how far the NPS ought to go to accommodate that type of visitor use.

At Mather's request, Engineer R.N. Kellogg of the Bureau of Public Roads surveyed this route in the fall of 1927. [41] The full loop road was found to be impractical and the plan was scaled back to a two-way road from Paradise to Alta Vista. From the earliest mention of this road proposal, however, NPS officials were skeptical. Chief Landscape Engineer Vint thought the road was unnecessary; visitors could walk the one and a half miles to Alta Vista. Mather and Albright were inclined to agree. Only Superintendent Tomlinson thought it was a good idea. [42]



Proposed Paradise Scenic Highway

RNPC officials held out for the scenic 1oop road, visualizing the tours that they would provide around it. The company's president, H.A. Rhodes, hinted to Mather that the construction of the new Paradise hotel depended on it. He was "keenly disappointed" when Mather first disapproved the project in 1928. Rhodes wrote to the director:

> Without this means of convenient access to the Glacier Rim the general public, many thousands of people on week ends and holidays, will swarm down upon the new hotel location and destroy the relative seclusion that is sought for in choosing this site. Without this route, intended for use of the general public, seventy-five per cent of Park visitors are denied opportunity to witness the marvelous spectacle to be enjoyed only from a location at the Glacier Rim. [43]

Rhodes also wrote to Congressman Louis C. Cramton of Michigan, a staunch friend of the national parks, for support on this issue.

After 1928, the scenic road proposal was eclipsed by developments elsewhere, particularly in Yakima Park. When the RNPC abandoned its plans for a new hotel at Paradise, settling instead for the more modest Paradise Lodge, it did not press as hard for this road. Still, as late as 1931, Albright had not rejected the project. The Bureau of Public Roads made another location survey, while the NPS made an independent preliminary survey of a different location. The latter entailed a steeper grade but made use of the more scenic north side of Alta Vista. Albright's thought at this time was to build a low-standard road using NPS labor on force account. However, this project was never carried out. [44]

DESIGNATION OF A WILDERNESS AREA

The large amount of public debate on the development of roads in Mount Rainier National Park gave rise to concerns that the NPS was going too far in opening the park to automobile use. These concerns came to a head in a resolution adopted by the Board of Trustees of The Mountaineers in April 1928. The Mountaineers' resolution asserted that the present road program "would subject approximately three fourths of the park to commercial use and development and retain only one fourth in its natural wilderness condition." Superintendent Tomlinson took issue with that characterization of his road plan, but he nevertheless endorsed The Mountaineers' proposal to have a certain portion of the park formally declared a "wilderness area." He suggested to Mather that "such action would be in entire accordance with national park policies and ideals, and it would have the effect of assuring those concerned with the preservation of natural wilderness areas that the National Park Service is guarding against over development of the national parks." [45]

The Mountaineers' resolution caused some perplexity among senior NPS officials in Washington, D.C. (Mather was then out West; Arno B. Cammerer and Arthur E. Demaray were left to ponder the proposal in his absence.) Demaray informed Tomlinson that the NPS had one precedent for a "wilderness area." Approximately seven square miles had been set aside for scientific study in Yosemite National Park. Within that designated area no camping, fishing, or domestic animals were permitted; access was only allowed for the purpose of scientific study or for necessities of administration. This wilderness area had been set aside in November 1926 at the request of Dr. C. Hart Merriam, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, and its principal purpose was for research. Obviously, that was not the intent of the resolution by The Mountaineers.

The Mountaineers seemed to desire that an area be reserved from all road and commercial development and made available for the sole use of those on foot or horseback. Demaray and Cammerer recommended that "wilderness area" was therefore the wrong term; rather, it should be designated on administrative maps as "to be free from road and commercial development." Demaray requested a map from Tomlinson, showing the area that he thought should be so administered. [46]

Tomlinson duly sent a map with areas marked for wilderness or roadless designation. He pointed out that The Mountaineers had consented to the proposed developments at Yakima

Park and Spray Park, but wanted all the lands lying north of these places preserved in a wilderness condition. "I suggest that the areas be described as follows," Tomlinson wrote. "'That all of the territory in Mount Rainier National Park lying north of Berry Peak, Ipsut Pass, Spray Park, Mystic Lake and Yakima Park' and the areas known as 'Klapatche Park, St. Andrews Park and Indian Henry's Hunting Ground' are to remain free of road, hotel, pay camps and all commercial development." Tomlinson pointed out that by designating these areas as roadless, the NPS would definitely have The Mountaineers on board for developing Yakima Park and Spray Park. [47]

In August, Mather returned to Washington, D.C. and took the opportunity to consider the proposal by The Mountaineers and Superintendent Tomlinson himself. The director approved the plan in its entirety, subject to the understanding that the wilderness designation did not bar the development of trails. [48] The only thing that The Mountaineers did not obtain was the official approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Time would show that that further guarantee was not necessary.

TWO BOUNDARY REVISIONS AND THE MATHER MEMORIAL PARKWAY

Congress passed laws in 1926 and 1931 that modified the boundaries of Mount Rainier National Park. In both cases, the new boundaries were extended outward from the original township lines to conform to natural features (the Nisqually, Carbon, and White rivers in the 1926 law, the Cascade Crest and the summit of Crystal Mountain in 1931). The main purpose of these boundary revisions was to bring park roads completely within the jurisdiction of the park.

Boundary Change of 1926

The problem was most pronounced in the case of the Nisqually Road, which followed the general course of the Nisqually River from the park entrance to Longmire, meandering across the south boundary of the park in two places. Technically, the NPS did not have authority to maintain these two short sections of road. As early as 1913, Superintendent Ethan Allen had called attention to the need for a modest boundary adjustment to correct this problem, but nothing came of it. [49] The problem was quietly overlooked for a dozen years until a good opportunity arose to push for a boundary adjustment.

In 1925, Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work formed the Coordinating Committee on National Parks and Forests to consider a whole package of land exchanges between the NPS and the Forest Service. As was the case with most national parks, additions to Mount Rainier National Park would be made at the expense of the surrounding national forests. Indeed, most of the national parks were created from national forest lands (beginning with Mount Rainier in 1899). This circumstance had made the Forest Service increasingly jealous of the NPS. Secretary Work's committee was formed in order to force NPS and USFS officials to reach an accommodation. The NPS was invited to make a comprehensive proposal for new national parks and boundary adjustments that involved national forest lands, and the committee would either reject or endorse the recommendations before submitting them to Congress. [50]

As part of this initiative, Mather requested Superintendent Tomlinson's views on possible boundary changes for Mount Rainier. Tomlinson recommended that the eastern boundary be adjusted to follow the Ohanapecosh River, Chinook, Dewey and Klickitat creeks, and the White River. Noting that the state of Washington proposed to build a highway from Cayuse Pass southward along these water courses, the superintendent suggested that "it might be well to consider this with regard to road development." [51] In addition, Tomlinson recommended

extending the boundary to the Nisqually River in the southwest corner of the park and to the toe of Cowlitz Divide in the southeast corner of the park—the latter extension to include Ohanapecosh Hot Springs. Tomlinson had conferred with Forest Supervisor E.J. Fenby on these proposals and Fenby had expressed himself in favor of the boundary adjustments, but had cautioned Tomlinson that others in the Forest Service might object to the eastside additions. It is unclear whether Mather had any discussion of this with Forest Service officials, but in his final proposal to the Coordinating Committee, he asked for adjustments along the Nisqually, Carbon, and White rivers and the addition of a mere half section in the southeast corner to take in Ohanapecosh Hot Springs.

In August and September 1925, the Coordinating Committee made an inspection trip of several areas in the Rocky Mountain region which Mather had recommended for inclusion in the national park system. The committee endorsed the relatively modest boundary changes at Mount Rainier without personally visiting the area because the Forest Service raised no objection to them. Since other proposals, notably Mather's proposal to create a Grand Teton National Park, did arouse strong opposition from the Forest Service, the various boundary changes were introduced as separate bills in Congress the following spring. [52]

Meanwhile, local opposition had built up in Lewis County toward the inclusion of Ohanapecosh Hot Springs. Evidently the opposition was organized by Dr. Albert W. Bridge, owner of a small hotel and mineral baths which he operated under Forest Service permit. Bridge convinced the Lewis County Commission and a number of local newspaper editors and civic organizations that the boundary adjustment was a plot by the Rainier National Park Company to drive out its competition. Bridge was able to capitalize on Lewis County residents' feeling that Seattle and Tacoma business interests were monopolizing the national park tourist trade. [53] After Representative Albert Johnson of Washington brought this local opposition to the attention of the House Committee on Public Lands that May, Mather agreed to drop his request for the half section and leave Ohanapecosh Hot Springs outside the park for the time being. The amended bill was passed May 28, 1926. [54]

Boundary Change of 1931

The second boundary adjustment involved considerably more land area. It extended the east boundary of the park to the summit of Crystal Mountain and the Cascade Crest. This made better sense than a line following rivers and creeks, both from the standpoint of managing wildlife populations and protecting scenic vistas. But again it was the developing road grid around Mount Rainier that prompted the boundary change. When Director Albright broached the issue with Chief Forester R.Y. Stuart in 1930, the state highway over Chinook Pass was less than a year from completion. Albright listed the following reasons for the extension of the park:

> 1. Chinook Pass was the natural eastern gateway to the park. It would make a spectacular entrance to the park at a place where the NPS could meet all incoming visitors and provide them with information.
>
> 2. The region between Chinook Pass and the present park boundary was naturally tributary to the pass and could best be patrolled and protected from the park.
>
> 3. A small section of the Cascade Crest would enrich the scenery of the park, vary its natural features, and increase its educational opportunities.
>
> 4. Cayuse Pass, below Chinook Pass, was a central point for all roads east of the present park boundary. The NPS proposed to build a new road up the Ohanapecosh River to join the state highway at Cayuse Pass.

5. The NPS could not build this road unless some boundary adjustment were made. There was no other feasible route for the road.

6. A proposed camp development at Tipsoo Lake just west of Chinook Pass, or at Cayuse Pass, would seriously impair the investment being made at Yakima Park. Gasoline stations or refreshment stands at these strategic points would blot the landscape.

Albright noted that the NPS could not justifiably charge a park entrance fee for through traffic on the new state highway, but pointed out that this matter could be handled in the bill to revise the park boundary. He closed his letter to Stuart by asking that the Forest Service forebear issuing any special use permits covering land in the extension area pending a final determination of the boundary. [55]

The Forest Service cooperated with the NPS proposal and the legislation was whisked through Congress expeditiously. The Act of January 31, 1931, gave the NPS all that it had asked for, including Ohanapecosh Hot Springs and most of the southern end of Cowlitz Divide, around which the Eastside Road would be located. Section 2 of the act contained a proviso, "that no fee or charge shall be made by the United States for the use of any roads in said park built or maintained exclusively by the State of Washington." [56]

Only one year after this boundary extension, NPS biologists would recommend further additions to the park based on ecological considerations. These would not go through. The boundary adjustments in 1926 and 1931 did benefit the park from an ecological standpoint. But this was almost as much by luck as by design. It was the lay of the land for purposes of road development that finally shaped the configuration of the park's boundaries.

The Mather Memorial Parkway

The desire to bring road development and land use into harmony led to one other significant land action at the end of this era. The aim of the Mather Memorial Parkway was to protect scenic values—to set aside a one-mile-wide, seventy-five-mile-long strip of land along the new Naches Pass Highway so that the scenic drive over the Cascades would be protected from the visual effects of logging. The creation of the Mather Memorial Parkway is part of the history of Mount Rainier National Park's road development, but it involved the protection of roadside timber leading to the park rather than new road construction in the park. The designation of the Mather Memorial Parkway is part of the history of Mount Rainier National Park's boundaries, too, but two secretarial land orders rather than an act of Congress were all that were required to accomplish it.

Mather conceived the idea of a "Cascade Parkway" during a visit to Mount Rainier in July 1928 when he was looking over the proposed Yakima Park development. The Naches Pass Highway was then nearing completion. It would connect Yakima with Seattle and Tacoma via Chinook Pass and the White River Valley. Mather anticipated that the completed highway would bring large numbers of visitors to the northeast corner of the park, especially with the construction of a new road up to Yakima Park. He wanted the scenic approaches to the park—either up the White River Valley or over Chinook Pass—to be protected. He broached the idea of a Cascade Parkway with Asahel Curtis and Herbert Evison, the latter a Washington state resident and close collaborator of Mather in the National Conference on State Parks. Both Curtis and Evison were enthusiastic. [57]

The creation of a parkway would involve two main land owners: the U.S. Forest Service and the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. In addition, there were a number of summer homesite owners in the national forest who would have to be brought on board. Mather first

took his request to the most problematic of these land owners, the railroad. He met with the president of the railroad, Charles Donnelly, in Yellowstone on July 24, 1928. Mather described the impending development at Yakima Park and suggested that the Northern Pacific might be able to work something out with the park concession—perhaps run its passengers through Mount Rainier National Park by bus, taking them off the train in Yakima and reboarding them in Tacoma. He then explained that he wanted to preserve the timber along this scenic highway, and suggested that the Northern Pacific might dispose of its timber holdings in this area by exchange or donation. Donnelly was non-committal. [58]

That fall, Curtis and the Rainier National Park Advisory Board launched a publicity campaign to save the timber along this highway. They had hoped for a return visit by the director, but Mather suffered a stroke enroute in November and had to be hospitalized in Chicago. According to Albright, several top NPS officials who visited Mather at his bedside shortly after his stroke attested to the fact that their fallen leader mumbled over and over with great determination the word "Cascade." Albright finally deduced that Mather was referring to the Cascade Parkway in Washington. [59] It was the one unfinished piece of work that most troubled him.

Mather's good friend Herbert Evison, who was actively involved in the Cascade Parkway project, corroborated Albright's story. "When I visited Mr. Mather at the hospital in Chicago," Evison wrote, "his first question concerned the parkway plan; he was keenly interested in knowing what sort of reception the people of the state had given it; delighted that the Forest Service was cooperating by setting aside the needed lands inside the national forest; and intensely pleased at the prominence given the project by the newspapers." [60] Evison would use this story to great advantage in advancing the Cascade Parkway project.

A few weeks after his stroke, it became clear that Mather was permanently disabled. Albright succeeded him as the second director of the NPS on January 12, 1929. Mather died a little more than a year later on January 22, 1930. Two days after Mather's death, Evison met with prominent conservationists in Washington, D.C. to discuss the Cascade Parkway. Franklin Adams, chairman of the Mather Memorial Appreciation Committee, was at the meeting. Evison proposed to set up the parkway project as a memorial to Mather, and wanted the committee's endorsement." [61] A few days later, he wrote to the committee that he was strongly opposed" to the memorialization of Mather with any kind of "man-made structure," for he could imagine "nothing more unsuitable to this lover of trees and of the beauty and grandeur of the American out-of-doors." Instead, Evison insisted, Mather deserved "a memorial that is living and will live as we are sure the memory of the man and his works will live." [62] Evison finally got what he wanted: the committee's blessing, and its valuable financial assistance as well.

By then the project had garnered an impressive list of supporters: Superintendent Tomlinson, the Forest Service's Recreational Examiner J. N. Cleater, District Forester C. M. Granger, and Forest Supervisor E. J. Fenby. [63] To this official roster could be added the White River Recreational Association—homesite owners who had formed their own association and affiliated with the Rainier National Park Advisory Board. [64] With passage of the Act of January 31, 1931, twelve miles of the proposed parkway now came within the boundaries of the national park. The parkway therefore required secretarial orders from both the Agriculture and Interior departments. On March 26, 1931, Secretary of Agriculture Arthur M. Hyde issued a land classification order which set aside a strip of land fifty miles long and half a mile wide on either side of the Naches Pass Highway, which was designated the Mather Memorial Parkway. On April 23, 1931, Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur signed a similar order for the twelve miles of road through the northeast corner of the park. The land was dedicated to the scenic and recreational enjoyment of the public. [65]

The parkway was formally dedicated on the morning of July 2, 1932. On hand for the ceremony were Asahel Curtis, Superintendent Tomlinson, Governor Roland H. Hartley, and Professor Edmund S. Meany. A bronze plaque, donated by the Stephen T. Mather Appreciation Committee, was unveiled by the governor. Due to an unusually deep snowpack that year, the plaque could not be placed in its permanent stone foundation on Chinook Pass, but Tomlinson had a temporary stand on hand for the unveiling. When the snow melted off later that season, the plaque was mounted on a boulder "in a beautiful grove of mountain trees more than a mile above the sea and under the shadow of old Mount Rainier." [66]

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART THREE: YEARS OF PROMISE, 1915-1930

IX. THE RAINIER NATIONAL PARK COMPANY

INTRODUCTION

With the advent of Stephen T. Mather's administration of the national parks, all tourist services in Mount Rainier National Park were consolidated under a single operator, the Rainier National Park Company (RNPC). From its construction of the Paradise Inn in 1916 until its close coordination with the NPS in the development of the Sunrise area fifteen years later, the RNPC played a prominent role in shaping the park.

Many people thought it was too prominent. Some critics argued that the RNPC's exclusive franchise, or "regulated monopoly," was a corruption of the free enterprise system, and that the field should be thrown open to other entrepreneurs. Others charged that the company was leading the NPS toward overdevelopment of the park. Still others claimed that the company and the NPS were developing the park only for the well-to-do. A political cartoon depicted the RNPC as an octopus sitting astride the summit of Mount Rainier, its tentacles splayed down the mountain's flanks in place of the mountain's glaciers.

The RNPC, however, was not without problems during this era. Despite an eight-fold increase in the park's annual visitation between 1916 and 1930, the evolving pattern of visitation gave company officers little else to cheer about. It was frustratingly concentrated on weekends in July, August and September. This made it difficult to keep a resident hotel staff consistently busy during the summer, much less stretch the season of operation very far beyond those three months of the year. The RNPC had to close down and leave its buildings empty for the better part of each year. Most difficult of all from the company's standpoint was the fact that visitors to Mount Rainier overwhelmingly came by automobile from Seattle and Tacoma and either returned home the same day or car-camped, giving the RNPC little or no business. The dearth of out-of-state hotel visitors made it difficult for the RNPC to interest the transcontinental railroads in any joint promotional effort. The RNPC proposed various schemes to increase the number of out-of-state sojourners, from building a golf course at Paradise to teaming up with the railroads in the development of two grand hotels at Spray Park and Yakima Park. In its most controversial move, it proposed to build an aerial tram from the Nisqually Road bridge up to Paradise so that the area could be developed as a winter resort, thereby extending the RNPC's short season of business.

This chapter examines the Park Service's new concession policy and the role that the RNPC made for itself prior to the Great Depression. The chapter is in three sections. The first section concerns the formation of the company and the consolidation of visitor services under a single operator. The second section considers the various challenges to the NPS 's new concession policy in Mount Rainier. The third section traces the RNPC's expansion of facilities and services in the 1 920s as it sought to attract more out-of-state visitors.

THE FORMATION OF THE RAINIER NATIONAL PARK COMPANY

In the summer of 1915, national park promoters across the nation learned that they had a new leader in Stephen T. Mather, "The National Parks Man." Appointed by Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane to reorganize park administration and to drum up support for a National Park Service, Mather threw himself into the work with a will. After his famous gathering of sympathetic publishers and civic leaders in an outing in California's High Sierra in July—an important catalyst in the culminating effort to get a National Park Service established—Mather repeated this strategy on a more parochial scale in Mount Rainier National Park in August. He conducted an eighty-five mile pack trip around the Wonderland Trail with members of the Seattle-Tacoma Rainier National Park Committee and other selected commercial leaders of the two cities. Mather's biographer, Robert Shankland, described the consequences:

> They circled the west side by trail, an exciting maneuver, and camped one night at Spray Park, well under Mount Rainier on the north side, between two of its greatest glaciers, Carbon and North Mowich. There, beneath a brilliant full moon, Asahel Curtis, the Northwest's leading photographer, brother of the famous photographer of Indians Edward S. Curtis, mesmerized the company with a recitation of Robert W. Service's The Spell of the Yukon. Next day they crossed Carbon on foot and left the park at its northwest corner. Then in earnest conclave at the Rainier Club in Seattle, Mather worked his miracle: he talked the Seattle and Tacoma crowd—T.H. Martin, Chester Thorne, H.A. Rhodes, Alex Baillie, William Jones, S.A. Perkins, David Whitcomb, Joseph Blethen, Everett Griggs, J.B. Terns, Herman Chapin, Samuel Hill, C.D. Stimson—into getting together in a Rainier National Park Company and building an inn in Paradise Valley. [1]

Not surprisingly, the Rainier National Park Company maintained a different version of these events in which the original vision of a Paradise Inn belonged not to Mather but the company's first general manager, T.H. Martin. For five years, the story went, Martin contemplated the mountain through the windows of the Tacoma Building where he worked as secretary of the Tacoma Commercial Club and Chamber of Commerce. What the city needed, Martin believed, was a first-class hotel on Mount Rainier "in order to entice persons of real vision and financial stature" to visit the Pacific Northwest "and perhaps consider the commercial possibilities in this Great Empire." Martin resigned his post in 1915 to devote his full energies to this plan. According to the company history, the decisive meeting occurred not at the Rainier Club with Mather but in Tacoma on October 3, 1915. There, Martin persuaded a handful of businessmen to try and bring Seattle and Tacoma financiers together to form a company which would handle all hotels, camps, and transportation in the park. Promptly, the group dispatched Martin to San Francisco to present his proposal to Mather. [2]

The discrepancy between these two stories is instructive. The difference between them goes deeper than whether Mather or Martin—the national or local figure, the public official or the capitalist—comes out the hero. It has been said that the Park Service's dilemma in managing the national parks for both preservation and use is compounded by the tension between two fundamentally different conceptions of what parks are for. One conception would have them managed respectfully as "artifacts of culture." The other would have them managed exploitively as "commodity resources." [3] The roots of this problem run deep. Clearly, Martin and the other businessmen who formed the Rainier National Park Company were interested in profits. But they were also motivated by the prospect of making Mount Rainier National Park into a nationally-renowned asset of the Pacific Northwest and a magnet for

regional growth. Their vision harkened back to the Seattle and Tacoma boosters of the 1890s and early 1900s who sought to identify their respective cities with the mountain's appealing image, to "package" the Pacific Northwest as a place that offered an exceptional quality of life. For all of their veneration of the mountain, it represented to them a commodity resource.

Mather, for his part, wanted to make the scenic beauty of Mount Rainier accessible to all the people. This would pay dividends of another sort. Mather's long-term goal was to introduce enough Americans to the national parks to create a strong political commitment to the national park idea so that the parks would be duly preserved for future generations. Mather's grand vision was to make the national park system into one of America's most celebrated institutions. In other words, he wanted to secure each national park's place in American life as an artifact of culture. At this point in time, in 1915-16, the interests of the Seattle and Tacoma businessmen converged perfectly with Mather's strategy of national park preservation. But the tension between their ideals was inherent in the compact.

Mather had no illusions about the Park Service's alliance with business. In several national parks, the Department of the Interior had already forged such an alliance with one railroad or another. In Glacier, for example, the Great Northern had been lavish in the development of hotels—with an eye toward generating more passenger traffic over its railroad line. Similarly, the Northern Pacific had kept the financial props under its subsidiary, the Yellowstone Park Hotel Company, mindful of the indirect profits that Yellowstone National Park brought to the railroad. Mount Rainier had its own modest railroad patron in the Tacoma and Eastern, a subsidiary of the Milwaukee Road, but Mather judged the situation correctly when he decided that Mount Rainier's proximity to Seattle and Tacoma made it more practical to reach for the deep pockets in the local business community rather than try to interest one of the transcontinental railroads in building a hotel at Paradise.

That Mather understood the Rainier National Park Company's interest in Mount Rainier is clear from his early annual reports, in which he promoted national parks as agents of economic growth in the West. In his annual report for 1925, Mather waxed poetic on the topic. The passage is worth quoting because it demonstrates how well the NPS director was able to see through the eyes of all his collaborators in the private sector, including the gentlemen in the Rainier National Park Company. "Every visitor is a potential settler and investor," Mather began.

> The march of the huge wagon trains along the scarcely discernible trails in the fifties marked the beginning of the settlement of the West. The new people were the settlers and the builders. They carried with them plows, and the seeds from which the granaries of the future were to be filled. Their descendants are the living pioneers of western development. The new West, however, is being built up by later visitors who came to see, and, having seen, brought their families to become citizens of now large prospering communities. Hundreds of thousands in the past few years have pulled stakes in the East and invested in western ranches and fruit farms, in mines, and other industrial enterprises. In all this the national parks, as the scenic lodestones, through their attractions draw these future settlers and investors for their first trip and in this way contribute their vital share in the prosperity of the institutions, scenic resorts, and general business of the country. [4]

Mather's new concession policy was one of his most important reforms of national park administration. He found a chaotic situation in 1915—not only in Mount Rainier but in all the national parks. Competition between the various tourist concessions within each park was debilitating to them all. The concessioners spent so much effort warding off competitors that they could not give good service to the public. There were too many fly-by-night operators.

The messy scene at Longmire Springs, with its ragged line of stables, tent-stores, and advertising signs in addition to the two hotels, was typical. The solution, he argued, was to consolidate tourist services in each park under one licensed operator. Each park concession would be a regulated monopoly: regulated so that the NPS could ensure that it was providing good service, a monopoly so that the operator could be induced to accept low yearly returns on long-term investments. Mather called the concessions "public utilities," a disarming term that suggested their similarity to that other kind of regulated monopoly, the municipal utility company. [5]

The label was somewhat disingenuous. Unlike municipally-controlled utility companies, the RNPC would be under no profit-sharing plan with its own rate-payers, the tourists. Nor would it appeal to tourists for a new bond issue each time it sought to build a new hotel. The company was less accountable to the "public interest," much less the "national interest," than the "public utility" tag would indicate. Of the RNPC's 142 stockholders in 1919, all but nine lived in Seattle or Tacoma, and all but eight were owners, executives, or general managers of businesses in the region. [6] Since park users had no representation whatsoever in the company's decision-making, it was the NPS's task to interpret their interests for them and attempt to influence the company's management accordingly.

The Rainier National Park Company was incorporated on March 1, 1916. It started with a capital stock of $200,000. At the first meeting of the board, Chester Thorne of Tacoma was elected president, and Martin was hired as its general manager with a salary of $5,000 per year (nearly double the salary of the park superintendent.) [7] The RNPC then contracted with the Department of the Interior for the exclusive privilege of providing hotels, inns, camps, and transportation in the park for a period of twenty years beginning on April 24, 1916. [8] Its initial plan of action, outlined that spring, was to build an inn at Paradise, accommodate visitors in two camps at Nisqually Glacier and Paradise Valley, purchase the National Park Inn at Longmire Springs, buy out the various small concessioners, and take over the guide and transportation services.

The Paradise Inn

The new hotel was the centerpiece of the RNPC's development scheme. That summer, before the snow had left the Paradise Valley, construction of Paradise Inn began with the installation of a 250-horsepower, hydroelectric power plant on Van Trump Creek at Christine Falls, two miles below the main development site. This was followed by the establishment of a 100-tent camp for the building crew in Paradise Valley. The RNPC's building contractor, E.C. Cornell, was finally able to break ground for the inn on July 20. Despite a late snowpack and short construction season, Cornell's crew nearly completed Paradise Inn during the summer of 1916. The initial cost of Paradise Inn, not including furnishings and equipment, came to $91,000. [9]

The Paradise Inn was designed by Tacoma architect Frederick Heath. The building comprised three main wings, each one featuring steep, gable roofs and a row of dormer windows in the upper story. In the popular style of the period, the building's large timber frame remained exposed on the interior. A guest standing in the cavernous assembly room on the ground floor could look straight up to the ridge pole three stories overhead. Park Supervisor Dewitt L. Reaburn gave permission to cut dead Alaska cedars from the "silver forest" for the interior decor of the building. This timber, located on the road between Longmire Springs and Paradise, had been fire-killed several years before the establishment of the park and had seasoned to a ghostly light-grey or silver hue. The use of this timber was in keeping with the service policy of using native building materials whenever possible. The great, silver logs were the inn's most appealing feature. [10]

The Paradise Inn opened for business in 1917 with only thirty-seven available guest rooms and a dining room capacity for four hundred guests. The plan was to build more guest rooms as demand increased and the company grew. This turned out to be a sound approach, because during the first two seasons of operation the nation was engaged in World War I and travel to the national parks was somewhat depressed. The federal government placed restrictions on railroad passenger traffic, which reduced the number of visitors to the national parks. So the company's stockholders bided their time through 1917-18. The highlight of the 1918 season at Paradise Inn was the visit of General Hazard Stevens, now in his seventy-sixth year. The white-bearded old pioneer gave an evening program on the occasion of the forty-eighth anniversary of his first recorded ascent of the mountain with Philemon Van Trump in 1870. As it turned out, Stevens' emotional return to Mount Rainier occurred just two months before the end of his life. [11]



Paradise Valley and Paradise Park "where the flowers and the glaciers meet." *(Asahel Curtis photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. UW4838)*

At the end of 1919, following the Paradise Inn's first peacetime tourist season, the RNPC's stockholders finally had reason to rejoice. The inn had been filled to capacity through most of the season, the RNPC's gross revenues had doubled over the year before, and the company

showed a net profit on the year of more than $20,000. The mood of the board of directors' meeting in January 1920 was ebullient. [12] The directors decided to build their first addition to Paradise Inn, a 104-room wing which they called the annex. This time the company employed its own labor and used its own trucks to deliver all building materials to the site. This first stage of expansion of the inn was completed by the end of 1920. [13]

As part of its expansion of the Paradise Inn, the RNPC also requested permission from the NPS to replace its small power plant on Van Trump Creek with a larger installation at the confluence of the Paradise and Nisqually rivers. Before giving final approval to the project, Mather directed Superintendent Toll to consult the NPS's chief landscape engineer, Charles P. Punchard, Jr., on the precise location and character of the project. Mather wanted assurance that the power plant would not be at a point where it would cause a "blemish on the landscape." [14] This accomplished, Mather approved the plan for the new plant, with its dam, penstocks, and powerhouse, which the RNPC completed that fall at a cost of $75,000. The powerlines went from the hydroelectric site past Oh My Point up to the Paradise Inn. [15]

The completion of the annex and power plant ended the first phase of the RNPC's development of the Paradise area. From a commercial point of view, burgeoning visitor demand in the early 1920s almost immediately justified the RNPC's investment. Each year, the Paradise Inn did a thriving business throughout the short season, accounting for more than half of the RNPC's total revenue. The Paradise Inn deserved no less praise as an architectural achievement. Considering the heavy snowfall and short tourist season at Paradise and the condition of the road in 1916, it was rather a bold enterprise to build such a grand hotel so high on Mount Rainier. An ink engraving of the impressive structure soon graced the RNPC's letterhead, bearing the proud caption, "Paradise Inn in Paradise Valley—elevation 5557 ft. Where the flowers and the glaciers meet." The building certainly possessed more grandeur than the two existing hotels at Longmire Springs. It was not in the same class with the log palaces found in certain other national parks—for example, the Old Faithful Inn (completed in 1903), the Glacier Park Lodge (1913), or the Many Glacier Hotel (1915)—but there is no evidence to suggest that Mount Rainier visitors wanted it to be. The Paradise Inn aptly reflected the RNPC's middling position between the undercapitalized park concessions of the pre-1916 era and the railroad-subsidized park concessions of Yellowstone, Glacier, Yosemite, and Grand Canyon.

Developments at Longmire

The RNPC's second priority was to acquire the various enterprises at Longmire and tidy up the place. The National Park Hotel and Transportation Company proved willing to sell out to the RNPC before its five-year contract with the government expired, and the many small concessions with one-year contracts were fairly cooperative as well. The Longmire family interests posed a trickier problem, because the federal government had no leverage for making them sell to the RNPC. But even this situation resolved itself satisfactorily for the time being as the RNPC purchased a twenty-year lease of the property. The transition to a single park concession was accomplished in just over two years.

Some people accused the RNPC of strong-arm tactics in acquiring these interests. After the RNPC purchased John L. Reese's camp equipment and improvements for $8,250 in 1916, past patrons of the camp complained that Reese had been "squeezed out." The RNPC tried to purchase George B. Hall's horse barn and livery service at Longmire Springs and tent camp at Indian Henry's Hunting Ground and got nowhere in 1916. But when Hall died in April 1917, the RNPC negotiated a deal with the attorney for the Hall estate, acquiring the Hall property for $3003. [16] The RNPC then closed the Indian Henry's camp. Superintendent Reaburn, noting that the Indian Henry's trail had always been the most popular pony trip out

of Longmire Springs, speculated that the RNPC had closed the camp in order "to cripple the business at Longmire Springs, and force the Longmire Springs Hotel Company to sell their property to the Rainier National Park Company." [17]

In the late spring of 1916, Superintendent Reaburn initiated negotiations between the National Park Hotel and Transportation Company and the RNPC on the sale of the former company's buildings, furnishings, and small fleet of touring cars. The National Park Hotel and Transportation Company's president, James Hughes, wanted $42,500. [18] The negotiations stalled, and the National Park Inn continued under the old management for the 1916 and 1917 seasons. In April 1918, Hughes reopened the negotiations with an offer to sell for $37,000. He accepted the RNPC's counter-offer of $30,000 a few weeks later. [19]

The RNPC got lucky with the Longmire property, which might have continued under separate management indefinitely. In 1916, the Longmire family leased the hotel operation to J.B. Ternes and E.C. Cornell, who built an annex next to the original Longmire Springs Hotel. [20] In 1919, following lengthy, three-way negotiations between the RNPC, the lease holders, and the property owners, the RNPC purchased the buildings together with a twenty year lease on the patented land for $12,000. [21] Ternes became a major shareholder and secretary of the RNPC. The following year, the RNPC moved the new annex across the road to a position adjacent to the National Park Inn, calling it the National Park Inn Annex, and demolished the old Longmire Springs Hotel. Together with the removal of the various tent-stores and outbuildings, this improved the appearance of the Longmire area. [22]

In its first year of operation in the Longmire area, the RNPC opened the National Park Inn for business before the end of April, nearly two months earlier than its customary opening date of June 15. This proved to be a costly mistake; the hotel and restaurant crew were practically alone in the building for six weeks. Even when the tourist season finally got under way, most overnight visitors were intent on driving to the end of the road and staying at the new Paradise Inn or campground. As a result, the inn finished the summer $3,000 in the red. [23]

As the 1920s unfolded, the situation at Longmire left both the RNPC and the park administration dissatisfied. It was clear to the RNPC that the National Park Inn would not be very profitable. The NPS, meanwhile, found that the appearances of the place left much to be desired. [24] Ironically, the RNPC had no sooner cleaned up the Longmire area than it became no more than a pit stop on the road to Paradise, or at best, an overflow area when the Paradise Inn and campground were filled to capacity. Park visitors overwhelmingly preferred to drive to the end of the road and stay in the new Paradise Inn or in the campground there. The RNPC was not inclined to invest very much in the Longmire area to try to change this pattern. So the underlying problem in Longmire was low occupancy in the National Park Inn. After 1920, the company's sole effort to hold park visitors in the Longmire area was to offer special weekly rates at the National Park Inn in order to attract a different clientele. For the most part, the RNPC wanted to invest where the demand was greatest—at Paradise. [25]

The Park Service took a different view of the matter. It was concerned about low occupancy at the National Park Inn because there was so much congestion at Paradise—crowded campgrounds, a shortage of parking spaces, traffic jams, park visitors turned away at the inn. There remained one possibility for rehabilitating Longmire as a tourist destination: the attraction of the mineral springs. Superintendent W.H. Peters recommended that the mineral baths be developed for their medicinal properties, that a natatorium be built, that tennis courts and other outdoor sports facilities be developed. In short, Longmire should be made into a health spa. [26]

In September 1920, the NPS took water samples from eight springs in Mount Rainier

National Park, two of them in the Longmire area, and sent them to the Bureau of Chemistry's Hygienic Lab in Washington, D.C. This began more than a year of correspondence between top NPS officials in Washington, experts in the Public Health Service, and the superintendents of Mount Rainier National Park and Hot Springs Reservation, Arkansas. NPS officials concluded that the mineral springs contained no real medicinal value other than the natural benefits that were incidental to a restful and relaxing sojourn in a mountain resort. Nevertheless, it still favored redevelopment of the springs by the RNPC, provided that no false claims were made about the therapeutic powers of the mineral baths. [27]

The RNPC declined to rehabilitate the Longmire Springs mineral baths. In the long run, this was probably fortunate; the park administration would later find the development of mineral baths at Ohanapecosh to be both unsightly and unsanitary, and would have a difficult time closing the establishment down. But it also portended the difficulties that would arise when the RNPC and the NPS did not see eye to eye on how the park should be developed. The park administration's desire to make Longmire into a health resort was motivated in part by its desire to relieve pressure on the Paradise area. This would be a constant theme in park planning from this point forward. And the Park Service's efforts to move visitor services to lower elevations would meet with constant resistance from the RNPC.

Guide Service

The RNPC took over the guide service without any difficulty. Mountain guides who had formerly held individual permits under the Secretary of the Interior simply went to work for the RNPC. In 1917, the RNPC hired Asahel Curtis as its first chief guide. He was followed by Otis B. Sperlin in 1918, Joseph T. Hazard from 1919 to 1920, Frank A. Jacobs from 1921 to 1924, and Harry B. Cunningham from 1925 to 1932. The guide department employed several guides each season, including two Swiss brothers, Hans and Heinie Fuhrer, and a few women such as Alma D. Wagen, a Tacoma high school teacher who was later described as "unique at the time, dressed colorfully, and.. .most competent on the glacier tours of that day." [28]

Summit climbs increased in popularity as word of the guide service's professionalism spread. Approximately 300 people reached the summit of Mount Rainier in 1919, 400 in 1920, and 500 in 1921. [29] In addition to summit trips, the guide service offered regular trips onto the Nisqually and Paradise glaciers, one rock-climbing trip in the Tatoosh Range, and horseback trips such as the "Skyline Trail" around the rim of Paradise Valley. Most of the guides were teachers or college students, and they tried to inform their clients about the natural history of the park as well as lead them safely over the mountain terrain. In this respect, the RNPC's guide service prefigured the nature guide service which the Park Service began to provide in 1922. [30]

The RNPC housed the employees of the guide service in a steep-roofed dormitory building called the Guide House, built in 1919-20. This building, located near the Paradise Inn, also served as an auditorium for slide shows and evening lectures, a cache for search and rescue equipment, and a gathering place for all guided trips out of Paradise. In the early years, it was a hub of activity second only to the inn itself. [31]

Transportation Service

Mather believed that the control of all transportation service by a single park concession was as important as the control of all lodging facilities by one company. Preferably, the two services would be combined in one company. Accordingly, the RNPC set up a transportation department within the company. Three persons who had previously operated passenger automobile service to the park, Frank M. Jacobs, C.E. Atherton, and Frank Hickey, each sold

their equipment to the RNPC for company stock. [32]

Paradise Inn and company stages. The concessioner 's transportation department did a thriving business in the 1920s. *(O.A. Tomlinson Collection photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. UW1576)*

The RNPC's transportation monopoly was abetted by the state of Washington. A state law required all new stage lines which proposed to operate over the state highways to obtain a permit from the Board of Public Utilities. The law's purpose was to prevent ruinous competition between different transportation venders. In the summer of 1921, the state highway director ruled that the RNPC would be the only carrier between Seattle or Tacoma and points inside Mount Rainier National Park. [33]

The RNPC's transportation monopoly irritated park users more than the RNPC's monopoly on lodging and other services in the park. The company jealously guarded this exclusive privilege, for it was perhaps the most reliable revenue producer among the RNPC's various departments and services. It also raised some of the most complicated legal questions, as will be seen in the next section.

CHALLENGES TO THE NEW CONCESSION POLICY

Nothing in the National Park Service Act spoke directly to the need for a new concession policy in the national parks; this was wholly Mather's initiative. The importance of this policy reform comes into clearer focus when the alternatives are considered: opening up the parks to free competition on the one hand, or eliminating the role of private capital altogether on the other. Mather and his assistants were anxious to see the single concession in Mount Rainier National Park do a good job in serving the public because it was an important test of Mather's new policy. The RNPC was not a large corporation but it had a high profile. Likewise, The Mountaineers and another Seattle-based group called the Cooperative Campers of the Pacific Northwest were local clubs but their challenges to the NPS had more than local significance. When The Mountaineers aimed a broadside at the Park Service's concession

policy in a pamphlet published in 1922, it pointedly titled its tract "The Administration of the National Parks." Mather gave these challenges to his policy due consideration.

Cooperative Campers of the Pacific Northwest

The most significant challenge to the new concession policy came from a non-profit, left-leaning, outdoor club known as the Cooperative Campers of the Pacific Northwest. At first, Park Service officials thought the Cooperative Campers could be treated like The Mountaineers or the Boy Scouts—as a non-commercial organization that fell outside of its concession policy. But when the Cooperative Campers began providing transportation from Seattle to its camps in the park, NPS officials decided that the group was taking business away from the RNPC and undermining the concession policy. For its part' the Cooperative Campers insisted that the group offered people of low income an affordable alternative to the concession. The contest involved basic issues of public access versus federal control in the development of Mount Rainier National Park.

The Cooperative Campers was founded in 1916. The group's purpose, as stated in its by-laws, was "to encourage the love of simple living in the open air, and to make the wonders of our Mountains accessible, especially through establishing self-supporting but non-profit making camps for summer vacations." [34] The group required a nominal membership fee of one dollar and invited anyone to join who could satisfy one of the club's officers that he or she could make a "good camper." The group was affiliated with The Mountaineers and the Mazamas, but it differed from those clubs in the fact that it organized summer camps rather than outings. These camps were initially limited to locations inside Mount Rainier National Park. The camps ran for nearly two months and members could join the camp for three days or a week or two weeks. They could stay in one camp or hike from camp to camp around the mountain. Members received summer schedules which listed dates and fees for a wide variety of trips. Group sizes were limited to twenty-five people. [35]

The Cooperative Campers operated on a shoestring budget of a few thousand dollars. The camp cooks, a packer, and an office secretary in Seattle were the only salaried employees of the organization. Camp managers and leaders of hikes did not receive salaries but could receive fee-waivers for their trips. The club's president, elected for a one-year term, served without salary. In its early years, the Cooperative Campers benefited from the energetic leadership of its first president, Anna Louise Strong, a civic activist, writer, and socialist. After Strong's departure in 1919 (she left for the Soviet Union to report on the Russian Revolution), no dominant personality took her place. Major E.S. Ingraham, a pioneer climber of Mount Rainier and longtime leader in the Boy Scouts, remained active in the Cooperative Campers, but did not serve as president.

The Cooperative Campers aimed to strike a middle ground between the camps of the mountain clubs whose members owned their own equipment, and the campgrounds run by the RNPC for automobile tourists. [36] It offered its members help with supplies and equipment. Each camp consisted of four six-man tents, divided into men's and women's quarters, separated by the cook tent. In addition to tents, food, and eating utensils, the camps were stocked with straw mattresses, blankets, alpenstocks, grease paint (sun screen), and other specialty equipment. Camp fees in 1917 were $1.25 per day for shelter, equipment, and meals. Transfer of baggage from camp to camp cost $.50 to $1.00 depending on the distance between camps. Clearly, the cooperative camps offered affordable recreation to people of low income. [37]

In 1917, the Cooperative Campers maintained camps at Paradise, Ohanapecosh Park, Summerland, Glacier Basin, Mystic Lake, and Seattle Park. It was possible to hike from camp to camp more than half way around the mountain. Heady with the group's success,

Anna Louise Strong urged readers that summer to sign up and be charter members in what was destined to be the first of many cooperatives to open up "the far recesses of other mountain ranges and other national parks." [38] Did the cooperative camps really have that kind of potential? Probably not. Quite apart from the obstacles that the NPS soon put in the organization's way, the cooperative camps would eventually lose their attraction as members either acquired their own equipment and automobiles and used the public campgrounds built by the NPS, or patronized the hotel and transportation service of the RNPC. But the NPS nevertheless treated the cooperative camps as an unwelcome development, because the camps seemed to undermine the Park Service's concession policy.

The Cooperative Campers' socialist leanings did not escape Mather's notice when he first pondered the issue in December 1917. In addition to her efforts on behalf of the cooperative camps, Anna Louise Strong worked on the staff of the socialist newspaper, the Seattle Union Record, and was an elected member of the Seattle School Board. That year, she had angered Seattle voters by her strident anti-war position in the newspaper, and was now embroiled in recall proceedings. This was irrelevant as far as the cooperative camps were concerned, but Mather judged that in the present context of war-bred, anti-socialist hysteria in the country, the Cooperative Campers might soon self-destruct. When Reaburn asked whether he should prohibit Strong from conducting cooperative camps in the park during the coming summer, Mather suggested that the matter could await the outcome of the recall proceedings. [39]

Ejected from the Seattle School Board that spring, Strong continued to pour her energy into the Cooperative Campers. In the summer of 1918, the group scaled back its operation and maintained just two camps at Paradise and Summerland. She explained to Reaburn, "The war changes many things and many of our men are gone." [40] The camps served 155 and 67 people respectively, but the average stay of campers at Summerland was more than twice as long, at ten days, so the two camps were comparatively busy. It was the Paradise camp that troubled Mather the most, since the camp was in direct competition with the RNPC's campground. Fortunately, Strong indicated to Reaburn at the end of the season that the Cooperative Campers intended to discontinue the Paradise camp next season. These campers had expressed a certain amount of dissatisfaction "due to the inevitable comparison with the standards they see about them and also to the fact that people who ride up in autos expect a different type of camp-life from those who walk." [41] Henceforth, the cooperative camps would not compete with car camping but would concentrate on opening up the backcountry.

This new direction might have alleviated the conflict between the Cooperative Campers and the NPS, except that Strong now asked for permission to take over the old Wigwam Hotel camp at Indian Henry's, which the RNPC had recently purchased and abandoned. According to Strong, the plan met with the RNPC's approval. Mather and Albright both opposed the plan, however. Mather did not want to place the development of the national park's backcountry in the hands of some local organization of campers; Albright was concerned about the quality of service that the cooperative camps would give to the public. [42]

With Strong's request that the park give her the keys to the ranger cabin at Indian Henry's so that the Cooperative Campers could make use of it that winter, Reaburn's patience snapped. In September 1918, he directed one of his rangers to arrest the Cooperative Campers' packer, George Crockett, for receiving pay for his services in the park without having a permit. U.S. Commissioner Edward S. Hall convicted Crockett on the misdemeanor charge and imposed a small fine. Explaining this action to Albright, Reaburn contended that the Cooperative Campers was neither an authorized concession nor an organized outdoor club like the Mazamas or The Mountaineers. The Cooperative Campers did not meet the criteria for the latter because it solicited members through printed circulars and newspaper advertisements. Reaburn also reminded Albright that Strong had been recalled from the School Board for her anti-war statements, and that "her bosom companion, Miss Olivereau was given a

penitentiary sentence of 10 years." What really galled the superintendent was Strong's claim that the Cooperative Campers were opening up the backcountry in the park. "As a matter of fact she is spending absolutely nothing in the way of developing, but expects the Service to do a lot of things in the way of fixing up and improving conditions for her camp, having no doubt gotten the impression that we should improve her camp as we have done the public camping grounds." [43] Reaburn thought it was time the NPS held the Cooperative Campers to account, for the organization was practically billing itself as a populist alternative to the RNPC.

At this point, the Cooperative Campers virtually disappears from the historical record until 1921. From later statements it is evident that the Cooperative Campers maintained at least one camp in the park each season at Summerland, and probably the NPS chose to tolerate the group as long as it limited its activities to the east side of the park (away from the RNPC's hotels and camps). Moreover, the personal antagonism between Strong and Reaburn ended in the spring of 1919 with Strong's departure for the Soviet Union and Reaburn's request for an indefinite leave from the NPS. Still another factor which may have worked to deter the NPS from taking a stand against the Cooperative Campers in 1919 or 1920 was the concern about the public backlash it could create against the Park Service. These were the years of the Seattle general strike and the election in Seattle of a socialist mayor. There was a movement afoot for establishing municipally-run automobile camps not only on the outskirts of cities but in nearby mountain areas, too. In September 1920, Mayor Hugh M. Caldwell of Seattle petitioned the Secretary of the Interior for permission to maintain a camp in an unfrequented section of Mount Rainier National Park (where it would not compete with the RNPC facilities). Minimal camp fees would be set to cover the cost of operation. Secretary of the Interior John Barton Payne politely refused this request by suggesting that the city of Seattle could establish a municipal camp in the adjacent national forest instead, but subsequently suggested that a camp could be maintained in the northeast section of the park on a cooperative basis. [44] In this context, the NPS may have deliberately muted its earlier opposition to the Cooperative Campers and bided its time.

In 1921, the RNPC opened a new campground facility at the end of the White River Road. T.H. Martin notified the Cooperative Campers in June that the RNPC had an exclusive automobile concession in the park, and that it objected to the plans of the Cooperative Campers to provide its members with transportation between Seattle and the end of the White River Road. The RNPC planned to offer this service for a fare of between $10 and $12, while the Cooperative Campers intended to charge members $5 to $7. Advised of the situation by Superintendent W.H. Peters, Assistant Director Arno B. Cammerer informed the Cooperative Campers' executive secretary, Norman Huber, that the NPS would not allow the Cooperative Campers to employ its own vehicle in the park. "In order to get the greatest number of people to visit certain sections of the parks that have been opened up," Cammerer explained, "it is necessary for us to install regular service, and in order to make this regular service pay for the benefit of the greatest number we have to insist that no other operators be permitted in competition." Whomever the Cooperative Campers paid to transport campers to the park would be undercutting the RNPC's rates. [45]

But Mather, Albright, and Cammerer found that the Cooperative Campers were not so easily turned aside. The Cooperative Campers purchased their own truck. With the summer season already commenced, Superintendent Peters told his superiors that he saw no alternative but to admit the Cooperative Campers' truck into the park as a private vehicle. After the present summer season, he urged, the NPS would have time to devise a new policy toward the cooperative camps. [46]

That fall, Albright and Cammerer visited Mount Rainier National Park and discussed the Cooperative Campers at length with the superintendent. There was no question that the

Cooperative Campers was competing with the RNPC: the cooperative camp at Summerland had received about three times the use that the White River Camp had. [47] The new plan would be to challenge the group's liberal membership policy, treat the group more like an actual camping club than an unauthorized concession, thereby either forcing it into an acceptable mold or running it out of the park. In the coming summer, the Park Service would require the Cooperative Campers to submit a list of members to the superintendent by June 1. No one would be permitted to use the camp whose name was not on the list, and no more than one hundred people would be permitted overall. [48]

The following spring, Superintendent Peters once again advised his superiors to hedge a bit as the summer season drew near. How could the NPS make the 100-person limitation stick if it were challenged? The NPS would be on more legally defensible ground, he argued, if it went back to its earlier position that the Cooperative Campers was an unauthorized concession, and simply disallowed the camp altogether. "It is my belief that the Cooperative Campers are operating in direct and hurtful competition to the concessionaire and that when such an organization is allowed at all we are immediately involved in a maze of fine points impossible of solution," he wrote. [49] Peters wanted to restrict the use of the camp to pre listed members but not to cap it off at one hundred, and then advise the Cooperative Campers at the end of the summer that the camp would not be permitted anymore.

Even with this compromise, however, NPS officials were dragged into a testy correspondence with the Cooperative Campers' new executive secretary, H.W. McKenzie, over the use of the truck in the park. The situation was complicated by the fact that Peters resigned his post in June, only days before the cooperative camp was to open. The newly appointed superintendent, C.L. Nelson, immediately received explicit instructions from Cammerer to stop the Cooperative Campers' truck at the park entrance, check the campers' names against the membership list, and have the RNPC's vehicles ready, if necessary, to provide the group transportation into the park. At the last moment, Nelson countermanded Cammerer s instructions and directed the White River district ranger to allow the Cooperative Campers' truck to enter the park, and to admit unlisted members along with members who were on the list which the NPS had obtained on June 10. In defense of this act of insubordination, Nelson told his superiors that local public sentiment about the Cooperative Campers was divided, and that he did not want to give the organization an issue with which to arouse popular feeling against the Park Service and the RNPC. [50]

Cammerer sharply reprimanded the new superintendent, stating that his indecisiveness would cost the NPS support when it held a public hearing on this troublesome issue in Seattle in the fall. Cammerer insisted that for the remainder of the season the park staff was to refuse official permission for use of the camp to all unlisted members, and it would keep a record of all violators. This would be used to discredit the Cooperative Campers in the public hearing. [51]

Ironically, the Cooperative Campers appears not to have survived to attend that hearing, which was finally held on February 19-20, 1923 at the Seattle Chamber of Commerce building. If the Cooperative Campers still existed in 1923, it must have moved its operation somewhere outside Mount Rainier National Park. It seems more likely that the group disbanded. The proliferation of free public campgrounds in the national parks and forests, along with municipal camps and public and private organization camps, made the cooperative camps obsolete. When the Playground and Recreation Association of America published a 634-page manual on organized camping in 1924, it did not even mention cooperative camps. [52] It remains unclear whether the low income people who patronized the cooperative camps found other means of affordable camping as the nation's camping culture evolved, or were forced to turn to other kinds of recreation within the city. [53]

The Mountaineers

In November 1922, The Mountaineers joined the attack on the Park Service's concession policy. With its 1,000-strong membership and long record of solid support for national parks, this must have been a disappointment to NPS officials. Following an investigation of "the administration of national parks," the club resolved:

> 1. That the administration of national parks be liberalized with the view to making their enjoyment by the public less burdensome in its restrictions.
>
> 2. That cooperative camps or camps of organizations desiring to furnish service to their members at cost be permitted under proper regulations.
>
> 3. That further attention be paid to the comfort of campers who are not large patrons of the established concessionaires.
>
> 4. That the financial profits resulting from the operations of the various concessionaires be made available to public scrutiny, to the end that in the establishment of rates the voice of the public may be expressed equally with that of the concessionaires.
>
> 5. That the rules relating to automobiles be subjected to fundamental revision. [54]

The investigating committee's report accused the NPS of kowtowing to the park concessions in general and to the RNPC in particular. The committee alleged that the profit-driven park concessions were gaining too much influence, treating the park superintendents as their own agents in dealing with NPS officialdom. "The resulting tendency is for the development of the parks to proceed disproportionately along lines of commercial profit," the committee reported. "The administration of national parks, although based upon high ideals of public service, has not escaped this evil." [55]

The Mountaineers' investigating committee characterized the Cooperative Campers as a "benevolent" organization which had made camping trips possible "to a limited number of persons of congenial tastes and modest means, many of whom would not be able to patronize the regular concessionaire." The committee stopped just short of endorsing the cooperative camps, but it insisted that any effort by the NPS to eliminate the camps should be done in a lawful way. It was evident to the committee that the park administration was determined to force the Cooperative Campers out of the park, and it found the record of actions taken against this group to be "arbitrary," "insincere," and "petty." [56]

The committee reserved its most stinging criticism for the NPS prohibition against hired auto stages. The NPS and the RNPC maintained that the park concession had the exclusive privilege of providing transportation services between Seattle or Tacoma and points inside the national park. The controversy over the Cooperative Campers' truck led the NPS to interpret the RNPC's transportation monopoly in the broadest possible way. As a result, the NPS inadvertently thwarted The Mountaineers as well. On a Labor Day weekend outing in 1922, a large party of Mountaineers was inconvenienced and humiliated when the park authorities made them transfer their whole party and all their gear from hired auto stages to RNPC cars at the park entrance. [57] In the view of the committee, the NPS had gone way too far in protecting the concession s monopoly, and was fencing the park with so many regulations as to make it difficult for the public to gain access to it.

The RNPC's officers reacted angrily to The Mountaineers' pamphlet and demanded a retraction of some of its statements. Other conservation groups, meanwhile, gave the report

mixed reviews. The Mountaineers received letters from the American Civic Association, the National Parks Association, the Mazamas, the Sierra Club, and various other mountain clubs. But The Mountaineers stood by the committee report. [58] In January 1923, The Mountaineers' president, Edmund S. Meany, received a letter from Cammerer stating that the NPS wanted to hold a public meeting in Seattle at which these various complaints could be discussed. [59]

The meeting, held on February 19-20, 1923 in the Seattle Chamber of Commerce assembly rooms, was attended by Albright, Nelson, and former Superintendent Roger W. Toll (then superintendent of Rocky Mountain National Park). The representative for The Mountaineers, Irving M. Clark, told the NPS officials that The Mountaineers did not endorse the Park Service's regulated monopoly policy, but it would not try to oppose it either. Rather, it sought changes in the policy that would allow more flexibility. Specifically, The Mountaineers wanted the admittance of hired cars, the allowance of cooperative camps "in larger parks where there is ample room for everybody," an end to the requirement that all horse riders hire guides, full disclosure of the concessionaire's yearly profits, better sanitation in the public campgrounds, and overall clarification of the park's rules and regulations. [60]

It is difficult to assess the overall effect of The Mountaineers and the Cooperative Campers on park policy in the early 1920s. The documentary evidence in the Park Service's files does not support the conclusion that the agitation by these groups brought about specific reforms of park policy. No single example can be cited of a park rule or policy being changed in order to satisfy their demands. Nevertheless, it may have been partly due to the influence of The Mountaineers and the Cooperative Campers that the NPS moved into two areas of public service in Mount Rainier National Park in the early 1920s which it had formerly left to the RNPC. The first of these was the nature guide service, a forerunner of the NPS interpretive program. This is discussed in a later chapter. The second public service was the development of free public campgrounds, discussed below. In these two new areas of national park administration, Mount Rainier National Park was on the cutting edge. Coming so soon after the successful consolidation of visitor services under a single park concession, these developments would seem to indicate a deliberate scaling back of the Park Service's partnership with the RNPC in response to the challenges to Mather's concession policy by the Cooperative Campers and The Mountaineers.

Free Public Campgrounds

In 1915, most overnight camping in Mount Rainier National Park was conducted in the so-called "hotel camps" at Paradise Park, Longmire Springs, and Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. Campers slept in canvas-walled tents and ate meals prepared by the camp host. Relatively few people had their own camping equipment; those who did were apt to join large, organized outings like those of The Mountaineers. Less than a decade later, more than ninety percent of visitors to Mount Rainier National Park wanted to camp in public automobile campgrounds. [61] Typically they had their own tents, sleeping bags, and cooking gear (much of it acquired from army surplus outlets after World War I). They required no more than drinking water and toilet facilities to complete their outfit, and after paying their entrance fee, they expected to be able to camp in the park for free. Most of them came in small parties by private automobile. This was an extraordinary change in the pattern of visitor use to take place in a single decade. In a sense, Mather's conception of the role that the national park concession would play was outmoded before it was ten years old.

The Park Service inherited a system of privately-owned camps that was barely able to cope with the rising number of campers in the national parks. The hotel camps were overcrowded, overpriced, and often located in places that inhibited the flow of automobile traffic. In all the parks, there was a growing problem of sanitation. On the July 4 weekend in 1916, for

example, some five thousand people were camped in a one-square-mile area of the Yosemite Valley, completely overrunning the limited camp facilities there. That year the Department of the Interior commissioned an experienced hotel operator, one J.A. Hill of Chicago, to make a detailed inspection of hotels and camps in the national park system. On the basis of Hill's report, Supervisor of National Parks Robert B. Marshall found that the sanitation problem was the most pressing concern in every park. As a result, the department recommended that Congress appropriate funds for the development of sanitation and water systems in the national parks, taking over an area of park development which had previously been left to private enterprise. [62]

The government's involvement in campground development in Mount Rainier National Park began in 1918, with $8,000 expended in clearing camp sites and installing sewer and water systems. Free public camping areas were developed at Longmire, Paradise, and one mile inside Nisqually Entrance. [63] Yet the system was still only rudimentary and existed alongside a number of new hotel camps developed by the RNPC. The largest hotel camps were at Longmire and Paradise where campers could avail themselves of the dining facilities connected with the hotel. The RNPC established additional camps at Nisqually Entrance and the Nisqually Glacier overlook. (In this era, the road bridge over the Nisqually River afforded a dramatic view of the Nisqually Glacier terminus; the glacier has since receded out of sight.)

Mather's comments on the RNPC's camps in 1918 reveal a strategy of campground development that was in transition. "Paradise and Nisqually Glacier Camps with their lunch pavilions and a-la-carte service fill an important need in this park," Mather reported.

> The Paradise Camp is especially popular because here the tourist is at liberty to live under almost any conditions that he may choose. He can live in one of the tents of the camp, using his own bedding and cooking his own meals, or he can rent bedding at a nominal price and eat at the lunch pavilion; or he may bring his own tent equipment and eat at the lunch pavilion or purchase his supplies there and do his own cooking. [64]

The variety of needs which campers presented seemed to call for a mixed system of hotel camps and free public campgrounds (not to mention cooperative camps, which Mather omitted from his report). Mather could not have foreseen how quickly the demand for public campgrounds would grow, nor how quickly the hotel camps would become obsolete.

The sanitation problem in Mount Rainier's public campgrounds continued to draw Mather's attention. In 1920, he recommended that the campgrounds should have better facilities for sewage and garbage disposal, and that these should be installed by the government. "As a general thing," he commented, "all public utilities of this kind should be owned and operated at a profit by the Government, and should include power plants, telephone systems, and water systems, as well as sewer systems." In Mount Rainier National Park it was too late for the government to build the power plant, as this had already been accomplished by the RNPC. But the principle still held, in Mather's view, that the government must take responsibility for basic services that the hotels had provided prior to World War 1. [65]

Over the next two years, the public campgrounds began to assume a more modern shape. The Park Service improved the sewer system at the Paradise and Longmire campgrounds and installed water taps and flush toilets. Park staffers put in camp stoves and tables and established individual camp sites within the cleared area. The Longmire campground was equipped with electric lights. Superintendent Nelson assigned a caretaker to each campground, whose duties were to police the grounds and keep the place clean. In 1922, a sanitary engineer from the U.S. Public Health Service pronounced the campgrounds at Mount Rainier National Park as clean as any he had inspected in the national parks. This was all the

more impressive considering that the campground at Paradise was one of the busiest in the national park system. [66]



Paradise public campground in the 1920s. *(O.A. Tomlinson Collection photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. UW15699)*

Still the burgeoning demand for camp sites outstripped what the NPS and the RNPC could supply. In 1923, Mather secured $25,000 for a new campground at Longmire on the south side of the Nisqually River. Most of the funds were earmarked for a bridge and loop road, while other line items included camp site development, water and sewer systems, a community kitchen, and electric lights. The campground was state-of-the-art, oriented to the automobile camper. [67] A smaller public campground was laid out at White River that year, too, complementing the RNPC's White River Camp which had opened two years before.

Yet these improvements fell short of what the national park required. "Travel has grown to such an extent," Mather commented in his annual report on Mount Rainier for 1923, "that the comparatively small midweek crowds desiring camping space could not be comfortably accommodated this year." [68]

Expansion of the public campgrounds continued in 1925. The Paradise and Longmire campgrounds now could accommodate about 800 people each, the White River campground could accommodate about 500, and a new campground at Ipsut Creek, on the Carbon River road, could accommodate about 400. In addition, unimproved sites were located on the road to Paradise at Kautz Creek and the Nisqually River, and various points along the White River Road. Together, the unimproved camps could accommodate another 700 people. With these developments, it became clear that the government had taken over responsibility for camping facilities in the park. By the mid-1920s, visitors to Mount Rainier had come to expect that the national park would provide free public campgrounds, complete with running water, toilets, chopped firewood, and evening campfire programs. [69]

The RNPC's camps declined in popularity as the free public campgrounds became more attractive. Superintendent Tomlinson noted in 1925, "Bungalow tents maintained as a part of the Paradise Inn operation are not popular with the visiting public. A great majority of the patrons prefer rooms inside the building and are willing to pay the additional charge for that class of accommodation." [70] For Tomlinson, this underscored the need for additional hotel accommodations at Paradise. In other words, he did not expect the RNPC to stay in the hotel camp business. What had been left to private enterprise in 1915, and considered a partnership enterprise in 1918, was henceforward to be exclusively a government enterprise. This represented a significant evolution in the Park Service's concession policy.

Did local dissatisfaction with the single concession policy in Mount Rainier National Park have something to do with this change? Perhaps. Certainly the development of free public campgrounds proceeded apace in Mount Rainier National Park in the early 1920s. But NPS officials may have been reacting on their own initiative to the pressures of the automobile culture and the growing number of weekend visitors from Seattle and Tacoma regardless of any prompting from The Mountaineers or the Cooperative Campers. Whatever the case may have been, the development of free public campgrounds silenced the criticism from these groups.

GROWTH OF THE PARK CONCESSION

When Mather got together with Seattle and Tacoma businessmen in 1915 to form a partnership of public and private investment in the development of Mount Rainier National Park, neither party anticipated the pace at which visitor use would grow. Mount Rainier's total annual visitation shot from 34,814 visitors in 1915, to 123,708 visitors in 1923, on the way to 265,620 visitors in 1930. [71] For a brief period in 1924-25, Mount Rainier passed Yellowstone as the second-most visited national park in the United States (though well below the annual visitation of Rocky Mountain). At the end of this period it remained a close third. [72]

The driving force behind these numbers was, of course, the sensational spread of the automobile in American society. As early as 1923, it was claimed that one in two American families owned their own car. Mather reacted to the spread of the automobile with glee. He supported the automobile as the most democratic means of opening up the parks to the people, and of building up a strong constituency of national park users. His biographer, Robert Shankland, wryly commented that "Mather could recognize manna when he saw it." [73] Significantly, the businessmen who formed the RNPC were less than enthusiastic about the growing dominance of the automobile in the national park. As the company's officers consistently pointed out, the RNPC made its money from patrons who traveled by train. These were the people who boarded the company's auto stages in Tacoma and stayed at the Paradise Inn. Automobile travelers typically came and went without patronizing anything but the RNPC's restrooms. [74]

The RNPC liked to portray itself as the victim of its special position in the national park. Company officers insisted that the NPS required the RNPC to make sacrifices for the public interest again and again, either by providing services that did not make a profit or by foregoing promising developments that would make up the company's losses elsewhere. The company also tended to get the public's ire for things that were beyond its control, in spite of its best public relations efforts. "Don't forget that the Park Company is the 'goat' for much criticism based on National Park regulations and restrictions," the RNPC's general manager once told a local magazine reporter. [75] One of the difficulties of sorting out the RNPC's role in the development of Mount Rainier National Park is that the company's somewhat plaintive public relations stance contained a modicum of truth: the RNPC was in fact forced

to make financial sacrifices in the public interest, and it was indeed maligned unfairly by local public opinion.

The RNPC was victimized most of all, however, by the spread of the automobile. While railroads brought tourists to national park hotels, automobiles brought tourists to national park campgrounds. Although Mount Rainier jockeyed for position with Yellowstone as the second-most heavily visited park in the United States, it was a distant fourth after Grand Canyon, Glacier, and Yellowstone in the number of train passengers received. This disparity was a source of constant frustration to the RNPC, which tried everything in its power to get more out-of-state train passengers to come to the park. The inundation of the park with automobilists actually worked to the RNPC's disadvantage, because it made the transcontinental railroads wary of all the RNPC's overtures.

The RNPC's impressive capital investment in Mount Rainier National Park during the 1920s is best understood as an effort to reconcile two objectives. The first objective was to cooperate with the NPS's plan for the development of the park—a development plan, nevertheless, which pandered more and more to the automobilist. The second objective was to interest one or more of the transcontinental railroads in exploiting Mount Rainier in the same way Yellowstone, Glacier, and Grand Canyon were exploited—with a branch line to the park and one or two well-financed grand hotels. With the advantage of hindsight, it would seem that the glory days of the big national park hotels were past in the 1920s. Yet surprisingly, RNPC officials did manage, with help from Mather and Albright, to interest the Northern Pacific, Great Northern, Union Pacific, and Milwaukee Road in a $2.5 million joint development proposal in 1928-29. The RNPC, as shall be seen, came within an ace of realizing its dream just prior to the Great Depression.

Extending the Visitor Season

It was the RNPC's perennial desire that the NPS open the road to Paradise as early in the season as possible. Late-melting snowpacks usually precluded outdoor camping at Paradise until mid-July, but the inn would attract visitors as soon as the road was plowed. Indeed, so anxious was the RNPC to get the visitor season started in June that for several years it operated a saddle horse and baggage sled service from Longmire in order to get tourists up to Paradise Inn prior to the opening of the road. Unfortunately, the company received many complaints from visitors about the discomforts that this trip entailed. [76]

Opening the road to Paradise was a yearly race against time. NPS road crews used a tractor, a steam shovel, army-surplus TNT, and even hand shovels to get the job done. Floyd Schmoe, the RNPC's winter caretaker in 1919-20, gave a vivid picture of this work in his book, A Year in Paradise.

Day by day the sound of the shovel grew closer, and soon from the inn we could see the clanking, stuttering machine slowly creeping up the deep trough it was gnawing through the layers of snow....

The next day was Sunday, July 4; and we celebrated it by cheering the government road crew and the weary steam shovel around the last bend. They arrived in front of the inn about four in the afternoon—and directly behind the government trucks came the big red buses of the Park Company. The first ones were filled with college girl waitresses and maids, college boy guides, bellboys, busboys, tent boys, dishwashers, and sundry others. Then not a hundred yards behind this bus there were two busloads of tourists. [77]

The most dramatic race against time occurred the following year, in 1921. That April, RNPC President David Whitcomb boldly slated a convention of the National Association of

Building Owners and Managers for June 26, then negotiated with Albright to share costs with the government for an all-out effort to open the road by that date. On May 10, Mather wired Superintendent Peters that he wanted the road opened in time for the convention, with photographs to document the whole process. On May 23, Mather reiterated this request, adding that the unusually heavy snowfall made the opening of the road "in the nature of an emergency." On June 14, word came from Superintendent Peters that the weight of the snow shovel was damaging the cribbing on the switchbacks above Narada Falls, but that they were pushing ahead with dynamite and hand labor. Finally, on July 9, two weeks after the convention, came the long-awaited telegram from Peters: "Automobile reached Paradise Inn." Then it was time to reckon the costs—$4,000 to $5,000 for the RNPC and approximately double that amount for the NPS. Albright and Cammerer consulted Mather and decided not to ask the company for a contribution to the $4,000 cost overrun. [78]

Similar excitement occurred earlier each season as the first tourist cars reached Longmire. Peters' monthly report for May 1921 described the scene:

> To the Chevrolet Motor Company of Seattle goes the credit of being the first to reach Longmire Springs by auto. After two unsuccessful attempts, they drove one of their cars through to the Springs on Sunday, May 8, while there was still about two feet of snow on the ground. A rather ingenious device of extension wooden ladders, was used for getting over the deeper drifts, which proved very effective.
>
> Later in the day The Blangy Motor Company, authorized by Ford dealer of Tacoma, brought a car to Longmire without the use of any mechanical device whatsoever; and to the Ford should go the credit of really breaking the road to Longmire Springs. [79]

It was not long before the Park Service and the RNPC began to discuss Mount Rainier's potential as a winter resort. Prior to 1923, some 1,200 to 1,400 Northwesterners snowshoed or skied into the park each winter, many on weekend outings with The Mountaineers. Beginning in that year, the Park Service kept the road open all year as far as Longmire. The RNPC rented out snowshoes, skis, and toboggans, and kept the National Park Inn open "informally." Ten thousand people took this opportunity to visit the park during the first winter season of 1923-24, most of them coming only for the day.

In the winter of 1924-25, the RNPC tried to attract more people to the park by bringing in a team of thirteen Alaskan sled dogs and an Eskimo driver. [80] Tourists paid a fare to ride through the Douglas fir and hemlock forest on the dog sled. This was continued for several years. No one questioned the fact that the dog sled was completely out of context at Mount Rainier; rather, it was considered another form of winter sport along with the popular toboggan run at Longmire and the ski and snowshoe trips up to Paradise. [81]

From the Park Service's standpoint, the use of the park for winter recreation was a great success. From the RNPC's standpoint, the winter operation was a disappointment because it did not pay for itself. The inn could only afford to open during the weekends, and the employees had to be run in and out of the park each Saturday and Sunday on a company bus. While the company lost money each winter season, it continued to operate through each winter in part as a public service, in part with the hope of building up a larger winter clientele over time. [82]

The First Aerial Tramway Proposal

Mount Rainier's real potential as a winter sports center lay in getting people to Paradise. Longmire experienced frequent rain and above-freezing temperatures during the winter,

while Paradise's extra elevation assured it of much better snow conditions. With this in mind, the RNPC's T.H. Martin in 1924 proposed an aerial tramway from the Nisqually road bridge up the mountainside to Paradise. It would be purely functional, an alternative to the road during the three-quarters of the year when the road was closed. Superintendent Tomlinson forwarded this proposal to Mather with the comment that the tramway would make Paradise available for winter use and therefore deserved further study. [83]

The tramway proposal went no further for three and a half years, or until January 1928. Then Martin tried to link the tramway development to the construction of a second hotel, Paradise Lodge, at Paradise. "It is our definite plan to maintain the new hotel on an all year basis," Martin wrote, "and to do this it will, of course, be necessary to have some sort of comfortable and practicable method of transportation to Paradise Valley throughout the winter." [84] RNPC President H.A. Rhodes assured Mather that the tramway would not be promoted as a novelty or "Coney Island type of amusement." [85] The RN PC held that the only alternative to a tramway was for the NPS to keep the road open all winter—at an estimated cost of $100,000 per year. Of course, another alternative was to operate the new hotel on a seasonal basis just like the Paradise Inn, but NPS officials never broached this possibility with the RNPC out of concern that the hotel would not be built. NPS officials did not endorse the RNPC's premise that the expansion of Paradise facilities required that the area have a winter tourist season, but they did not take issue with it either.

The tramway proposal stirred opposition in the Park Service. Chief Landscape Engineer Thomas C. Vint observed that the tramway would mar one of the most spectacular roadside views in the park—the view of the Nisqually Glacier from the Glacier Bridge. Others worried that it would be precedent-setting, opening the door for tramways to be built to the tops of peaks in other national parks. The fact that many such tramways could be found in the Alps was no consolation to them; a review of these European engineering works indicated that they were built without much regard for scenic preservation. Still another concern was that local organizations including The Mountaineers and the Rainier National Park Advisory Board might oppose the project. [86]

Mather gave this issue his close attention, consulting not only his own landscape architects, but also the National Commission of Fine Arts in New York City. In August 1928, he gave the project his tentative approval, explaining his decision to Superintendent Tomlinson thus:

> This is not a proposition having in view a spectacular trip, nor to make a scenic point in a park available at greater convenience to the traveling public, such as the proposed tramway to the top of Mount Hood contemplated or the existing cograil to the top of Pikes Peak presents, but an arrangement whereby the future hotel will be made accessible during the winter months for winter sports and travel from the most readily accessible point on the road. It therefore cannot be pointed to as a precedent by any other park operators, and any other such applications would have to be passed on their merits. [87]

The tramway proposal fizzled one year later, in the summer of 1929. The NPS remained tentatively supportive to the end, and the decision not to go forward appears to have rested with the RNPC rather than the NPS and to have been based on economics rather than aesthetics. After completing the new Paradise Lodge in 1928, the RNPC was in a weak financial condition. As discussed below, company officials were trying diligently to work out a plan with the major Pacific Northwest railroads to refinance the company. This circumstance seems to have been the crucial one in causing the tramway proposal to fizzle.

Nevertheless, the Park Service's evolving position in the first half of 1929 is instructive. The two major points of concern—that the tramway would mar the scenery, and that it would set a

bad precedent—continued to cause a great deal of ambivalence. Tomlinson worked closely with the RNPC's hired engineer, Richard Ernst from the German firm of Blechiert & Company, to ensure that the visual intrusiveness of the tramway would be minimized. He was disappointed to learn, for example, that the loading station would have to be placed below instead of above the road, so that it would now be in plain view to anyone approaching the Glacier Bridge from Ricksecker Point. [88] As for the claim that it would not be precedent-setting, this did not deter Assistant Director Albright from holding a conference with Ernst and various other tramway experts on both it and the Yosemite Valley-Glacier Point tramway proposal. [89] When the Secretary of Agriculture spoke out against the proposed aerial tramway to the summit of Mount Hood, NPS officials felt compelled to urge the officers of the RNPC to "keep the soft pedal on their project as far as publicity is concerned." [90] It was clear to NPS officials that they could not treat the RNPC proposal as an isolated case.

The other interesting point that the tramway proposal brought to light was the attitude of The Mountaineers. The Tacoma Mountaineers came out squarely in support of the proposal in March 1929. [91] The Seattle Mountaineers waited for a copy of Ernst's report in April before passing judgment; then it too expressed support. On May 9, The Mountaineers's Board of Trustees gave unanimous approval to the project. Superintendent Tomlinson was somewhat taken aback by this. [92] Earlier, the NPS had not wanted to approve the project without The Mountaineers's support; now it sought some indication that The Mountaineers would stand behind it should the NPS decide to oppose the installation.

It is impossible to know, of course, what Mather's ultimate decision would have been had the RNPC continued to press for this development. He was always careful to leave himself an out. In his annual report for 1929, he reported, "No actual opposition to the proposed aerial tramway has developed, but all National Park Service officials and all those not connected with the company have expressed themselves as opposed to the location of the cableway in any manner that will interfere with the view of the Nisqually Canyon as one approaches the Glacier Bridge from either direction." [93] When Mather wrote this, he knew that Ernst's plan involved just such a visual intrusion, even though it was the most discreet of four routes considered. Thus, a year and a half after his discussions with the RNPC on this issue began, he had not committed himself definitely to anything.

A Search for Capital

The RNPC's partnership with the NPS culminated during this era in the preparation of an ambitious "park development plan." The plan was produced in cooperation with Superintendent Tomlinson, Mather, and NPS landscape architects, who were themselves designing the park's road development plan. A major problem with the plan was that the RNPC did not have sufficient capital to carry out its part. The NPS tried to help the RNPC to enlist the financial backing of one or more railroad companies, but the railroads finally offered only token assistance.

The main stimulus for this planning effort was Congress's five-year, multi-million dollar, national park road construction program. With this infusion of federal funds, Park Service officials now had the opportunity and responsibility to determine which sections of the park would be opened up by roads and which sections ultimately would be left in a primitive condition. As park planners contemplated how the park's network of roads would eventually shape up, the question arose whether the RNPC would provide the requisite hotel accommodations at the ends of these new roads. Neither the RNPC nor the NPS wanted to see competition develop from rival concessions in other sections of the park. On the other hand, it was evident that the RNPC's financial resources would be stretched thin enough just to carry out the necessary expansion of facilities at Paradise. Faced with this choice, NPS officials preferred to stick with the single concession and assist the RNPC in growing into a

larger operation.

The first way in which the NPS was able to help the RNPC to improve its financial standing was to strengthen its concession contract with the government. The RNPC's original contract in 1916 was to run for twenty years, but in 1926 company officials applied for a new, stronger franchise. The Park Service prepared a new contract for the RNPC which added stronger protections against competition, changed the government's fee from a profit-sharing plan to a percentage of gross receipts, and included sundry other modifications. Albright called it "the best franchise that has ever been prepared for the National Park Service." [94] Most importantly, the new contract allowed the RNPC to increase its capital stock by mortgaging its properties. This much desired feature was included in the contract by authority of an act of Congress passed on March 7, 1928. The new contract, which ran for another twenty years, was signed on April 2, 1928. [95]

The second way in which the NPS was able to help the RNPC was to involve the company as a full partner in its master planning effort. As a first step, NPS Chief Landscape Architect Thomas C. Vint attended the meeting of the RNPC board of directors in Seattle on April 9, 1928, one week after the new contract had been completed. President H.A. Rhodes called for an estimated $960,000 investment over the next five years—considerably more than the company's existing capital stock of $500,000 would allow. Listening to the board discuss the company's new five-year plan for upgrading and expanding its facilities, Vint proposed that the NPS and the RNPC work "hand-in-hand" in fashioning a comprehensive park development plan. Such a plan, though even more ambitious than Rhodes's five-year plan, would actually make it easier for the RNPC to interest large investors, namely the railroads, in its long-range scheme. According to Vint, "the board of directors considered this scheme very favorable and saw its advantage in planning their financial program as well as their construction program." [96] Mather responded even more favorably. The idea of involving the company in a general plan for the entire park, Mather wrote, was "excellent and should be followed out." [97]

Vint returned to the Park Service's new field office in San Francisco and produced a package of drawings and overlays called the "Master Plan for Mount Rainier." The master plan involved the RNPC in three areas: 1) an expansion of the development at Paradise, 2) a new hotel and cabin complex to be built at Yakima Park within the next couple of years, after the NPS completed a road up to the site, and 3) another and final development, probably located at Spray Park, to be undertaken a few years after that. Although quite sketchy by later standards, it was the first master plan of its kind in the national park system. [98] Later, a $2.5 million price tag would be attached to these developments—a near tripling of the investment Rhodes had proposed only a few months earlier. The main outlines of the plan were ready in time for Mather's trip west that July.

At Mount Rainier, Mather rode horseback up to Yakima Park with Tomlinson, Vint, Rhodes, and Asahel Curtis, chairman of the Rainier National Park Advisory Board, to inspect the proposed development site. Curtis took their photograph: the men seated on an outcropping of rock, Vint's maps and drawings spread out across their knees, and in the background, the enormous east face of Mount Rainier rising beyond the bare meadow where the new hotel would be built. It was a perfect image of the partnership between the NPS and the RNPC, symbolizing perhaps the headiest and most promising moment in the partnership's fifty-year history.

Twelve days after leaving Mount Rainier, Mather and Rhodes had another meeting, this time in company with the Northern Pacific's president, Charles Donnelly, at Mammoth Hot Springs in Yellowstone National Park. It appears that this was the first time the RNPC approached the Northern Pacific as a potential investor, and Mather was there to give the

railroad executive his most effective sales pitch. According to a memorandum prepared by a Northern Pacific official after this meeting, Mather felt so positive about the Yakima Park site that he thought it would surpass even Paradise in fame and popularity. [99]

In January 1929, Rhodes gave a more complete presentation of the RNPC's proposal to Northern Pacific officials. This was followed by a conference one month later in Portland involving Donnelly and six other Northern Pacific officials on the one side and Rhodes and Martin on the other. Rhodes proposed a $2.5 million investment over five years. Rhodes explained that the RNPC could not obtain that kind of capital from its present stockholders and that it seemed to him after "'very careful consideration" that the railroads would be "logically interested" not only because of the traffic revenues that would result, but from an investment standpoint, too. [100]

Two months later, Assistant Director Albright wrote to Donnelly in support of the RNPC proposal. Albright described the master plan for Mount Rainier and reviewed the list of other national parks in which railroads had given financial assistance to the park concession. "'The time has now arrived," Albright wrote, "when.. .a very large development must go forward in Mount Rainier and it should be undertaken in the same broad gauge way in which such developments had been made in the other parks with financial assistance from the railroads interested in the growth of the tourist business." Albright gave the RNPC's financial plan his "personal endorsement," and hoped the Northern Pacific would consider it favorably. [101]

Donnelly proposed to his counterparts of the Great Northern, Union Pacific, and Milwaukee Road that the four transcontinental railroads serving Washington state should make this a joint venture, each contributing a half million dollars; the RNPC's Seattle and Tacoma stockholders would put up the remaining half million. The Union Pacific's president, C.R. Gray, found this proposal ""staggering," but like Donnelly, did not want to reject it out of hand. Together with H.A. Scandrett, president of the Milwaukee Road, he suggested that the companies send a representative to the park to look it over. The Great Northern's president, Ralph Budd, agreed but insisted on sending his own representative. [102]

After investigating the park concession and the proposed development sites in July 1929, both railroad representatives filed favorable reports. The Northern Pacific's man thought the proposed Spray Park development would exceed visitor demand, but considered the prospects for new hotels at Paradise and Yakima Park to be excellent. The Great Northern's investigator was even more positive, suggesting that the expanded development of the park could make it the central tourist attraction of the Pacific Northwest. [103]

Why the four railroad presidents did not accept the advice of their own investigators is not entirely clear. The decisive meeting of the four executives occurred in Chicago on January 6, 1930, where they reached unanimous agreement to decline the RNPC's offer. In reply to Albright's further entreaties that March, the railroad executives insisted that they did not want to make the investment because it would be precedent-setting. The analogy between Mount Rainier and other national parks in which the railroads were involved was not fair, they said, because Mount Rainier was not accessed directly by rail and unlike Yellowstone, Glacier, Grand Canyon, Zion, and Bryce Canyon, it had alternative sources of capital in the two nearby cities of Seattle and Tacoma. No mention was made of the crisis in the economy following the stock market crash of October 1929, but it seems that this may have weighed in their decision as well. When Albright tried once more to enlist their help in 1931, asking the railroads for $200,000 to assist with the Yakima Park development only, Donnelly replied that the present economic conditions made it impossible. [104] In February 1932, in the very depths of the Depression, the RNPC finally got the four railroads to buy a piddling $2,000 of company stock each. [105] After entertaining such high hopes in 1928-29, this turned out to be as much investment by the railroads in Mount Rainier National Park as the RNPC and the

NPS would ever see.

Developments at Paradise

In its five-year plan of 1928, the RNPC proposed to make qualitative improvements at Paradise as well as merely expand its facilities. For that reason, RNPC officials thought in terms of a whole new structure some distance apart from the Paradise Inn. It would offer deluxe accommodations, and it would be more fire-proof than the old building. [106] Preliminary plans called for 118 rooms to start and a total of 200 rooms after completion. [107] Meanwhile, the Paradise Inn would be scaled back to a lodge-type of service, the full-service dining room converted into a cafeteria, and the bungalow tents replaced by cabins.

This plan met with NPS approval. It addressed the general upscaling of visitor preferences that had taken place over the past decade. As Albright and Vint both saw it, the national park should eventually provide five types of accommodations on a scale from rustic to sophisticated, beginning with free public campgrounds and ending with deluxe hotel service. In between these two extremes would be what were called "housekeeping cabins," and two types of indoor lodging known as the "European plan" and the "American plan," the chief distinction being whether or not the rooms had private baths. [108] The RNPC's improvements were thus tied into an effort to create uniform standards among all national park concessioners. [109]

Owing to a lack of capital, however, this plan had to be revised in 1930. The original Paradise Inn was refurbished, repainted and retained as the most luxurious hotel in the park. The tents which had surrounded it on three sides were removed. Plans for a deluxe hotel were abandoned; instead, the RNPC built 275 housekeeping cabins and a central service building with cafeteria, camp store, and 40 guest rooms. This building was called the Paradise Lodge. The housekeeping cabins and lodge were located away from the Paradise Inn. Built during the fall of 1930, the cabins and lodge were opened to the public on June 20, 1931. [110]

There was one other noteworthy development at Paradise in 1930-31. The NPS approved a request by the RNPC to put in a nine-hole golf course. This short-lived "experiment," completed in 1931, was justified by Park Service officials on the grounds that golfing was a form of outdoor recreation and would not detract from the mountain setting. [111] It appears to have been one more attempt by the RNPC to attract a sojourning type of clientele to the Paradise Inn.

Developments at Sunrise

Just as the disappointing search for investors and the economic downturn in 1930 altered the new development at Paradise, so too did they affect the RNPC's development at Yakima Park, or "Sunrise." Here the scaling back of RNPC developments caused NPS officials more frustration, however, because it defeated the park administration's long-standing aim of taking pressure off the Paradise area by creating an equivalent development on the east side of the mountain. Indeed, some people suspected the RNPC of dragging its feet precisely in order to keep visitors concentrated at Paradise.

Sunrise was to be the first instance of master planning of a complete area by the NPS and the park concession. The NPS would build the access road and plaza, physical plant, campground, and administrative buildings; the RNPC would build the hotel and cabins and be ready to serve the public practically as soon as the road opened. The imperative for close cooperation was recognized as early as 1923, six years before the road work was actually begun. [112] In 1928-29, when NPS planners began drafting alternative plans, it was expected that the RNPC would build a full-service hotel and cabins at the site. When the

RNPC's plans for refinancing collapsed in 1930 and it turned out the hotel was not to be, the NPS was left with an overdeveloped site in spite of its best efforts to plan carefully.

The lay of the land at Yakima Park did not make planning any easier. The road reached the top of the ridge at Sunrise Point and came westward toward the mountain view. The landscape engineers (Tom Vint and his assistant, Ernest A. Davidson, who was assigned to Mount Rainier in 1928) found that Yakima Park divided naturally into three segments proceeding from east to west: the relatively narrow approach, the park proper, and a lower area of benches around Shadow Lake. It was already agreed that the '"hotel" would stand in the park proper. The question was where to put the government buildings, the campground, the cabins, and the camp store and cafeteria building in relation to the '"hotel" and road. The desirability of keeping the park proper uncluttered had to be weighed against the limitations of space at either end of Yakima Park. Above all, the NPS wanted to keep the area between the road and the canyon rim in a natural state. [113]



Sunrise Lodge and cabins under construction in 1930 or 1931. The development was supposed to be the first instance of cooperative planning by the Park Service and a concessioner but the Great Depression forced the company to scale back its commitment. *(J. W. Wheeler photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. UW15697)*

To Davidson, the RNPC proved a most exasperating partner. The company's responses to his many alternative plans (eventually eight in all) were vague, inconsistent, and uncooperative. Even when Albright and Tomlinson visited the area with the RNPC's director and general manager in July 1929, the two parties failed to reach final agreement on where the developments would go. Company officials did state, however, that they wanted sufficient area to put in no less than 600 cabins. After many more delays, RNPC officials finally approved a development plan on February 4, 1930—one month after their two million dollar proposal had been turned down by the railroads. [114]

The RNPC's development plan was considerably scaled back. In July 1929, RNPC officials had described their plans for the Yakima Park area to the Great Northern's investigator as follows: Construction of a 300 room hotel, most rooms with bath, electric lighted and heated; a central lodge building and cabins nearby to accommodate 300 guests; 80 to 100 housekeeping cabins for auto tourists; and a hydro-electric plant, garage, and service buildings. [115] But when the Sunrise development opened for tourists two years later,

accommodations consisted of 215 housekeeping cabins and a central service building containing cafeteria, camp store, post office, storage, and employee dormitories. Moreover, in the interests of economy, the RNPC eliminated many of the adornments on the main building that the architectural drawings called for and laid out the cabins in straight rather than curving rows. [116]

In summary, the effort to incorporate the RNPC's general development plan into Mount Rainier National Park's master plan went awry in 1930-31. Park planners had every reason to feel keen disappointment over the company's flagging contribution to the park's development. But it would be too simple to attribute this failure to caprice or greed on the part of the RNPC. Rather, it reflected underlying weaknesses in the partnership of public and private investment in Mount Rainier National Park. This soon became obvious as the Great Depression knocked the stuffing out of the national park concession.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART FOUR: DEPRESSION AND WAR YEARS, 1930-1945

X. VISITOR USE IN THE DEPRESSION ERA

INTRODUCTION

The Great Depression had a mixed effect on people's ability to visit Mount Rainier National Park. Hard times kept many people away who could not afford the cost of a trip, even a weekend trip, to the national park. This was reflected in the annual visitation statistics for Mount Rainier, which fell by 25 percent from 1931 to 1932, and by an additional 21 percent from 1932 to 1933. These were the worst years of the Depression. But hard times had an opposite result, too, as widespread unemployment and underemployment gave people more leisure time. After the hardest years of the Depression had passed, annual visitation to Mount Rainier picked up and soon exceeded what it had been in the 1920s. Nationwide, automobile and gasoline sales rebounded after 1933 and resumed their phenomenal growth of the preceding decade. Travel expenditures for the whole country rose during the years 1934 to 1937, dipped slightly during the 1938-39 recession, and rose spectacularly in 1940-41. Reflecting these trends in the national economy, annual visitation to Mount Rainier showed a 71 percent increase over the whole decade (from 265,620 people in 1930 to 456,637 in 1940).

The Depression affected visitors' lodging preferences in Mount Rainier National Park more than it influenced total visitation. Park hotel patronage declined sharply during 1931-33 and remained depressed throughout the era. Meanwhile, campground use increased in both relative and absolute terms. Again, this reflected national trends. According to automobile historian Warren James Belasco, "Tourists economized on operating expenses, mainly room and board, in order to keep cars running. Expenditures for hotels, restaurants, vacation clothing, and travel supplies fell from $872 million in 1929 to $444 million in 1933." [1] Belasco documents how the autocamps and the nascent motel industry grew during the Depression years while the hotel business suffered. The rise of the motel in American life changed visitor demand in Mount Rainier National Park. Tourists who could ill-afford a room in the Paradise Inn wanted to stay in small "housekeeping" cabins, not the tent cabins of yesteryear. The RNPC built hundreds of housekeeping cabins at Paradise and Sunrise to meet this new demand. Other significant changes in visitor use in the 1930s included the advent of winter sports at Paradise and increased summer use of the Sunrise-White River section of the park.

SUMMER RECREATION

There were two broad trends in summer recreational use in the 1930s: a trend toward greater distribution of use among the four corners of the park, and a trend in favor of activities that were self-guiding or free-of-charge. One trend related to new road development, the other to the deepening economic depression.

Road access to all four corners of the park affected visitor distribution. As numbers declined overall, the percentage of visitors going to the less developed sections of the park increased. Visitor use of the Carbon River and Ohanapecosh areas increased relative to the more developed Sunrise and Paradise areas. Visitor use of the Longmire-Paradise area stayed about double that of the Sunrise area.

Park visitors were inclined to be more thrifty and independent than they had been before the Depression. The RNPC's restaurant sales shrank dramatically while use of the park's picnic areas rose. Occupancy rates in the hotels fell more sharply than overall park visitation, and souvenir sales were so depressed that the company did not even open its photograph business in 1933. Fewer visitors availed themselves of the company's guide service, preferring to hike on foot, explore the trails without a guide, or take free nature walks led by park naturalists. [2]

Company officials accepted most of these setbacks with equanimity. They were less gracious about the decline in patronage of the RNPC's commercial guide service. They saw the surge of interest in the NPS 's free educational program—its ranger-led nature walks, evening lectures, museum exhibits, and self-guiding nature trails—and they argued that the ranger-led activities were cutting into their guide business, perhaps interfering with their contractual rights.

Two explanations were given for the growing visitor preference for the NPS guide service over the RNPC guide service. Company officials assumed that it was purely economic: hard times were forcing park visitors to seek out free services wherever they were available. The NPS's free nature walks, lectures, and museums were touted in Seattle and Tacoma newspapers. [3] NPS officials, on the other hand, believed that the trend was independent of the Depression. After all, the educational program was already enjoying great popularity in the 1920s when it was still relatively small. They regarded the growing number of "public contacts" made by the Naturalist Department in the 1930s as a reflection of the organization's growing size, resources, and professionalism. [4] They saw the evolution of the park's educational program as a response to longterm trends in visitor demand.

The NPS did not want to take business away from the RNPC. It supported the company's guide service on principle. The company could ill-afford the loss of guide business in the early 1930s. But the NPS did not want to limit its own educational program on the company's behalf, either. The park administration worked out a cooperative plan with the company in 1931, but the plan was short-lived. Half way through the summer of 1933, the company withdrew from the cooperative program and started providing its own talks at another location. Superintendent Tomlinson responded to this challenge by suspending all naturalists' lectures and all but the shortest ranger-led nature walks. The result was just as he had anticipated: hundreds of visitor complaints provided proof that there was a public demand for "authoritative informational service in the National Park." [5]

Meanwhile, increasing numbers of park visitors availed themselves of neither service and simply struck off on their own. Two self-guiding nature trails, the Trail of the Shadows at Longmire and the Glacier Trail to the terminus of the Nisqually Glacier, were used by tens of thousands of people each summer. Longer trails saw increasing use by people without guides, too. The result was an increasingly varied pattern of summer recreational use. The pattern deserves a closer look.

Paradise

The Paradise meadows and the surrounding area continued to be a focal point for visitors to Mount Rainier. The Skyline Trail, a five-mile loop trail that took in Alta Vista, Glacier Vista,

Panorama Point, Timberline Ridge, and Mazama Ridge, remained the most popular horse trail in the park. RNPC trail guides led parties on the half-day ride morning and afternoon. Much of this route lay over melting snowfields until late summer. What the horse traffic must have done to the delicate alpine meadows can only be imagined; damage to the plants and wildflowers from trampling would not be evaluated or monitored until many years later. Other popular horse trips went to the Reflection Lakes and the foot of the Tatoosh Range. The RNPC's guide service offered regular foot trips to Nisqually Glacier, Paradise Glacier, and Pinnacle Peak. The NPS encouraged tourists to get out on the glaciers as long as they were with experienced guides. [6]

A party of CCC boys visiting the Paradise ice caves. *(O.A. Tomlinson Collection photo courtesy of University of Washington, Negative No. UW14013)*

Many tourists hiked on their own up to the Anvil Rock lookout and the rock shelters at Camp Muir. Tomlinson once remarked that the latter, dating from 1916 and 1921, were "used extensively by amateur climbers and others who hike about aimlessly and improperly equipped for hiking or climbing at that altitude." [7] When a visiting official recommended that the NPS install a telephone line to Camp Muir, Tomlinson noted that "undoubtedly if the telephone was placed in Camp Muir, hundreds of casual hikers who reach that point would keep a telephone line more than busy with idle and unnecessary gossip." [8] Such comments suggest why the NPS favored guided walks in the Paradise area. The high altitude, glaciers, and sheer cliffs in the Paradise area presented a multitude of hazards.

The Paradise ice caves were a popular attraction. It was a unique experience to look up at the blue, green, and pink light filtering into these great rooms under the Paradise Glacier. Due to the rapid melting of the Paradise Glacier, the caves changed from year to year. As the last winter's snowpack melted off each summer, the RNPC's guide service sped the process along by chopping or blasting out openings in the ice large enough for people to enter. Normally this occurred toward the end of the summer, but in 1932 the RNPC requested permission to dynamite a hole in the ice in July, so that this popular attraction could be made available

earlier. After some philosophizing about the problem of "forcing nature," Cammerer gave his approval. [9] As Tomlinson pointed out, the ice caves were a good source of revenue to the company's guide department, and with business ailing "the pressure is greater than ever for hastening the opening of the Paradise Ice Caves." [10]

The lingering snowpack around the Paradise area held its own attractions. "Nature coasting" was a popular and much-photographed activity. A popular postcard image of Mount Rainier in the 1920s and 1930s depicted a line of people—usually young women—seated on a steep snowfield one behind the other in stairstep fashion. These were tin-pants sliders, or "nature coasters." [11] Floyd Schmoe described this activity in his reminiscence of his year with the RNPC guide service.

> On the usual half-day guide trip [to the Paradise ice caves] we always made a long circle on the glacier and had several slides of two or three hundred feet as well as many shorter ones. On the short steep slopes we sent people down singly with a guide at the bottom to pick them up, but on long gentle slopes we all sat down with each man holding the feet of the one behind him. When all were ready the guide in front would lift his feet and the guide behind would shove off and the entire party would serpentine down the glacier whooping and yelling. It was good sport and no one was ever hurt much. [12]

On August 1, 1931, the RNPC opened a nine-hole golf course at Paradise. [13] This short-lived venture was another attempt to bring the RNPC more business and counter the effects of the Depression. RNPC President H.A. Rhodes put the idea to Director Albright when he inspected the park in 1930. Albright agreed with Rhodes that a golf course might entice local people to stay at the Paradise Inn during the week. He rejected Rhodes's proposal for a miniature "Tom Thumb" golf course. Albright wrote in a memorandum afterwards, "Golf is a country game not a city one. It can be justified in parks easier than tennis. Anyway, I want to try out the thing and as the Rainier Company needs revenue more than any other Company I am disposed to let them try the experiment." He put Tom Vint in charge of its design. [14]

With the completion of the south side road to Reflection Lakes, this area began to attract crowds as never before. In 1934, the NPS authorized construction of a "boat house-comfort station" on the shore of the lake. The building was a small public works project. Boating, fishing, and picnicking on and around the lake became more and more popular. [15] The RNPC guide department offered fishing trips from Paradise to Reflection Lakes with hiking gear, fishing tackle, and boat provided. [16]

Another distinctive tourist attraction during the Depression was the presence of the Civilian Conservation Corps (see Chapter XI). President Roosevelt's "Tree Army" received substantial press coverage, and tourists were curious to see these vaunted young men in action. For most of the CCC's existence, from 1933 to 1942, there were six CCC camps in Mount Rainier National Park, the most accessible one being at Narada Falls. All RNPC busses made the Narada Falls camp a regular stop for tourists enroute to Paradise. Hundreds of private automobiles also stopped at Narada Falls each day during the summer. The waterfall itself drew many onlookers, of course, but it was the camp superintendent's feeling that most people were primarily interested in seeing what a CCC camp looked like. "Owing to the fact that this camp is under constant observation by the public in general," wrote the camp superintendent, "a special attempt has been made by this camp to present a smart appearance." [17]

Camp Narada occupied the level ground on the far side of the stone bridge directly above Narada Falls. Beyond the decorative log entrance to the camp were a handful of permanent buildings consisting of garages, mess hall, wash houses, and tool shops. These were laid out

on either side of a short section of abandoned road. Nestled against a wall of trees were the tent quarters of the company officers and men.

Interestingly, the site was selected for a CCC camp over the protests of NPS landscape architects who thought the area ought to be restored to a natural condition. The site had formerly seen use by road crews and seasonal rangers assigned to traffic control. Some effort had been made to clean up the area in the late 1920s with the removal of an unsightly toilet building at the brink of the falls and the clearing of a mass of downed trees from the Paradise River directly above the falls. After the camp's abandonment in 1937, the landscape architects were once again thwarted, as several of the buildings remained standing for equipment storage. [18]

Sunrise

Throngs of tourists drove up the new road to Sunrise after its opening on July 15, 1931. Each succeeding weekend brought more people, and on three weekends during August the travel to Sunrise exceeded that to Paradise. [19] Tomlinson was jubilant, confidently predicting that in the following year, with the expected completion of the road over Chinook Pass, travel to Sunrise would nearly double what Paradise received. That did not happen, however. The pattern of visitor use soon stabilized the other way, with about two times the number visiting Paradise each summer as visited Sunrise.

The Sunrise development confirmed the park's growing orientation to the private automobilist. The most popular attraction in the entire new development in the northeast corner of the park was the Sunrise Point parking area and overlook. As described earlier, this was a carefully designed switchback on the road from White River up to Yakima Park. As the new road gained the crest of Sunrise Ridge, it made a broad, 180-degree turn that provided the automobilist with a panoramic view in all directions. A large parking bay inside the turn and pedestrian bays around its perimeter completed this site's functional design. Hundreds of cars packed into the Sunrise Point parking area each day. At the end of its first season of use Tomlinson wrote approvingly, "Perhaps the fact that this vantage point is on the main highway where the visitor may, from the comfortable seat of his automobile, enjoy all the thrills of the mountain climber, had something to do with its popularity." [20] The park administration was satisfied if most park visitors came only for the pleasure of the road and its scenic views.

There were opportunities for nature study and recreation at Sunrise for all those who would take advantage of them. The NPS improved the trail system around Yakima Park to accommodate the new crowds of people. The most popular walk was the Rim Trail. Within a modest 800 feet of the parking area and ranger station, the visitor could gain an unobstructed view of the massive Emmons Glacier for its whole length from the summit of Mount Rainier to its terminus in the White River Valley below. Other trails followed easy grades up the slope behind the plaza and turned east or west near the crest of Sourdough Mountain, yielding occasional grand views to the north as well as a constant view of Mount Rainier to the southwest. In that era of better air quality, it was possible on a clear day to see northward all the way to the Selkirk Range in British Columbia. Beginning in 1931, a ranger-naturalist was duty-stationed at Sunrise to answer questions, give lectures, and lead nature walks. Longer hikes to Burroughs Mountain and Berkeley Park were also available to the visitor at this time. [21]

Visitors to Sunrise also found a variety of guided trips and amenities provided by the park concession. Regular half-day horse trips could be purchased for $3.00. Small and plain "housekeeping cabins" could be rented for $2.50 per day with blankets and linen, or $1.50 per day without. In the Sunrise Lodge, which first opened in 1931, the visitor could rent

bathtub, shower, and laundry facilities; purchase groceries; and enjoy cafeteria-style dining. [22] By 1934, a free public campground and picnic area had been established near Shadow Lake, less than a mile west of the Sunrise plaza. [23]

Backcountry Use

The vast majority of visitors to Mount Rainier in the 1930s did not go very far into the backcountry. If they left the immediate vicinity of their automobiles at all, they generally kept to the popular day trips around Paradise, Longmire, and Sunrise. There were practical reasons for this pattern of recreational use. Few people owned the necessary equipment to go into the backcountry. The park concession outfitted parties and offered guided horse trips around the mountain, but these were beyond the means of most visitors. The company's general manager, Paul Sceva, remarked in 1932 that 99 percent of park visitors never ventured more than a mile from the Paradise and Sunrise areas. [24]

Nevertheless, backcountry use grew into an identifiable activity during the 1930s. Increasing numbers of Americans made a distinction between wild country that could be visited by car and wilderness that was only accessible by foot or horseback. Organizations like the Wilderness Society, founded in 1935, and older mountain clubs such as The Mountaineers, argued forcefully that road development threatened to overwhelm the relatively few remaining areas of countryside that could be reached only by non-mechanized means. The absence of automobile access became the defining quality of American wilderness. The effort by The Mountaineers in 1928 to get the NPS to set aside the northern section of Mount Rainier National Park as an undeveloped, roadless area, or "wilderness area," anticipated a much wider protest in the 1930s against too much road-building in the national parks and national forests. Against this backdrop, backcountry use became more strongly differentiated from other forms of recreation in Mount Rainier National Park than it had been before.

Evolving ideas about wilderness were one significant factor in stimulating more backcountry use. Another factor was that the logistics of backcountry travel in Mount Rainier were becoming easier. In the 1920s, it generally required from twelve to fourteen days to hike the Wonderland Trail around the mountain. In the 1930s, the trip could be accomplished in about eight to ten days. With the completion of the road to Sunrise, backpackers could lighten their loads by first depositing a food cache there or at the Carbon River Ranger Station, or at both places, for resupply as they came around the mountain. [25] Moreover, trail conditions were improved and the route was significantly shortened in a few places. Estimates of the Wonderland Trail's original length varied from 100 to 115 miles; today it is given as 93 miles. [26]

The NPS encouraged greater use of the backcountry. Park naturalists urged visitors to get out onto the hiking trails. As early as 1921, the superintendent had recommended the establishment of four or five "hotel camps" at intervals on the Wonderland Trail in order to facilitate this trip. [27] Although that plan never materialized, the NPS developed a system of free public shelters instead. With the help of the CCC, the number of backcountry shelters proliferated. The trail shelters differed from backcountry patrol cabins in that they were generally three-sided with earthen floors and were intended for public rather than administrative use. [28] By the mid-1930s, there were perhaps a dozen trail shelters in the backcountry, making it possible to spend each night in a shelter while hiking around the mountain. [29]

The RNPC also encouraged the use of the trails. The company advertised guided horse trips around the entire Wonderland Trail as well as shorter trips along segments of the trail. At the beginning of the decade, the company provided an outfit, food, and a guide for $25 per person per day, with discounts for larger parties. In an effort to increase business, the RNPC

slashed its rates by one third for 1933 and offered new overnight trips from Sunrise to Mystic Lake and from Paradise to Snow Lake in the Tatoosh Range. General Manager Sceva thought the company had "a golden opportunity because of the financial condition of the country to hold people in the park perhaps longer than before." These initiatives had the full encouragement of the park administration. [30]

The economic hard times contributed to one other form of backcountry use in the 1930s: poaching. In October 1932, two men were arrested for hunting in the park. Owing to the fact that the men had been unemployed for some time, the U.S. commissioner decided to waive their fines. He merely confiscated their guns. Superintendent Tomlinson and Assistant Director Cammerer both concurred with his decision. [31] Naturally there is no reliable record of the amount of poaching in the park, but one could surmise that it increased during the Depression owing to the desperation of many people in the area.

Summit Climbs

After a surge of interest in climbing to the summit of Mount Rainier in the early 1920s, this activity attracted no more than a few hundred people each season. [32] The most popular route was the Gibraltar route, pioneered by Stevens and Van Trump on their historic first ascent in 1870. The route featured a traverse of Gibraltar Rock by way of a long, narrow ledge. In 1936, a section of this ledge avalanched away, making the route impassable, and from that year forward a variety of other south-side routes were used. [33] Still, the basic pattern of the ascent remained the same: climbers departed from Paradise at mid-day and hiked up alpine meadows, scree and snowfields to Camp Muir, at 10,000 feet elevation. Starting out from there a few hours before sunrise, climbers proceeded to the summit before the snow turned soft in the heat of the day, and then retraced the full distance back to Paradise by nightfall.

Most summit climbers were either experienced themselves or accompanied by experienced guides. The few amateurs who tried to climb the mountain on their own, usually without suitable equipment, caused the park administration grave concern. In December 1927, the president of The Mountaineers, Edmond S. Meany, alerted Superintendent Tomlinson to the fact that one Lionel H. Chute planned to take his troop of Boy Scouts on a foolhardy winter ascent of Mount Rainier. Despite the entreaties of both Meany and Seattle Boy Scout Executive Stuart P. Walsh that he cancel the trip, Chute intended to go anyway. Tomlinson wrote to Mather that there was an urgent need for a regulation authorizing the ranger force to prevent visitors from undertaking hazardous stunts like this. Not waiting for a reply, the superintendent advised Chute that all trails to the summit were closed. This action prevented Chute from going and may have saved lives. Before the next summer season, the park had rules for summit climbers. [34]

The climbing rules required all parties to register with the district ranger. Parties which did not have a professional guide or were not affiliated with a recognized mountain club were required to show evidence that they were competent and properly equipped. Required equipment consisted of climbing boots and crampons (or their equivalent), woolen clothing, colored glasses, gloves or mittens, alpen-stock or ice axe, and climbing rope. [35] The rules were strictly enforced, particularly after climbing accidents claimed the lives of two men in 1929 and another man in 1931. Even so, improperly equipped parties sometimes gave rangers the slip. In 1931, rangers spotted through binoculars an unregistered party on the summit dome. Confronting the climbers that afternoon at Camp Muir, they found that the group of five had only one alpen-stock between them and that they were all shod in tennis shoes. [36]

WINTER RECREATION

Winter use of Mount Rainier National Park grew significantly during the 1930s. Most people who visited the park during the winter came either to ski or to watch one of the several ski events held at Paradise; thus, winter use in the 1930s was practically synonymous with skiing. The nature of skiing itself changed in the 1930s, as downhill racing overtook cross-country touring as the most popular form of skiing.

The Developing Sport of Skiing

It was in the 1930s that Americans discovered the European sport of downhill skiing. The first American ski school, with European ski experts providing instruction, opened in New Hampshire in 1929. Three years later, winter sports received a big boost when the third winter Olympics were held in Lake Placid, New York. Two years after that, in 1934, the first rope tow in the United States was installed at Woodstock, Vermont. It was powered by the rear wheel of a jacked-up Model T Ford. Despite some early technical difficulties with this contraption, the idea quickly spread to the West. By the mid-1930s, there were new, rope tow-equipped ski hills from Wilmot Hills, Wisconsin, to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to Stevens Pass, Washington. [37]

Downhill racing events began to draw spectators and the national media. The First National Downhill Championship was held at Mount Moosilauke, New Hampshire, in 1933. The First U.S. National Downhill and Slalom Championships were held at Paradise, Mount Rainier National Park, in 1935. It was at this event that the American team for the fourth Winter Olympics was selected. In 1937, the first Harriman Cup race was held at the Union Pacific Railroad's new ski resort of Sun Valley, Idaho. [38]

Personalities also contributed to the growing popularity of downhill skiing. Alpine skiing techniques were introduced to American skiers by a flock of prominent German and Austrian skiers who fled Hitler's Germany in the mid to late 1930s. Austrian champion Otto Schniebs attracted ski disciples at Dartmouth. Hannes Schneider, another Austrian, taught skiing in Conway, New Hampshire. Friedl Pfeiffer went to Sun Valley; Sepp Ruschp to Stowe; Luggi Foeger to Yosemite; and Otto Lang to Mount Rainier. [39]

Skiing also grew more commercialized in the 1930s. Clothing and equipment manufacturers moved to exploit the new market. The first two public ski shows, held at Madison Square Garden and Boston Gardens in 1934, drew thousands. Alf Nydin of Seattle founded SKI Magazine, the first magazine devoted to the winter sport, in 1935. The Union Pacific Railroad built the nation's first destination ski resort, replete with chairlift, at Sun Valley the next year. The site was selected by Austrian alpine expert Count Felix Schaffgotsch, who considered and rejected Paradise along with a handful of other western locations. According to SKI Magazine, the Sun Valley development "startled the fledging American ski scene, springing full grown out of an isolated Idaho sheep pasture." For years, Sun Valley reigned supreme as America's single world-class ski resort. [40]

The Development of Skiing at Mount Rainier

Among ski enthusiasts, the Paradise area acquired national renown in the 1930s. For a short time, winter sports loomed so large at Mount Rainier that the superintendent described them as the park's most important public use. [41] Mount Rainier's emergence as a major ski area followed fifteen to twenty years of increasing local use of the park for winter recreation.

The Mountaineers began making annual and well-publicized winter pilgrimages to Paradise Valley in 1912. At first these were by snowshoe. Club member Thor Bisgaard, a Norwegian, led some fellow Mountaineers on the first cross-country ski trip to Paradise Valley probably in the winter of 1915 or 1916. This was the earliest known use of skis in Mount Rainier

National Park. A group of NPS officials and RNPC board members who called themselves the SOYPs (an acronym that celebrated their penchant for wearing "socks outside your pants" on hiking trips) began making their own annual winter expeditions to Paradise Valley in 1920. In the course of the decade, the SOYPs gradually exchanged snowshoes for skis. At the same time, they became more and more impressed by the possibility of making Paradise a winter sports area. [42]

Beginning in 1923, the NPS kept the park road open to Longmire while the RNPC provided a variety of snowplay activities, rental equipment, and a lunch service at the National Park Inn. At the end of the decade, the RNPC looked to the expansion of winter sports to justify its new investment in Paradise. The NPS received mounting pressure from local booster clubs and winter sports enthusiasts to plow the road all the way to Paradise. In 1930, the park road was kept open to Canyon Rim and two years later it was plowed as far as Narada Falls. Increasing numbers of winter recreationists drove to the end of the road and skied the last few miles to Paradise. [43]

In April 1934, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer sponsored an event at Paradise that definitely put Mount Rainier on the map of national ski competition. The first annual Silver Skis race featured a five-mile course from Camp Muir to Paradise Valley, with an elevation drop of approximately 5,000 feet. Sixty contestents made the arduous trek from the end of the road up the slope of Mount Rainier, then came racing down before a large crowd of spectators. The route was thought to be one of the most challenging in ski competition. Eight months after the race, in December 1934, the National Ski Association voted to use the lower part of the Silver Skis course for the site of its national championship downhill and slalom ski races, to be held the next spring. [44]

This contest attracted more than the usual amount of interest because it also served as the occasion for the Olympic ski team tryouts. The downhill racecourse started at Sugar Loaf at 8,500 feet elevation and descended past Panorama Point into Edith Creek Basin, near the Paradise Inn. The course had an overall pitch of 33 percent. The slalom course was set up on the uphill side of Alta Vista, a prominence above the Paradise Lodge. Sportscasters from the Columbia Broadcasting System provided live coverage for radio listeners throughout the United States, while three wire services described the event for newspapers. Moving-picture photographers documented the contest for newsreels. An estimated 7,500 spectators drove approximately 2,000 automobiles into the park and hiked up to the Paradise meadows to get a view. Tomlinson had the road plowed a mile above Narada Falls to provide extra parking space. It was the busiest weekend in the park's history up to that time. [45]

Second Thoughts

Ever since Mather had singled out Mount Rainier as one national park with the potential to become a significant winter playground, the park administration had striven to encourage more and more winter use. Tomlinson was sensitive to local ski clubs' demands for better access to Paradise Valley; in his view, the large expense of snow removal was the only significant factor to be weighed against it. He had the road plowed as far as Narada Falls during the winter of 1935-36, and kept it open all the way to Paradise in the winter of 1936-37. Meanwhile, he listened sympathetically to the request of the RNPC's manager, Paul Sceva, that the government build an aerial tram from Narada Falls to Paradise for winter visitors, promising to take the matter up with his superiors. [46]

But Tomlinson also admitted that heavy winter use of the park was creating severe administrative challenges. Problems of winter use ranged from the cost of snow removal to inadequate parking and lodging facilities, treatment of ski injuries, avalanche danger, and public pressure for permanent ski lift and aerial tram fixtures that would mar the landscape

during the summer season. Moreover, these difficulties were not limited to the Paradise area. Thousands of skiers began driving to the Cayuse Pass area for a day's worth of recreation, and local ski clubs and civic groups from Enumclaw to Seattle started calling for ski facilities at Sunrise, too. [47]

Although Tomlinson did not necessarily share their views, some NPS officials began to question whether downhill skiing was an appropriate activity in a national park. The skiers' growing emphasis on speed, technique, athletic competition, and urban amenities led some park officials to view them as an unwelcome user group. This was perhaps the most controversial aspect of the problem. It called for a subjective judgment on the kind of experience that downhill skiers typically had in the park. Doubts about the appropriateness of this sport in a national park setting were crucial because they undergirded public debate over seemingly more objective winter-use issues, such as snow removal costs and ski lift development.

Mount Rainier's landscape architect, Ernest A. Davidson, argued that the growing popularity of the park as a downhill ski area was insidious, because skiers, as a group, were pushing for developments that would be injurious to the national park's broader purpose of providing for the public's enjoyment of nature. He tried to define the problem objectively this way:

> There is a point where a fine healthy outdoor sport begins to degenerate. This point is reached when the majority of its so-called devotees are more interested in the various side-lines of the sport than they are in the sport itself; when the sport becomes the social thing-to-do, rather than the athletic thing to be done; when the results of participation become physically useless or harmful, rather than physically beneficial. At Mt. Rainier this point is dangerously near. [48]

Davidson suggested that the NPS should not plow the road above Narada Falls, nor provide any rope tow or other mechanical lift at Paradise. Then those skiers who wanted a physical challenge would rightly come to the national park, while those who wanted only the thrill of the downhill runs would go elsewhere.

The problem for Tomlinson was that the differences between downhill and cross-country skiing were still fairly subtle in the 1930s. The value judgments defined by Davidson were not widely recognized even by skiers themselves. An account of a day of skiing at Paradise, written in 1938 by a Tacoma high school student named Ralph A. Spencer, illustrates what a fine line Davidson was attempting to draw at that time. [49] To what class of skier did Spencer belong?

"Skiing is like the measles!" Spencer wrote. "I was exposed about three years ago to the most glorious winter sport there is. The craze quickly spread among my friends, just as it is still spreading over the country." With two friends, Spencer would pile skis on top of the car and leave the city at four in the morning for a day at Paradise. The road trip was itself an adventure, with the first intimate view of Mount Rainier never failing to give him a "choked feeling" in his throat. At Narada Falls, the boys would park the car and shoulder their skis and packsacks for the hike up to Paradise.

> As we round the last curve there, lying in full view, with welcome smoke pouring from huge chimneys is the gray, rambling lodge of Paradise. At the entrance to the lodge are literally hundreds of skis, stuck in the snow, with the owners in the lodge, where a crowd is gathered about the huge heater, discussing spills and waxes. After a hasty breakfast in the ultra-modern cafeteria, and following a session in the ski-shack with cans of wax, we are ready for the long climb to the face of Panorama...

> With canvas climbers attached to the skis we begin the tedious climb to Panorama, with mighty Tatoosh range at our backs. Over the practice hill and up to the saddle of Alta Vista, our course lies. Far down in the valley, like doll's houses on a vast white sheet are the inn, the Sluskin building, the guide houses and the Tatoosh building.
>
> Up from the front of the Sluskin building to the top of Alta Vista runs the modern ski tow, installed just this year. A continuous revolving rope, the lift is an easy and energy-preserving access to the heights above.
>
> At the base of Panorama the tedious, agonizing grind starts up over the face of the field. At the halfway mark the slight mist of snow has become a wind, and as we round the protected side, a breath-snatching gale hits us square in the face. Biting wind and flying snow sting our visor-protected faces and hoods are put on parkas to shut out the cutting cold...
>
> Goggles are adjusted, harnesses secured, climbers removed, and the long-awaited descent begins. Down the face of Panorama, with a snow-tossing stem turn, we are off With stinging wind taking away your breath, pants whipping in the breeze, the terrain zipping away from under you at a terrifying clip, knees bending in the famed Hannes Schneider-Arlberg crouch.
>
> At last the inn comes into sight, and down the draw of Alta Vista we speed. With a screaming cristie at the door, we stop. It's over—a long time to climb up, a few minutes to speed down...

Did Spencer revel primarily in the physical challenge and the outdoor experience, or the athletic comradery and the thrill of the downhill run? Was he the type of park user who would be glad to see the rope tow removed, or would he then take his skis elsewhere? Spencer's story is significant because it reflects the sport of skiing at a time of transition when it was difficult to evaluate. This ambiguity in the very nature of skiing was the source of the Park Services s indecision over winter use during the 1930s.

By the winter of 1937-38, Paradise was the leading ski resort in the Pacific Northwest. The NPS permitted the installation of a rope tow at Paradise during the winter of 1937-38. Powered by an eight-cylinder Ford engine, the rope tow could haul 250 skiers per hour from the guide house to the saddle of Alta Vista. Enterprising skiers extended the length of the downhill run all the way to Narada Falls, where they caught a company shuttle bus back up to the foot of the rope tow. Floodlights were installed to allow night skiing, and the Paradise Inn rented out rooms through the winter season. The RNPC employed Austrian expert Otto Lang as a ski instructor. Classes were conducted daily throughout the winter. [50]

The park administration balked at other proposed developments. Tomlinson tried unavailingly to persuade officials of the Washington State Highway Department to close the state road up to Cayuse Pass during the winter, arguing that there was too much avalanche danger. The superintendent urged The Mountaineers not to advertise an organized ski outing to the Tipsoo Lakes country, above Cayuse Pass, suggesting that once the area was discovered the NPS would be hard-pressed to develop shelters and sanitary facilities for the winter crowds. [51] When an estimated 34,000 people used the Cayuse Pass area for skiing during the winter of 1937-38, Tomlinson tried to get the Enumclaw Ski Club to provide a ski patrol, but refused to commit any of his own staff to this area. For several seasons in a row, the NPS withstood pressure from the Pacific Northwest Ski Association and various local ski clubs to build a modern ski lift from Paradise to Panorama Point. The NPS permitted the annual Silver Skis competition to take place again in 1936 and 1938-41, but with a minimum of fanfare. The

NPS refused all requests to hold additional contests at Paradise, asserting that the fireworks displays and carnival-like atmosphere normally associated with these meets were not appropriate in a national park. [52]

Still another aspect of the ski season that troubled park administrators was the tendency toward "boisterousness and excessive drinking" by young people at Paradise Inn. [53] The superintendent complained to General Manager Sceva that the sale of beer in the fountain room made the Paradise Inn "similar to any common roadside tavern," and he recommended to his superiors in Washington that no alcoholic beverages should be served in the new government-owned ski lodge building that was then nearing completion. Associate Director Arthur E. Demaray approved this request a month before the building opened, in November 1941. [54]

Skiers at Paradise in 1941, the busiest downhill ski season in the park's history. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

A Policy in Transition

By the end of this period, park officials were wondering whether the effort to develop a winter season in Mount Rainier had been too successful. Winter use grew faster than anyone anticipated, outpacing the growth in visitor use overall. Winter use, defined for statistical purposes as the number of people who entered the park during the six-month period of November through April, accounted for five percent of the park's total visitation in 1923 (i.e. November 1922 through April 1923) and climbed to thirty-eight percent by 1941. The most rapid growth came at the end of the 1930s.

Yet, if park officials had begun to lean toward a more conservative winter-use policy on the eve of the Second World War, they left it to the next superintendent and NPS director to persuade Washington residents of the need for such a change of direction. At the end of this period, the NPS made two significant concessions to skiers which seemed to confirm Mount Rainier as a major ski area in the minds of local skiers. In 1938, Director Cammerer approved plans for a large dormitory building at Paradise, to be constructed from CCC, PWA, and regular appropriation funds. The tentative plan for this building was to use it for NPS or RNPC employee housing during the summer, and to lease the building at cost to the

RNPC for use as a low-rate guest facility during the winter. Known as the Ski Lodge, the building was designed with four main compartments, each with lobby, toilet, shower, and dormitory area. It would accommodate 80 people. The hope was that low-income people, semi-charitable groups, and college and high school students could be accommodated for about 75 cents per person per night. [55] The Ski Lodge was finally completed in December 1941, the same month that the United States entered World War II. As the war years brought a hiatus to winter use of Mount Rainier, the future use of this building was unclear.

The second significant concession to ski groups was Director Newton B. Drury's decision, approved by the Secretary of the Interior on December 12, 1940, to permit the installation of a demountable, T-bar type of ski lift. [56] The T-bar represented an intermediate-sized lift between the rope tow and the chair lift. The plan was to extend the lift well beyond Alta Vista to the foot of Panorama Point. The Pacific Northwest Ski Association had been calling for a chair lift for the past three years. In view of the later controversy over the construction of a permanent chair lift in the park, this was an unfortunate precedent. In June 1941, the RNPC announced that it was not prepared financially to build such a lift, but this only postponed the issue until after World War II. [57]

THE OHANAPECOSH HOT SPRINGS COMPANY

The large addition to Mount Rainier National Park in January 1931 brought the natural feature known as Ohanapecosh Hot Springs under the jurisdiction of the park administration. The feature consisted of more than a dozen separate springs, some of them very hot, which drained into the Ohanapecosh River, deep in the lowland forest in what was now the southeast corner of the park. At that time the springs could be reached most easily from the town of Lewis (Packwood), Lewis County, at the end of a twelve-mile mountain road. Alternatively, the springs were sixteen miles by trail from Narada Falls. The springs were locally popular as a place to camp and bathe, attracting a few thousand visitors each year.

Early Interest in the Springs

The park administration had shown an interest in the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs long before the boundary extension in 1931. Park superintendents made repeated proposals—in 1913, 1916, 1919, and 1925-26—to extend the park boundary so as to include this area in the park. The original boundary of 1899 placed the hot springs a mere fifth of a mile outside the park. The ostensible reason for including the springs in the park was to give protection to the natural feature itself, but the overriding concern was to be able to control visitor access and use in the southeast corner of the park. As long as the springs remained just outside, it would be an easy thing for Lewis County residents to camp at the springs and hike across the park boundary—either intentionally or inadvertently—to hunt game. But each time the proposal for a boundary change surfaced, it ran into opposition from Lewis County residents and local developers. These opponents of the boundary extension claimed that the NPS was merely acting in the interests of the RNPC, which wanted to stifle development of the springs and protect its monopoly in the area. [58]

When the springs finally came under park administration in 1931, development of the springs already dated back many years (Chapter VIII). The earliest commercial tent camp at the springs was established by Mrs. R.M. O'Neal in 1913. Apparently it was a short-lived affair. [59] Three years later, Superintendent Reaburn noted that many people attributed therapeutic powers to the springs, but that "very little development work has been done on them." [60] In 1921, a local entrepreneur named N.D. Tower obtained a permit from the Forest Service to develop a resort at the springs. Tower's permit contained a 25 year lease. After a few years, Tower found an investor by the name of Dr. Albert W. Bridge and together they formed the

Ohanapecosh Hot Springs Company. Bridge was owner of the Bridge Clinic in Tacoma. In the spring of 1924, Bridge and Tower hired a road crew to construct five and a half miles of road from Clear Fork to the hot springs, and that summer they opened a tent camp and a few cabins. In 1925, they built a small hotel and two bathhouses. According to an announcement in the Tacoma Ledger, the cedar-shake and log building was supposed to be a start toward "a great resort and sanitarium" which would acquire a national reputation "such as the Hot Springs in Arkansas." [61] Asahel Curtis offered a more realistic appraisal when he predicted to Superintendent Tomlinson that the development would "never amount to anything" unless a large company got involved. [62]

Park officials were unsure how to handle the Ohanapecosh concession when they inherited it from the Forest Service in 1931. It was clear that the Ohanapecosh development would remain small compared to the RNPC's developments at Paradise, Longmire, and Sunrise. The RNPC refused to have anything to do with it. Even the owner, Dr. Bridge, who bought out Tower's share in the company in the mid-1920s, seemed to be biding his time until the Eastside Road was completed. [63]

To make the situation still more problematic, local opinion about the concession was divided. The developers claimed to have strong local support for their enterprise, which they styled as a populist franchise challenging the monopolistic RNPC, whose profits they alleged were siphoned off by Seattle and Tacoma capitalists without any benefit to the people of Lewis County. But many people who actually used the springs did not appreciate the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs Company. They thought the government should provide campground, toilet, and bathhouse facilities for free rather than allow a concession to charge a fee for them. With the opening of the road to the springs in 1925, a considerable number of people with rheumatism and other maladies had started coming to the springs each summer, camping in a free public campground provided by the Forest Service, staying for weeks or months at a time, and paying the company twenty-five cents per day for use of its bathhouse and concrete-lined hot pools. These convalescents formed a summer community of as many as 135 people, all of whom favored free public access to the springs. [64]

In the early years of the Depression, Tomlinson showed some sympathy for these campers, even though they were not the typical kind of park visitor. He refused to let the concessioner build new cabins in the area of the free camp sites, even though this area was too hummocky for a good campground, because it would require moving the campers farther away from the springs. Tomlinson explained to Bridge and his architect that this was undesirable "due to the fact that many of the campers are crippled with rheumatism and other diseases and want to have their camps as close as possible to the bath house." Moreover, Tomlinson wanted the company to provide two classes of baths with one at a lower rate "to meet the demands of poor people who claim they cannot afford even to pay that much, but feel that the Government should provide free bathing service." [65] On the other hand, Tomlinson showed no inclination for the NPS to take over this service from the concession.

A Second Park Concession

As a result of all these circumstances, the boundary addition in 1931 brought a second concession into the park which did not fit the mold of the NPS concession policy established under Mather. The Ohanapecosh Hot Springs Company was a throwback to the type of rustic resort hotel such as James Longmire had built. It was also akin to the small, family-owned resorts that began appearing along highways and lakeshores in the national forests in this era. NPS planners disparagingly referred to such developments as "topsy" because of the disorderly or topsy-turvy way that the buildings and grounds usually developed.

The Ohanapecosh Lodge was built in 1925 and became a secondary park concession after the Ohanapecosh area was added to the park in 1931. It was removed in the early 1960s. *(Photo courtesy of University of Washington.)*

This is not to say that the Ohanapecosh development was ignored by the Park Service's landscape architects and engineers. Rather, the concession s small size limited how much could be done with it. The concession was permitted to continue operating with a minimum of improvements to the existing facilities. A sawmill was removed in 1934, and an oil house was taken out in 1938, but other improvements to the site were postponed until the Eastside Road neared completion. [66] In 1939, the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs Company added five new cabins to the existing twenty, improved the employee quarters in the lodge, and built a five-car garage. In 1941, the company completed seven more cabins. [67] Despite these improvements, however, the development remained substandard. It would be a growing embarrassment to the park administration until its closure in 1960.

THE ORDEAL OF THE RAINIER NATIONAL PARK COMPANY

The partnership of public and private investment which had underpinned the development of Mount Rainier National Park in the 1920s was superseded by a matrix of federal relief programs in the 1930s. The Seattle and Tacoma businessmen who served on the board of directors of the RNPC saw their influence ebb rapidly as NPS officials concerned themselves less with private capital and more with the federal administrators who held the purse strings of the Emergency Conservation Work (ECW), Public Works Administration (PWA), Civil Works Administration (CWA), Emergency Relief Administration (ERA), and other New Deal agencies.

The RNPC's stockholders, meanwhile, found their hopes for a large return on their investment blighted by the Depression. As the company's outlook changed, they began to wonder how they could tactfully extricate themselves from such a public-spirited yet unprofitable venture. The financial misfortunes of the RNPC held longterm consequences for the park, because twenty years later it would become necessary for the federal government to buy the company's buildings and lease them back to the RNPC in order to keep the

concession operational. Therefore, the nature and finances of this company are significant to the park's administrative history.

Reversal of Fortune

Company spokespersons insisted that the progressive-minded businessmen and women of the Puget Sound region who had launched the RNPC had done so with little thought of private gain; rather, they had responded to Mather's summons to develop the national park for the economic return it would bring to the region. These spokespersons pointed out that the company's elected officers served without compensation, and that the stockholders had thus far received negligible dividends as most of the RNPC's profits were plowed back into the expanding enterprise during the 1920s. [68] But the RNPC was comprised of longterm investors. The company's financial records show that it posted strong yearly profits as total revenues climbed impressively from 1916 to 1929. There should be little doubt that the RNPC management was motivated by considerations of profit and loss just like the management of any other company.

The effects of the Depression on the RNPC were profound. During the worst years of the Depression the RNPC's gross revenues shriveled to about one quarter of what they had been in 1929. In six out of ten years of the Depression decade the company lost money. In 1933, the company's indebtedness was so severe that it was barely able to scrounge together enough capital to open for business that summer. The Depression was all the more stunning to company officials because the preceding decade had been so full of promise. For the whole 1920-29 period, the RNPC averaged an annual gross revenue of $437,000 with a net profit of approximately 17 percent. Stockholders were told that when all the approach roads to the park were completed, the company's business would quadruple. [69] As it turned out, the 1920s were the RNPC's heyday. The company would suffer further financial reverses during the war years and again in the early 1950s. It would never approach the level of business that its founders had anticipated. After grossing more than a half million dollars in 1925, it would not pass that mark again until the late 1950s. In a sense, the Depression delivered a blow from which the company never recovered.

But the company's problems went deeper than that. They also had to do with changing visitor demand. As discussed in Chapter IX, the RNPC was asked to undertake an ambitious five year development plan in 1928. The commercial tent camp at Paradise was to be upgraded to housekeeping cabins at the same time that a new, first-class hotel was to be built near Nisqually Vista. In addition, the company agreed to undertake another major development at Sunrise. To finance this $2.5 million scheme, the RNPC tried to enlist the four transcontinental railroads serving the Pacific Northwest. When that failed, the company scaled back its five year development plan to something that could be financed by local capital. The RNPC was stretched thin trying to modernize its accommodations at the very time that the economy crumbled. [70]

The concessioner built more than 400 cabins at Paradise and Sunrise in the early 1930s. They were not popular with visitors and did not stand up well under the heavy snowloads. Removed in 1944, they left lasting impressions in the meadows. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

After borrowing heavily to pay for new lodges and cabins at Paradise and Sunrise, the RNPC was some $375,000 in debt. The company tried to increase its stock but could find no new subscribers as the business climate worsened. Desperate for cash, the company tried to borrow $350,000 through an issue of $500 notes that would mature at six percent in five years. [71] The RNPC's new president, Alexander Baillie, urged the four railroads to subscribe to 1,000 notes apiece. NPS Director Albright wrote to the president of the Northern Pacific, Charles Donnelly, asking that his railroad loan $200,000 to the RNPC. After months of haggling, the four railroads finally tried to appease the RNPC and the Park Service with token loans of $2,000 apiece. Altogether, the RNPC raised a mere $30,000 in notes. In 1933, the RNPC appealed to Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes for a loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), but since a large part of the money was needed to retire the company's debts the RFC could not help out. [72]

Meanwhile, the company was faced with shrinking business revenues. Brand new housekeeping cabins stood empty through the summer; a newly redecorated and refurnished Paradise Inn experienced room vacancies on weekends in July; waitresses and busboys stood around with nothing to do in the inn's elegant dining room. The RNPC's account books were awash in red ink: a $69,000 loss in 1931, $91,000 in 1932, $73,000 in 1933. Superintendent Tomlinson could do little more than offer the company praise and encouragement. He wrote in his annual report of 1931:

> The improvements and new equipment provided by the Public Utility Operator during a time of serious business depression throughout the country are indicative of the progressive attitude of Company officials. Although business was far below expectations, the impression gained by visitors as to the fine accommodations now available places the company in an excellent position to

> meet the needs of visitors when conditions return to normal. There were more expressions of approval of the Operator's facilities this year than during any other year, and I desire to here acknowledge my personal appreciation of the fine spirit of cooperation shown by directing officials of the Rainier National Park Company. [73]

Mitigative Measures

The company looked for ways to cut operating expenses. Transportation service between Seattle, Tacoma, and Portland and the park was turned over to the North Coast Transportation Company in 1931. That company had fully-enclosed, 32-passenger busses. Passengers transferred from the large busses to the RNPC's open-air, 14-passenger stages at Longmire. Tomlinson considered this arrangement an improvement because the large busses were more comfortable for the long drive while the stages gave passengers a better view of the scenery from Longmire to Paradise. [74]

The company proposed to sell to the government its hydroelectric plant on the Paradise River. [75] This proposal took the form of a bill, which Washington's Senator Wesley Jones introduced in the Senate on December 14, 1931 [76] At the annual meeting of the board of directors in January 1932, it was suggested that the Seattle and Tacoma chambers of commerce be requested to lobby for the bill through their representatives in Washington, D.C. Albright also supported the proposal. In a memorandum written for the Secretary of the Interior, Albright explained that the company had used the majority of the electrical power supply when the plant was built in 1915. Now with the lighted public campground and numerous administrative and residential buildings at Longmire, the situation was reversed, with the government using most of the plant's power-generating capacity. Albright informed Secretary of the Interior Ray Lyman Wilbur that it was the government's policy to own such power plants in the national parks, and moreover, the purchase would provide the company with much-needed capital. [77] This bill failed to pass.

In August 1932, General Manager Sceva and RNPC President Baillie wrote to the Secretary of the Interior to request a waiver of the $2,000 annual franchise fee. "We rather feel we are partners of the Government in maintaining these facilities for the comfort and convenience of visitors," Baillie wrote. "I am not using idle words when I say that if this charge is not eliminated from our contract it will be impossible to raise money from the public to create increased facilities." [78] This request was politely refused. Assistant Secretary Joseph M. Dixon reminded Baillie that the RNPC had been allowed a smaller franchise fee than the Curry Company of Yosemite when the RNPC's new contract was negotiated in 1928. [79]

Company officials had to adjust their expectations for the new development at Sunrise. Even after the plan for the Sunrise Lodge was scaled down from the original plan of a large, deluxe hotel, it was opened in July 1931 with some $50,000 of interior finishing yet to be completed. The new building contained a cafeteria-style food service, baths, supply store, post office, and employee quarters, but no guest rooms. Uphill from the lodge were 215 housekeeping cabins.

To attract business to this new development the RNPC began marketing the Sunrise development as a dude ranch. The company brochure stated, "Memories of the Old West are revived and experienced in the Sunrise Dude Ranch where real western riders entertain and lead you on many interesting trips." Yakima Park was billed as a former cattle range abounding in "romantic legends." The Mount Rainier Mining Company's idle works in Glacier Basin were styled the "Ghost Gold Mine" and were the destination of moonlit horseback rides. A small box canyon called Devil's Hole was claimed to have been a hideout for rustlers, where two badmen were said to have defended themselves against an attack by a

large posse of local townsmen. [80] This kind of exploitation of the national park was not in keeping with the purpose of the park concession, but under the circumstances park officials did not object to it. Indeed, the design theme of the new administrative buildings at Sunrise, which commemorated the Indian past in Yakima Park by the use of a dubious frontier-blockhouse architectural style, only contributed to the hype.

An important thrust of the RNPC's new marketing effort at Sunrise was its offering of a weekly rate that included cabin, meals, and a horse, all in one package. The aim, once again, was to attract easterners to Mount Rainier. The RNPC also coordinated its publicity and sales efforts with the transcontinental railroads, offering all-expense fares that included two and three days' accommodations at Mount Rainier in the cost of a railroad ticket. These tickets could be purchased at any railroad office or travel agency in the United States and Canada. Beginning in 1932, RNPC officials persuaded the Seattle, Tacoma, and Yakima chambers of commerce to help pay the cost of the company's promotional literature. [81]

Meanwhile, on the south side of the mountain, the company adjusted its rates and schedules to appeal to a local clientele. During the 1933 season the guide service at Paradise was greatly curtailed, the photograph business was not opened, and most guest services were concentrated at the Paradise Lodge, the inn being used only for overflow guests on weekends. These drastic measures lasted just one season, and succeeded in trimming the company's losses from what they had been the year before despite the fact that park visitation fell to its lowest point during the whole Depression.

Government Purchase of the Longmire Tract

Park administrators had been urging that the government purchase the Longmire Springs property since the early years of the national park. The privately-owned tract, or inholding, flew in the face of the basic national park concept of public ownership of the land. The more cluttered the Longmire property became, the more it undermined the purposes of the national park. Indeed, a case could be made that the old Longmire Springs Hotel was an example of the very kind of unsightly development that Cornelius Hedges and his companions had had in mind during their legendary discussion beside the Madison River in Yellowstone when they pledged themselves to work for the creation of the nation's first national park. It is rather surprising, given the centrality of public ownership to the national park idea, that Congress was so reluctant to appropriate funds for the purchase of inholdings like the Longmire property.

In 1927, Congress finally appropriated $50,000 for purchases of private lands in national parks, with the stipulation that fifty percent of each purchase must come from private donations. That year Mather approached the RNPC about buying the Longmire property, based on a fifty-fifty split and a $30,000 option price. The RNPC countered that it would donate $15,000 if the government would remit its $2,000 franchise fee yearly until the company was reimbursed. This was unsatisfactory to Mather and the matter was allowed to rest. [82]

Six years later, the RNPC's president, Alexander Baillie, reopened the issue with Director Cammerer, suggesting that the property owners themselves might be willing to make a donation. "I think it would not be difficult to get the Longmire Mineral Springs Company to put a reasonable price on their property and then cut the price in two, which I understand is the usual procedure where the National Park Service is acquiring property in or adjoining the National Parks," Baillie wrote. The owners placed a value of $100,000 on the land, and would likely accept $50,000 from the government, he thought. [83] At this stage it was difficult to judge whether Baillie was motivated by concerns about adverse use of the land or by a desire for personal gain: he neglected to mention that the Longmire Mineral Springs

Company had bought the land from the Longmire family for about $60,000, and that his wife was a 25 percent owner in that company. In any case, Assistant Director Arthur E. Demaray rejected the $100,000 value as unrealistic. [84]

One year later, in 1934, Cammerer received a communication directly from the Longmire Mineral Springs Company's president, a Tacoma lumberman named Frost Snyder. Cammerer was willing to deal if the property was reappraised. Nearly a year later, Tomlinson reported to the director that he and Snyder had been able to settle—"after considerable delay, numerous conferences, and much investigation"—on an appraisal of $55,000. Evidently both the Longmire Mineral Springs Company and the RNPC hoped that the other would donate half the purchase price, and negotiations stalled once more. In 1936, the RNPC tried to have the property reappraised at $100,000, expecting the owners to settle on a basis of $50,000. [85]

These protracted negotiations reached a critical stage in 1937. With the RNPC's 20-year lease soon to expire, Cammerer and Baillie both displayed less and less patience with one another. Baillie urged the NPS to secure an emergency appropriation that would allow it to pay 100% of the option price. Cammerer reiterated his request that the RNPC contribute half, noting that the Curry Company had made an analogous donation for the purchase of the Wawona properties in Yosemite. [86] Baillie did not even acknowledge the director's request, but coolly replied:

> I may tell you that the public are very much aroused over the possibility of the Longmire Mineral Springs property falling into the hands of a resort crowd and there is much criticism of the National Park Service for not acquiring the property at its appraised value when you had the opportunity to do so. And I think if you have another appraisal of it the price will be more than doubled. And with no restrictions as to what could be placed on the property except the restrictions of the State, one can't foresee what may happen.
>
> Does Mr. Ickes understand the situation? [87]

It was well-known that Cammerer had an uncomfortable relationship with the irascible Secretary of the Interior, and Baillie's final remark was clearly barbed. Cammerer duly instructed his assistant director, G.A. Moskey, to review the now-voluminous file on the Longmire property and prepare a memorandum. In late October, Cammerer and Tomlinson discussed the Longmire property with Baillie and Paul Sceva in person at the Rainier Club in Seattle. Now it was Cammerer's turn to bait Baillie: he wondered aloud whether the RNPC president was acting primarily in the interest of his wife's 25 percent share in the Longmire Mineral Springs Company? Baillie resented this, but the men nevertheless reached an agreement. The property was assessed at $60,000, and Cammerer promised to seek a special appropriation by Congress for the government's share of $30,000, while Baillie promised to urge the Longmire Mineral Springs Company to grant the U.S. government a one-year option to purchase. [88]

The RNPC's general manager, Paul Sceva, believed that the deal was still very tenuous. He contacted local conservation groups, chambers of commerce, and Representatives John M. Coffee and Charles H. Leavy of Washington in an effort to create public support for the deal. [89] Sceva's letter to J.J. Underwood, the Seattle Chamber of Commerce's lobbyist in Washington, D.C., suggests how serious the situation had become:

> ...The owners of the property, the Longmire Mineral Springs Company, with Mr. Frost Snyder, of Tacoma, as its President, has [sic] determined to get some revenue from this area and has offered it for sale in whole or in part. The area

> can easily be divided into one hundred lots that would readily sell to the public at a price from $1,000 to $2,000 per lot. I am of the opinion that the whole area could be sold within ninety days and undoubtedly bring the owners from $110,000 to to [sic] $120,000 by such means.
>
> Fortunately, Mr. Alexander Baillie's wife owns 24% of the stock of the Longmire Mineral Springs Company. She is a public spirited woman and a lover of National Parks, and through her influence she has been able to talk down the aggressiveness of Mr. Snyder in his method of selling this area without giving the National Park Service an opportunity to buy it. Furthermore, she has been able to have that company grant to the National Park Service an opportunity to buy for one year from this date at a price of $60,000. I understand the Longmire Mineral Springs Company paid approximately $60,000 for this area years and years ago.
>
> If the National Park Service is unable to exercise the option and purchase the area, the method referred to above of selling will undoubtedly come to pass and then we will have virtually a Coney Island right in the center of Mount Rainier National Park. To my personal knowledge, I know of one man who offered $2,000 for a plot of this area fifty by seventy. He wanted to install a beer tavern. I know of another one who offered $2,000 for a small area around the soda springs and he intends, if he is successful in his purchase, to build a tavern with the soda spring in the middle of it, using the soda spring water for a soda fountain and other uses. The warm springs would probably be utilized for bath houses. Undoubtedly there will be gas stations, repair shops, curio stands, hot dog stands, dance halls and everything imaginable, because the general public believes there are great profits to be made in individual business in the Park. I am of the opinion that any purchaser of any of these lots could make a very good living out of his endeavor because he would not be burdened with any expense of publicity, promotion fees or whatnot. The purchasers would merely tie on to the tail of the kite of the Rainier National Park Company and pick off any business that they could get from the two or three hundred thousand people who go right through this area every year.... [90]

Finally, by the Act of March 9, 1938, Congress appropriated $30,000 for the purchase of the Longmire property. [91] More than a year later, on June 15, 1939, Tomlinson notified Cammerer that Check No. 5,683,886 had been received and delivered to Snyder's partner, C.L. Dickson, treasurer of the Longmire Mineral Springs Company. Tomlinson concluded his message, "Custody of the land and responsibility for its protection and maintenance was accepted today by the National Park Service." [92]

The perilously long delay in acquiring this land may be attributable in part to the attitude of Secretary Ickes. In his "Secret Diary," Ickes fretted about the way the NPS acquired land parcels like the one in Mount Rainier. According to Ickes, park officials would employ an appraiser who "would determine the value of the property to be purchased, then double that value on the basis of an understanding with the owner that half of the doubled value would represent a contribution to the National Government." As a result, alleged Ickes, "the Government would be paying the full, fair and reasonable values of the property instead of fifty percent of it." [93] The official record suggests that Ickes's suspicion was in this case unfounded.

Disappointment with the Winter Season

Mount Rainier's winter season was like a gambling habit for the RNPC: year after year the

company officers ruefully tabulated the RNPC's losses during the past winter's operation and then talked themselves into trying it again. The Paradise Inn was available for use and the snow conditions were superb; it stood to reason that the company would do well to extend its operation through the winter. Unfortunately, local skiers did not spend a lot of money while they were in the park, and profits eluded the RNPC. [94]

The company liked to blame the Park Service for making it offer services to the public which were unprofitable, but the fact was that RNPC officials consistently pushed for a winter season, first at Longmire and later at Paradise. They believed that the national park must establish a market; a profitable level of business would develop in due course. The construction of the Paradise Lodge went forward with high hopes of developing a big winter season at Paradise. When winter business failed to materialize, company officials decided that a promotional campaign was required. The RNPC advertised winter sports in Mount Rainier. [95] It leased housekeeping cabins and rooms in the Paradise Lodge for the entire winter season for nominal rates of $30 to $60. The plan was inaugurated for the winter of 1933-34. Superintendent Tomlinson gave it his full support. "This policy of low cost accommodations and the maintenance of a winter road to within 1-1/4 mile of Paradise Lodge are doing more than anything else to increase interest in winter sports in the Park," he wrote in his annual report. [96]

By the end of the 1930s, RNPC officials were feeling discouraged about the winter season. Probably Sceva or someone else with a close involvement in the company was responsible for an editorial in the Tacoma News Tribune, on November 28, 1938, which blamed the government for the RNPC's troubles. "Years ago the government called on the citizens of Tacoma and Seattle to help in the building of a recreation resort at the mountain," the editorial began. Now the federal government was investing heavily in recreation areas, creating unfair competition. Timberline Lodge on Oregon's Mount Hood was the most flagrant example; ski resorts built by government-subsidized railroads were another. At Mount Rainier, meanwhile, the RNPC had incurred a debt of more than $300,000; its old buildings were in need of rehabilitation. [97] The sense of betrayal in this editorial probably reflected the views of the company. The company's president, Alex Baillie, confided to a business associate, "Between you and me and the gatepost, I have been pretty much disgusted with the attitude of the National Park Service in regard to our problems, and while I am optimistic about the future of the Rainier National Park, we don't get very much help from the 'powers that be' in Washington." [98] Company officials were in no mood to cooperate with the Park Service on a winter use policy.

Many Washington residents resented the Rainier National Park Company's monopoly in the park. Here the company is depicted as an octopus barring all access roads to the mountain except the road to Paradise. *(M. Tackaberry cartoon from the Washington Sportsman, vol.3 no.9, November 1937.)*

After World War II, Washington residents who wanted skiing facilities at Mount Rainier would demand that the concession either provide this public need or step aside so others could do so. These promoters would attack the NPS for coddling the RNPC and perpetuating a private monopoly that they alleged was against the public interest, a charge that had not been heard since the early 1920s. After the war there would also be a whole new cast of characters: John Preston replaced Tomlinson as superintendent in 1941; Newton B. Drury became the next director of the NPS after Cammerer's retirement in 1940; Paul Sceva would become president of the RNPC after Baillie's death in 1949; and the editor of The Washington Motorist, Roger Freeman, would emerge as the Puget Sound region's most voluble booster after Asahel Curtis died in 1941. Yet, as this issue swelled into the dominant management concern in Mount Rainier National Park in the postwar period, its roots could be found in the 1930s, when Pacific Northwesterners discovered the sport of downhill skiing and the RNPC discovered the vagaries of the winter tourist season.

MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART FOUR: DEPRESSION AND WAR YEARS, 1930-1945

XI. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW DEAL

INTRODUCTION

During the Depression the NPS continued to define park visitors as all those people who visited the park for pleasure. The actual number of people in the park was considerably higher as hundreds of men came to work in emergency relief camps. In 1933-34, the Civil Works Administration employed several hundred men and furnished their lodging at Longmire, Ohanapecosh, and Carbon River. Between 1933 and 1940, the Civilian Conservation Corps had camps at Tahoma Creek, Narada Falls, Ipsut Creek, St. Andrews Creek, White River, Ohanapecosh, and Sunshine Point, with as many as two hundred men in each camp company. Altogether, these relief camps held as many as a thousand men during the early to mid-1930s. Apart from the valuable work that these men accomplished, their residence in the park added considerably to the administrative burdens and to the cumulative human impact on the park's natural resources.

After a brief slowdown at the beginning of the Depression, Mount Rainier once more became the scene of much construction work in the 1930s, as it had been in the 1920s. The difference was in the kind of work being performed. The main focus of construction shifted from major road and hotel construction to scores of smaller projects that could be accomplished by CCC crews. These included campground improvements, minor road and trail improvements, administrative buildings, backcountry shelters, landscape rehabilitation, plant beds, scenic turnouts, picnic areas, and various other items. Major road work went forward at a slower pace; the Eastside Road, completed in 1940, was the most important addition to the road system in this era.

Emergency relief projects were indicative of the NPS's expanded mission after 1933. During the famous "Hundred Days" in which the new Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration sent up a raft of emergency and reform bills to Congress, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes enlisted NPS Director Horace Albright and the Park Service in the effort to bring about a national economic recovery. [1] During the New Deal, all national park administrators were called upon to contribute to this effort. Various federal emergency relief administrations were established to provide work for the unemployed which would not only aid families without income but would thereby increase household consumption and stimulate the economy. Thus, the several relief camps in Mount Rainier National Park had more to do with the national emergency than they did with traditional NPS management goals. During the New Deal era, all projects were evaluated not only for their ability to serve the core NPS mandate of preserving the park for the enjoyment of present and future generations, but for their potential to create jobs, too. The park administration garnered massive amounts of money for myriad projects through various New Deal programs (the PWA, the WPA, the CWA, the CCC). These relief funds enriched all areas of park administration, from museum development to trail improvement. Actual park appropriations, meanwhile, grew by relatively small

increments in the 1930s. When economic depression gave way to national defense preparations in 1940-41, the NPS experienced a painful period of adjustment. Relief programs were dismantled without a commensurate increase in park appropriations. After the U.S. entered World War II, the NPS actually faced deep budget cuts in addition to the loss of these New Deal programs.

At the same time that the Roosevelt Administration made the Park Service a major player in various emergency relief programs, it greatly enlarged the Park Service's scope of responsibilities in other areas. By two executive orders of June 10 and July 28, 1933, Roosevelt added scores of national memorials, battlefield sites, parkways, and other areas of national significance to the national park system. The Roosevelt Administration called upon the NPS for advice and expertise on everything from community recreation planning to historic preservation. After the creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Park Service worked with CCC administrators to implement a program of "emergency conservation work" in units of the national park system and in state parks. Throughout the New Deal era, the national parks obtained large allotments from federal emergency relief appropriations with which to employ thousands of men and women on public works projects.

This chapter considers the overall impact of the New Deal on Mount Rainier National Park. It begins with an analysis of the effects of the Civilian Conservation Corps, and then proceeds to a discussion of other public works programs in the park. The last section of the chapter attempts to place the park in the context of regional conservation politics and the burgeoning national park system and looks at the changing role of the Mount Rainier National Park superintendency.

THE CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS

Each summer during the New Deal years, hundreds of young men lived in CCC camps in Mount Rainier National Park. They spent their working hours erecting buildings, improving trails and campgrounds, fighting white pine blister rust, and planting trees and shrubs. Their labor and energy, together with the accompanying infusion of funds into the park's operating budget, came close to creating a distinct "CCC era" in the national park's history. On closer examination one finds that many of the trends that are popularly associated with the CCC era in national parks and forests—such as the construction of buildings in a rustic architectural style, the all-out effort to suppress forest fires, and the increased commitment to biological research and management—began before the creation of the CCC. One also finds that the increased funds available to the NPS came from a variety of federal relief programs of which the CCC was only the most renowned. Still, the fact remains that the Civilian Conservation Corps was one of the most popular and memorable programs of the New Deal. It came to symbolize the impact of the New Deal on national forests and national parks, including Mount Rainier National Park. [2]

The establishment of the Emergency Conservation Work (ECW) program, more commonly known as the CCC, presented park administrators with two new obligations. One objective, plainly, was to accomplish valuable conservation work. The other objective was to provide emergency relief for CCC enrollees. These were distinct, albeit compatible, objectives. Park officials viewed each CCC enrollee not just as a source of labor but as a new client—a new type of visitor who could find spiritual renewal in nature through the collective CCC experience. As Superintendent Tomlinson explained to the CCC camp superintendents, the fundamental values that guided national park management in normal times would be "effective in their entirety during the Emergency Conservation Work, with the additional requirement of training and character building of the young men enrolled as a part of the nationwide employment relief plan." [3] As a former military officer, Tomlinson welcomed

the chance for the park to serve as a place for "man building."

This section of the chapter focuses first on how the NPS administered the CCC in Mount Rainier National Park and how the CCC permanently changed the park staff organization. It then reviews the considerable physical accomplishments of the CCC in the park. Finally, it considers the CCC in Mount Rainier as a unique social experience in the park's history.

Administration of the CCC

The CCC was President Franklin D. Roosevelt's own brainchild. It was among the first of the legislative initiatives which the new administration hammered through Congress in the spring of 1933. Even as the CCC was under discussion by Congress, senior officials in the NPS recognized that it would be a boon for the national parks. Already, in the last year of the Hoover Administration, Congress had allotted emergency relief funds for road construction in the national parks in an effort to stimulate the economy. The master plans which the NPS had prepared for each national park during the preceding five years outlined the work which needed to be done throughout the system and assured that the national parks would receive due consideration for public works projects during the Depression. [4]

From a Park Service administrative standpoint, the difference between the CCC and earlier emergency relief measures was that the CCC involved the NPS much more deeply in the task of managing a labor force. Administering the CCC was not merely a matter of turning more federal funds into road construction contracts under the Bureau of Public Roads. Rather, it involved the formulation of a wide array of work projects and the development of a technical staff to supervise those projects. It required cooperation with the Army, the Department of Labor, and to a lesser extent other land management agencies in the Interior and Agriculture Departments, and the development of liaisons with these parties at all levels of administration from the directorship to the park superintendency. It entailed the location and supply of hundreds of CCC camps throughout the national park system, as well as the administration of the CCC program in state parks. To deal with the administrative burdens that the CCC placed on the NPS, it became necessary to increase the amount of support staff in field offices such as the one in San Francisco and eventually, in 1937, to divide the national park system into four regions. Mount Rainier National Park, like all other units in the system, came to rely more and more on the technical staff and services provided by each regional office.

Setting up the CCC was a mammoth task in itself. President Roosevelt's announced goal was to have a quarter of a million men enrolled in the CCC by July. Horace Albright, serving out his last months as director of the NPS, represented the Interior Department on the CCC's organizing council that spring as the administration formulated how this goal was to be accomplished. It immediately became obvious that conservation agencies like the Park Service and the Forest Service were too small to build and run the camps as originally envisioned; only the Army could handle that. Therefore, the division of responsibility between government agencies was made as follows: the Army would process the enrollees and form them into companies with Army commanders, dispatch the companies to their respective camps, build the camps, and maintain discipline in the camps; the conservation agencies such as the Park Service and the Forest Service would select all CCC camp locations, furnish the camps with tools and vehicles, employ the enrollees in useful conservation work, and supervise their efforts. [5]

Meanwhile, the Labor Department was given the special task of enrolling supervisory personnel in the CCC. These would be older men with experience in forest work or a building trade who would serve as camp leaders and crew foremen for the young enrollees. The law required that they be recruited from the local area and that they receive a higher rate of pay than the other enrollees, so that it would not seem to the local inhabitants near a CCC

camp that the CCC was taking away jobs or further depressing the wage scale. In what must be one of the gems of the New Deal's distinctive nomenclature, these supervisory personnel were designated by the homely title of "local experienced men," or LEMs. [6]

Superintendent Tomlinson worked with Army officers from Fort Lewis, Washington, in planning when and where CCC camps would be built in Mount Rainier National Park. Suitable sites were selected and cleared of trees, building materials were shipped to the site, and camp equipment was requisitioned. Tomlinson's years of military experience in the Philippines no doubt proved an asset to him now as he found himself involved in a rapid mobilization of manpower for emergency conservation work. "These are strenuous days," he confided in a note to Cammerer. Along with the heavy demands imposed by the CCC, Tomlinson was preparing estimates for a two-year public works program under the PWA, and contending with "wild rumors" about an impending shake-up of the department by the new Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes. [7] Despite all the distractions, he could report by mid- July that more than a thousand men were deployed in the park in five CCC camps. Most of the men were performing trail work and roadside cleanup while their camp buildings were still under construction. [8]

Company 2941 of the Civilian Conservation Corps at Sunshine Point Camp. This was one of seven sites in the park which NPS officials selected for CCC camps. *(Darius Kinsey photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

Probably the most immediate effect that the CCC had on the administration of the park was in the area of fiscal management. Before the camps were even occupied, Tomlinson was informed that all funds authorized for new construction in Mount Rainier had been impounded and pooled with funds set aside for the CCC. This was in addition to a 25 percent cut in regular maintenance and operation allotments and a 15 percent cut in the allotment for personnel. The purpose of the impoundment of funds was to ensure that the ECW program would be assimilated quickly into the bureaucratic power structure. Tomlinson illustrated the dramatic change in the park's sources of funding with this tabulation of figures on July 4, 1933:

APPROPRIATIONS AVAILABLE FOR OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION

	1933 Fiscal Year	1934 Fiscal Year
Administration & Operation	$132,250.00	$103,250.00
Construction Projects	72,250.00	none
Forest Protection & Fire Prevention	19,830.00	6,125.00
Roads & Trails		
Minor Projects, NPS Force Account	50,000.00	none
Major Projects, Contracted by BPR	230,000.00	none
Emergency Relief Allotments		
Minor Projects, NPS Force Account	22,400.00	none
Major Projects, Contracted by BPR	420,000.00	none
Public Works Program (1934-1935)	none	$2,534,279.00
Total:	$946,730.00	$2,643,654.00

These figures did not include ECW funds and manpower nor other relief funds that would shortly come available to the park under the Civil Works Administration (CWA). Nevertheless, they demonstrated that NPS officials would need to change the way they did business, working closely with federal relief administrators to obtain a large part of their operating budgets from year to year. [9]

Another effect of the CCC on the park administration was to increase the level of contact with state and federal officials outside the NPS. This was inevitable when the park became closely involved in an unemployment relief program. Tomlinson's close coordination with officers at Fort Lewis has already been mentioned; at another level, Tomlinson's rangers worked almost daily with the handful of Army personnel who were assigned to the CCC camps in Mount Rainier, as well as the supervisory personnel, or LEMs, in the CCC. District rangers trained all CCC enrollees in fire prevention, and CCC fire crews were given frequent fire drills. The superintendent, meanwhile, had frequent contacts with the CCC's Washington Procurement Office and the Washington State Park Authority. Since Mount Rainier experienced heavy snowfall in winter, the CCC camps had to be vacated each fall. It was found that the most efficient procedure was to have the CCC companies in Mount Rainier move out to winter quarters located in Washington state parks at or near sea level. Tomlinson worked out a schedule for these moves each fall and spring with state officials. [10]

The CCC program led to an increase in the number of technicians on the park staff. The technicians were needed to supervise the myriad CCC work projects. These new staff members were not part of the park's regular staff; their salaries were paid with ECW funds, and their positions were subject to renewal after each six-month enrollment period of the CCC. Moreover, they were assigned to the park by the NPS branch offices of landscape architecture, architecture, engineering, and wildlife in San Francisco. They answered to those offices' two representatives in the park, Engineer R.D. Waterhouse and Landscape Architect Ernest A. Davidson, as well as to the superintendent. At the end of the 1934 season, this new corps of "detached technicians and aides" in Mount Rainier had taken shape as follows: C.E. Drysdale and H.J. Cremer, supervising engineers; Russell L. McKown and Halsey M. Davidson, supervising landscape architects; E.A. Kitchin, wildlife technician; E. S. Foley, headquarters clerk. [11] Despite their highly contingent status, these ECW-funded personnel remained in the park together with the two NPS field technicians, Waterhouse and Davidson, to the end of the 1930s.

As indicated above, the primary responsibility of the NPS in administering the ECW program

was to supervise the CCC crews in their conservation work. Senior NPS officials helped work out a broad-brush program for the CCC for each new six-month enrollment period; it remained for the park staff to compile a detailed list of projects. Tomlinson consulted with his chief ranger, maintenance foreman, park naturalist, landscape architect, and engineer to fashion a list of projects; he then prioritized them according to their importance and seasonality (those projects situated at lower elevations in the park could be undertaken early in the summer while those at higher elevations had to wait until the summer advanced). Ernest A. Davidson commented to Tom Vint on the first season's list of projects, "I believe the preparation of this definite program was the best kind of start toward a successful season's work." [12] It was a credit to Tomlinson's skill as an administrator that this process was relatively frictionless despite the keen competition between administrative departments for the CCC's labor.

When it came to deciding how much the CCC would be capable of doing, Ernest Davidson was perhaps the most skeptical member of Tomlinson's staff Davidson worried that the NPS would employ inexperienced CCC crews on types of projects that properly deserved more expertise. The result would be an impressive amount of work accomplished in the short term, but accomplished to such a low standard that it would have to be redone a few years later. To avoid this outcome, Davidson wanted the park administration to put the CCC on projects that could be closely supervised or at least adequately monitored: roadside cleanup, erosion control, blister rust control, trail maintenance. Even concerning trail work, Davidson wanted the CCC to widen and improve the drainage of existing trails rather than relocate trails or construct new ones. [13] Tomlinson weighed Davidson's concerns carefully. For the most part, Davidson got his way.

Tomlinson prepared a detailed letter of introduction for all the CCC camp superintendents, briefing them on "National Park fundamentals and policies," on the administrative organization of the park, and on how the CCC would be administered in Mount Rainier National Park. On the latter, he wrote:

> Officials of the park organization with whom you will closely cooperate are as follows: Chief Ranger, Mr. John M. Davis, whose department has complete charge of all matters pertaining to the protection and policing of the park; the acting Park Engineer, Mr. R.D. Waterhouse, who prepares all plans for construction and improvement, and advises on all engineering matters; the General Foreman, Mr. Frank Akehurst, who is charged with the details of organizing and supervising personnel for all maintenance. Mr. Akehurst also has charge of all park equipment and will be available to assist and advise when requested, regarding work plans. As a rule, Mr. Akehurst will be available only upon request. The Fiscal Agent, Assistant Superintendent O.W. Carlson, will advise on all financial matters....
>
> Of the various staff and technical officials most concerned with the Emergency Conservation Work are the Chief Architect, the Fire Control Expert, and the Chief Engineer from the San Francisco offices. These officials will make inspections of the work, and through the Park organization, offer suggestions. The Chief Architect's assistant, Mr. E.A. Davidson of the Branch of Plans and Designs, will have full charge of all matters pertaining to landscape and natural features protection. Your cooperation with Mr. Davidson is especially required, as this official has full responsibility for carrying out the fundamental policies of the National Park Service for the protection and preservation of the natural features, and it is this work that I desire to emphasize as second in importance only to protection against fire and other destructive elements. [14]

Tomlinson took one further precaution. To ensure close cooperation between the CCC supervisory personnel and the landscape architects, Tomlinson directed Davidson to select one local experienced man (LEM) from each camp to serve as landscape foreman or erosion control foreman for the whole company. The LEMs varied in quality; some were practically an extension of the park staff, while others were incompetent or insensitive to national park values. Tomlinson's action seems to have been aimed at bringing the best talent to the fore among the CCC's supervisory personnel, and Davidson thought the system worked admirably. [15]

The Park Service played a supporting role in administering the CCC camps. As noted above, the Army was in charge of constructing, provisioning, and running the camps. But the NPS naturally took a keen interest in where the camps were located, how they appeared to tourists, and what kind of impact the camps had on plants and wildlife. In the rush to get the CCC mobilized in 1933, five camps were established in Mount Rainier. In the summer of 1934, when the CCC in Mount Rainier reached full steam, a sixth camp was added and the park was divided into six areas for purposes of CCC projects. These were set up as follows:

1. Tahoma Creek Camp (NP-1) located on Westside Road. Camp 1 Area included the lower Westside Road, Longmire, and the southwest corner of the park.

2. Narada Falls Camp (NP-2). Camp 2 Area included Paradise and the south side of the park from the Nisqually Bridge to the upper Stevens Canyon.

3. Carbon River Camp (NP-3). Camp 3 Area covered the northwest corner of the park from the Mowich entrance to Mystic Lake.

4. St. Andrews Creek Camp (NP-4) located on Westside Road. Camp 4 Area covered the west side from Round Pass north to Sunset Park.

5. White River Camp (NP-5) located on State Route 410 north of the East Entrance. Camp 5 Area covered the northeast corner of the park including Sunrise, White River Campground, and the Cayuse Pass Tipsoo Lakes area.

6. Ohanapecosh Camp (NP-6). Camp 6 Area covered the southeast corner of the park where the Eastside Road was under construction. The camp was accessed through Packwood, Washington. [16]

In the late 1930s additional camps were built as others were abandoned but the total number of camps never exceeded six. Virtually all camps were vacated in the fall and rehabilitated and reoccupied the following spring—a pattern which was repeated until each camp's abandonment toward the end of the CCC era. The single exception appears to have been Sunshine Point Camp (NP-8), which was built in the fall of 1938 as an all-year camp. [17]



Mount Rainier National Park in 1934 was divided into six areas for purposes of CCC work.

Physical Accomplishments of the CCC

So popular was the CCC during the New Deal that its conservation work has become almost legendary. According to popular tradition, most of the pre-World War II administrative buildings that are seen in the national parks and forests today were built by the CCC. The buildings were designed predominantly in a rustic architectural style, and it is also popular tradition that the CCC practically originated this style. Both these traditions are considerably wide of the mark. With regard to the invention of the rustic style, landscape designer Phoebe Cutler sets the record straight in her book, The Public Landscape of the New Deal:

> The rustic style had, in fact, already established itself as the architectural dialect of the national parks and forests. As early as 1903, the Old Faithful Inn, a rambling assemblage of logs, shingles, and enormous dormers, made a major statement in the rustic vernacular at Yellowstone. Similar log-and-boulder structures abounded at Yosemite, Crater Lake, the Grand Canyon, and Glacier National Parks. Nonetheless, the structures of the 1900s through the 1920s were grand primary-use edifices such as Herb Maier's assortment of museums and lodges. The New Deal did not innovate so much as it mass-produced. [18]

The other fondly-remembered assumption about the CCC—that it single-handedly constructed all the Depression-era buildings in the national parks and forests—is also a fallacy. In fact, the CCC crews were mainly assigned to jobs that required less skill than construction of buildings did. The Public Works Administration (PWA) was at least as responsible as the CCC for the florescence of Government Rustic in the 1930s. In Mount Rainier National Park, Tomlinson oversaw yearly allotments from the PWA with which to pursue a massive public works program that he had outlined in 1933. Some of these funds were used to hire temporary, skilled workers for building construction. That was how many of the ranger residences, patrol cabins, fire lookouts, and other administrative buildings of the Depression era came to be built.

The CCC's actual accomplishments were extensive and varied. Quarterly reports on the CCC

quantified each camp's accomplishments in terms of man-days spent on each project. The number of projects, large and small, multiplied with each passing enrollment period. Statistics for the whole park mounted so quickly as to become mind-numbing. Never before or since had the park administration had so much unskilled labor at its command. The best that can be done here is to give an impression of the hundreds of jobs accomplished by the CCC, listed by project type.

1. Roadside Cleanup. The object of roadside cleanup was two-fold: to reduce forest fire hazard and to improve the appearance of the roadway. After all the road construction accomplished in the 1920s, the sides of the roads remained littered with debris. In places, large "docks" of piled logs could be seen. Such debris intruded on the natural scene and posed a fire hazard. CCC crews either hauled the logs to one of the temporary sawmills in the park or sawed them into sections and burned them. There were also areas where high winds had toppled exposed trees at the edge of the road, and these too were removed. A lot of dry, unsightly, fire-hazardous material was raked out and eliminated. Snags that posed a risk to road safety were cut down and removed.

2. Erosion Control. Many road cuts and fills required work to stabilize their unnaturally steep and bare surfaces and prevent erosion problems. CCC crews used a variety of methods to accomplish slope stabilization, including sodding, seeding, flattening or rounding, applying a stone riprapping, and even constructing giant, log grids against the road cuts which would later be subsumed by earth and vegetation. Another aspect of erosion control was river-channel cleanup. Log jams were removed wherever they were directing a streamflow against a road embankment or threatening to take out a bridge. The banks of the Nisqually and Carbon rivers were reinforced with log cribs to protect the Longmire area and the Carbon Road from potential flood damage.

3. Landscape Naturalization. The vegetative cover in numerous areas in the park was scarred by new construction or by past use and abandonment. Near the Tipsoo Lakes, for example, an abandoned fishing camp had left behind a number of old roads and trails which the Park Service wanted to obliterate. The CCC devoted 201 man-days to resodding 2,000 square yards of abandoned road and trail surface and transplanting 532 trees and shrubs. The new development site in Yakima Park, the residential village at Longmire, and the lower campground at Paradise also received extensive treatment by the CCC.

4. Trail Construction. A large percentage of man-days went to trail work of various kinds, including new construction, improvement of tread and drainage on existing trails, building of bridges, and repairs. Some of this work was very labor intensive. One CCC crew spent 703 man-days reconditioning a little more than a mile of trail past Narada Falls, where the work included putting in an observation station with log railing opposite the waterfall, relocating and surfacing with crushed stone the portion of the trail that was frequently made wet by the spray of the falls, and installing no less than 69 rock and cedar culverts. Some new trails, such as the Huckleberry Creek trail and various boundary trails, were built principally for fire protection.

5. Campground Improvement. Another major undertaking by the CCC was the redevelopment of Mount Rainier's campgrounds according to the Meinecke system. In the late 1920s, the NPS had contracted with plant pathologist E.P. Meinecke to determine how campgrounds which were being worn out by overuse could be rehabilitated. Meinecke had found that trampling by campers and soil compaction by automobiles was inhibiting plant regeneration. The solution, Meinecke wrote, was to limit the movements of campers and vehicles by the creation of individual campsites with fixed fireplaces, tables, and "garages," or spurs for vehicle parking, in combination with the subtle placement of shrubs, logs, and boulders to delineate each site. Until the coming of the CCC, Mount Rainier National Park

had made slow progress toward "Meineckizing" its campgrounds. CCC crews provided the needed manpower. Working under the close supervision of landscape architects, CCC crews redeveloped the campgrounds at Longmire, Paradise, Tahoma Creek, White River, and Ohanapecosh along the lines recommended by Meinecke. In addition, the White River Camp (NP-5) fitted out the campground at Yakima Park with permanent fireplaces and an amphitheater.

6. Telephone and Power Lines. The CCC took over the task of maintaining and repairing the park's 172 miles of telephone lines, and constructed many miles of new telephone and power lines as well. Old wires and insulators were upgraded, brush was cleared away from the lines, and the system was expanded in order to furnish electric lighting and telephone connections for the public campgrounds and for the CCC camps themselves.

7. Forest Fire Protection. All CCC companies in the park were on standby to fight forest fires. Men with fire-fighting experience were culled from the ranks and given special training by the rangers. These men in turn led eight-man squads made up of the balance of the labor force. All CCC companies held fire drills at regular intervals, and when a fire occurred the whole 1,000-man force was at the park administration's disposal to fight it.

8. Blister Rust Control. CCC crews built upon earlier efforts to stop the spread of this white pine disease. Blister rust control was accomplished by eradicating the disease's alternative host plant, ribes, from the vicinity of white pine stands. A few picked men from each company were trained to recognize the various species of ribes and in some cases these small eradication crews were gradually augmented so that dozens of men were employed in this work by the end of the summer. Where the ribes were dense, it could take up to ten man-days to clear each acre. Blister rust control was most intensive in Stevens Canyon, where the men worked out of spike camps.

9. Headquarters Detail. The Tahoma Creek Camp (NP-1) provided a detail of about 25 enrollees for the park administration at Longmire. These men were assigned to various departments and performed everything from clerical work to campground maintenance to curation in the Longmire Museum.

10. Buildings. The CCC built a variety of structures in the park, from simple, three sided backcountry shelters to four-room, bath, and basement residences. The quality of workmanship was generally high. A skilled foreman working with a small crew of helpers was capable of fine work as evidenced by the ranger cabin built near the mouth of Ipsut Creek in 1934. On the other hand, inexperienced crews could make a mess of a project. Landscape Architect Ernest A. Davidson expressed skepticism about the CCC's capacity for handling large building projects, an opinion which seemed to be born out by the difficulties encountered in the construction of the Paradise ski lodge between 1938 and 1941. Yet CCC crews from Camp Narada (NP-2) built four residences at Longmire during the summer of 1938; they then finished the interiors expeditiously after moving to Sunshine Point Camp (NP-8) for the winter.

A CCC crew landscaping Paradise campground. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

Building construction made up a relatively small proportion of the total man-days expended by the CCC in Mount Rainier National Park. Yet these rustic structures are the CCC's most enduring legacy. The fine log cabins, the well-crafted stone comfort stations and trailside exhibit shelters, the carefully-laid flagstone paths, the many stone guardrails—these features are as ubiquitous as they are unpretentious. They have become a familiar part of the national park experience for millions of Americans. As one NPS architectural historian has contended, "park design includes numerous subtle and sometimes subconscious cues to the visitor. These features contribute to the sense of place of a national park." [19] The CCC—and the particular way in which the NPS used the CCC—made a significant contribution to that special quality which makes national parks such a distinctive part of the American landscape.

The CCC Experience

The physical accomplishments of the CCC cannot be evaluated apart from the humanitarian ideals and democratic yearning for national renewal that brought the CCC into being. Horace Albright, who spent his last few months as director of the NPS representing the Interior Department on the CCC's advisory council, commented on the CCC's objectives in his annual report for 1933:

> Officials of the National Park Service have a deep appreciation that they were enabled to assist in carrying out President Roosevelt's emergency conservation program, one of the greatest humanitarian movements ever conceived for the relief of distress. In addition to its primary purpose of relief, the conservation work accomplished will be of far-reaching importance to the whole country and will build up the health and morale of a large portion of the young manhood of the Nation, fitting them better to be leaders of the future. [20]

It is difficult to generalize about the thousands of CCC enrollees who passed a summer or two at Mount Rainier. To enroll in the CCC, a man had to be eighteen to twenty-five years of age, single, unemployed, from a family on relief, and physically fit. Usually the enrollees

were assigned to companies with men from the same city or county. Enrollees were generally put with men of the same race, too. Blacks were considerably underrepresented in the CCC, and in most cases they were formed into separate companies. Native Americans likewise were enrolled in separate units, which were employed on Indian reservations and administered by a separate branch of the CCC called the CCC-Indian Division.

Ideally, a CCC company was assigned to a camp within about 200 miles of where it was formed, so that the young men could go home to their families every other weekend. However, since most of the national forests and parks were in the West and most of the enrollees came from the East, a large number of CCC companies were put on trains and sent westward. As a result, CCC companies which were assigned to camps in Mount Rainier National Park tended to be either from nearby counties in Washington State or from distant states in the East or Deep South. [21] In the first enrollment period, for example, the five camps in the park were occupied by three companies from New York, one from Illinois, and one from western Washington. Meanwhile, the supervisory personnel for each camp invariably consisted of local men. CCC companies that spent summers in Mount Rainier usually spent winters in one of Washington's state parks. [22] CCC companies and their supervisory personnel sometimes returned to the same camp two summers in a row, but more often there was a complete turnover of companies from one summer to the next.

Two examples of specific camps in Mount Rainier suggest the differences and similarities that could be found among the CCC companies. Company 1303 occupied Camp NP-2 at Narada Falls during the summer of 1934. The camp superintendent was W.C. Pabst, a general contractor from Everett, Washington. The 199 enrollees in this company were from western Washington, with most of them, according to Pabst, already possessing "woods, trail, and forest fire experience." Among the supervising personnel, or crew foremen, of Company 1303 were two graduates of the University of Washington's School of Forestry and three former NPS employees, one with seven years experience in the landscape department. Pabst stated that the company's morale was excellent, with "gold-bricking" (shirking or playing sick) practically non-existent. [23]

Company 1303's baseball team at Camp Narada. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National*

Park.)

The men of Camp Narada lived close to the outdoors. Like all of the CCC's summer camps in Mount Rainier National Park, Camp Narada was a mixture of frame buildings and tents. The mess hall, wash and shower houses, and latrines were all permanent buildings, constructed in 1933. The camp kitchen, sleeping quarters, and infirmary were all under canvas. All camp buildings were wired for lighting and furnished with heater stoves. [24] The CCC enrollees had scarcely any more shelter than the campers in the public campgrounds, and less privacy than either the campers or the NPS staff who lived in the park.

The company was fortunate to have a number of experienced cooks and a baker in its ranks, and the men were kept well-fueled for their outdoor labor. A typical breakfast consisted of canned Hawaiian pineapple, oatmeal mush, fresh milk, bacon omelette, buttermilk pancakes with syrup, coffee, milk, and sugar. Dinner might consist of beef stew, assorted garden vegetables, mashed potatoes with brown gravy, raisin sauce, tea, milk, and sugar. This was followed by a supper of roast beef with brown gravy, browned potatoes, cold tomato, lettuce salad, bran muffins, and coffee, milk, and sugar. [25] There were some complaints about the camp food during the CCC's first summer at the park, but provisions seem to have been adequate by 1934.

The men's favorite recreational activities at Camp Narada consisted of baseball, softball, horse shoes, boxing, fishing, and "considerable hiking on weekends." Indoor recreation included motion picture shows at the community buildings at Longmire and Paradise, and an occasional dance held outside the park. Four weeks after their arrival, the men of Company 1303 were in the process of forming a social club, stamp club, climber's club, and fisherman's club. Five musicians in the camp formed an orchestra and practiced at the community building at Longmire. The camp had a bi-weekly newspaper called The Narada Narrator. [26]

The work day generally ran from 7:45 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Each morning the men assembled into their various work details and rode to work on the company's Chevrolet trucks. About two-thirds of the time they were employed in trail and forest improvement work. A large project that summer was clearing trees from either side of the RNPC's power lines between Longmire and Paradise in order to reduce the fire hazard. Some 400,000 feet of felled timber was bucked to suitable lengths for the park's sawmill. Smaller projects included renaturalization with plantings, campground improvement, construction of a truck trail, and repair of telephone lines. [27]

For many of the young men in Company 1303, the CCC provided an opportunity to acquire more diverse experience in a field of work with which they were already acquainted. Perhaps the greatest value of the CCC for many of these men was that it provided them with work experience and a calling. As one appreciative landscape designer has written: "The CCC left a patrimony of men dedicated to the outdoors and skilled in appropriate trades." [28] The superintendent of Tahoma Creek Camp (NP-l) may have been right when he wrote about the CCC: "It gives a man a chance to get out of the common labor class and likewise increases his possibilities of finding employment." [29] Pabst him self noted that a large number of the men in Company 1303 showed a keenness for landscape work.

Another camp superintendent in Mount Rainier seemed to think that the CCC's greatest value could be found in its socializing experience. William S. Nowlin was superintendent of Camp NP-6 on the Ohanapecosh River in the summer of 1937. He was a landscape architect with twenty years of professional experience prior to his service in the CCC. His company consisted of 140 enrollees from far away Arkansas. With a sense of fatherly pride, Nowlin described the CCC company's activities in a letter to his friend, Representative Charles H.

Leavy of Washington. Leavy found Nowlin's letter so evocative of the CCC experience that he read long extracts from it in a speech before the U.S. House of Representatives on July 8, 1937.

> All's quiet along the Ohanapecosh except the raindrops pattering on my tent. It can rain so easily here. The clouds seem to hang on the treetops and release the moisture so gently, so cheerfully, and so unceasingly. The sun is always on the point of breaking through but never quite succeeds...
>
> All week these CCC Arkansas boys have worked out in the woods uncomplainingly until yesterday. They put on those Army rainproof clothes—tin pants they call 'em. They lean them up against a stump, climb up on the top and jump into them. They are about as stiff as a suit of armor, like the knights used to wear, except the armor had joints at the knees and elbows. They do not clank or ring but when they walk it makes a noise like filing a saw.
>
> One of my "gang" (a little fellow weighing about 100 pounds) came out to work the other day without his "tin pants" and I sent him back to get them. There was only one pair left—size 44. Well, he got into them, bent the bottoms up so that he could walk, found a piece of half-inch rope, made a gallus [suspenders] to hold them up, and on the way back he gathered moss enough to fill them out around the waist and he also made himself a wig and some whiskers of moss and reported "ready for duty." These boys have a sense of humor.
>
> There is such a variety and contrast to this work. One day we are planting delicate, lacy ferns on the bank of a stream and laying a carpet of green moss around them.. .the next day we will be digging with a steam shovel or using a "Cherry picker" to replace weathered boulders, weighing about a ton, to keep these dumb campers from driving where they are not supposed to.
>
> Then we build huge log tables, so heavy the people can't move them around, and stone fireplaces[,] and stencil and carve and burn signs on the face of a cedar log cut in half, and build trails and footpaths, and haul gravel in dump trucks to surface roads, and, believe me, these boys are workers. They average over 20 years old, and most of this camp has had more than a year's experience in national park work (which is a lucky thing for me). The hardest task is to have work enough lined up to keep them busy. I assign them a job what I think will last all day, and in a few hours the leader will come and ask what to do next...
>
> I hope they make the C.C.C. permanent, even if they have to discontinue the Army and Navy. It's a great character-building institution. They get a better training than in any school or college. I think it is the greatest thing the present administration has done.
>
> I wish you could see this river—the Ohanapecosh. . .On a hot day, when the glacier silt come down, it turns milky white, and at times it appears blue and white. It is always in such a hurry and is always singing.... [30]

Park officials played a significant role in making the CCC experience a positive one. Their involvement with the CCC went far beyond what the division of responsibilities between the NPS and the Army required of them. On paper, the park administration's responsibility was to design suitable work projects for the CCC; the Army, meanwhile, was to set up and supply the camps, organize the CCC companies and transport them to the park, and maintain discipline in the camps. But park officials did much more than assign jobs. Superintendent Tomlinson worked closely with Brigadier General Joseph C. Castner, commanding officer at

Fort Lewis, Washington, in planning the placement of camps. Landscape Architect E.A. Davidson and Engineer R.D. Waterhouse provided instruction to CCC superintendents and foremen, some of whom were former NPS colleagues. Park rangers and naturalists had considerable contact with the CCC enrollees during their leisure time in the park, leading them on fishing, hiking, and climbing trips. [31] "The men have excellent opportunity for recreation on account of the friendliness of park officials," a CCC inspector reported. Even the park's interpretive program catered to the needs of the CCC enrollees. "Park officials also lecture on forestry," the inspector wrote, "and will show movies from time to time on forestry work." [32] In November 1933, an appreciative park staff treated a CCC company that was the last to depart for the winter to an elaborate turkey dinner at Longmire. [33] In his annual report for 1933, Tomlinson stated that the CCC enrollees had received much useful training in conservation work and citizenship, and he credited his own ranger staff with helping to keep the young men healthy and happy. It was partly through the many ranger-led activities that the CCC enrollees came to a "full appreciation of what their Government was doing for them." [34]

OTHER PUBLIC WORKS

To obtain a true picture of park administration during the New Deal, it is important to recognize that several federal relief programs were operating simultaneously, all of them offering possibilities for getting valuable work accomplished in Mount Rainier National Park. While Superintendent Tomlinson and his staff were preparing work programs for each new CCC enrollment period, they were also tapping into other new sources of funds for construction and conservation work. Each program involved somewhat different administrative demands. The three significant programs in addition to the CCC were the Civil Works Administration, Works Progress Administration, and Public Works Administration.

CWA Projects

The Civil Works Administration (CWA) was established in the fall of 1933 to provide emergency relief jobs for the unemployed through the coming winter. Roosevelt appointed Harry Hopkins to head the vast program. Under Hopkins's leadership, the CWA put more than four million men on the federal payroll, all at minimum wage, and pumped more than a billion dollars into the ailing economy. But the CWA was short-lived; Roosevelt worried that it would create a permanent underclass of people dependent on a federal dole. He terminated the program in the spring of 1934. [35]

As Tomlinson put together a civil works program for Mount Rainier in the fall of 1933, he wrestled mainly with the problem of housing the workers. Secretary Ickes, anxious to avoid anything that would tend to make the CWA a permanent fixture, ruled that no agency of the Interior Department would build new camps for civil works projects. Nor would CCC camps, vacant for the winter, be winterproofed and occupied for that purpose. Tomlinson's proposal called for 350 to 550 men depending on how strictly the Secretary's ruling was interpreted; he received authorization three weeks later for a force of 363 men. At the CWA's peak in mid-January, the force in Mount Rainier numbered 388 men and 7 women. Housing these workers called for some resourcefulness by the park administration. About one half of the workers (including six women) were employed in the Longmire area. Of this number perhaps half lived in towns or on farms near the Nisqually entrance and were able to commute to work, while the rest were housed in existing facilities at Longmire. Another 68 men and 1 woman worked in the Ohanapecosh area and were billeted in the facilities belonging to the road contractor and the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs Company; the remaining 108 men were assigned to the Carbon district and stayed in the Manley-Moore Lumber Company's facilities near Fairfax. [36]

The projects varied in each district. The CWA workers in the Carbon district spent a quarter of their time on river bar cleanup and crib construction for flood control, and the other three quarters of their time on improving the Carbon River Road. This camp started work on December 15 and was terminated on March 31. In the Ohanapecosh district the work consisted of campground development and construction of an approach road, and it lasted from December 8 to April 6. The workforce in the Longmire area was broken down into more than a dozen crews which accomplished diverse projects, including the production of 450,000 board feet of lumber at the sawmill for use in government buildings, the construction of three equipment buildings (two at Longmire and one at Nisqually Entrance), and building repairs. The last of these work crews was terminated on April 19, 1934, bringing an end to the CWA program in Mount Rainier National Park. [37]

Nationwide, the CWA was set up and dismantled with such lightning speed that it produced some of the most pathetic examples of make-work projects during the Depression. (The word "boondoggle" acquired its familiar meaning at this time.) But the national park was well-suited to make effective use of this federal relief program, and Tomlinson viewed it as a complete success. The total expenditure by the CWA in Mount Rainier amounted to $80,292.23, three-fourths of it paid directly to local unemployed people who were in desperate need of income. For this expenditure, the NPS received a considerable amount of skilled labor at the minimum wage level and accomplished much work toward its general plan of development. The program's extremely short duration (some projects had to be completed by the CCC), together with the shortage of adequate housing in the park, proved to be the program's two limiting factors.

WPA Projects

In 1935, Roosevelt pushed a much larger work relief bill through Congress called the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act. The law provided nearly $5 billion for relief and gave the President wide discretion over how the money was used. Congress made additional emergency appropriations each year through the end of the decade. The Works Progress Administration (WPA) administered most of these huge sums, providing jobs for millions of unemployed Americans. The NPS provided technical supervision for more and more WPA work camps each year, most of which were located on state, county, and municipal lands. Toward the end of the 1930s, the NPS supervised WPA work camps in the national parks themselves.

Beginning in 1938, Mount Rainier National Park had two WPA camps out of a total of eleven located in national parks throughout the nation. The WPA camps were also called subsistence camps. Mount Rainier's WPA camps were located at Longmire and Ohanapecosh (later Packwood), and were occupied from 1938 through 1940. The work consisted mainly of river bed cleanup and flood control on the Nisqually River and construction of a sewer system at Ohanapecosh. [38]

In addition to the labor provided by WPA work camps in the park, the Emergency Relief Appropriation Acts permitted these funds to be granted directly to other federal agencies. In 1940, for example, "E.R.A. funds" paid for two project superintendents, one engineer, and two secretaries on the park staff. The WPA program wound down in Mount Rainier at the end of the 1940 fiscal year. [39]

PWA Projects

The Public Works Administration (PWA) was technically not a relief agency; it was established under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and was aimed at improving

cooperation between the federal government and private industry. But like the WPA and the CWA, the PWA had the capability of putting millions of people to work and "pump-priming" the economy with federal expenditures. NPS officials were quick to grasp the importance of this development. For one thing, the NPS was in the enviable position of having master development plans already on hand which called for millions of dollars of road, bridge, and building construction. For another, the NPS had the good fortune of being in the same department as the PWA; Roosevelt decided to place the PWA in the Interior Department under the direct control of Secretary Ickes. Not surprisingly, therefore, the national parks received generous allotments of PWA funds over the course of the next seven years. [40]

The PWA actually contributed more funds to Mount Rainier National Park than the CCC, CWA, and WPA combined. But the figures are deceiving: a large proportion of the public works program in Mount Rainier in the 1930s was merely a continuation of the heavy road construction program of the 1920s, carried out under a new arrangement. PWA-funded construction of the Eastside Road and the Stevens Canyon Road in the 1930s approximately matched NPS-funded construction on the Nisqually Road, Westside Road, and Yakima Park Road in the previous decade. Forty years of road development in Mount Rainier happened to reach its culmination in the 1930s. All that remained after 1940 was the completion of the Stevens Canyon and Mowich Lake roads during the Mission 66 period.

What distinguished the PWA's public works program in Mount Rainier as another Depression-era relief program, similar in design to the CWA and WPA, was its ambitious array of small-scale development projects, collectively termed "other physical improvements." These projects ranged from water and sewer systems and campground development to comfort stations and ranger residences. The single, largest project involved the construction of an underground telephone system for the entire park—estimated to cost $106,340. [41] While the Bureau of Public Roads continued to administer and supervise road construction contracts in Mount Rainier, the NPS handled this other component of the public works program.

These were not make-work projects. In reality, the public works program that Superintendent Tomlinson proposed to the director consisted almost entirely of items that had been programmed in the park appropriation estimates for the past several years. The projects had been deferred year after year while funds were diverted to meet the urgent need for services at Ohanapecosh and Tipsoo Lakes (the two areas encompassed in the 1931 addition to the park) as well as the newly developed area at Yakima Park. The PWA allotments gave the NPS an opportunity to catch up on the backlog of projects that were required to meet the demand of growing visitor use. Excerpts from the superintendent's proposed public works program for 1934 may provide a sense of how basic these projects were to the development of the park:

Extension, Administration Building Yakima Park

> Present Administration building crowded, and with no space for some operations. Telephone exchange takes up most of lobby. Sleeping quarters inadequate.
>
> New building needed for Naturalist quarters, telephone exchange and additional sleeping quarters.
>
> Part of personnel now required to rent cabins from operator. Yakima Park has proved unusually popular and room is needed to care for necessary personnel to handle functions necessary.

Community House, Yakima Park

> No facilities now available, lectures held outdoors where weather handicaps tremendously, or in Operators dining room where operations conflict.
>
> Building with adequate heating plant very necessary if public is to be taken care of, and educational features continued.
>
> There is a persistant [sic] public demand for shelter of this kind from visitors who criticise [sic] adversely when they find none now. The lectures are well attended and deserve shelter rather than being compelled to be outdoors.
>
> Equipment Shed, Yakima Park
>
> At present much equipment is stored outdoors, facilities being inadequate for storage purposes.
>
> Rapid deterioration is inevitable under the circumstances. Only a temporary garage and repair shop is now available and this shed will at least get drivers and mechanics under cover while working on machinery.
>
> Sewer System, Ohanapecosh
>
> With the vastly increased patronage of this area caused by the building of the Transmountain Road by the State and our own road into the area just being completed, the problem of sanitation immediately becomes important.
>
> An adequate sewer system for the hotel, cabins, the camp ground, new Ranger Station and Utility area is very necessary to prevent pollution of the stream and resultant danger to health.

The above items were ordered fifth through eighth in priority in a list of forty items. At the end of the list were such items as Comfort Station, Paradise Camp Ground; Bunk House, White River Entrance; Gas and Oil Storage Shed, White River Entrance; Carpenter and Plumber Shop, Longmire; 2 Equipment Sheds, Longmire; Paint Shop, Longmire. Most of the items received the director's conditional approval. [42]

The public works program brought about changes in the park staff. The park administration had been hiring seasonal laborers for construction projects such as these since the early 1920s, but the public works program of the 1930s was on an unprecedented scale. At the peak of the program in the mid-1930s, hundreds of PWA workers were employed in the park. Unlike the CCC and WPA, the PWA did not provide funds for supervisory personnel. In order to administer and supervise the increased labor force, the Park Service had to create its own new staff positions. Specifically, Tomlinson requested more engineers, foremen, experienced clerks, timekeepers, and storekeepers to oversee the public works program. [43]

The park administration was also responsible for housing and feeding the PWA workers. Initially, the cost of procuring tents, cots, blankets, tools, and mess equipment for the work camps had to be charged directly to the PWA projects. By the mid-1930s, the park had accumulated a large stock of camp equipment which could be used year after year. PWA camps were smaller and less elaborate than CCC camps. They were set up at the beginning of each summer season and dismantled at the end of it. The precise locations of these camps is not well-documented, but presumably the Park Service situated them near Longmire, Paradise, Sunrise, and Ohanapecosh, where most PWA projects were located. [44]

While the NPS judged the public works program in Mount Rainier National Park to be

necessary and indeed overdue, the program eventually fell victim to broader public policy concerns. When the national economy made a partial recovery in 1937, Roosevelt, believing that the federal government's deficit spending might cause inflation and undermine private investment, slashed funding for both the PWA and WPA. A year later, with the economy in retreat once more, Roosevelt requested another $1.4 billion for the WPA and $1 billion for the PWA. But by 1940, public works programs were rapidly giving way to federal spending on defense. [45] Tomlinson rode this rollercoaster without complaint, though each year it became more difficult to plan and complete large projects.

One project epitomized the difficulties of winding down the public works program: this was the Paradise ski lodge. The building began as a joint CCC-NPS project in 1938. When construction of the Paradise ski lodge stalled for lack of funds in 1939, Tomlinson's superiors tried to get the PWA to chip in the last $22,000; when this failed, they tried to scrape the money together from the balances remaining in other PWA project accounts. Finally, in 1941, the ski lodge had to be completed under NPS force account. By coincidence, the ski lodge opened to the public in the same week that the United States entered World War II. The building marked the end of an era in the park's construction history. [46]

Road Construction under the PWA

Road construction practically proceeded on a separate track from the rest of the public works program in Mount Rainier National Park. Road work required heavy equipment and skilled equipment operators, putting it out of reach of the various government relief camps. Instead, the Bureau of Public Roads contracted all major road construction projects to private companies, as it had since 1925. These companies hired their own labor, serviced their own work camps, and provided their own tools and heavy equipment. They followed engineering plans prepared by the Bureau of Public Roads. The park administration was involved mainly at the beginning and the end of each project: working with BPR engineers on the location and design of the road in the early stages of the project and employing CCC crews or other laborers in roadside cleanup and landscape naturalization work in the later stages of the project. [47]

A crucial planning meeting between NPS and BPR officials took place at park headquarters on August 18, 1933. The purpose of the meeting was to go over the large allotments for road construction projects which Albright had authorized in July and devise a public works program that would meet with the PWA's approval. The main question was whether to modify the program in such a way as to allow more contracts to be let right away, in order "to put as many men to work in the very near future as possible." [48] Attending the meeting were the Park Service's chief architect, Tom Vint; the Park Service's landscape architect assigned to Mount Rainier, Ernest A. Davidson; the Park Service's chief engineer, Frank A. Kittredge; Superintendent Tomlinson; and four engineers of the BPR, F.E. Andrews, E.D. Kinney, C.G. Polk, and G.W. Mayo. Unexpectedly, the meeting also brought out lingering differences of opinion among NPS officials concerning the Stevens Canyon Road, even though Albright had tried to lay that controversy to rest two years earlier. Immediately after the meeting, Vint, Kittredge, and Tomlinson each dictated a letter expressing their respective position on the Stevens Canyon Road, and sent the letters along with a neutral memorandum describing the meeting to the new director, Arno B. Cammerer.

Regarding the main issue of harnessing Mount Rainier's multi-million dollar road construction program to the national economic recovery plan, the representatives of the two bureaus agreed to several changes that would allow more road work to commence immediately. Four-year contracts were broken down into two-year contracts to be let concurrently. About half of the funds programmed for Eastside Road construction were reapportioned to other projects: Westside Road construction, improvement of the road into

Ohanapecosh, paving the Yakima Park Road, building a bridge over Laughingwater Creek. A temporary "tote" road would be built from the Reflection Lakes into the head of Stevens Canyon so that construction of this section of the Stevens Canyon Road could be attacked from both ends at once. Tote roads would not be built, however, for the Eastside or Westside roads, "on account of the destruction which would be entailed in the very difficult country." It would be necessary, instead, to work these projects from one end only. [49] There were limits to what ought to be sacrificed in the face of the current economic crisis.

Concerning the Stevens Canyon Road, the two landscape architects, supported by Kittredge, argued that the road should not be built. They favored an alternative route via Skate Creek, south of the park boundary, which would connect the Nisqually Road with the state highway south of Ohanapecosh. The distance from Longmire to Ohanapecosh would be only two miles greater via Skate Creek, or thirty-one miles as opposed to twenty-nine. The advantages of the Skate Creek route were that it would cause less scarring of the landscape, cost considerably less to construct and maintain, open earlier in the season, and reach completion sooner. The main disadvantage was that it would not fulfill the goal of an all-park road linking Paradise and Sunrise. To get from Paradise to Sunrise via the Skate Creek route would require a thirteen-mile backtrack to Longmire plus an excursion outside the park. [50]

Tomlinson, of course, favored the Stevens Canyon route. He had been pushing hard for this connecting road since 1930. He thought the former director had finally settled this issue on his visit to Mount Rainier in 1931, and he fumed that Vint and Kittredge should have raised their objections two years ago. This was somewhat disingenuous: Albright had settled the matter of whether the south side road should follow a low-line route from Stevens Canyon around Backbone Ridge, or take a high-line route over Cowlitz Divide. As Vint pointed out, he and Kittredge were now responding to the more detailed plans which the BPR engineers had developed during the past two years. Vint commented,

> From my viewpoint we could very nicely eliminate the Stevens South Side Canyon project avoiding the construction of a very heavy project which means heavy scars and heavy maintenance on a short season project. I have always recommended the use of the Skate Creek project in preference to the Stevens Canyon Ohanapecosh project. [51]

Kittredge, for his part, observed:

> The proposed highway is about one thousand feet in elevation above the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs and parallels the existing new East Side highway near Ohanapecosh Hot Springs for a distance of several miles. The steepness of the Cowlitz Divide slope is so great that the scars of construction must be very severe. It will be impossible to hold all of the blasted rock on the slope and there will be much devastation of the timber below. There is also the extreme danger that on such a steep slope, burning logs may during clearing, roll and start fires between the right-of-way and the river. [52]

Both Kittredge and Vint suggested that the high cost of the road—now estimated at $2 million—should also be taken into account. The money could be used on the Westside Road instead. Tomlinson replied to these arguments:

> It is true that the Stevens Canyon Section is an expensive route to build and maintain as compared to a much larger and less scenic route. If construction and maintenance costs are the governing elements, then the Stevens Route should be abandoned. These points were considered by Director Albright and his decision to include the Stevens Canyon Route was based, as I understand it, on the need

> for a direct scenic route connecting the two major operations; namely, Paradise Valley and Yakima Park; also a route within park boundaries. [53]

Cammerer sided with the superintendent in this debate, and work on the Stevens Canyon Road commenced that fall. By 1941, the road was virtually completed from the Stevens Canyon Entrance to Box Canyon and from Reflection Lakes to within a half mile of Stevens Creek. Work on the actual Stevens Canyon section was halted by World War II, and was not resumed until 1950. [54] It is interesting to speculate whether Cammerer would have decided against the project had he known that it would take twenty-four years to complete it.

The location and construction of the Eastside Road, meanwhile, proceeded without much controversy. The route was straightforward: up the Ohanapecosh River and Chinook Creek to Cayuse Pass—an elevation gain of 2,700 feet in thirteen miles. The main engineering challenges consisted of the single tunnel between Deer and Dewey creeks and the several creek crossings. [55] To speed the work along, the BPR let separate contracts for clearing, grading, and surfacing sections of the road and for constructing the tunnel and bridges. Sometimes small complications arose from having so many contractors working on the east side at one time; for example, the contractor for the Eastside Road surfacing occupied the vacated work camp of the Deadwood Creek Bridge contractor before the latter's project was approved. Minor labor troubles and short construction seasons also hampered the work. [56] The NPS anticipated that the road would be completed in 1937, but it took an additional three years. The eventual cost came to $1.4 million. [57]

TOMLINSON AND THE SUPERINTENDENCY

The growth of the NPS during the New Deal years added immensely to the administrative burdens of the Mount Rainier superintendency. The demands placed upon the superintendent by the public works program and federal relief programs have already been described. Other new responsibilities are discussed below. With added responsibilities came added power; the Mount Rainier superintendency acquired pivotal regional importance in the NPS hierarchy.

Effects of the Reorganization of 1933

President Roosevelt issued two executive orders in June and July 1933 which transferred a large array of federal reserves from the Forest Service and the War Department to the Park Service. When these took effect on August 10, 1933, the national park system embraced not only national parks and monuments, but national memorials, national battlefields, national cemeteries, and national capital parks. During the next few years, it also came to include national recreation areas, national parkways, national historic sites, and national seashores. These diverse holdings expanded the NPS mission. The Park Service was now not only the keeper of the nation's natural wonders, but the recognized leader in recreation policy, historic preservation, and related matters. [58]

There were so many units in the national park system that senior officials in the NPS could no longer expect to have a close, personal familiarity with each one. Before the reorganization, Mount Rainier National Park was one of twenty-two national parks. In addition to the national parks, the NPS administered forty national monuments. [59] Thus it was possible, during the Mather-Albright years, for Mather or one of his two top assistants, Albright or Cammerer, to make almost yearly visits to Mount Rainier. They obtained a firsthand knowledge of park issues and did not hesitate to overrule the superintendent even from their far away offices in Washington, D.C. Director Cammerer faced a new situation. As the first director of the NPS after the reorganization, Cammerer had to adopt a new management style, relying more and more on the judgment of superintendents to resolve

local policy questions. By the time Cammerer retired in 1940, the NPS administered more than 175 separate units of the national park system.

Superintendent Tomlinson adapted his office well to these changing circumstances. He and Cammerer were both "Mather men," veterans of the Park Service's early years, and he knew that he had the director's full confidence, often addressing him in correspondence as "Cam." Not only did Cammerer rely on Tomlinson's judgment in nearly all major administrative decisions affecting Mount Rainier, he also respected Tomlinson's advice on other NPS concerns in Washington state. With his tenure as Mount Rainier superintendent now entering its second decade, Tomlinson had become a known quantity among the people of the state. Conservationist Irving Brant, who worked closely with Tomlinson on the Olympic National Park campaign, wrote in his memoirs that the Mount Rainier superintendent was "highly regarded throughout the state of Washington." [60] Increasingly, Tomlinson served as the Park Service s ambassador to the Pacific Northwest, a sort of regional director before the national park system was regionalized.

Washington state was the scene of one of the great conservation battles of the 1930s: the struggle between the Park Service and the Forest Service for control of the old growth forests on the Olympic Peninsula. In the reorganization of 1933, Mount Olympus National Monument was transferred from the Forest Service to the Park Service. Within months of the transfer, the Seattle Mountaineers and the Emergency Conservation Committee were starting a campaign to make the area a large national park that would take in some of the forest country surrounding the crest of the mountain range. Washington's Congressman Mon C. Wallgren introduced a bill in March 1935; the president visited the embattled peninsula in October 1937; the park was established in June 1938. These were the turning points in a campaign that increasingly took Tomlinson away from the administration of Mount Rainier. Some time prior to 1938, Tomlinson was named coordinating superintendent for Mount Olympus National Monument. He also had responsibility for Whitman Mission National Monument (established in June 1936) and he served at this time as the Park Service's point man for the proposed North Cascades National Park. [61]

Tomlinson's broader responsibilities not only divided his attention, they shaped his outlook on certain matters pertaining to Mount Rainier. For example, when the NPS Wildlife Division pushed for a south side addition to Mount Rainier National Park that would include winter range for the park's deer population, Tomlinson objected that it might cause political repercussions on the Olympic Peninsula. "The most important project in this State now before the National Park Service is the proposed Mount Olympus National Park," he declared. "I feel that all of our efforts and energies should first be directed toward obtaining approval of National Park status for as much of that fine wilderness area as can be obtained." [62] Acting Director Arthur E. Demaray backed him up, advising one NPS official that "such projects [as the south side addition to Mount Rainier] should not be pressed at this time in view of the detrimental effects such action might have on our prospects regarding the Olympic Peninsula." [63] Another NPS official reported a conversation with Tomlinson on this matter in the summer of 1936. The brief memorandum is revealing of Tomlinson's forceful personality as well as his political savvy:

> Major Tomlinson emphasized to me the importance of avoiding any activity in this direction. He stated that the state-wide controversy regarding any increase in national park area in the State is so heated, that any suggestion for the addition of this area to Mount Rainier would greatly endanger the possibility of securing local support of our Mount Olympus plans.
>
> This area is obviously of far less importance to the National Park system than the Mount Olympus area, and, unless you instruct otherwise, this office will

> definitely avoid any further action on it at this time, and will discourage any interest which may arise from other sources. [64]

On Tomlinson's recommendation, the NPS established a branch office in Seattle in April 1933. Although not continuously staffed, the office served as a convenient meeting place for NPS officials and other federal and state officials. Tomlinson made it his practice to occupy the office each Thursday, and he encouraged other park staff members to use the office as the need arose. It was his view that the trend of NPS affairs in the state would create more and more need for a city office such as this, particularly if and when Mount Olympus became a national park. [65]

At one point, Tomlinson's office routine got him into trouble. The superintendent had purchased a home in Seahurst, a suburb south of Seattle on the shore of Puget Sound, where his wife and children now resided. Tomlinson regularly made the round trip from his home at Longmire to the Seattle office, then from Seattle to Seahurst, then from Seahurst back to Longmire. At the beginning of fiscal year 1937, the NPS issued a travel order authorizing him to travel from park headquarters at Longmire to and from such points in the state as might be required in connection with his official duties. For some time (it is unclear how long) the superintendent dubiously claimed per diem expenses for all the week days that he spent the night at his second residence in Seahurst. This embarrassing infraction was brought to Secretary of the Interior Ickes's attention after what appeared to be a routine, internal audit of Tomlinson's expense vouchers. It is possible that the superintendent was set up. He had been investigated twice before on spurious grounds. [66] More likely, Tomlinson's expense vouchers came under scrutiny because he was one of several "coordinating superintendents" in the expanding national park system who were being asked to take on administrative duties outside their respective parks. This called for more complicated accounting procedures, and Secretary Ickes was known for running a tight ship. In any case, Tomlinson agreed to reimburse the government for these per diem expenses and managed to lay the matter swiftly to rest. [67]

Regionalization and the Seattle Office

As the NPS grew during the 1930s, the various field offices with technical staff became consolidated into a few cities spread across the United States. San Francisco and Berkeley had the western offices of the NPS Branch of Planning and the Wildlife Division respectively. With the creation of the CCC, the NPS also established a field office in San Francisco for administering the CCC program in state parks. To fulfill this latter function, the NPS divided the nation into four regions and established four field offices. Four years later, Cammerer decided to regionalize the entire national park system along the same lines as its administration of the CCC. Mount Rainier National Park became part of the Western Region, or Region Four, with the regional office located in San Francisco.

A regional directorship was similar to the kind of position Tomlinson was trying to create in Seattle, and it was hardly surprising that four years later he would become regional director for the Western Region. [68] But in 1937-38, the Mount Rainier superintendent remained sharply focused on the Olympic National Park campaign and the potential for an important Seattle office situated between the two national parks in Washington. He worked closely with his former chief ranger and then custodian of Mount Olympus National Monument, Preston Macy. [69] In October 1937, when President Roosevelt went to the Olympic Peninsula, he and Macy faced off against Forest Service officials as the president listened and made up his mind in favor of the Park Service's position. [70]

After the establishment of Olympic National Park on June 29, 1938, Tomlinson proposed the establishment of an enlarged superintendency based in Seattle. He advised Cammerer that

such an office would be the "best way to administer the two parks in the State of Washington"—it would allow the superintendent to devote "much needed attention to the development of better understanding in the State of national park policies, the solving of numerous conflicting problems in the new park, and the coordination of the work in connection with the North Cascades proposed park." The North Cascades park proposal alone, Tomlinson added, would justify the position. The position would barely allow the NPS to keep abreast of the Forest Service's vigorous public relations effort in the state. The details of Mount Rainier administration could be left to subordinates, who had proven their mettle during his many absences from the park in the last four years. [71]

Tomlinson fleshed out his proposal in a letter to Demaray in September. The "coordinating office" in Seattle would handle all purchasing, vouchering, and accounting work as well as much of the routine administrative correspondence for both parks. The superintendent would spend about 50 to 60 percent of his time there and the remainder in the two parks as circumstances required. He would need an assistant superintendent, a stenographer-clerk, a purchasing and voucher clerk, a typist, and an accountant-clerk. Besides the savings in personnel and equipment costs, the permanent staffing of a Seattle office would be a boon to NPS public relations in the state. [72]

Cammerer made recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior along somewhat different lines from what Tomlinson proposed. Tomlinson's position as Mount Rainier superintendent would be reallocated to grade 17 and he would supervise the organization and preliminary development of Olympic National Park, Preston Macy would be appointed superintendent of Olympic at grade 15, and there would be an assistant, grade 13, who would serve both parks. Meanwhile, Demaray wrote to Tomlinson: "I see no reason why you should not recommend transferring some Rainier personnel to Seattle during the winter and spending perhaps the major part of your time at Seattle." [73]

If Tomlinson still hoped that his supervisory role in setting up Olympic National Park might evolve into an enlarged superintendency, he was finally disappointed in March 1939 when Demaray informed him that Secretary Ickes had stipulated that the administration of Mount Rainier and Olympic were to be fully separated. Tomlinson was to turn over all records pertaining to Olympic to Superintendent Macy. In an effort to soften the blow, Demaray added:

> At this time, I desire to tell you of the deep appreciation that we all have here of the splendid work you have done to bring about the creation of Olympic National Park and to assist in the progress of its administration. This fine work of yours has been recognized so far as possible by administrative promotions and will be borne in mind for any future consideration. [74]

Tomlinson was now anxious to move on. His superintendency at Mount Rainier National Park, dating from 1923, was the longest of any serving national park superintendent. For several years he and his wife had maintained two residences for the benefit of their school-age children. In the winter of 1940-41 he accepted a temporary assignment in Washington, D.C. (leaving his family behind in Seahurst), at the behest of Director Newton B. Drury. [75] Finally that summer he received the appointment he had been looking for: regional director, Western Region. He would serve effectively in that position until 1950, keeping a hand in the administration of Mount Rainier National Park.

MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART FOUR: DEPRESSION AND WAR YEARS, 1930-1945

XII. RESEARCH AND INTERPRETATION IN THE 1930s

INTRODUCTION

In the years prior to the New Deal, the Park Service strove to build up its interpretive program and its research capabilities. Tomlinson, together with all park superintendents, kept statistics on the number of contacts between park visitors and what was then called the Education or Nature Guide Department, demonstrating year after year that this function of the park administration was a proven success with the public. In the area of research, the NPS made important strides with the system-wide wildlife survey undertaken by George M. Wright, Ben H. Thompson, and Joseph M. Dixon, the appointment of John D. Coffman as NPS chief of forestry, and the establishment of a Branch of Research and Education headed by Assistant Director Harold C. Bryant, all in 1930-31. Wright's and Thompson's field work in Mount Rainier and Coffman's detailed report on fire protection in the park were two early results of this new push. Thus, the Park Service had already established a commitment to research and interpretation before the coming of the New Deal. The main significance of the New Deal was that it gave these developing programs a large boost of funding. Mount Rainier National Park's research and interpretive programs grew substantially in this era.

The funding increases had a collateral effect. As the Branch of Research and Education grew, it obtained greater respect within the service's hierarchy. Park naturalists and experts in the NPS Wildlife Division were soon advising on policy matters with almost as much frequency as the park landscape architects and their superiors in the NPS Landscape Division. In Mount Rainier National Park, Tomlinson sought the advice of biological experts on everything from the CCC's blister rust control work to proposed boundary changes. Still, the influence of biologists should not be exaggerated. With so many public works programs underway in the 1930s, the NPS continued to place heavy emphasis on developing the park for recreational purposes.

WILDLIFE RESEARCH

In 1934, the park staff acquired an assistant naturalist, or wildlife technician, named E.A. Kitchin. Like the four new assistant landscape architects and engineers assigned to Mount Rainier, Kitchin was recruited by the NPS using ECW funds. He took up residence at Longmire where he was nominally responsible to the park naturalist, C. Frank Brockman. For the most part, however, Kitchin was allowed to pursue his own research program. Acting Director Arthur E. Demaray outlined a research program for Kitchin covering three main projects. These consisted of investigating the exotic elk population and recommending a policy; surveying the winter range for deer south of the park with a view toward a possible

boundary extension; and monitoring the effects of CCC roadside cleanup on wildlife habitat. [1]

Exotic Elk

The elk problem engaged Kitchin's attention first. Another transplant of Yellowstone elk had been made in the Cascade Mountains east of Mount Rainier in 1932. One year later, park rangers reported that elk were ranging into the park near Cowlitz Divide. [2] Just as it had twenty years earlier (see Chapter VI), the introduction of Yellowstone elk raised concerns that these animals were taking over range which ought to be preserved for rehabilitating the native Roosevelt elk. As the Wildlife Division's Ben H. Thompson described the situation, "it is not too late to rectify the damage by some means whereby the Yellowstone elk might be replaced by Roosevelt elk, provided all the factors of the case are known." [3] Roosevelt elk could be obtained from the Olympic Mountains. The reason that this population had not been used for a source of stock before was that their rugged, woodland habitat made them more difficult to capture than the more distant Yellowstone elk. [4]

Kitchin's field work confirmed that elk were using both sides of the park for summer range. Working with the park's chief ranger, Preston Macy, Kitchin devised three alternatives for eliminating the elk: (1) employ agents of the Biological Survey to kill the elk on the elk's winter range outside the park; (2) encourage the State Game Commission to open a season on the elk and permit sport hunters to kill the elk on its winter range; (3) kill the elk on its summer range inside the park, packing the meat out for distribution to welfare agencies. Tomlinson favored the first option even though it would require NPS funds; he thought the last option would likely arouse public protest. The state game director indicated that he would publicly support any of these options provided that the destroyed elk were replaced with Roosevelt elk. [5] This initiative by the Wildlife Division got no further than the planning stage, however, presumably for lack of funds. Tomlinson did not include an item for elk management in either his park budget recommendations or his CCC project proposals.

Winter Range for Deer

Tomlinson and the men of the Wildlife Division also found that their priorities differed in the matter of obtaining additional winter range for deer. During their survey of wildlife conditions in the national parks, Wright, Thompson, and Dixon had characterized Mount Rainier as a classic "mountaintop park"—a park whose boundaries had been too tightly drawn around the principal scenic feature, the mountain. It was the common failing of mountaintop parks that the populations of deer and elk—and the predators that depended on them—ranged in the park's high country during the summer only, and migrated out of the park to the surrounding low country during the winter. Mount Rainier's deer population sometimes suffered heavy losses from sport hunters and poachers when it ranged outside the park's protective boundaries. Kitchin's second assignment was to survey the deer's winter range and recommend boundary changes. [6]

The Wildlife Division had been interested in a south side addition to Mount Rainier ever since Wright, Thompson, and Dixon made their faunal survey of the park in 1930. It was thought that the addition of a strip of land from three to seven miles wide between the present park boundary and the crest of the Sawtooth Range would go far to protect the deer population. [7] Kitchin made a reconnaissance of the area, together with logged-off lands west of the park, and suggested that both areas made ideal winter range for deer. Chief Ranger John M. Davis objected to the idea of bringing logged-off lands into the park. This problem notwithstanding, the Wildlife Division kept the proposal alive through 1935. But Tomlinson ultimately quashed the plan. In Tomlinson's view, the Park Service's major priority in Washington state was to acquire the desired rainforest additions to Mount

Olympus National Monument and have that highly-prized area upgraded to a national park; minor adjustments to Mount Rainier National Park should not distract the NPS and Washington conservationists from their main purpose. In making this judgment about conservation politics in Washington state, the superintendent received the full backing of senior NPS officials in Washington, D.C. The Wildlife Division had to let the matter drop. [8]

Monitoring of Roadside Cleanup

In the matter of monitoring roadside cleanup, the Wildlife Division wanted Kitchin to alert his superiors to instances where such activity might be causing excessive damage to the natural resources. Here the NPS was responding to those few, insightful critics who had begun to suggest that emergency conservation work was, contrary to its intended purpose, actually taking a toll on the land. In his instructions to Kitchin, Ben Thompson quoted from a recent article by Aldo Leopold in the Journal of Forestry in which that sage conservationist expressed grave doubts about the CCC:

> There was, for example, the road crew cutting a grade along a clay bank so as permanently to roil the troutstream which another crew was improving with dams and shelters; the silvicultural crew felling the "wolf trees" and border shrubbery needed for game food; the roadside-cleanup crew burning all the down oak fuel wood available to the fireplaces being built by the recreation-ground crew; the planting crew setting pines all over the only open clover-patch available to the deer and partridges; the fire-line crew burning up all the hollow snags on a wild-life refuge, or worse yet, felling the gnarled old veterans which were about the only scenic thing along a "scenic road." In short, the ecological and esthetic limitations of "scientific" technology were revealed in all their nakedness. [9]

In another few years the Wilderness Society and other preservationist groups would be headlining their opposition to the CCC's frenetic road and trail development program, but at this early date that criticism was still relatively muted. It is to the Park Service's credit that NPS officials tried early in the ECW program to minimize the kind of mischief that Leopold described. Indeed, Thompson urged Kitchin to do no less than conceptualize the flora and fauna of Mount Rainier as a "complex biological society." Kitchin tried to convey this thought in his lectures to the CCC camps. [10] Helping to instill that new ecological thinking in the service was perhaps the Wildlife Division's most important contribution.

Underscoring its goal of pushing ecological research as a management tool, the Wildlife Division proposed in 1935 to set aside an area of Mount Rainier National Park as a "wilderness research area" or "primitive area." Kitchin and an assistant CCC enrollee surveyed a wedge-shaped area on the north side of the mountain bounded by the Carbon River on the west, Huckleberry Creek on the east, and the park boundary on the north. To give this area greater protection, Kitchin proposed closing the Carbon River Road and the Northern Loop Trail, leaving the Wonderland Trail as the only improved access through the area. [11] George M. Wright, chief of the Wildlife Division, endorsed the plan on January 17, 1936. [12] Over the next several months, Tomlinson exchanged views with the Wildlife Division's Adolph Murie, Victor H. Cahalane, and Lowell Sumner on precise boundaries and on the implications of a "research area" for recreational users. Finally, he objected to the idea outright, suggesting that to establish a specially protected area was, by implication, to throw open the rest of the park to unlimited development. Sumner wrote to Cahalane: "This is the old argument with which we are all familiar, but since it appears that Supt. Tomlinson feels quite strongly on the subject it would seem better for us not to press the matter at this time." [13]

In the final analysis, Tomlinson did not support the Wildlife Division on any of its three major initiatives in Mount Rainier—the Roosevelt elk transplant, the south side boundary addition, or the north side primitive area. And in each case, the superintendent's opposition or lack of support definitely killed the initiative. Yet the Wildlife Division provided expertise on a host of minor questions as they arose, and Kitchin accomplished much important work of a routine nature, such as monitoring CCC projects, inventorying wildlife, and contributing to the Naturalist Division's biological collections and Nature Notes. In doing so, NPS biologists were moving the park administration closer to an ecologically-informed approach to park management. [14]

FORESTRY RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION WITH RADIO

NPS forestry had roots in the utilitarian school of silviculture. During the New Deal, NPS forestry continued to emphasize the protection of green timber from wildfire, disease, and other infestations. Throughout the Park Service's extensive restructuring in the 1930s, Albright and Cammerer kept the service's Branch of Forestry separate from the naturalist or interpretive branch of the organization. NPS administrators still viewed forest protection as primarily a ranger activity. [15] Nevertheless, the growing emphasis on ecology occasionally brought the two separate spheres together, as occurred in the case of blister rust control in Stevens Canyon when it was discovered that the white pines were being killed by porcupines as well as the forest-tree disease. What to do about blister rust (and the porcupines) was one significant area of forest-related research in Mount Rainier in the 1930s; the other was experimentation with radio communications in fire suppression.

As described in Chapter VII, blister rust had been discovered in Mount Rainier National Park in 1928. Eradication of the host ribes bushes began in a white pine stand near Longmire in 1930. Two years later, the main blister rust control effort shifted to the Muddy Fork-Stevens Canyon area, where it was carried on by CCC labor after 1933. After four seasons of work in this section, the trees seemed to be dying faster than the CCC crews could eradicate the ribes bushes. The density of ribes bushes, steep topography, and a continual diversion of funds to other CCC projects owing to "the mild interest taken in this work by the resident park staff" conspired to undermine the blister rust control's effectiveness. Or so it seemed. In 1936, it was suggested that the work be discontinued. [16]

As the NPS assessed the situation further, another ecological factor came into play. Individual white pines that seemed large enough to fight off an attack of blister rust were being killed by another assailant—either the porcupine or the Mount Rainier mountain beaver. Now the choices were more complicated: abandon the ribes eradication and risk allowing the blister rust to come back, or continue the ribes eradication and risk the possibility that the white pines would simply succumb to the rodent instead, or identify the offending rodent and attempt to control it as well as the blister rust. At this point, two wildlife technicians, the park naturalist, and a plant pathologist were brought into the investigation to determine which animal was feeding on the bark at the base of the trees, and what to do about it. As the NPS's consulting plant pathologist, Emilio P. Meinecke, observed:

> It is highly important to know whether we have to deal with one animal or two, and whether an eventual control will have to be directed against an ecologically interesting species like the Mt. Rainier Mountain beaver which is strictly confined to Mt. Rainier, or to a far more common one like the porcupine which was not known to exist in the Park until 18 months ago and therefore cannot be regarded as belonging to the native and characteristic fauna of the Park. [17]

In the end, the biologists offered no definitive answers but counselled restraint. After a field

study in the spring, Kitchin and Brockman concluded that the barking was the work of the yellow-haired porcupine, but found that the phenomenon had been occurring for several years. [18] When officials in the Branch of Forestry proposed the use of a poison, ammonium thiocyanate, to attack the blister rust problem more aggressively, officials in the Wildlife Division objected. The circumstances in Stevens Canyon, they insisted, did not warrant "making an exception to the established National Park Service policy against the use of poison for control work." [19]

Meanwhile, the Mount Rainier park staff was pioneering the use of radios in forest protection work. This investigation seems to have been started solely through the initiative of Park Engineer R.D. Waterhouse. Waterhouse began his radio tests in 1928, carrying an 80-pound "portable" radio into the backcountry, testing its range for voice and telegraph communications, and demonstrating the new technology's utility for fire protection. He soon had the support of Tomlinson and Chief Engineer Kittredge, and by 1932 he was also getting help from the University of Washington and the Westinghouse Company's research department. With the advent of the New Deal, Tomlinson regularly assigned CCC enrollees to assist Waterhouse with his radio experiments. [20]

Experimentation with radio sets paralleled another important development in fire protection: lookouts. Permanent lookout buildings appeared in the national forests in the 1920s, but their usefulness was limited at first by the necessity for telephone links between lookouts and standby fire crews. As the number of lookouts proliferated, the Forest Service began its own experimentation with radio in the hope of installing radios in lookouts. Waterhouse cooperated with his counterparts in the national forests adjacent to Mount Rainier, but it soon became clear that the two agencies had somewhat different objectives: while the Forest Service wanted to establish radio communications for its lookout system, the Park Service, not having any lookouts, was interested in portable radio sets that could be used on patrol or at the scene of a fire. Furthermore, the Forest Service emphasized range for coded messages, the Park Service wanted clarity for voice transmissions. [21] As it turned out, the national park was only a step behind the national forests in developing a lookout system of its own. In the summer of 1932, the NPS built four lookouts at Gobbler's Knob, Windy Knoll, Shiner Peak, and Tolmie Peak. It added two more at Mount Fremont and Crystal Mountain in 1934. [22]

Artist's rendition office dispatchers. The scene was used in an exhibit in Ohanapecosh Forest House. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

As other national parks instituted a more aggressive system of fire protection in the early 1930s, NPS officials looked to Mount Rainier National Park for advice in the procurement and use of radio equipment. [23] One report, written for general circulation in the service, described two types of radio sets which had been "developed, tried out and accepted for use by the Forest Service and in Mount Rainier National Park." One was a portable set weighing ten pounds which could transmit and receive up to forty miles; the other was a semi-portable set approximately eighteen inches square, weighing sixty pounds, with a range of about one hundred miles. This report went on to recommend that the technology for radio communication with voice transmission was now sufficiently reliable to be adopted for use by fire-fighting crews, fire lookouts, construction camps, district ranger headquarters within the park, and headquarters. [24]

Despite the cumbersome size and expense of early radios, Tomlinson moved quickly to adopt radio communications in the park. Radios were installed at all district ranger stations in 1933 and two lookouts were equipped with portable radio sets to augment telephone service. The superintendent commented, "The establishment of radio service in the park has been a most valuable addition to park administration and protection work during the winter months when telephone communication is cut off with outlying districts." [25] In 1940, park rangers adopted the use of portable radios in patrol cars. [26] The park administration's use of radio in this era represented innovative, pioneering work. Radio technology improved dramatically during World War II, and radio communications became much more common in the postwar years. [27]

GLACIER STUDIES

Beginning in the early 1920s, the park naturalist made yearly measurements of glacial recession in Mount Rainier. By 1933, the Naturalist Department was conducting yearly

glacial recession surveys on the Nisqually, Paradise, Carbon, South Tahoma, and Emmons glaciers, some in cooperation with the city of Tacoma and the U.S. Geological Survey. The primary purpose of these surveys was to contribute to the science of glaciology. Another purpose was to monitor the tremendous forces of nature that made Mount Rainier not only an interesting place but a potentially hazardous one, too.

One of the most destructive natural events in the park up to this time occurred on October 14, 1932, when an ice dam which had formed on top of the Nisqually Glacier burst, sending a wall of water almost thirty feet high over the snout of the glacier and down the Nisqually river bar. The sudden flood smashed into the Nisqually Bridge, took out the center span, and carried it almost in one piece about one-half mile down the river. It was the park's first experience with a glacial outburst flood. Various explanations for the phenomenon were proposed, but nothing could be deduced with certainty from the single experience. [28]

Whenever a glacial outburst flood or other unusual phenomenon occurred in the park it was the Naturalist Department's responsibility to document it. He hoped that correlations between glacial activity and volcanic activity would someday provide the park administration with part of an early warning system for coping with an imminent volcanic eruption.

THE INTERPRETIVE PROGRAM

Mount Rainier's interpretive program in the 1930s built upon foundations laid in the 1920s. Guided nature walks, campfire talks, lectures in the community buildings at Longmire and Paradise, museum development, and scientific research remained the staples of the program. C. Frank Brockman became Mount Rainier's second park naturalist in 1928 and held that position until 1941. Brockman oversaw a growing staff of seasonal ranger-naturalists (from three in 1928 to nine in 1940), and supervised significant improvements in the park's museums. He produced the park's first museum prospectus in 1939.

The naturalist department passed a critical test in 1933. For some years the RNPC's guide department had complained about unfair competition from the free nature walks led by ranger-naturalists. Tomlinson acknowledged that the interpretive program was taking some business away from the guide department, and he and Brockman made several attempts to work out a cooperative plan with the company so that the two programs would not overlap and compete. In the summer of 1933, the company agreed to let ranger-naturalists give public lectures in the Community House at Paradise and accepted the Naturalist Department's plans to offer longer nature walks. But as the RNPC's patronage dwindled, company guides became increasingly critical of the ranger-naturalist activities. In August, the RNPC guide department began giving rival lectures in the lobby of the Paradise Inn, where it plugged its own guided trips while denigrating those offered by the NPS. Tomlinson reacted by suspending the naturalist program at Paradise "in order to make a test of what visitors really want." Hundreds of visitor complaints quickly affirmed the public's desire for an interpretive program. Harold C. Bryant, chief of the Branch of Research and Education, inspected the park at the end of August and made suggestions for further separation of the two services. Henceforth, the RNPC's guide department would specialize in summit climbs, glacier trips, and trail rides. As a gesture of good will, the guides were given a five-minute spot during the ranger-naturalists' evening lectures with which to publicize their activities. [29]



Guide Map for park visitors, 1938.

The growing popularity of the lecture program was quite impressive. In 1933, Brockman and his staff delivered 196 lectures. These lectures drew an estimated 16,092 people, an average of eighty people for each talk. During the off-season, Brockman gave lectures at schools, chambers of commerce, and other public places in the region. Brockman's lectures outside the park attracted audiences of several hundred people each. [30]

The ranger-naturalists made most contacts with park visitors as the latter circulated through the Longmire Museum or past the floral exhibits and relief model in the Community House at Paradise. Whereas fewer than two percent of park visitors went on ranger-led nature walks, and less than ten percent attended lectures, a solid majority entered the museums. These public contacts in the museum, though brief, allowed the ranger-naturalists to dispense information and perhaps equally important, to personalize the visitor's impression of the park administration. Moreover, museum displays appeared to be the Naturalist Department's most effective venue for conveying interesting information to the visitor which would enhance his or her enjoyment of the park.

Brockman's 47-page museum prospectus provides a clear picture of what the Naturalist Department deemed to be Mount Rainier's most educational and inspirational features in the 1930s. Brockman proposed that the park should eventually have four museums located at Longmire, Paradise, Sunrise, and Ohanapecosh, each with a different focus in keeping with its immediate environs. Thus, the Ohanapecosh museum would tell the story of the lowland forests, the Sunrise museum would tell the geologic story of Mount Rainier, the Longmire Museum would offer biological exhibits together with a minor emphasis on the history and ethnology of the area, and the Paradise museum would focus on "inter-relationships." Brockman's concept for the Paradise museum was the most original, and exemplified the early influence of ecological thought on NPS interpretation. He elaborated:

> This museum will explain, in dramatic fashion, the manner in which all features of interest in Mt. Rainier National Park (geology, botany, zoology, and human

> relationships) are inter-related, correlated and dependent upon one another. It will interpret the scenic beauty and the various features of natural history of which this scenery is composed not as separate units but as a single entity. The motif of the museum, then, will be [the] inter-relationship of all things in nature as exemplified in Mt. Rainier National Park. It will serve as an explanation of how the varied interests in this area bear a definite relationship to one another to bring about a complete interesting and inspiring picture. All exhibits, whether geological or biological, will be definitely aligned with this theme. [31]

Brockman suggested that the Paradise museum would address, among other things, the unintended effects of visitor use on nature in a national park. In planning this particular display, Brockman anticipated the Park Service's vigorous effort many years later to educate the public about the need to stay on designated trails. He described his proposed exhibit on "human relationships" this way:

> This feature, because of the great popularity of the national parks and the many complications that arise from such interest, should be given some consideration in order to effect a better understanding on the part of the public as to many of the administrative problems of the park and their relation to certain of our rules and regulations. This should develop a better co-operative spirit. It involves the problem of modifying natural conditions by fire, destruction of plants, by heavy concentration of people, feeding of animals, etc. It also enables one to discuss the relations of human beings, particularly the early [I]ndians, with their interest in or fear of the mountain, their use of plants as food, and various materials for artifacts characteristic of the region. [32]

One can only assume that Brockman was already noting the effects of large numbers of park visitors on Mount Rainier's most accessible alpine meadows. More than twenty years later, while working as a professor of forestry at the University of Washington, he would contract with the NPS to conduct specialized research on meadow rehabilitation around Paradise and Tipsoo Lakes (Chapter XVII).

Although the full scope of Brockman's museum prospectus would not be realized until the Mission 66 period, emergency relief funds paid for considerable expansion and improvement of museum facilities in the 1930s. By 1935, the Naturalist Department was managing small museums at Longmire, Paradise, and Sunrise, and the superintendent was boasting that the park's naturalist program was of "a professional caliber." [33] In 1939, a CCC crew erected a temporary museum building at Ohanapecosh from scrap lumber as it dismantled its own CCC camp buildings. The building would serve as a museum until 1964. [34]

After Brockman left the NPS, he went on to become a leading scholar of outdoor recreation policy and management. In 1978, he published an article in the Journal of Forest History on "Park Naturalists and the Evolution of National Park Service Interpretation through World War II." He described his own efforts in Mount Rainier and the efforts of his contemporaries as truly pioneering work, for early park naturalists were faced with inadequate research, a lack of unified objectives or planning, and minimal financial support. The gradual improvement of the interpretive program in these years, he wrote, "resulted from the interest, efforts, and ingenuity of early workers who persisted, often at personal expense and at sacrifice of personal time, despite criticism and even ridicule." [35]

No doubt an important part of the interpretive program's development in these years was its struggle for credibility. Brockman's own comments on the dubious status of the NPS interpretive program are interesting, though it is unclear how directly the comments pertained to his situation in Mount Rainier National Park. In his article on the evolution of NPS

interpretation, Brockman recalled that while ranger-naturalists generally received many accolades from the visiting public, they seldom received much respect from the science academy, which questioned (often with good reason) the scientific credentials of park naturalists. At the same time, the ranger-naturalists sometimes did not fit in with the rest of the park staff. Many ranger-naturalists were teachers who worked in the park during their summer vacations and the permanent rangers often belittled them by calling them "nature fakers," "posy pickers," or "Sunday supplement scientists." [36]

Even Secretary of the Interior Ickes complained that Park Service interpretation could be superficial. He thought that museums simply did not belong in national parks, and that scientific research by park staff was a waste of effort. Worse yet, Ickes maintained, ranger-naturalists too often burdened the visitor with heaps of disconnected facts. "Nothing makes me want to commit murder so much as to have someone break in on a reverential contemplation of nature in which I may be indulging by giving me a lot of statistical or descriptive information relating to what I am looking at," Ickes once fumed. [37] With the Secretary of the Interior expressing thoughts like these, it was no wonder that some park naturalists felt a little insecure about their work.

Brockman, however, proved to be one of the most talented park naturalists in the service. During the winter of 1935-36, Brockman was granted leave after receiving the first of several scholarships awarded to NPS employees for graduate study at Yale University's School of Forestry. [38] Brockman founded the Mount Rainier Natural History Association in 1939, and published his book, The Story of Mount Rainier National Park, the following year. In March 1941, he was promoted to park naturalist at Yosemite, and less than two weeks later Howard R. Stagner took his place at Mount Rainier. [39]

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART FOUR: DEPRESSION AND WAR YEARS, 1930-1945

XIII. NATIONAL PARK VALUES IN WARTIME

INTRODUCTION

Following the American entry into World War II in December 1941, the Roosevelt administration called upon the Park Service to join in the national war effort. This was the second time in ten years that the Park Service had to respond to a national emergency. Just as it had during the Great Depression, the NPS had to adjust its priorities and change the way it did business while protecting the core values embodied in its mission. The NPS had to recognize the extraordinary nature of the times without losing sight of the fact that, as the keeper of the nation's wonderlands, the agency bore an exceptional responsibility to the future. Wartime, like the Depression era, required a different calculus for policymaking. As the new director, Newton B. Drury, explained his agency's mission in wartime, national parks symbolized the very values that the nation was fighting for and it would not do to sacrifice those values in the cause of victory. The NPS had to ensure that the national parks would be preserved for the American people's enjoyment after the war.

ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS

The most significant effect of World War II on the Park Service was the budget and personnel cuts it wrought. These were swift and deep. Public works projects virtually came to a halt. Congress slashed park appropriations and terminated the CCC in 1942. The NPS had to cut sharply the number of seasonal hires in each park, even as it lost a sizable percentage of its permanent employees to the Armed Services. Regional offices were preserved, but with reduced staffs. The Park Service headquarters were moved to Chicago to make office space available for other agencies more involved in the war effort; the move reduced the Park Service's contacts with Congress and caused considerable attrition of NPS personnel.

In Mount Rainier National Park, the task of adjusting park operations to meet these new wartime conditions fell to a new superintendent, John C. Preston. Formerly superintendent of Lassen Volcanic National Park, Preston took Tomlinson's place in July 1941 when Tomlinson was appointed director of the Western Region. Preston saw the completion of various public works projects in the park: the Paradise Ski Lodge, the Yakima Park Campers Shelter and Blockhouse, an employees' residence at Longmire. He worked with contractors on the Stevens Canyon Road who faced wartime shortages of labor and materials for construction, and allowed these contracts to be suspended at the end of the 1942 season. Under the provisions of the Selective Service Act, the superintendent oversaw three draft registrations at designated stations in Mount Rainier National Park between July 1941 and April 1942, each one auguring a loss of park personnel to the Armed Services. Robert K. Weldon, district ranger at Paradise, was the first permanent staff member to be inducted into the army, while many temporary staff members volunteered at the end of the season. [1]

Wartime cuts in the park staff and budget paralleled a drop in visitation as gasoline rationing and shortages of automobile parts discouraged travel. The reduction in travel to Mount Rainier mainly occurred in 1943 and 1944 when official restrictions on travel were most severe. From a peak travel year in 1940, annual visitation declined as follows:

ANNUAL VISITATION DURING WORLD WAR II

Year	Total Visitors	Percent of 1940
1940	456,637	100
1941	446,636	98
1942	389,857	71
1943	113,234	25
1944	125,744	28
1945	287,289	61

Winter use declined from 136,220 in 1940-41 to 97,177 in 1941-42, then plummeted to practically nil for the remainder of the war years as the NPS kept the road plowed only as far as Longmire or a little above. [2]

Interpretation in Wartime

Cuts in personnel and the budget forced a sharp reduction of the interpretive program. Theoretically, the Naturalist Department had an important contribution to make to the war effort by interpreting national parks as symbols of American democracy. "In so doing," park naturalists were told at Mount Rainier, the NPS could "contribute perhaps more than any other agency to the psychology and moral phases of national defence [sic]." [3] In practice, however, the Naturalist Department's visitor services proved to be relatively expendable. In the first summer of the war, seasonal ranger-naturalists were assigned many duties that were normally covered by the Protection Department. In subsequent seasons, Park Naturalist Howard R. Stagner had to keep the Naturalist Department going without any seasonal staff whatsoever. [4]

Guided walks and lectures were the first part of the interpretive program to be cut back. In the course of one summer, Stagner conducted a mere eight nature walks, all from Paradise; gave a total of 53 slide-illustrated lectures in the lobbies of the Paradise Inn and National Park Inn; and manned only one of the four museums (at Longmire)—this with the help of one ranger. Stagner devoted most of his time to resource and planning studies. He even had to give part of his time to other national park units: he helped the custodian of Whitman National Monument prepare that unit's first circular, or visitor's pamphlet, in 1941; and he produced the first interpretive development plan for Olympic National Park in 1944. [5]

Stagner carried on certain naturalist activities through the war years in order to preserve continuity for the postwar era. He made annual measurements of the recession of five glaciers. He kept the financial accounts of the Mount Rainier Natural History Association, maintained the library, photograph collections, and museum records, and tried generally to keep the Naturalist Department "on a current basis" so that it could quickly resume a full interpretive program when it once again had a normal staff. [6]

Forest Protection in Wartime

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 precipitated a great deal of speculation about whether the Pacific Coast states might be vulnerable to invasion, or sabotage. One concern was that the enemy might attempt to set forest fires. Another concern

was that the wartime drain on manpower (exacerbated by the termination of the CCC on June 30, 1942) would itself pose a threat of increased forest fires. In January 1942, Superintendent Preston joined other federal and state officials in forming the Washington Forest Defense Council. The purpose of the council was to bring about closer coordination of forest protection activities by various agencies. Preston represented the Interior Department (both the NPS and the BIA), and attended bi-weekly meetings in Olympia for several months. [7]

The park staff updated Mount Rainier's fire control plan for the wartime emergency. [8] A total of thirteen men were assigned to forest protection each summer from 1942 through 1945. Six fire guards were stationed at Gobbler's Knob, the Colonnades, Tolmie Peak, Mount Fremont, Crystal Mountain, and Shiner Peak; six others were assigned to patrol around Longmire, Nickel Creek (later Lake James), Yakima Park, St. Andrews Creek, Ipsut Creek, and Paradise; and the thirteenth fire guard served as dispatcher at Longmire. [9] The park administration equipped all fire lookouts with two-way radios, and kept portable sets on hand for emergency use in the field. Radioman Ralph McFadden set up a radio operating room and repair shop adjacent to the fire dispatcher's office at park headquarters. [10]

While the yearly average number of fires increased marginally, improvements in fire detection technique helped the park staff to reduce the total acreage that was burned—from 60 acres during the 1930s to a mere 7 acres during World War II. Reduced visitation, meanwhile, appeared to lower the proportion of fires that were anthropogenic. [11]

In May 1943, Mount Rainier hosted a Western Region Fire School. Personnel from Olympic, Crater Lake, Lava Beds, Yosemite, and NPS offices in San Francisco and Chicago attended the training session. [12]

Cooperation with the RNPC

From the standpoint of the RNPC, the decline in visitation during the war essentially prolonged the economic depression. Indeed, the advent of gasoline rationing and the discouragement of pleasure travel caused an even more precipitous fall-off in visitation in 1943-44 than had occurred in 1932-33. But the RNPC and the park administration dealt with the wartime business climate very differently than they had the earlier crisis. This time the RNPC managed to keep its financial losses to a minimum by drastically consolidating its operations. The NPS, for its part, showed more willingness to allow a temporary curtailment of visitor services. Unlike in the Depression years, it appeared to be good public policy to allow the park concession to go into a kind of semi-hibernation during the war.

The RNPC cut back lodging and transportation services. It virtually eliminated whole departments, including its photographic and guide departments. It closed its promotional office in Seattle. In this program of retrenchment, the only significant point of friction between the RNPC and the NPS developed over visitor services at Sunrise. The RNPC wanted to suspend operations in that part of the park entirely and consolidate its operations at Paradise and Longmire. The NPS did not want to go quite so far in view of its large investment in the area, but Director Drury finally authorized this deviation from the concession contract as well. At Paradise, meanwhile, the RNPC closed down Paradise Lodge and operated Paradise Inn on the "European plan" (substituting cafeteria-style food service for full dining service). The RNPC curtailed some operations in anticipation of reduced demand, and eliminated others in response to personnel shortages. Like the park staff, the RNPC suffered attrition as managers and seasonal employees joined the Armed Services or took better-paying jobs in nearby war industries. [13]

General Manager Sceva requested in August 1942 that the RNPC be allowed to eliminate transportation service between Seattle and Tacoma and Mount Rainier National Park.

Superintendent Preston tried to persuade Sceva that this was too drastic. It would inconvenience the public and it might even undermine the rest of the RNPC's operation. Furthermore, it would force the NPS to allow other transportation companies to enter the field. The only way for the RNPC to preserve its exclusive right to provide transportation to and in the park would be to maintain that service through the war years. Nevertheless, Sceva persisted in severely reducing the company's schedule of trips. [14]

That winter, local ski clubs inquired whether they could charter buses to get club members to and from the park, rather than rely on RNPC stages. NPS regulations prohibited admittance of non-concessioner, passenger-carrying vehicles that were unaffiliated with a school, scientific organization, or bona fide mountain club. The question arose, therefore, whether ski clubs qualified as bona fide mountain clubs. Regional Director Tomlinson thought that the NPS should maintain a distinction between skiers and mountaineers in their relationship to national parks. He advised Preston not to allow ski club charter buses under the "mountaineering organization" exemption, but rather to grant "temporary permission" to ski clubs while wartime conditions prevailed—that is, until the RNPC resumed providing this service itself. [15]

In 1944, the Army began providing bus transportation from Fort Lewis to Mount Rainier for soldiers on leave. The Army was authorized to take transports into the park without charge if such transportation was part of a regular activity of the Armed Services. The RNPC objected to the admittance of the buses from Fort Lewis, contending that they were tantamount to a commercial enterprise. The buses were owned by a private company and were leased to the Army for purposes of transporting soldiers and their friends between Fort Lewis and other points (mostly Tacoma). General Manager Sceva alleged that some civilians were using the buses because they got a cheaper rate than they did on RNPC stages. It is unclear how this issue was resolved, but it paralleled the matter of ski club charter buses and clearly had implications beyond the current wartime conditions. [16]

During the war the RNPC sold all of its cabins at Paradise and Sunrise to two real estate companies: Washington Homes, Inc., and the Richaven Company. The cabins were taken out of the park to alleviate housing shortages among war industry workers in the Puget Sound area and migrant farmers in the Yakima Valley. The RNPC sold its 200 cabins at Paradise in 1943 for $160 each and its 215 cabins at Sunrise one year later for $110 each. [17] This was something of a windfall for the company considering that the cabins had proven unsuccessful and needed to be upgraded or removed anyway. [18] Company officials suggested that the money from these sales might be set aside to help finance hotel expansion after the war. NPS officials were sympathetic to this idea but could find no legal way to bind those funds for such use under the terms of the concession contract. Instead, the money went to retire a part of the company's indebtedness. [19]

Planning for the postwar era began as early as 1944. Though the RNPC was in a weak position financially, it was obvious that the park stood on the threshold of a new era. The RNPC's president, Alexander Baillie, submitted a detailed program for concessioner improvements on October 14, 1944. In general, he proposed a downscaling of the Sunrise development and an upscaling of the Paradise development. There would be a limited demand for overnight accommodations at Sunrise, he predicted, although day-use facilities would need to be nearly as elaborate as those at Paradise. The Paradise Inn and Annex, meanwhile, were worn out and outmoded and should be replaced by "a first-class resort hotel," while the Paradise Lodge and Government Ski Lodge should be remodeled and combined into one operation for the so-called auto camp tourists. Baillie proposed that the facilities at Longmire be remodeled and refurnished, but suggested that the cabins there, unlike at Sunrise and Paradise, be retained. In view of the RNPC's weakened financial condition after a decade and a half of depression and war, Baillie urged the federal

government to pay for the foregoing building improvements. As for the winter season, the RNPC favored reducing its services to a minimum level. Finally—and this caused dismay among NPS officials—Baillie suggested that the scenic highway above Paradise which the NPS had considered and rejected in the late 1920s be reconsidered. "This mile and a tenth of highway should be the number one project on the road program for Mount Rainier National Park," he wrote. [20]

Preston commented at length on the plan on November 9, 1944. His staff had not reached unanimity on the type of accommodations needed at Sunrise, Paradise, and Longmire, but they agreed on one thing: that the park should not be developed to accommodate all weekend visitors. Therefore, development plans should include overflow accommodations outside the park. Preston agreed with Baillie that the Sunrise Lodge should be completed in order to furnish some overnight accommodations and a larger day visitor and campground type of use. Motel cabins were not necessary at Yakima Park, but should probably be encouraged somewhere along the White River outside the northeast boundary of the park. Paradise Inn and Lodge should be rehabilitated, not replaced by a luxury hotel. The best use of the Government Ski Lodge would be to remodel it for use by government employees. At Longmire, Preston and his staff thought the best course was to tear down the existing concessioner buildings and start over with new cabins and a central service building. Both Longmire and Paradise should be kept open for winter use. Finally, Preston was "vigorously opposed" to the proposed scenic highway development, and urged that the boathouse and boat rental service at Reflection Lakes be taken out. Regional Director Tomlinson added some margin notes: complete the Sunrise Lodge without cabins; tear down the Paradise Inn and build a new hotel, if necessary; beware of the flood hazard at Longmire. [21]

One week after V-J Day, NPS officials met with Paul Sceva, now president of the RNPC, to negotiate a basis of agreement for the return to peacetime conditions. [22] The two parties agreed to the following outline of postwar developments:

1. Yakima Park. The cafeteria or restaurant would operate in Sunrise Lodge in 1946, but the RNPC would not be required to furnish overnight accommodations.

2. Paradise. The RNPC would not be required to provide overnight accommodations during the coming winter, but would operate both the Paradise Inn and the Paradise Lodge during the summer of 1946. Use of the Government Ski Lodge would be determined later.

3. Longmire. The RNPC would remodel and refurnish the National Park Inn for all-year service. The cabins and dormitory would be removed.

4. Reflection Lakes. The RNPC would remove the boathouse and discontinue boat rental service by January 1, 1946.

5. Above Paradise. The proposed scenic road would not be built. The NPS would improve hiking trails to Glacier Vista, perhaps paving them to prevent erosion and to encourage visitors to keep on the trails.

6. Guide and Photographic Departments. The RNPC would relinquish all rights to guiding, except saddle horse trips. All summit climbs would be made under permit by the NPS. The RNPC's photographic service would be eliminated.

7. Additional Buildings. All new accommodations would be hotel-type structures rather than cabins. The NPS would not attempt to provide adequate accommodations in the park for peak weekend demand.

8. Government Ownership of Buildings. The NPS would adopt the long-range objective of purchasing the RNPC's buildings. The RNPC would be a potential operator under a new operating contract.

9. Concession Contract. At the expiration of the present concession contract in 1948, the RNPC would be willing to accept a five-year contract.

10. Building Maintenance. The RNPC would be required to maintain and keep all buildings used by it in a good state of repair.

As this document revealed, the RNPC was emerging from ten years of economic depression and four years of semi-hibernation during the war. Mutual agreement on this list of items smoothed the way for a return to normalcy in Mount Rainier National Park. The list also highlighted the three largest issues on the agenda for the park administration in the postwar era: rehabilitation of old buildings, the problem of winter use, and planning how to cope with the burgeoning weekend crowds.

ANSWERING THE WAR PROFITEERS

The nation's call to arms brought demands by grazing, lumbering, and mining interests to open the parks for resource exploitation. These demands were often cloaked in patriotism, couched as if the nation's vital interest were at stake, when in fact they were motivated by profit and did not really promise to have any measurable effect on the war effort. In responding to these pressures, NPS officials had to make sure that the public, in its patriotic zeal, did not lose sight of national park values.

One week after the U.S. was officially at war with Germany and Japan, Secretary Ickes issued a general directive to all his bureau chiefs for "full mobilization of the Nation's natural resources for war.. .upon a basis best suited to serve our military and naval forces without waste, and with a view to saving all that we can of such resources for future generations." [23] With regard to the national parks, Ickes advised the NPS to work with military authorities in determining whether natural resources were actually needed in the war effort. Wherever proposed uses would be apt to cause "irreparable damage," the NPS would insist on learning (1) whether all reasonable alternatives had been exhausted, and (2) whether the demands were based on a strategic need. [24] NPS officials used these two litmus tests to thwart proposals for the exploitation of grazing, timber, and mineral resources in Mount Rainier National Park. The NPS also perfected its water right claims on the Nisqually River at this time.

Mining

In March 1942 a stockholder in the Mount Rainier Mining Company by the name of Ole Oakland wrote to Senator Mon C. Wallgren of Washington for help in reactivating his company's mining operation. Oakland alleged that NPS rules and regulations were preventing his company from mining copper ore in Glacier Basin, and suggested that the law of 1908 which prohibited mining in Mount Rainier National Park now ought to be repealed. Oakland claimed that opening the park to mining would be patriotic. "All I know of the stockholders [indicates that they] are 100% for Defense and help to the Government," he wrote. [25] Explaining to Drury a month later why he had called for the senator's help in this matter, Oakland insisted: "I am going to keep trying with what help I can get to see if we can't get some extra metals out to beat the Japs. . . .I have no personal ill will against persons connected with [the] Park but oh well, let's lick Hell out of the Japs." [26]

Senator Wallgren forwarded Oakland's letter to Drury and simply asked for comment. Having led other Washington politicians in the fight for Olympic National Park, the senator was an unlikely person to support mining in Mount Rainier. Drury gave Wallgren a detailed account of the Glacier Basin mining operation, including the imprisonment of the company's first president for defrauding the stockholders and the subsequent complications over ownership. This was enough to convince Wallgren that the exigencies of war did not require any special consideration for the mining operation. Although the Mount Rainier Mining Company would make further demands and plans for reactivating the mine as the decade wore on, it was no longer a wartime issue.

As numerous requests like Oakland' s came in for mining in other parks, Drury decided on a definite procedure for handling all such war-related inquiries about mining. Whenever a mineral prospect appeared to have potential for furthering the war effort, Drury wrote in a memorandum, a U.S. Geological Survey geologist would investigate the prospect in company with a park naturalist or other NPS representative. There was one more such request in Mount Rainier National Park. Unfortunately, when the second inquiry concerning Mount Rainier was made that summer, the new procedure was ignored. [27]

This time the inquiry came from a Puyallup attorney, Robert D. Campbell, through Representative John M. Coffee of Washington, regarding a copper prospect near Mowich Lake. The NPS referred the inquiry to the U.S. Geological Survey and the War Production Board. John J. Collins of the U.S. Geological Survey investigated the area on his own, without notifying Superintendent John Preston or Park Naturalist Howard Stagner. Collins found that the ore was too low-grade to be worth mining, and furthermore, he had just completed mapping a large copper-molybdenum deposit elsewhere which would obviate any need for Mount Rainier copper. This was good news for the park, of course, but both Preston and Stagner felt chagrined that they had been left in the dark until the investigation was completed. [28]

Grazing

Due to the nature of mineral resources the NPS had no choice but to respond on a case by case basis to potential mining developments. No one could state categorically that a national park did not contain strategic minerals, nor did it serve national park purposes to do geologic testing in order to prove that no such mineral deposits existed. It was different with grazing resources. The past effects of livestock on plant and soil conditions could actually be studied in many cases, and the data were relevant to the Park Service's overall mission of preserving the flora and fauna of the national parks in a natural condition. Consequently, in 1942, the NPS set out to quantify the national parks' minimal grazing resources and demonstrate conclusively that their use during the war would not be warranted. After a system-wide study, the NPS reported in the spring of 1943 that the consequences of opening the national parks to grazing as a war measure "would be out of all proportion to the slight increase in the food supply that would be attained." [29] Secretary Ickes concurred in this judgment. The Park Service's aggressive policy succeeded in holding the line against stockgrowers. [30]

Study of the grazing resources of Mount Rainier National Park occurred in two phases: Superintendent Preston transmitted a quick compilation of data to the regional office on July 29, 1942 for use in the NPS report covering system-wide grazing resources. Park Naturalist Stagner then made a more detailed investigation and report the following summer. [31] Stagner's study, "Some Ecological Factors Relating to Possible Cattle Grazing in Mount Rainier National Park," was the most thorough report on the problem to date, and probably led the park administration to take a closer look at the use of saddle horses in the park after World War II.

Stagner addressed (1) the history of grazing in Mount Rainier National Park, (2) the potential cattle range areas in Mount Rainier and the implications for park administration if the park were opened to grazing, (3) the general relationship of grazing to the scenic and scientific values of national parks, and (4) the specific ecological effects of cattle grazing in Mount Rainier. It was this last section of Stagner's report that had implications beyond the current wartime demand for grazing privileges.

Stagner argued that the effects of grazing in Mount Rainier's highcountry meadows were more severe than in most other mountain areas because of the composition of the soil, which was largely volcanic ash. The ash was light and porous, retaining relatively little water. The soil was generally poor in minerals and contained little humus. The abundance of grasses and lupine gave such areas a deceptively luxuriant appearance, but once the plant cover was weakened the soil became subject to severe wind and water erosion. Cattle would potentially damage the vegetative cover of these areas not so much by overcropping the forage as they would by trampling the plants and compacting the soil. The past experience with cattle grazing in Yakima Park during and after World War I showed how quickly the covering of bunch grasses and lupine could give way to barren soil. Once removed, the plant cover took many years to restore itself. It was said that Yakima Park's wildflowers did not appear the way they had before World War I until about 1934 or 1935. [32]

Stagner's report went into the files for use in case Washington state's stockmen should agitate for permission to graze cattle in Mount Rainier National Park. Regional Director Tomlinson, facing renewed pressure for the opening of national parks to grazing in the spring of 1944, sent a circular to all superintendents in the Western Region reiterating the Park Service's strong opposition. The main contest over grazing privileges revolved around the demands of California's drought-stricken stockgrowers for access to the national parks and monuments in that state, and it appears that no similar demand arose in the Pacific Northwest. [33] But the grazing issue had called attention to how vulnerable Mount Rainier's meadows were to trampling, and in time the park administration would recognize that crowds of people could do nearly as much damage as herds of cattle.

Water

In 1943, the NPS accomplished another task which had been contemplated for many years: it perfected title to all of its water rights claims in the Nisqually River drainage. [34] A. van V. Dunn, a hydraulic engineer with the water rights section of the Branch of Land Acquisition and Regulation in the regional office, investigated the existing situation and filed eight new applications with the State Supervisor of Hydraulics. The water rights filings covered new diversions and supplemental supplies for old ones (all of which had been deeded to the government or originally claimed by the NPS). The old diversions embraced the early water rights claims of David Longmire and John Reese to Rampart and Edith creeks respectively, both filed in 1906; the claims associated with three early hydroelectric plants built on the Nisqually River at Longmire, Van Trump Creek, and the Paradise River; and the Park Service's own claims for its diversions at the Nisqually Entrance, Sunshine Point, and on a nameless tributary to Fish Creek, near Tahoma Vista. [35]

Water rights were a minor issue in Mount Rainier, as the Park Service's claims seemed relatively secure in the event that water rights claims on the Nisqually, White, or Cowlitz river drainages should ever be adjudicated. But Dunn's investigation did turn up two interesting points. First, the situation in the Nisqually drainage was somewhat complicated by the fact that the Park Service's claims rested in part on the prior rights of private interests which were later deeded to the government. Second, some of the Park Service's points of diversion were located only a few miles below glaciers, where the amount of stream flow could be influenced by glacial recession. Thus, as the Paradise and Stevens glaciers receded,

the flow toward Stevens Creek and the Cowlitz River drainage increased while the flow toward the Paradise River and the Nisqually River drainage decreased. "If the same trend continues," Dunn cautioned, "we shall either have to divert water from Stevens Creek to the Paradise, or move our power plant." For the time being, however, the eight new water rights filings left the park in a satisfactory situation. [36]

Timber

The gravest threat to national park forests during World War II came from the airplane manufacturing industry's demand for Sitka spruce. In January 1943, Drury prepared to make Sitka spruce in Olympic National Park available for logging, but the need to log national park timber never actually eventuated. By September 1943, the War Production Board had withdrawn its earlier request; alternative sources of Sitka spruce in Alaska, British Columbia, and elsewhere in Washington sufficed. [37] The controversy was relevant to Mount Rainier only in that it focused Washington residents and NPS officials on the Olympic Peninsula rather than Mount Rainier. As in the 1930s, controversies over the protection of Mount Rainier s resources during World War II were overshadowed by conservation battles in Olympic National Park.

There were no demands to log timber in Mount Rainier National Park on behalf of the war effort. When one forest tract in the park was proposed for logging in 1944 (see below), no pretense was made that the timber sale would boost the nation's war production. Rather, the controversy revolved around private versus public interests in the case of a national park inholding owned by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company.

CLOSING THE NORTHERN PACIFIC LAND DEAL

World War II produced a boom in the Pacific Northwest's timber industry which would continue well into the postwar period. Logging companies, now using heavy trucks instead of narrow-gauge railroads, moved their operations farther and farther into the Cascade Range. In 1944, the Skate Creek Logging Company offered to purchase a 204-acre tract belonging to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company located in the southwest corner of Mount Rainier National Park. The isolated tract dated from the 1926 boundary extension. The imminent threat of logging inside the park proved to be a catalyst that enabled the NPS to close a land deal with the Northern Pacific which it had sought for nearly twenty years. Although the forest area was saved, it was a Pyrrhic victory; the land deal presaged a new era of heavy logging around all sides of the national park.

The history of this land deal, like that of the Longmire property, illustrates how difficult it was for the NPS to secure funds for land acquisitions. It will be recalled that the park boundary was adjusted in 1926 to conform to the Nisqually and Carbon rivers in the southwest and northwest corners of the park respectively, thereby adding two slivers of land to the park. Since the land surrounding the park was checkerboarded by the Northern Pacific land grant, fractions of three alternate sections owned by the railroad now came within the park boundary (two along the Carbon and one along the Nisqually). By far the largest parcel was the 204-acre tract located between the park road and the Nisqually River about two miles from the Nisqually Entrance (see map).

The Northern Pacific called the Park Service's attention to the three parcels soon after Congress enacted the boundary adjustment, asking whether the government expected to acquire it. At that time, Congress had not appropriated any funds for national park land acquisitions. [38] But three years later, in 1929, Director Albright negotiated a deal with the officers of the company. The government would pay the Northern Pacific for half of the

land's value, estimated at $20,000, and the railroad company would donate the other half to the government. [39]

The Northern Pacific executed the contract, and the contract was approved in principle by Assistant Secretary John H. Edwards on September 4, 1930, but then the deal hit a snag. Asked by Edwards to review the contract, the department's solicitor, E.C. Finney, suggested that the deal might compromise the government's case involving the whole Northern Pacific land grant, which was then in litigation. The Department of the Interior then referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney General, who asked that the purchase be held in abeyance until the suit was settled. [40]

The litigation finally concluded, negotiations started over again in the fall of 1938. On May 5, 1939, the Northern Pacific offered the government an option to purchase the property under the same terms as before, at $20,000 on a "50/50" basis. The government accepted the option on May 3, 1940, one day before the offer was to expire. The option allowed the NPS three years to confirm the accuracy of the property appraisal and obtain the funds, but as no funds were made available for land acquisitions during the war, it finally became necessary to request a one-year extension of the option, to May 3, 1944. Then, in the spring of 1944, it was learned that the Northern Pacific was cruising the timber on this parcel and on other sections close to the park with a view to selling the timber, and that the company would not renew the government's option after it expired on May 3, 1944. [41]

It soon came to light that the Skate Creek Lumber Company had offered to buy this tract for $42,000—more than four times what the Northern Pacific stood to gain by selling it to the government. During May, June, and July 1944, Director Drury, Regional Director Tomlinson, and Superintendent Preston all had separate communications with Northern Pacific officials in an effort to get the company to renew the government's purchase option through the end of the war. Company officials rejected their pleas, indicating that the tract would be selectively logged by the lumber company. Finally, on July 25, 1944, Superintendent Preston wired Drury for permission to go public with this imminent threat of logging in the park. [42]



The Northern Pacific Railway Company held land in the northwest and southwest corners of the park. In 1944 it tried to sell the shaded area shown above to a logging company but encountered strong opposition.

The publicity worked to the Park Service's advantage. Even though Northern Pacific officials pointed out that they had been trying to sell the property to the government for nearly twenty years, they did not win much sympathy for the railroad. Articles appeared in the Seattle and Tacoma newspapers: "N.P. May Log in Rainier Park," "Plan to Log Park Tract," "Rainier Tract to be Logged." [43] The RNPC, the Tacoma Chamber of Commerce, the Northwest Conservation League, the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, and The Mountaineers all objected to the planned timber sale. [44] According to a senior Northern Pacific official, The Mountaineers stated that in the event the railroad was unable to consummate a deal with the government "they would like to have the opportunity of raising funds in order to make up any difference." [45] The company was further embarrassed when an article on its plan to log in the national park appeared in the October issue of National Parks Magazine. [46] As a result of all this negative publicity, the Northern Pacific decided to postpone its timber sale.

The problem remained of finding money with which the NPS could purchase the Northern Pacific tract on a 50/50 basis. Congress had last made an appropriation for national park land acquisitions in 1939; this source of matching funds had long since been exhausted. Northern Pacific officials approached Representative John M. Coffee on the need for a bill, but the prospect of getting such a bill passed in wartime was not good. Drury conceived another plan. The Park Service had recently sold a small parcel of land from Great Smoky Mountains National Park to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. In February 1944, he had obtained authorization from the Comptroller General to use these limited funds for land purchases in other parks. [47]

The Northern Pacific suggested that $40,000 was a fair value for the land; that is, it would sell the land to the government for $20,000. Considering the fact that recent appraisals of the timber and the land now ranged from $50,000 to $70,000, this was a good deal. Drury offered $15,000. He intimated that that was as much as the NPS could offer, although the Great Smoky Mountains land sale had netted $25,000. Perhaps the director had other, equally urgent needs for the remainder of his land acquisition funds, or perhaps he had reliable information that the Northern Pacific wanted to sell. There was no question that Drury considered the land purchase a top priority; leaving no stone unturned, he called upon his old friend Horace Albright, now president of the United States Potash Company, to pressure Northern Pacific officials to accept his proposal. Drury's hard bargaining finally succeeded where earlier efforts had failed. In August 1945, three small parcels of the Northern Pacific land grant—205 acres on the Nisqually River and 100 acres on the Carbon River—were deeded back to the United States. [48]

MOUNT RAINIER AND THE MILITARY

NPS officials went out of their way to make national parks available for recreational use by the U.S. Armed Services during World War II. Director Drury, in his annual report for 1943, made special, laudatory mention of Mount Rainier (along with Olympic, Yosemite, Sequoia, and Mount McKinley) for its role in serving thousands of military personnel. Busloads of soldiers who were stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington, received free trips to Mount Rainier while they anxiously awaited word as to what theater of war their units would be sent. Drury observed that this alone was "significant justification of the national-park concept," for untold numbers of soldiers were "being given opportunities they never had before, and may never have again, to see the inspiring beauty and historical significance of this land of ours." [49]

Making national park facilities available for troops had other benefits as well. It brought some desperately-needed business to the park concessions, who were hurting again due to the sharp curtailment of tourism during the war. (The RNPC avidly supported proposals by the Army and the Navy to establish a rest center at Mount Rainier in 1943, but this did not materialize. [50]) And perhaps most importantly, it blunted accusations by grazing, lumbering, and mining interests that national parks were not making their share of sacrifices for the war effort. NPS officials well remembered the national park experience in the First World War, when these same interests had made inroads in the national parks supposedly in the cause of boosting the nation's war production. Perceiving that the Park Service might have a choice between opening the parks for use by military personnel or for use by war profiteers, NPS officials had no difficulty deciding between the two. [51]

Mount Rainier's most significant contribution to the war effort was its use as a training ground for ski troops. Mount Rainier attracted the military for the same basic reason that it attracted natural scientists and tourists: it stood out as an "arctic island in a temperate sea." The vertical zones that made the fauna and flora of Mount Rainier so diverse and beautiful also made the area a good place to find terrain and weather conditions which could simulate

fighting conditions in the European Alps and the European winter. Snow and inclement weather were abundant, and if Army officers found the weather at Paradise too mild for their purposes, they only had to march their soldiers higher up the mountain to test cold-weather clothing and equipment under the most severe conditions. Men tested sleeping bags and snow suits on the summit of Mount Rainier. They did sentry duty at night wearing a kind of sleeping bag with legs and feet. One party of ski troops made a circuit around the mountain carrying rifles and 85-pound packs. [52]

The Army found Mount Rainier an attractive ground for mountain infantry exercises because of its location near Fort Lewis, too. Established as an Army training camp in World War I, Fort Lewis survived the Army's lean years in the 1920s and 1930s to become one of the major Army installations on the West Coast in World War II. In the 1930s, the commanding officer of Fort Lewis had cooperated with Superintendent Tomlinson of Mount Rainier National Park on the administration of the CCC. Still, despite the Army's longtime presence nearby, the use of Mount Rainier for mountain infantry exercises developed fairly suddenly. On a November day in 1940, a platoon of the 41st Infantry Division, calling itself the Military Ski Patrol, arrived at Paradise for a "preliminary instruction exercise," accompanied by public relations officers and a photographer from the Seattle Post Intelligencer. The four-hour visit heralded a full winter of ski training and maneuvers by a second "Military Ski Patrol"—twenty-four soldiers of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, also based at Fort Lewis. These soldiers were quartered in government housing at Longmire. [53]

The two military ski patrols from Fort Lewis were of an experimental nature; this was the first time in the history of the U.S. Army that soldiering and skiing were being combined. With the possibility growing that the U.S. Army would be called to fight in central Europe, Army officials began to contemplate the need for specialized mountain units. The idea was given a special impetus by the impressive performance of Finnish ski troops in the Winter War of 1939-40. In that conflict, the greatly outnumbered Finns deployed swift-moving, lightly-armed, ski troops with deadly effect against the ponderous Soviet Army. Photographs of Finnish soldiers on skis gained wide circulation in the American press. Following exploratory discussions with the presidents of the National Ski Association and the National Ski Patrol during the summer of 1940, the Army initiated military ski exercises with small groups of volunteers at Mount Rainier and at Lake Placid, New York; Old Forge, New York; Camp McCoy, Wisconsin; and Fort Richardson, Alaska. [54]

The first regiment of ski troops, the 87th Mountain Infantry, was formed at Fort Lewis the following November. Army units in all parts of the country sent their crack skiers to the new regiment. The U.S. Forest Service and the NPS contributed more than a score of rangers. Meanwhile, the War Department entered an agreement with the National Ski Patrol, a civilian organization, to recruit experienced skiers for the special unit. New England ski clubs and Ivy League ski teams provided numerous volunteers. Many European immigrants and exiles joined the 87th Mountain, prompting one writer to call it a virtual foreign legion. [55]

The thousand-man regiment wintered at Fort Lewis during the winter of 1941-42 and sent contingents to train at Paradise under a cooperative agreement with the NPS. In a noteworthy compromise, ski troops claimed full use of the rope tow above Paradise Inn on week-days and yielded the ground to park visitors on weekends. [56] The Army rented and occupied the Paradise Lodge and Tatoosh Club facilities of the RNPC. [57] In the spring of 1942, the 87th Mountain transferred to the Army's new Camp Hale, located on the Continental Divide in Colorado, where it formed part of the 10th Mountain Infantry Division.

More Army units were dispatched to Mount Rainier for special training in the fall of 1943. These included a 100-man detachment of ski troops from the 10th Mountain Infantry Division, a 150-man force from the 938th Aviation Engineers who undertook snow

camouflage tests, and a 30-man unit of photographers from the Army Signal Corps who made an army training film. These units pulled out by the end of November 1943, ending Mount Rainier's role in World War II as a training and testing ground. [58]

Ski troops drill at Paradise. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART FIVE: CONTENTIOUS YEARS, 1945-1965

XIV. THE PROBLEM OF WINTER USE

INTRODUCTION

In the decade and a half following World War II, the NPS wrestled with the problem of winter use at Mount Rainier National Park. The heart of the problem was this: to what extent should skiers shape the physical development and budget priorities of the national park? The problem concerned several other national parks as well—notably the California parks—but nowhere was the situation more vexing than at Mount Rainier. As a result, the problem of winter use at Mount Rainier received a great deal of attention from both Newton B. Drury and his successor in the directorship, Conrad L. Wirth.

Some of the dilemmas which winter use presented were not new but were merely a resumption of problems that the NPS had been contending with in the 1930s. There was the problem of public safety when so many people engaged in a hazardous sport so far from hospitals. There was the issue of how far up the mountain the road should be plowed, how to provide adequate parking space at the end of it, and how to justify the large expense of this maintenance operation if downhill skiing was in any way incidental to the NPS mission. There was the matter of weighing the skiers' desire for some kind of uphill lift against the summer visitors' desire that there be no visible traces of such a device on the landscape. Finally, there was the problem of making the park concessioner stay open through the winter when experience showed that the winter season was not profitable.

Yet the postwar years formed a new and distinct context for the problem of winter use, too. When the park administration revisited these familiar issues after 1945, the debate was generally more contentious. Two underlying factors explain this important difference in the climate of policymaking. First, it was difficult to disentangle the problem of winter use from the larger problem of rehabilitating the park's infrastructure. After World War II, the NPS faced a backlog of deferred maintenance problems, a critical shortage of personnel housing, a recalcitrant concessioner with only a few years left on its twenty-year contract, and a collection of old visitor-lodging structures that failed to meet the needs of a changing pattern of summer visitation. Poised to begin rebuilding, the NPS did not want winter use requirements to drive master planning at this critical juncture in the park's development. Chiefly at issue was the NPS proposal to move overnight accommodations from Paradise to a lower elevation in the park, where the visitor season would be longer and the weather would be less severe on the buildings.

The second factor that created a new context for winter use policy after World War II was the growing political influence of skiers. With the return of prosperity in the late 1 940s and 1950s, the American political economy became increasingly consumer-oriented. Politicians showed a heightened interest in public recreation and leisure. Senators, congressmen, and governors of the state of Washington advocated winter use development of Mount Rainier

National Park as a way to win voter approval. They relied on groups like the Pacific Northwest Ski Association and the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs to inform them of consumer interests. These groups, in turn, had strong ties to local chambers of commerce. Thus, demands for all-year road access to Paradise, all-year overnight accommodations at Paradise, and a chair lift or aerial tram above Paradise became increasingly linked together. The NPS found itself in opposition to a powerful pro-development lobby led initially by ski groups, later by the Washington Automobile Club, and staunchly supported by the state governor.

This chapter seeks to explore the various administrative challenges of winter use at Mount Rainier: public safety, snow removal, concession operations, proposed chair lift development. Since the overall problem of winter use was such a contentious one, it will be helpful to approach the problem chronologically as it unfolded through four phases. The first phase, from 1945 to 1948, saw the NPS and the pro-development lobby become polarized over the issue of Paradise's suitability as a winter use center. The second phase, from 1948 to 1953, involved an unsuccessful search for alternative sites in and outside of the park. The third phase, from 1953 to 1955, marked the high tide of the long campaign for a chair lift or aerial tram, and culminated in Director Wirth's persuasive report to the Secretary of the Interior recommending against such a development. The fourth phase, from 1956 to 1962, saw the construction of a new all-year road from Marmot Point (above Narada Falls) to Paradise, and then a gradual decline in winter use as another ski resort was developed at Crystal Mountain outside the northeast corner of the park.

POSTWAR INTEREST IN WINTER USE DEVELOPMENT

Park officials fully expected winter use of Mount Rainier to swell after World War II. During the last winter season before the United States entered the war, in 1940-41, approximately 136,000 people visited Mount Rainier. Most people used the Paradise area; a smaller number went to Cayuse Pass. Due to wartime budget cuts for the national parks, the NPS did not attempt to keep the road to Paradise open during the winters of 1942-43, 1943-44, and 1944-45. In the first winter after the end of the war, the road was closed above Longmire from December through February yet the park still recorded 102,000 visitors between October 1 and April 30. A large number of these people came in the months of March and April, when the road to Paradise was reopened and the 600-foot rope tow was put back in operation. Superintendent Preston stated that it was not uncommon that season to have 500 or more people in the Cayuse Pass area and 2,000-3,000 people in the Longmire-Paradise area on weekends. [1]

National Park Values, Skiers, and Winter Use Policy

Skiers presented NPS officials with a quandary. Park officials wanted to make Mount Rainier' s winter scenery available to the public. Not everyone came to Mount Rainier in winter to use the ski slopes; a significant minority came to enjoy other forms of winter recreation such as snowshoeing, skiing across country, or a quiet stay at the National Park Inn during the off-season. Nor were the thrill-seeking downhill skiers oblivious to the scenery. Nonetheless, most NPS officials agreed that downhill skiing stretched the parameters of appropriate recreational use of the national parks, and they were not comfortable with the increasingly crowded conditions on and around the ski slopes. Yet to explain why this was so required fairly arcane statements of policy.

Director Cammerer attempted to circumscribe appropriate winter use developments in two office orders of April 7, 1936 and January 27, 1940. [2] Director Drury did the same with office orders of August 13, 1945 and March 21, 1946. [3] Each revision of policy was born of

a combination of philosophizing about the fundamental purposes of national parks and a desire to ameliorate the demands of an increasingly vigorous ski lobby.

Drury's first statement of policy, issued one day before V-J Day and the end of hostilities in World War II, paralleled Cammerer's statement in its reaffirmation of the Park Service's longstanding commitment to encourage winter use of the parks. But it adopted a somewhat more conservative stand toward ski installations such as runs, tows, jumps, and warming facilities. Tows and jumps, for example, had to be completely removable at the end of the winter season, and warming facilities would be strictly oriented to day-use. In an effort to define the appropriate "spirit" for winter recreational use of national parks, Drury wrote:

> This Service desires to develop a program of informal skiing, snowshoeing, ice skating and tobogganing, in which all those who desire to do so may participate. Winter carnivals, crowning of "Queens" and "Kings", highly competitive, and other spectacles designed to attract large crowds of spectators with the resultant overcrowding of available accommodations, will be avoided. Such a situation is a detriment to family and other groups who come to enjoy the use of the slopes, rinks, and other facilities themselves and not with the intention of standing on the sidelines while someone else performs. [4]

Drury's intention was to reach out to the amateur ski enthusiast who was drawn as much by the park environment as by the sport itself. Regional Director Tomlinson made the same distinction when he advised Superintendent Preston not to equate ski clubs with mountaineer clubs. "We know that the majority of ski organizations are interested only in skiing as a sport," he wrote, "as distinguished from the general enjoyment of the park values where skiing is incidental to the broader use of such park values." [5] The NPS wanted to develop winter use sites for the casual skier while encouraging competitive and resort skiers to go elsewhere.

If the state of Washington had had more ski areas in 1945, local skiers might have found this policy acceptable. Unfortunately, Paradise remained the foremost ski area in the region in the minds of most Pacific Northwest skiers. Newer ski areas at Snoqualmie Pass, Stevens Pass, and Mount Baker still lacked basic facilities, and that was the full extent of ski development for an estimated 150,000 skiers in the state. [6]

Washington skiers began to develop their own agenda even before the end of World War II. As early as the spring of 1944, the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs (FWOC), an offshoot of the National Ski Association, began goading the Park Service and the Forest Service to produce postwar recreation planning studies for each state. The FWOC wanted national parks to play an important role in the development of ski areas. In the first months following the end of World War II, the FWOC, the Pacific Northwest Ski Association, various local ski clubs, and even The Mountaineers criticized the new winter use policy announced by Director Drury. These groups wanted overnight accommodations, and they thought the prohibition against "highly competitive" events too restrictive. [7]

When Drury issued a revised statement of NPS winter use policy on March 21, 1946, he sought to placate skiers while quietly reducing their influence. The statement began by explicitly retracting Drury's earlier opposition to the holding of competitive events in national parks. Rather, the statement could now be read as embracing the downhill ski fraternity. "It is recognized that important recreational benefits are available during the winter months in areas of the National Park System having a heavy fall of snow and where the climate is otherwise not too severe," Drury wrote. "It is further recognized that, if made available under proper controls, the use of our areas for healthful out-of-door recreation during the winter months is a very desirable way to make the scenic and other natural values of the System available for

the benefit and enjoyment of the people." The other modification of his policy was subtle but significant: Drury deleted a provision that would allow ski clubs to operate their own ski tows under special permit, reserving this privilege instead for the park concession. [8]

The Rise of a Pro-Development Lobby

Pacific Northwest skiers discovered their political influence during the winter of 1945-46. In October 1945, Superintendent Preston announced that the Paradise area would be closed through another winter, as the NPS was still operating on a wartime budget and no funds were available for snow removal. Several community, high school, and university ski clubs were alerted to the prospect of yet another winter passing without access to the state's leading ski area. The sports editor of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Royal Brougham, who had been instrumental in promoting the Silver Skis event at Paradise in the 1930s, lobbied Senator Warren Magnuson on behalf of the state's skiers to secure road maintenance funds for the park. Magnuson succeeded in getting a special supplemental appropriation of $11,500 for snow removal (Mount Rainier was the only park so favored), but it did not clear Congress until January. In the meantime, Governor Mon C. Wallgren pledged the assistance of his State Department of Highways. This calculated move received good press coverage while the governor's later retraction of the offer, on the advice of his attorney general, went unnoticed. Park Service maintenance crews went to work on the road in midwinter and had it open on March 3, in time for the spring ski season. [9] Magnuson and Wallgren, both seasoned Washington politicians, had found that intervening in the administration of Mount Rainier National Park earned them the public's gratitude. Ski clubs, for their part' learned that their special interest in Mount Rainier carried weight with politicians.

Chambers of commerce were quick to perceive this and to find some common ground with the ski clubs. Both groups wanted a larger commitment to visitor accommodations at Paradise by the RNPC and the park administration. Preston noted this in his annual report for 1947. "Ever since the end of the war there has been a concerted effort, led by ski clubs, chambers of commerce, sporting good stores and other organizations and individuals, to have accommodations at Paradise available through the winter season." [10] In 1948, leaders in the tourist business reestablished the Rainier National Park Advisory Board, defunct since 1936. The purpose of the new advisory board was to bring together representatives of the Pacific Northwest Trade Association, the State Hotel Association, the State Restaurant Association, the Washington Automobile Club, and other organizations interested in the development of Mount Rainier. Although the advisory board's resurrection was short-lived, NPS officials viewed it warily as one more sign of a growing lobby for commercial exploitation of Mount Rainier National Park. [11]

Plowing the road to Paradise, June 2, 1954. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

A Commitment to Paradise

The pro-development lobby succeeded in its effort to influence park planning. On June 17, 1946, Secretary of the Interior Julius A. Krug met with Governor Wallgren and various Seattle and Tacoma business leaders in Seattle to discuss the postwar use and development of Mount Rainier National Park. The business community wanted all-year overnight accommodations at Paradise. They envisioned a new, government-built hotel together with a chair lift similar to the Timberline Lodge and ski area on Mount Hood. Krug indicated his firm commitment to an all-year development of some kind at Paradise. This meeting set in motion new development plans by the NPS. [12]

Chief Landscape Architect Thomas C. Vint duly outlined what the NPS would need to redevelop the Paradise area for all-year use. Vint based his plan on two central assumptions. First, the aged structures at Paradise would be replaced by one structure that would be of fire proof construction and designed to hold up under heavy snow loads. Second, the new building would be planned and built with the understanding that all-year accommodations at Paradise were unprofitable and must be subsidized by the federal government. Specifically, Vint proposed that the Paradise Inn, Paradise Lodge, and Community House would be torn down and replaced by a $2,000,000 structure designed for efficient, practical hotel operations. The building would include approximately 100 guest rooms; six large dormitory rooms; accommodations for 60 to 80 employees; a dining room, cafeteria, and kitchen; and lobby, lounge, gift shop, store, and other public facilities that would be large enough to accommodate day-users as well as overnight guests. [13]

Vint's proposal served as a working plan as the NPS negotiated with the RNPC over the terms of their new concession contract. As these negotiations grew more and more strained and complicated, it became evident that the commitment to all-year facilities at Paradise had placed the NPS in an awkward position. Not only were all-year visitor accommodations infeasible without government subsidy, the NPS would be hard-pressed to make road access

safe and reliable through the winter. So concerned were the Park Service's engineers that they began to look again at the alternative of a tramway. Still another alternative was to build snow sheds along the most avalanche-prone sections of road in Paradise Valley. (A third alternative, to build a new winter access road to Paradise that would avoid Paradise Valley altogether, was not yet proposed at this time.) Vint advised the director in May 1948, "To keep the road open the year round is almost in the 'stunt' class." Even a generous commitment of funds to snow removal would not eliminate the potential for frequent emergency road closures, or worse, a fatal avalanche. Vint bluntly protested:

> The first error is the assumption that all year operation of facilities in Paradise is reasonable. It is not. Therefore, if the first error is to be maintained, others must follow such as a tramway as a substitute for the road as a means of reaching the area.
>
> I can not recommend the tramway—nor can I recommend the road as a means of access during the winter season for reasons of public safety. [14]

Vint wanted Director Drury to reconsider the Park Service's position and perhaps to contest the popular assumption that winter use of the Paradise area was both feasible and appropriate.

A SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE WINTER USE SITES

Between 1948 and 1953, the NPS considered various alternatives to Paradise, in and outside the park, for use as a winter sports center. One area, the Cayuse Pass-Tipsoo Lake area, was actually developed; others were given study. Although no viable alternative was found, this activity afforded a greater perspective on the challenges that the Paradise area posed. At the same time that park planners investigated alternative sites, the park administration experimented with other concessions for the winter operation.

The Tipsoo Lake Ski Area

Skiers first made use of the Cayuse Pass-Tipsoo Lake area in the mid-1930s, when the State Department of Highways began maintaining the road as far as Cayuse Pass throughout the winter. Skiers used portable ski tows at Cayuse Pass in the winter of 1945-46, and at Tipsoo Lake the following winter. In the winter of 1948-49, Preston had a survey made of the area and pronounced it the equal of Paradise from the standpoint of topography and snow conditions. [15] In the late summer of 1949, Drury allotted $15,000 for the development of ski facilities at Tipsoo Lake. The funds were to cover the installation of a temporary warming hut, first aid station, and ranger's office, the use of portable toilets, and the cost of keeping a parking area plowed at Cayuse Pass. [16] NPS officials hoped that the ski area would provide a practical alternative to Paradise, which had been rendered inaccessible through most of the previous winter by an unusually heavy snowfall. At the opening of the winter season, park officials invited press representatives to the Tipsoo Lake area in the hope of deflecting criticism of the decision to close the Paradise road that winter. Indeed, the cost of developing the Tipsoo Lake area was less than the annual cost of snow removal on the road to Paradise. The new ski area received good coverage in the local press, and Preston noted that public criticism of the Paradise closure was "less powerful than expected." [17]

Unfortunately, the Tipsoo Lake ski area did not prove to be popular with skiers. The park recorded 13,556 visitors to the area during the winter of 1949-50, compared to 54,067 visitors to Paradise during the winter of 1947-48. Superintendent Preston pointed out that the latter figure included many non-skiers. Moreover, an abundance of stormy weather during the winter of 1949-50 probably lowered public interest in winter sports overall. Nevertheless,

Drury concluded that the experiment had not been a success. [18] The most likely explanation was that Cayuse Pass was a longer drive from Seattle and Tacoma, and offered no more amenities than were available at Snoqualmie Pass and Stevens Pass. [19]

The Winter Use Committee

After the Tipsoo Lake ski area proved a disappointment for a second straight season, the NPS formed a winter use committee to investigate other alternative sites. Chaired by Park Landscape Architect Harold G. Fowler, the committee visited six actual or proposed ski areas during the last week of March, 1952. The committee's report offered two major findings. First, adopting a regional perspective on winter recreation, the committee affirmed that there was a need for one or more major ski areas in the state of Washington. Second, the committee stated that, if the NPS were called upon to develop a ski area in the park, it would then have to recommend Paradise as the most suitable area. [20]

The committee described four principal ski areas in the state of Washington. These were Stevens Pass, Snoqualmie Pass, Ski Acres (a mile east of Snoqualmie Pass), and Mount Baker. The four areas were equipped with a total of 26 rope tows, one chair lift (at Ski Acres), and one T-bar lift (at Stevens Pass). Stevens Pass and Mount Baker had lodges; the other two areas had warming huts and a limited food service. During the winter of 1950-51, the four areas drew from 30,000 to 60,000 visitors each. In addition, two proposed ski areas also showed promise: Corral Pass and White Pass, near the northeast and southeast corners of Mount Rainier National Park. None of these areas was preeminent the way Paradise had been in the 1930s, yet perhaps any one of them had the potential to be developed into a major ski area. [21]

Within the park itself, the committee investigated two areas in addition to Paradise: Tipsoo Lake and the Tatoosh Range. The Tipsoo Lake ski area could be developed into a first class ski area, the committee reported, particularly if runs were developed on both sides of the Cascade Crest. The view of Mount Rainier was outstanding. The disadvantages of the area were the shortness of its ski runs, the need for a chair lift from Cayuse Pass uphill to Tipsoo Lake, and the fact that the ski slopes intersected the road over Chinook Pass so that snow-plowing of this state highway each spring would bring an early end to the ski season. As for the Tatoosh Range, the committee found that the bowl between Pinnacle Peak and Reflection Lakes was too small and steep to be suitable for a major winter use development. [22]

This left Paradise. The committee cited four factors favoring a major ski development at Paradise: 1) there was public demand for a sizable hotel or lodge facility at Paradise anyway; 2) many skiers preferred to ski on the actual slope of Mount Rainier rather than some nearby mountain; 3) the heavy snowfall at Paradise provided excellent spring skiing; 4) keeping Paradise open for skiers allowed the public to visit an alpine area in all seasons of the year. Factors opposing such a development (strictly from a skier's point of view) were the area's southern exposure, and the fact that the mountain produced unusually stormy weather. [23]

The committee recommended six items needed to develop Paradise as a major ski area. First, a new approach road would be required to avoid the avalanche danger where the present road entered Paradise Valley. Second, overnight lodging and meal service must be provided. Third, the new hotel should have basement parking for at least 100 cars. Fourth, outdoor parking spaces must be increased to accommodate 1,000 cars. Fifth, the lodge must have a game room so that visitors could amuse themselves during stormy weather. Sixth, a chair lift would be required, as this was "an absolute necessity to a major ski area." [24] The winter use committee did not endorse this type of development. It was merely stating what would be needed if the NPS were required by lawmakers or the Secretary of the Interior to develop Paradise as a winter sports area. Indeed, in contrast to Vint's principled protests against the

development of Paradise as a winter sports center, the committee's analysis of what such a park use would require was starkly matter-of-fact. Perhaps this cold presentation was calculated to stir the blood of administrators higher up in the organization. Perhaps, on the other hand, the committee could be faulted for passing up an opportunity to comment critically on the whole idea.

Winter Concession Activities

Another dimension of the winter use problem was the strain it placed on the park administration's partnership with the concession. The RNPC made no secret of the fact that it opposed a winter season at Paradise. Winter use was even more weekend-oriented and weather-dependent than summer use. The heavy expense of transporting employees in and out of Paradise for the weekend business and keeping the operation going even when stormy weather drove most people off the mountain invariably added up to a financial loss for the season. Moreover, the RNPC had gone on record that it was not interested in building a lift of any kind unless it could be used in summer, too. Add to this the fact that the NPS and the RNPC were in the midst of negotiating a new concession contract and a government purchase of all the RNPC's buildings, and it will be seen that providing food and lodging for winter visitors was a very delicate matter.

The RNPC suspended winter operations after the winter of 1941-42, and did not resume this service through the first peacetime winter of 1945-46. In the fall of 1946, the NPS obtained an agreement with the RNPC to provide overnight accommodations and meal service at Paradise during the coming winter. In view of the RNPC's past misfortunes with the winter season, the agreement was no mean feat. Company officials consented to the plan only after a meeting in September with Assistant Secretary Girard Davidson, NPS officials, and local skiers' representatives. The concessioner operated the Paradise ski lodge on weekends and holidays from November 30 through April 6, reported a 65 percent occupancy rate, and showed a loss for the season of $18,961.97. Everyone recognized that it was a stopgap arrangement, pending a decision whether to rehabilitate the Paradise Inn and Paradise Lodge or raze the old buildings and construct a new hotel. [25]

A crew installs an all-steel passageway at Paradise Lodge entrance to provide access under deep snow, October 13, 1954. The passageway was afterwards covered by wood framing. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

In August 1947, the RNPC's board of directors decided unilaterally that the company would not provide overnight accommodations at Paradise through the coming winter, but only a cafeteria service on weekends in the Paradise Lodge. Losses for the winter of 1947-48 nevertheless came to $16,788.41. The RNPC provided similar service for the winter of 1948-49, with similar unhappy results. A company history summed up the year 1949 this way: "The net operating profit from June 1st thru Sept 30 was $13,733.07 and the net operating loss Oct 1, '48 through May 31, '49 was $16,819.81, so the winter operation continued to be the leech sucking out the life blood from the summer season operations." [26]

With the RNPC threatening to shut down permanently at the end of its one-year contract extension through December 31, 1949, the NPS made hasty arrangements in the fall of 1949 to open an alternative ski area at Tipsoo Lake, contracting with the Naches Company to operate rope tows and provide a sandwich-and-hot-coffee type of food service. At the end of the year, the RNPC and the NPS agreed to a further two-year extension of the contract, with the stipulation that the RNPC did not have to provide winter services at Paradise. In August 1952, the government purchased the RNPC's buildings and the RNPC agreed to continue operations under a new lease arrangement, but this still did not clarify what, if anything, the NPS would do to redevelop Paradise for winter use.

During the winters of 1949-50, 1950-51, 1951-52, and 1952-53, the Park Service closed the road above Narada Falls. [27] Initially there were some objections to this in the local press, but park officials generally felt that public criticism was milder than anticipated. [28] With the advantage of hindsight, it would seem that public disappointment with the winter road closure did not fade but rather smoldered, awaiting the right combination of personalities to fan it back to life.

THE CHAIR LIFT CONTROVERSY

On February 6, 1953, the Seattle and Tacoma newspapers reported a speech by Washington's Congressman Thor Tollefson, delivered on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, deploring the lack of ski facilities at Mount Rainier National Park. [29] Overlooking several statements of winter use policy by the NPS, as well as one NPS study particular to winter use in Mount Rainier National Park, Tollefson claimed that the park was languishing under a "lack of policy." He implied that it was Congress's job to make one.

Nothing illustrated so well the new politics of Mount Rainier National Park administration. Energized by their success in getting a bill passed that provided for the federal government's purchase of the RNPC's buildings, Washington's politicians now focused on getting a federal appropriation for the construction of a new overnight lodge and chair lift at Paradise. As long as local opinion favored it, they seemed deaf to the Park Service's warnings that such a development would be morally doubtful and economically unsound. For more than a year, Washington's Governor Arthur Langlie and Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay seemed to be ignoring, or at least discounting, the Park Service's advice as well. It was only by arguing against a chair lift in the strongest possible terms—risking his job in the process—that Director Conrad L. Wirth was able to save the park from this development.

A Polarization of Thinking

The resurgence of public interest in Mount Rainier National Park development during 1953-

54 was led not by skiers but by local merchants who wanted the road to Paradise kept open all year. In the fall of 1953, a group known as Greater Tacoma began calling meetings on the subject of reopening Paradise for winter use. The meetings brought together business leaders, resort owners, ski clubs, and others with a view to lobbying Washington's senators and congressmen. At the same time, a group called the Roads to Paradise Resort Association organized for the same purpose. Meanwhile, in the town of Eatonville, a group of citizens launched what they called "Operation Bootstrap," an effort to assemble data on the cost of snow removal between Longmire and Paradise, which they thought would strengthen their case for getting the road reopened for winter use. [30]

Governor Langlie addressed the subject of Mount Rainier National Park development in a letter to Secretary of the Interior McKay on October 16, 1953. Langlie observed that the park was the state's outstanding tourist attraction, and alleged that park use was severely restricted by NPS policies. If the park were adapted for use by skiers, Langlie argued, it would be usable for more than three months out of the year and would once again attract capital investment. Paradise had greater potential for ski development than Sun Valley, but skiers would not use the area unless it had some kind of permanent, uphill transportation. Langlie favored a chair lift or tramway for passenger transportation to at least 10,000 feet elevation, for use in both winter and summer. [31]

Secretary McKay's reply to the governor, drafted by the NPS, acknowledged that Paradise was the most promising area in the park for winter use, but did not indicate what type of uphill transportation was favored. Wirth proposed to save that information for a follow-up letter, when it would be stated that ski lift facilities would be limited to demountable T-bar tows. Sending a copy of the correspondence to Regional Director Lawrence C. Merriam, Wirth confided: "The important point at this stage is that we are approaching a commitment, all things being considered, for winter sports development in Paradise Valley... .I definitely want to avoid the impact of chair lifts and aerial tramways and the related pressures that would come for summer operation of them." [32] Wirth was already staking out what he hoped would be a defensible middle ground.

But as correspondence between the governor and the secretary continued through the winter of 1953-54, the issue became more and more polarized. In December, Governor Langlie formed a Mount Rainier National Park Development Study Committee. The committee was comprised of some of the most rabidly pro-development men in the state: Elmun R. Fetterolf, former chairman of the Rainier National Park Advisory Board; Joseph C. Gregory, an official of the Automobile Club of Washington and editor of The Washington Motorist; Roger A. Freeman, advisor to the governor and a chief exponent of the proposed aerial tramway. [33] That same month, Wirth received a resume of the Park Service's Mount Rainier winter use studies from Regional Director Merriam. Merriam' s report underscored the difficulties of developing Paradise for winter use. Even if a new winter access road were built and the cost of a new hotel were surmounted, Merriam cautioned, there would still remain the problem of Paradise's stormy weather, which would probably prevent Paradise from ever becoming an economically successful major ski area. [34]

In February 1954, Joseph C. Gregory announced in The Washington Motorist that the Automobile Club of Washington was launching a campaign for the full development of Mount Rainier National Park. The club claimed to have polled its 43,000 members and found a mandate to "change the thinking of the NPS." According to the club's polling, an overwhelming majority of club members favored the construction of a complete, all-year resort at Paradise. The club's essential program called for (1) all-year accommodations, (2) all-year road access, and (3) all-year uphill transportation (either a chair lift or tramway). After devoting the whole February issue of The Washington Motorist to Mount Rainier, Gregory kept up a drumbeat of criticism of the NPS in subsequent issues. In his most strident

articles, Gregory demanded a modern hotel at Paradise with swimming pool, tennis courts, and spacious green lawns. He also lambasted the NPS for not yet completing the Stevens Canyon Road and objected to its charging of fees for use of the Eastside Road. [35]

The National Parks Association (NPA) responded by defending the status quo and blistering the Automobile Club in two editorials in the spring and summer issues of National Parks Magazine. "Mount Rainier National Park Needs Your Help At Once," wrote the NPA's executive secretary, Fred M. Packard, in a newsletter to all NPA members. The Automobile Club of Washington was agitating for a "permanent steel chairlift" on the flank of Mount Rainier. Packard urged members to write at once to Secretary McKay and insist that chair lifts were out of place in a national park. [36]

Wirth held a series of public meetings in Seattle and Portland in August 1954. He met privately with the governor's committee, received its report, and conferred with the Automobile Club's board of trustees. He exchanged ideas with The Mountaineers, the Mazamas, the ski clubs, the Federation of Western Outdoor Clubs, and the local chambers of commerce. [37] His visit to the Pacific Northwest was not only a fact-finding mission but also an effort to rally public opinion against the chair lift scheme. The NPS did not want "a Coney Island at Mount Rainier," Wirth told his audiences. [38] A little more than a month after returning to Washington, Wirth submitted a 29-page report on the proposed developments at Mount Rainier to Secretary McKay.

Conrad Wirth's Report to the Secretary

There can be no question that Wirth's report to the Secretary was the product of his own deliberate thought on the subject. While the middle fourteen pages of the report on development plans came directly from Regional Director Merriam, Wirth front-loaded the report with so much of his own material—introduction, review of policy, conclusions and recommendations—that the report became his own statement. Moreover, Wirth attached such a strongly-worded cover letter to the report that McKay could not have missed its import. The issues addressed in the report, Wirth explained, were so close to the heart of the national park idea that the idea itself was on the line. "Whatever the money considerations may be, I am sure—just as sure as I can be of anything in this world—that [the national park idea] must endure as one of the basic American philosophies," Wirth wrote. "The national park concept is one of the important natural assets. If we destroy that concept we alter a point of view that I believe is basic to our American philosophy and way of life." [39] Back me up on this, Wirth seemed to be telling the secretary, or you will need to appoint a new director of the NPS. [40]

Wirth recommended that the secretary approve a plan for the development of Mount Rainier National Park containing the following principal items:

1. Completion of the Stevens Canyon Road by the summer of 1957.

2. More accommodations for the visiting public, especially at lower elevations, perhaps located outside the park.

3. A new section of road between Marmot Point and Paradise which would allow winter closure of the most avalanche-prone section of road entering Paradise Valley. Also a new parking area on this new road at Barn Flat.

4. Rehabilitation of the Paradise Lodge for day-use during the winter season.

5. Demountable T-bar type lifts that would be both economically feasible and unobjectionable to summer visitors.

6. Encouragement of more winter and summer use of the east side of the park.

Wirth strongly recommended against any permanent uphill transportation (tramway or chair lift) in the Paradise area, giving the following reasons:

1. Construction of a permanent lift to the 10,000-foot elevation on Mount Rainier would pose serious engineering and maintenance difficulties and would be economically unsound.

2. The suddenness and severity of storms on the mountain would make the ninety minute round trip unpleasant, if not hazardous, for people caught in adverse weather conditions.

3. The ride would not provide an appreciably different view than what could already be obtained at Paradise, and the thrill of the ride itself was not an appropriate use of a national park.

4. A majority of Pacific Northwesterners would undoubtedly be opposed on principle to the idea of a tramway on Mount Rainier.

5. Construction of an all-year mechanical lift would violate the principles established by Congress to govern the preservation and use of national parks.

In case these points were not persuasive enough, Wirth added a lengthy discussion at the end of his report on the physical and economic problems associated with the proposed chair lift or tramway.

Secretary McKay delayed his decision nearly three months, but finally gave the NPS director his full support. In a letter to Governor Langlie, the secretary carefully laid stress on the developments that were programmed or presently underway. For the present, McKay wrote, Paradise was again open for winter use, with the concessioner operating rope tows and day-use services at the Paradise Lodge. The Paradise area was to be further developed for winter use by the construction of a new approach road, and for summer use by reconditioning of the Paradise Inn and the addition of new campgrounds near Paradise Lodge and Barn Flat (so-named for the horse shelter and corral situated there). The Stevens Canyon Road was expected to reach completion by the summer of 1957, and in accordance with the governor's committee report, the NPS was no longer charging a fee for use of the Eastside Road. McKay concluded with the decisive statement that the Department of the Interior did not intend to give any further consideration to the construction of a chair lift or tramway in Mount Rainier National Park. [41]

Conservationists' Reaction to the Secretary's Decision

Wirth had won the crucial battle. All experts agreed that without a chair lift Paradise could not become a major ski resort. In contrast to many other public use issues, the Park Service actually had time on its side in this case. With the growth of other ski areas in the region, pressure for this type of use in Mount Rainier National Park would ease. Wirth's endorsement of a demountable type of ski lift merely reiterated what his two predecessors, Cammerer and Drury, had both maintained: if the concessioner wanted to put up the capital and handle the job of taking the contraption down at the end of each ski season, the NPS would authorize its installation. The development plan even left open the possibility that overnight accommodations would be moved to a lower elevation at a future time. The only new item in the development plan for Paradise was the alternate road from Marmot Point to Paradise via Barn Flat, and the additional campgrounds and parking areas associated with it. This certainly

seemed preferable to the construction of snowsheds or tunnels along the existing road.

Nevertheless, some conservationists interpreted the secretary's announcement of development plans for Paradise as a setback for national park principles. It seemed to them that the secretary had approved the development of a ski resort at Mount Rainier. It tended to confirm their suspicions about the rumored Mission 66 program—that it was a misguided plan for overdevelopment of the national parks. The proposed T-bar appeared to be a capitulation to the ski clubs and a grave compromise of national park standards. One local conservationist, Polly Dyer of The Mountaineers, suggested to Superintendent Macy that the T-bar at Paradise, like the notorious Echo Park Darn in Dinosaur National Monument, belied a fatal lack of commitment to wilderness preservation by the government. [42]

The National Parks Association was torn by the secretary's announcement. Some NPA officers thought the director had acted courageously. But Devereux Butcher, editor of National Parks Magazine, thought that Wirth had given up too much and proposed to rebuke him publicly in a signed editorial. The NPA's president, Sigurd F. Olson, and its vice president, Charles G. Woodbury, both tried to persuade Butcher not to print the editorial, arguing that it would cause a breach between the NPA and the NPS. Butcher printed his editorial anyway in the January-March issue of the magazine. In February, Wirth commented on the editorial to Sig Olson and suggested that the magazine might publish in its next issue two letters of support that he had received from other NPA officers, [43] The NPA's executive secretary, Fred M. Packard, assessed the political damage this way:

> Connie is quite perturbed about what may be said in the editorial in April. As far as I can figure out the matter, I think he feels he went way out on a limb and risked his job to convince McKay he should disapprove the chairlift. If now our organizations publish statements implying or stating criticism of the Secretary's decision, Connie may well fear that the Secretary will say there was no point in his cooperating as he did, and that could well lead to a request for Connie's resignation. [44]

Wirth did not lose his job, of course, but the souring of relations between the NPS and conservation groups carried a price. The chair lift controversy set the stage for a subsequent battle over Wirth's Mission 66 plan to remove overnight accommodations from Paradise to a lower elevation. In that battle, regrettably, conservation groups like the NPA and The Mountaineers provided the Park Service with precious little support. Conservationists failed to understand the range of administrative concerns surrounding these issues, and reacted myopically to such developments as the new road to Paradise and the completion of the Stevens Canyon Road as if they were signs of a new wave of park development. [45] In this particular instance, their aloofness from the Park Service hurt their own cause.

DECLINING WINTER USE OF MOUNT RAINIER NATIONAL PARK

Just as NPS planners had predicted, winter use of Mount Rainier National Park declined as other ski areas sprang up in the region. As early as the summer of 1955, the Yakima Ski Club announced its intention to install a ski lift at White Pass, outside the southeast corner of the national park, while the Olympia Ski Club began construction of a ski lodge at the same location. [46] Meanwhile, plans were taking shape for the development of a major winter use area northeast of the park. Focused on Corral Pass initially, planning efforts shifted to Crystal Mountain following a survey of the area by a team from The Mountaineers. [47] Both developments boded well for those who opposed downhill ski developments at Mount Rainier.

Indeed, it was doubtful whether anyone would bite on the Park Service's offer to allow the installation of demountable T-bar lifts at Paradise. Prospective concessioners who had earlier discussed the possibility with the park administration now informed Superintendent Macy that they would await the completion of the new road to Paradise before making that kind of investment. Ostensibly the delay was necessary in order to design the best possible layout of ski runs, parking areas, and day-use facilities in combination with the new road. But the growing competition from other ski areas probably weighed on their minds as well. [48]

A Bureau of Public Roads crew surveyed a route for the new road in the late summer of 1955. NPS landscape architects, meanwhile, assessed where a new day-use facility should be built if such a building were included in the park's Mission 66 program. Four sites came under consideration: the lower campground site, the old Community Building site, the area below Paradise Inn used for bus parking, and Barn Flat. The development of this important building (the eventual Paradise Visitor Center) is covered in a later chapter, but it is worth noting here that the four sites had various advantages from the standpoint of winter or summer use. Strictly from the standpoint of skiing, Barn Flat made the most sense because it would provide the most extensive parking area and one long ski run down from Alta Vista. This site was abandoned in favor of the old Community Building site, however, when it was found that the nearby Paradise Lodge would have to suffice for as much as a decade until the $1 million day-use facility could be built. Thus, even as the BPR designed the new winter road from Marmot Point to Paradise, winter-use planning was made to conform to the broader concerns of the Mission 66 program. [49]

The changing orientation of Paradise development plans was fortuitous. Use of the area by skiers declined as the decade advanced. In 1960, Superintendent Macy happily reported that plans were going forward to develop a ski resort at Crystal Mountain, outside Mount Rainier National Park. The Forest Service entered an agreement with the BPR for construction of an access road, and development of the Crystal Mountain ski resort began in 1962. [50]

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART FIVE: CONTENTIOUS YEARS, 1945-1965

XV. THE PROBLEM OF THE PARK CONCESSION

INTRODUCTION

Visitation to national parks increased dramatically with the return of peace and prosperity after World War II. Park administrators had to contend with increasingly crowded conditions in the campgrounds, on the roads, and at the entrance stations. These new conditions caught the NPS in a double bind. First, park staffing requirements grew much faster than the Park Service's budget. The ratio of park staff to visitors declined and the parks became woefully understaffed. The situation was exacerbated by the mood of fiscal retrenchment in the new Republican Congress, and by the exorbitant costs of fielding more personnel when a deficit of personnel housing had to be made up as well.

The second problem that the Park Service faced after World War II was a crumbling infrastructure. Much regular maintenance performed by the Park Service had been deferred during the war years. Worse still, proper maintenance on many of the privately-built visitor accommodations in the parks had been deferred for even longer, going back to the Depression years. By and large the concessions were in very bad shape to meet the new crowds of tourists who were eager to use the national parks. Thus, the park concessions problem nested inside the larger problem of deferred maintenance needs, inadequate staffing, and continued budget austerity in the face of burgeoning public use. But the park concessions problem loomed large because the concessioners clamored for help from the federal government.

Mount Rainier National Park was typical; indeed, it so exemplified problems that beset the whole national park system that Director Drury profiled the park's administrative challenges by way of illustration in his annual report for 1947. [1] Assistant Secretary of the Interior Girard C. Davidson told the House Committee on Public Lands that the problem of the concession in Mount Rainier National Park was perhaps "the No. I problem of the Park Service." [2] The company was financially weak and in low standing with its investors. Its inns and lodges were old and in an alarming state of disrepair. Some of the buildings could only be described as fire traps, and were not well-suited in any case to the day-use visitor who made up a growing proportion of park visitors. The company hesitated to invest in the rehabilitation or replacement of these buildings when its contract with the NPS was nearly due to expire, giving it little security on its investment. Finally, the company was burdened by rising operating costs after the war, especially for labor. For all of these reasons, the RNPC tried to get out of the business altogether in 1948-49. It only continued because the federal government purchased its buildings, gave it better terms in a new contract, and promised certain park improvements such as the completion of the Stevens Canyon Road and a new day-use facility at Paradise (see Chapter XIV). These changes gave the struggling RNPC another lease on life, perpetuating the government's partnership with the company in a new form for approximately twenty more years, or until the RNPC sold all its assets to a

successor company in 1968.

It may be helpful to think of the RNPC's partnership with the NPS evolving through three major phases in the course of its 52-year lifespan. It will be recalled that the partnership between the NPS and the RNPC dated all the way back to 1916 when both the agency and the company were born. From its inception until the onset of the Great Depression, the partnership functioned basically according to plan; the locally-owned RNPC was a model company in Stephen Mather's national park concession policy. During the Depression the partnership was transformed. The RNPC cut operating expenses wherever it could and accepted a much diminished role in the running of the park. The NPS, meanwhile, tapped into a variety of new federal programs and demonstrated a growing independence from local business interests in developing the park. This second phase in the partnership ended with the drastic reduction of the Park Service budget during World War II.

The third phase in the partnership was a long time in the making and quite politicized. Beginning in 1946, the NPS looked once more to the private sector for investment capital. But it quickly discovered a disturbing lack of confidence in park concessions on the part of businessmen. In an effort to put concession services in Mount Rainier on a sounder footing, the NPS advocated a policy of government ownership coupled with private operation of all guest facilities. The idea was neither new nor unique to Mount Rainier but it received a lot of attention in the Pacific Northwest, beginning with a visit to Seattle by the Secretary of the Interior in 1946 and followed by a congressional committee hearing at Paradise Lodge in 1947. President Harry S. Truman signed a law in 1950 allowing the government to acquire the RNPC's buildings, and a congressional appropriation in 1952 finally made the idea of government ownership and private operation of visitor accommodations a reality. Government acquisition of the RNPC's buildings crystalized the third and final phase of the Park Service's partnership with the RNPC. [3]

This chapter examines the role of the concessioner in rehabilitating visitor accommodations after World War II. (This task mostly preceded the rehabilitation of roads, campgrounds, museums, and administrative buildings under the Park Service's Mission 66 program, which is the subject of the next chapter.) The first section of this chapter traces the political dialogue and negotiations by which the NPS and the RNPC forged their partnership anew. The second and third sections of the chapter examine two sources of trouble, or at least ambiguity, in that restored partnership: the RNPC's responsibility for rehabilitation and maintenance of what were now government-owned buildings, and the precise meaning of the RNPC's exclusive privilege to provide visitor transportation. The fourth section of this chapter traces the history of that lesser Mount Rainier National Park concession, the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs Company, from the end of World War II to its dissolution fifteen years later. Finally, the fifth section looks at evolution of the mountain guide service from 1946 to 1965.

RESTORING THE PARTNERSHIP

The basic problem confronting the NPS and the RNPC after World War II was that the RNPC's stockholders had completely lost confidence in the company's ability to cam a profit. In the stockholders' view, either the federal government must subsidize the RNPC's operation or the RNPC must take the necessary steps to liquidate itself. This in turn presented the NPS with a choice. Either the NPS must persuade Congress to subsidize the RNPC or it must find other capitalists willing to take over the park concession. Two other alternatives, Park Service operation of the visitor facilities or termination of the visitor services that the RNPC provided, were both rejected out of hand. The problem therefore resolved itself into one of making the concession both profitable for the operator and consistent with the purposes of the

national park.

In their search for a mutually satisfactory solution to this problem, the RNPC and the NPS encountered three main points of contention. The first was the concession contract, which was due to expire on December 31, 1947. The RNPC was only interested in continuing operations past that date if it could secure better terms in a new contract. The NPS, for its part, did not want to extend the RNPC's contract if a new source of private investment capital could be found to replace the 30-year-old company. The series of short-term contract extensions which were made to bridge this situation barely kept the partnership functioning during the period 1948-53. The second point of contention was the need for an act of Congress that would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to acquire the RNPC's buildings for the government. The legislation was a major hurdle which the RNPC and the NPS had to leap together. The third and final point of contention was the problem of winter use, which impinged heavily on the problem of the concession. The Park Service's requirement that the RNPC provide public accommodations during the winter was clearly a major reason why the concession had become unprofitable. Yet the one development that seemed to offer hope of making the winter season profitable—the addition of a permanent chair lift above Paradise—was unacceptable to the NPS for it would violate the fundamental purposes of the national park.

The Search for Investment Capital

On June 22, 1945, President Truman made a four-hour visit to Mount Rainier National Park, the first president to visit the park since William H. Taft. In company with Governor Mon C. Wallgren and followed by a large entourage of reporters, photographers, Secret Service agents, and state patrolmen, the President rode by car to Paradise where he "frolicked in the snow and threw snowballs," ate lunch and played the piano in the Paradise Inn. The presidential outing was perhaps nine-tenths recreation and photo opportunity, but Superintendent John C. Preston was invited to join Truman, Wallgren, and the president's aides for about thirty minutes, at which time "the President asked many questions about the National Park Service and Mount Rainier in particular." [4] Whether anything substantive came out of this meeting is unclear, but Truman appears to have been the first politician to use Mount Rainier as a backdrop and the national park as a symbol of what the federal government could do for Washington state. In the years to come, numerous Washington state senators and congressmen would follow his example.

In the late spring of 1946, President Truman's Secretary of the Interior, Julius A. Krug, travelled to Washington state to listen to residents' demands for new accommodations in Mount Rainier National Park, especially new ski facilities at Paradise. Meeting with local business leaders in Seattle on June 17, 1946, Krug acknowledged the need for new development and pledged all assistance that the Department of the Interior could provide. But he emphasized that the government was faced with spending cuts, and he expressed hope that private industry would put forward the necessary investment capital. The money, Krug argued, logically should come from local banks and railroads and airlines which served the Pacific Northwest and benefitted most directly from tourism. Krug's meetings with the local business community were reminiscent of Mather's pitch to Seattle and Tacoma capitalists thirty years earlier. Accompanied to Seattle by NPS Director Newton B. Drury and Superintendent Preston, the Secretary of the Interior sought to initiate a new partnership between the Park Service and private capital in Mount Rainier National Park. [5]

The RNPC's president, Paul H. Sceva, injected a note of skepticism into the meetings with the Secretary of the Interior. Private capital could not "pay out" in Mount Rainier National Park, Sceva insisted. Public accommodations could only be rehabilitated and expanded with the help of the government. The RNPC had thirty years of experience and was uniquely

familiar with the many adversities facing the park concession. A few of the original 200 capitalists who had formed the company in 1916 were still on the board of directors; Sceva himself was appointed assistant to the general manager in 1923, general manager in 1928, and president of the company in 1944. Speaking from personal experience and on behalf of many old investors, Sceva said that the RNPC could not afford to borrow any more capital with which to make the necessary repairs and improvements in lodging facilities. Any investors who thought they could do better would be destined to disappointment. [6]

Sceva presented the RNPC's position in greater detail in a letter and memorandum addressed to Drury on June 5, 1946—probably in anticipation of the Secretary's June 17 visit. The RNPC president began by observing that the company's twenty-year lease was to expire a year and a half hence. Thus, he was laying out the terms under which the RNPC would enter a new concession contract with the government. The RNPC wanted the Park Service to build new facilities for the company to operate them under lease; it wanted the Park Service to purchase the company's buildings, the proceeds to be invested by the company in new transportation equipment; and it wanted the Park Service to recognize that the new arrangement would be of an experimental nature and subject to fair adjustment, especially with regard to winter operations. Sceva avoided the term "concession" altogether, calling his plan an "operating lease." [7]

The RNPC's twenty-year concession contract was one of several national park concession contracts that were soon to expire. These contracts dated from the late 192 Os, when the NPS had had the foresight to renew, years before their expiration dates, the several twenty-year contracts which had originated under Mather's new concession policy in 1916. The uncertainties brought about by the Depression and World War II prevented a repetition of this smooth procedure in the early 1940s. Now with this second generation of contracts beginning to lapse, Drury found himself in a tight spot not only with the RNPC but with several other park concessions as well. In his annual report for 1946, Drury provided a sketch of concession policy, including this comment on the twenty-year concession contracts:

> Existing law forbids concession contracts exceeding 20 years in duration. Since the useful life of such substantial structures as concessioners are expected to provide is normally more than 20 years, and since Internal Revenue regulations in many cases preclude writing off the investment in this period, this limitation, instead of being for too long a period, as is sometimes claimed, is in reality too short from the standpoint of the investors of private capital on these Federal lands. It compels either an unreasonably high allowance for depreciation, which usually cannot be allowed, or an implied understanding either that the concession contract will be renewed at the end of the 20-year period or that the Government will give the concessioner an opportunity to recover the remaining value of his investment when the contract. [8]

Drury went on to explain that to accede to the RNPC's demand that the government purchase the old buildings from the concessioner would require one of two assumptions. Either the operating lease would produce a sufficient return during the expected life of the structures so that the government would recover its investment, or the government would absorb a financial loss in the public interest of providing accommodations. The latter assumption amounted to a government subsidy, Drury stated, and did not seem justifiable when only a small percentage of the whole public actually utilized the facilities. [9]

Pacific Northwesterners generally had no such qualms about federal aid. Skiers observed that nearly every ski area in Washington and Oregon was located on federal land; therefore, they said, it was incumbent upon the federal land managers—chiefly the Forest Service and Park Service—to plan and provide for ski resorts in the region. Boosters in the Puget Sound cities'

chambers of commerce argued that Portland had its Timberline Lodge at Mount Hood, so the Park Service should provide the same kind of facility at Mount Rainier. Timberline Lodge had been built by the WPA at government expense, and since then the Forest Service had leased the development to a private operator for a modest annual fee without any expectation of making back what the government had put into it. The RNPC's investors and their supporters pointed out again and again that the government had invited Puget Sound area businessmen to form the company and build the park's hotels in the first place; now the government should do the right thing and assume the equity in those aging structures. With these arguments circulating in the local press and in public meetings, it was the unusual Pacific Northwesterner who quarrelled with the idea of a government subsidy for visitor facilities in Mount Rainier National Park.

Congressional authorization was needed for the government to purchase the RNPC's buildings. Sceva had been working on this problem for years. The first bill providing for government acquisition of all public accommodations in the park had been introduced in Congress prior to World War II. Representative John Coffee and Senator Homer T. Bone, both of Washington, introduced companion bills in the House and Senate in the spring of 1939. Both bills were tabled in committee. [10]

On February 28, 1947, Representative Thor C. Tollefson of Tacoma introduced a similar bill providing for the acquisition of the RNPC's buildings and the completion of new facilities by the government. This time Sceva was determined to secure the Park Service's and the Department of the Interior's support for the bill. A month after the bill was introduced, Sceva wrote to Drury complaining that Superintendent Preston was giving public statements to the effect that the NPS was neutral toward this bill. Drury responded by ordering Tomlinson to instruct Preston that as a general policy, the NPS was in favor of government ownership of concession buildings. [11] Later, when asked by the House Committee on Public Lands to report on the Tollefson bill, the Department of the Interior gave it a favorable report. Assistant Secretary Oscar L. Chapman informed the committee that experience had shown that public accommodations could not be built and operated by private capital at a profit in Mount Rainier National Park, and further, that it was the Park Service's duty to ensure that public accommodations were provided there. [12] Sceva's efforts on behalf of the bill were now paying off. Although the bill did not finally pass Congress for five more years, Sceva had won two points in principle: (1) that the federal government would stand behind new developments at Paradise even at government expense, and (2) that it favored government ownership and private operation of visitor accommodations at Mount Rainier.

On September 15, 1947, a subcommittee of the Committee on Public Lands held a hearing on the Tollefson bill at Paradise Lodge. The subcommittee's composition was indicative of new regional and party alignments in Congress; of the nine members of the House subcommittee on public lands who came to Paradise, seven were Republicans and eight hailed from western states. Representatives Thor C. Tollefson and Russell V. Mack of Washington were also present. The central issue of the hearing was whether or not visitor facilities in Mount Rainier National Park should be purchased by the government, thereby granting what amounted to a subsidy.

The hearing began with a long and forceful presentation by Sceva on the history of the RNPC. The congressmen questioned Sceva on the RNPC's rates, the value of its buildings, the costs of rehabilitation, the paltry amount of cash spent per capita by park visitors. There was this exchange between Sceva, Representative Wesley A. D'Ewart of Montana, and the subcommittee chairman, Frank A. Barrett of Wyoming:

> Mr. D'Ewart. I am amazed at your average spent per person [for RNPC services]. From the testimony that has been presented to this committee at other hearings,

> the average person who goes on hunting trips spends—if he is a local person, $50, and if he is an out-of-State person, a hundred dollars. You have 72 cents according to the table here.
>
> Mr. Sceva. Last year it was 55. It was 55 last year.
>
> Mr. D'Ewart. Fifty-five in 1946.
>
> Mr. Sceva. Yes.
>
> Mr. D'Ewart. I am amazed, considering the testimony that has been presented by the various groups to this committee in the past.
>
> Mr. Barrett. The other groups don't have a way to put it down to a mathematical certainty, but Mr. Sceva does, I take it.
>
> Mr. D'Ewart. I believe this would be interesting, in considering other testimony, what has been presented.
>
> Mr. Barrett. I agree with you.
>
> Mr. D'Ewart. Have you any alternative to suggest? This committee, at least I, would hesitate to do away with a private enterprise and establish a Federal agency for ownership of hotels and this operation. Have you any alternative to suggest?
>
> Mr. Sceva. I am thinking right along the same lines with you on the matter of capitalistic system or private enterprise. And almost all of our directors think the same way. But this is one thing we cannot surmount and I don't—we do not believe anyone else can surmount it. We do not believe you can put invested capital in here, in permanent buildings, and operate it 60 days in the summertime and pay out for 12 months' investment. We don't think it can be done. Maybe someone else smarter than we are can do it. But we haven't any way to suggest. The only way we can suggest is a subsidy. [13]

Following Sceva's testimony, the subcommittee gave shorter allotments of time to Fred H. McNeil of the National Ski Association, Art Ganson of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, Elmun R. Fetterolf of the Tacoma Chamber of Commerce, and Leo Gallagher of The Mountaineers, all of whom supported Tollefson's bill. The hearings closed with the testimony of Assistant Secretary C. Girard Davidson, who reaffirmed the department's support for the bill while cautioning that the purchase of the buildings would be a mere stopgap measure pending a much greater congressional appropriation for new visitor facilities.

Davidson also alluded in his testimony to a review of the whole national park concession problem by an advisory group to the Secretary of the Interior. This important service-wide review was currently underway. Asked why the Park Service had not yet assessed the value of the concessioner's buildings, Davidson explained that the Secretary was awaiting the recommendations by the concessions advisory group. Apparently the existence of this group was a revelation to most members of the subcommittee. Tollefson would later assert that the subcommittee's anticipation of the advisory group's report influenced its decision to table the bill. [14] This was understandable, for it was likely that the bill would in some way set a precedent, and it seemed prudent to await the Secretary's own policy review before addressing a particular situation such as that which occurred in Mount Rainier National Park. In any case, the findings by the concessions advisory group were crucial for the RNPC and Mount Rainier.

The Concessions Advisory Group

Secretary Krug went entirely outside the government for advice on park concessions. The group of five comprised a certified public accountant, a representative from the hotel industry, a member of the American Automobile Association, a representative of the traveling public, and a member of the National Parks Association. The group's report was nearly a year and a half in the making, and was finally submitted to the Secretary on February 19, 1948. Ironically, the fact that the Secretary requested this review caused some speculation that there would be a fundamental reverse of policy, that Mather' s basic concept of the single concession or regulated monopoly in each park would be rejected in favor of free enterprise. Far from making that recommendation, the concessions advisory group reaffirmed the basic idea that free enterprise would despoil the national parks. Indeed, NPS officials construed the report as a ringing endorsement of existing policy. This tended to mask the fact that the concessions advisory group did recommend a few significant changes. Most notably, it recommended that the government purchase and maintain the concession buildings in all national parks where they had been built by private capital. On the pivotal issue raised by Drury in his annual report for 1946—whether government purchase and maintenance of concession buildings should be in the form of a subsidy—the concessions advisory group suggested that it could.

> It is the opinion of the advisory group that Government ownership of the physical plant which provides facilities for housing, feeding, merchandising and incidental services to the public is in the long run in the public interest. The group is therefore in accord with the announced long-range policy of the National Park Service in this respect. In approving the philosophy of such ownership, however, the advisory group does not include Government operation of these facilities, but it is of the opinion that operation may be performed more efficiently and economically and with better service to the public by private operation under contract with the Secretary. The opinion of the advisory group is based on a careful study of the advantages and disadvantages of the Government ownership of basic facilities, and takes into account the history of development within the parks. In order to implement the policy here approved the group recommends to the Secretary and to the Congress that provision be made for a uniform annual appropriation for the purpose of acquiring basic facilities in the national parks, which in a certain number of years to be determined by Congress, would complete the acquisition of all such properties and most important of all, is a definite policy regarding upkeep that will assure adequate funds for that purpose. Without this Government ownership would be unwise. [15]

This finding by the advisory group was crucial, for it implied that visitor facilities did not have to be economically sound in order to be justified on the basis of public need; the free market relationship between supply and demand did not pertain to national parks. Therefore, in providing for the public use of national parks, the NPS could not only enlist the help of private enterprise, it could give private enterprise some assistance in its endeavors, too. This actually strengthened the hand of investment capital in the emerging new development plan for Mount Rainier National Park for it enlarged the meaning of public demand. When Secretary Krug later that year adopted the advisory group's recommendations as policy, it was good news to the RNPC and the company's backers in the Seattle and Tacoma chambers of commerce.

The RNPC's Contract Expires

By the time Secretary Krug enunciated his new policy for national park concessions, the

RNPC's twenty-year contract had already expired. If the RNPC had been alone, this circumstance might have placed the company in a weak bargaining position. But many other concession contracts had expired during the past two years, too. All had been replaced with interim one-year contracts. Conferring with other concessioners and testifying jointly at congressional hearings, the RNPC now acted as if the NPS were the supplicant.

Rather than being satisfied with the Secretary's statement of policy, concessioners were emboldened by it to demand more. In particular, they desired more security from their longterm contracts. They argued that the NPS should return to its past policy of negotiating new contracts several years in advance of the expiration dates of its current contracts, and they demanded the right of first refusal when the NPS offered new or additional concession contracts in each park. [16] Concessioners presented these and other demands to the Subcommittee on Public Lands in hearings held at the Capitol in May and June 1948. Sceva went to Washington with prepared testimony, although the subcommittee did not call him as a witness. In Sceva's place, Representative Tollefson testified on the difficulties faced by investment capital in Mount Rainier National Park. Other witnesses included a representative of the Union Pacific Railroad Company's interests in Grand Canyon, Zion, and Bryce Canyon National Parks, a representative of the Western Conference of National Park Concessionaires, the president and general manager of the Lassen National Park Company, and NPS Director Drury. The concessioners expressed frustration and even a willingness to shut down their operations unless NPS concession policy was modified on their behalf. [17]

Despite the tenor of the hearings, however, neither Krug nor Drury were willing to yield much ground to the RNPC. They still held out hope that new investors could be found, either for the company itself or for a new franchise that would buy out the RNPC. In the meantime, the RNPC must be induced to make preparations for the following year. On May 28, 1948, in the very midst of the hearings, the NPS offered the RNPC a one-year contract for 1949. It called for the company to make various repairs and improvements to its buildings, including the installation of sprinklers in Paradise Inn in order to bring the building up to code. The sprinkler system had been under discussion for the past two years.

This proposal was still on the table when the Secretary announced, on July 26, 1948, that all national park concessions must comply with the department's labor initiative instituting a 40-hour work week. The Secretary's order met with strong protest from concessioners, who had traditionally subjected their employees to 48-hour work weeks. They objected that they could ill-afford to hire the necessary employees when feeding and housing more employees would add to their operating costs. Sceva calculated that the 40-hour work week would cost his company $10,000 per year. Discouraged by the department's new labor ruling and its insistence on a sprinkler system for Paradise Inn, the RNPC's board of directors voted to reject the one-year contract offer. On August 25, 1948, Sceva sent Drury a counterproposal, which called for an interim five-year contract. The longer term was necessary, Sceva insisted, to protect the RNPC's investment in the sprinklers and other improvements. Drury rejected this proposal on September 10, indicating that the department would soon issue a new type of concessioner contract for the RNPC's consideration. Not waiting for this, Sceva wrote to the Secretary of the Interior on September 30, 1948, that the members of the board had voted not to seek another contract with the government after the current one expired on December 31, 1948. [18]

Relations between the RNPC and the NPS had reached a low ebb when a meeting took place that fall which had disturbing implications for the Park Service. In late November, Acting Superintendent Harthon L. Bill informed Drury that a number of organizations involved in Washington's tourist industry had come together to reconstitute the Rainier National Park Advisory Board. The Advisory Board, it will be recalled, had been an important agent in the allotment of federal funds for park road construction during the 1920s. Finding its influence

much diminished by the Depression and New Deal, the Advisory Board had gone out of existence in 1936. Now it was back, called into being by the excitement over the Tollefson bill and recent press reports that the RNPC might be forced out of business at the end of the year. Precisely what role Sceva played in its restoration is unclear; he informed the acting superintendent that he had attended the first meeting of the new Advisory Board in an "unofficial capacity." [19]

On the surface this seemed like a throwback to an earlier era. Like the first Rainier National Park Advisory Board, the new Advisory Board was animated by a desire to secure federal aid for the development of Mount Rainier National Park. But the first Advisory Board had focused on roads, while the new Advisory Board concerned itself with public accommodations. Arguably there was not much difference. In a resolution in support of the Tollefson bill, the Seattle Chamber of Commerce commented,

> To date the Government has spent many millions of dollars in Mount Rainier National Park for access roads, trails, bridges, administrative buildings, and facilities. The additional ownership of the tourist facilities is a small matter when considered with the over-all program and is believed to be fully in accord with the purposes for which the National Park Service was established. [20]

But this overlooked the fact that roads were a public enterprise almost anywhere they were built, whereas tourist accommodations were not. Road construction contractors did not have a vested interest in commercializing the park, but the tourist industry did. Giving federal assistance to the concessioner carried the risk of binding park administration too closely to commercial interests. Park development could then be pushed too far.

On December 31, 1948, Secretary Krug sent another one-year contract proposal to the RNPC. Sceva replied, on January 4, 1949, that the RNPC would accept no less than a two-year contract, that the contract must preserve the present labor agreement of a 48-hour work week with payment of time and one-quarter for all overtime, and that any infringement of that agreement would enable the RNPC to terminate its contract after 30 days notice. Krug then replied on January 17 that the controversial labor ruling would not now take effect until January 1, 1950; therefore, if the RNPC would accept a one-year contract, the labor issue could be dispensed with for the time being. The company accepted an interim contract on these terms. Both parties expressed hope that Congress would act on the Tollefson bill in the course of the year.

A Law Passed, A New Contract Signed

Tollefson reintroduced his bill in the House on January 18, 1949. The Committee on Public Lands delayed its second hearing on this bill until July, at which time Tollefson made yet another plea for government ownership of the buildings on the grounds that the public was entitled to adequate facilities in the national park even if private enterprise refused to invest in them. Opponents of the measure asserted that Tollefson's bill would only be a means of "bailing the Rainier National Park Company out of a losing business," for the RNPC had used poor judgment in developing facilities at such high elevations in the first place. The committee took no more action on the bill in that session. [21]

In the absence of this law, RNPC and federal officials went through nearly the same posturing as the year before. On August 30, Sceva sent notice to the Secretary of the Interior of the company's intention to discontinue service after December 31, 1949, and demanded to have the RNPC's buildings appraised. Krug replied, on September 13, that the RNPC would have to remove all saddle stock and equipment from the park, and advised that the NPS "at this time does not contemplate the use or demolition of any of the buildings or

appurtenances...formerly used by the Company." Sceva then wrote a conciliatory letter to Superintendent Preston on September 21, proposing five ways in which operating costs could be trimmed under another one-year interim contract. On Drury's recommendation, the Department consented to two of these: the RNPC could raise the rates it charged employees for room and board, thereby recovering some of the added labor costs which it would incur under the Secretary's new labor directive; and it could suspend winter operations. Hastily, the park made alternate arrangements for a winter season centered at Cayuse Pass instead of Paradise. [22]

Meanwhile, efforts continued on behalf of the legislation. Sceva lined up support from Senator Warren G. Magnuson and the freshman congressman from Everett, Henry M. Jackson, as well as the backing of the new Secretary of the Interior, Oscar L. Chapman. Secretary Chapman reported favorably on the bill when the House Committee on Public Lands considered it again in 1950. After the House passed the bill that summer, Drury expressed hope that Senate approval would follow quickly and "end the agony" during the current session. [23]

In the final version of the bill, the section that would authorize the Secretary to repair, reconstruct, and build new facilities was stricken out; the bill's purpose was narrowed to purchasing the RNPC's buildings. A limitation of $310,000 was placed on the purchase price. Truman signed the measure into law on September 21, 1950.

The fact that the law carried a virtual government subsidy for private enterprise led everyone to minimize the law's significance for public policy. Both the House and Senate committee reports emphasized that government ownership of the facilities would not require that they be operated by the NPS. The House report went further, insisting that the circumstances at Mount Rainier were peculiar and that the bill was "not intended to set a precedent or pattern for Government acquisition of concessions in any other national park or monument." But this pronouncement was followed by the contradictory statement that the bill was "in accord with the 1948 report of the Concessions' Advisory Group to the Secretary of the Interior." [24] That 1948 report clearly advocated a policy of government acquisition of concession facilities throughout the national park system. In reality, the act constituted an important turning point in the relations of government and private capital in national parks. Three weeks after Congress passed the Tollefson bill, on October 13, 1950, the Secretary of the Interior issued a new statement on national park concessions, reiterating and strengthening the principle of federal subsidization of visitor facilities in national parks. [25]

A year and a half after passage of the act, the government agreed to pay the RNPC $300,000 for its facilities. This was equal to one-third of the company's total investment of $884,000 exclusive of automotive equipment. [26] RNPC and federal officials settled on the figure after one full day of negotiations in Tacoma headed by Sceva on the one side and the new director of the Park Service, Conrad L. Wirth, on the other. [27] Final payment and transfer was made in August 1952, following another six months of negotiations over the finer points of the deal. [28]

NPS officials maintained that a fair financial settlement and a new concession contract were strictly separate issues; to combine them into a single negotiation would be to give the RNPC a competitive advantage over other prospective concessioners. Yet the new contract was so contingent upon the success of the legislation that it was hard to separate the two issues. Mainly for this reason, the longterm contract was delayed even further. From January 1, 1951 through December 31, 1952, the RNPC operated under a two-year interim contract. During this time the NPS produced a 21-page prospectus that purported to seek competitive bids for a new concession. This was virtually pro forma; it had become clear by now that no other capital was interested and the RNPC would continue under a new operating lease. But the

RNPC had to accept still another one-year interim contract for the calendar year 1953 in order to give the parties time to negotiate a new longterm contract to begin January 1, 1954.

In the course of these discussions, NPS officials concluded that the development of overnight lodging and ski facilities and the changing visitor use pattern at Mount Rainier contained too many variables to allow the granting of a twenty-year concession contract. Instead, the government concluded a five-year contract with the RNPC for the term January 1, 1954 to December 31, 1958. In negotiating and carrying out the new five-year contract, the NPS and the RNPC found two main points of contention: (1) how to structure the company's obligation to plow excess profits back into maintenance of what were now the government's properties, and (2) how to define the company's exclusive privilege for providing transportation to and inside the park. These two problems are discussed in the following sections.

REHABILITATION OF STRUCTURES

The rambling complex known as the Paradise Inn and Annex was from twenty-five to thirty years old in 1946, while the Paradise Lodge and Sunrise Lodge were half that age. All of these buildings had fallen into a sad state of disrepair. Exposed to high winds, drenching rains, frequent freezing and thawing, and enormous snow loads, the buildings took an extraordinary pounding from the elements. Their age worked against them not only because of the cumulative effect of so much weathering, but because the buildings contained design elements and construction materials that were now known to be impractical for structures located at such high altitude. Moreover, in the postwar era of reinforced concrete, steel girders, and automatic sprinkler systems, these wooden hotels held an unacceptably high risk of fire. And if the buildings did not actually fall down or burn up, they simply looked bad. Their dilapidated appearance was unbecoming for a national park.

Sceva provided a vivid description of the RNPC's maintenance problems for the congressional subcommittee which convened in the lobby of the Paradise Inn in 1947:

> Perhaps if you walk around Paradise Inn and you see some of the braces that have been broken, if you look on the front of this building here and see that we've got these cables, iron rods, inch and a quarter rods, fastened to the building, tying the building down to dead men to keep this building from sliding. This wing of this building, although built in 1930, we thought was to stand it, drove 8 inches out of plumb, this building over here the interior of the chimney collapsed and came down into the pit below. So it is almost impossible for us to hold them—our buildings in place...
>
> Last night Mr. Grater told you about the erosion or wearing down of the mountain. We are on the mountain gentlemen, and we are wearing down the properties of the Rainier National Park Co. and we can't keep pace with that sort of destruction. [29]

What to do toward rehabilitating these buildings was a complicated problem and a critical test of the restored partnership. The immediate problem was to prioritize between basic structural reinforcements, fire safety requirements, and the innumerable cosmetic needs of the buildings, or what the Park Service called "face lifting." Rehabilitation efforts also had to be weighed against the alternative of razing each structure and starting over. Finally, the NPS had to use its contract with the RNPC as a lever for making the RNPC commit resources to maintenance. Not surprisingly, obtaining a proper level of maintenance proved to be the pitfall of the new policy of government ownership and private operation of visitor facilities.

Fire Protection

Government officials were gravely concerned about the high fire hazard in Paradise Inn. On June 17, 1947, Secretary Krug issued a directive that guest rooms in the inn were not to be occupied above the lobby floor that summer and that the RNPC must install automatic sprinklers by the next summer or else the restriction would still apply. Sceva wired back that the directive would cause a financial hardship for the company and much inconvenience to the public as many reservations would have to be cancelled. On July 3, the Secretary modified his directive, stipulating that room reservations could be kept on the condition that the RNPC put a night watchman on each floor where rooms were rented out. The RNPC duly posted the night watchman. It also held fire drills every two weeks for its employees and had a fire truck stationed at Paradise throughout the summer. It did nothing toward installing a sprinkler system, however, due to the fact that its contract was expiring. [30] During the contract negotiations in 1948, Sceva was emphatic that the company would not invest in a sprinkler system, and the NPS dropped the request thereafter. [31]

The subject of fire came up again in the fall of 1953. Now the buildings had been acquired by the government, and Director Wirth and Sceva were negotiating a new operating contract on the basis of the Secretary's announced policy of government ownership and private operation of visitor facilities. Now it was Sceva's turn to demand some protection against the fire hazard, and he requested that the five-year contract include an escape clause in case the Paradise Inn should be destroyed by fire. Wirth was too diplomatic to remind Sceva of his company's earlier refusal to install sprinklers, but he did agree to strengthen the contract's escape clause. [32] The following April, the NPS included a sprinkler system in a comprehensive list of improvements for the Paradise facilities to be accomplished over the next fifteen to twenty years. The estimated cost for the sprinkler system was $58,000, or ten percent of the total for all repairs. [33]

By 1960, the sprinklers were still in the offing, while the cost estimate had risen to $200,000. Under the circumstances, RNPC and park officials tried to maximize public safety by discontinuing use of the Paradise Inn's oil furnace and increasing the night watchman's surveillance to a complete patrol of the building every thirty minutes. But for the time being, government officials were reluctant to sink a lot of money into the old building when there was such a public clamor for new, overnight lodging facilities at Paradise. The new building, it was emphasized, would be built of fire resistant materials. [34]

Rehabilitation Under Contract

Sceva's portrait of the inexorable destruction of the company's buildings at the hand of nature told only part of the story. NPS and RNPC officials all recognized that the deterioration of the buildings had accelerated during World War II due to lack of routine maintenance. This record of negligence partly sprang from the fact that the NPS-RNPC partnership was structured around a twenty-year contract. As the end of the contract neared, the RNPC grew more and more wary of reinvesting capital in the upkeep of its buildings. The NPS, meanwhile, had no means of forcing the RNPC to perform proper maintenance of its own buildings. A principal aim of the new contract was to rectify this situation by clearly delineating the responsibilities of both parties for maintenance and rehabilitation.

In negotiating the new contract, Sceva and Wirth agreed that much rehabilitation was required to place the plant in an operating condition. They also agreed that this would be a joint venture: the NPS would dedicate a portion of the park's annual maintenance allotment to rehabilitating the government-owned visitor facilities, and the RNPC would spend a designated amount each year on rehabilitation in lieu of a franchise fee. Most of the cost for major rehabilitation projects would be born by the government, but the RNPC's contribution

was important because it would be available immediately. The new contract called for the RNPC to spend up to $30,000 in the first year (1954), and $7,500 per year for the remaining four years of the contract (1955-58). In addition, any profits above $16,000 per year would be put toward rehabilitation. The NPS would decide how the money would be spent. [35]

Unfortunately, the RNPC's total contribution of $60,000 covered far less rehabilitation work than the NPS had hoped. As federal funds for major rehabilitation projects failed to materialize, the RNPC's money was frittered away on minor repairs. The contract stipulated that the $60,000 was for rehabilitation, not routine maintenance, which the RNPC had to cover as an operating expense. But the poor condition of the buildings caused one problem to lead to another such that "routine maintenance" costs could hardly be considered routine anymore. As a result, the RNPC sought to apply its rehabilitation funds toward repairs which the NPS defined as maintenance items. The distinction between rehabilitation and maintenance was vague in any case. Superintendent Macy fought a running battle with Sceva over what projects constituted rehabilitation and what constituted maintenance. [36]

Inasmuch as rehabilitation of the visitor facilities was a major focus of the restored partnership between the government and private capital, the arrangement was seriously flawed. When the five-year contract expired on December 31, 1958, much rehabilitation work remained to be done on all the major buildings, particularly the Paradise Inn. Beginning in 1959, the NPS returned to the interim contract, with each year's lease stipulating that the RNPC would spend a specified amount of money, plus any profits above $16,000, on rehabilitation and maintenance. In 1965 the NPS once more granted the RNPC a five-year contract, finally eliminating the requirement for rehabilitation and maintenance. Now the concessioner paid an annual fee to the government based on a percentage of gross revenue, while the NPS handled all rehabilitation and maintenance—an eminently more sensible arrangement. [37]

THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

The NPS had always looked upon visitor transportation service as an integral part of the concession. The same assumption applied to transportation as to public accommodations: the creation of a regulated monopoly was supposed to lead to better, more reliable service at reasonable rates. Alternatively, if the Park Service allowed anyone to compete for the business of carrying passengers to and from the park, the result would be a vigorous competition during times of peak travel and a loss of service when visitor use was at a low ebb. [38]

Eventually the transportation portion of the concession acquired added importance as the most consistently profitable area of national park business. Profits from the transportation service underwrote other parts of the park concession that were marginal or even a consistent money loser from the standpoint of the concessioner. By the 1940s, the RNPC's stage service between Seattle and Tacoma and Mount Rainier National Park accounted for only about one-sixth of the company's annual gross sales but it was one of the few concession departments consistently in the black. [39] The RNPC's exclusive transportation privilege was one of its most prized assets. It guarded its privilege jealously, especially in the decade after World War II when its tenuous, year-to-year contracts with the government seemed to encourage a spate of challenges to its transportation monopoly.

Ski Club Charter Busses

Soon after the concession policy was established in 1916, the NPS found that it needed to differentiate between public transportation, which fell under the concession's exclusive

privilege, and private transportation, which did not. It will be recalled that the conflict between the park administration and the Cooperative Campers of the Pacific Northwest in the early 1920s arose directly out of this ambiguity. In the conflict with the Cooperative Campers, the Park Service was torn between its desire to protect the park concession on the one hand, and its reluctance to alienate a sympathetic group of outdoor enthusiasts on the other. After World War II a similar situation arose with regard to ski clubs.

When Sceva first raised the issue with the Park Service in the winter of 1947-48, Superintendent Preston informed Regional Director Tomlinson that there had "long been a steady demand by skiing enthusiasts of public and private schools for permission to enter the park by private bus." It was Preston's practice to grant these requests on the basis of Section 2.36 (a) (1) of the Park Service's rules and regulations, which held that charter busses would be denied entry unless they were "carrying only members of educational, welfare, and scientific organizations such as boy scouts, accredited schools and universities, or bona fide mountaineering organizations." Preston interpreted "bona fide mountaineering organizations" to include ski clubs. [40]

Sceva disagreed. Mountain clubs like The Mountaineers, the Mazamas, and the Sierra Club were old, established organizations, whereas ski clubs were sprouting like mushrooms. Most skiers were high school or college age and did not own cars—good potential customers for the RNPC's charter busses. The test case involved a request by the Olympia Ski Club to run its own bus between Olympia and Paradise for club members only. Sceva objected that this was really a charter bus; its admittance into the park would be in violation of the RNPC's contract. Moreover, Sceva alleged that a certain individual in the Olympia Ski Club who was trying to chisel into the RNPC's business by using ski clubs as a front. On the basis of Sceva's complaint, Drury decided that further requests for admittance of ski club charter busses would be denied.

Superintendent Preston felt strongly that skiers had a good claim to the title of mountaineers and the distinction was unfair and unenforceable. Upon further investigation of the Olympia Ski Club's request, Preston thought the bus in question was owned by a member of the club. He thought the club was legitimate; it was not organized primarily to circumvent the RNPC's transportation privilege. The owner of the bus had no profit motive; he was not using the club as a front for chiseling into the RNPC's business. With the concurrence of his superiors, Preston sought advice on this issue from the agency's chief counsel, Jackson E. Price. Price noted that the NPS had considered the question with regard to a California ski club in 1942, but it had been left unresolved. Price advised that ski clubs were not well-defined legally; the NPS could interpret ski clubs' prerogatives under this regulation whichever way it chose. [41]

Drury reiterated his position in support of the concession on May 12, 1948. "It appears to me to be stretching the point to interpret ski clubs as being bona fide mountaineering organizations," Drury wrote.

> Since there can be no hardship to groups of skiers wishing to use charter bus service to the park by having that service furnished by our established transportation concessioner under rates approved by the Service, I am not willing to make an administrative determination pertaining to Section 2.36 (a) (1) that a ski club is a mountaineering organization. [42]

Preston continued to argue that ski clubs should qualify under this rule, but he did not change Drury's mind on the issue.

Gray Line Tours on the Mather Memorial Parkway

Another threat to the concessioner's transportation privilege arose from the special situation pertaining to the Mather Memorial Parkway. This stretch of park road had been built by the state of Washington prior to the area's inclusion in the national park and the road's dedication as a parkway. According to the act of Congress which extended the boundary of the park, the NPS could not charge entrance fees for traffic over this road. But Park Service officials had persuaded state officials that it was in the best interest of the state's tourist industry to protect the RNPC's exclusive transportation privilege, and soon after the highway was completed over Chinook Pass the NPS and the State Department of Highways reached a "gentleman's agreement" instituting a fee. A single exception was made for through-traffic of the Washington Motor Coach Company, which had since merged with Greyhound Corporation. [43]

In the summer of 1948, Gray Line Sightseeing Company of Seattle began advertising trips to Mount Rainier National Park via the Mather Memorial Parkway. The company offered single-fare day trips from Seattle to Tipsoo Lake and Chinook Pass and return. Thus, while limiting its use of the park to the state highway, Gray Line nevertheless undercut the RNPC's business. Sceva objected that Gray Line, billing these excursions as trips to Mount Rainier National Park, was guilty of false advertising. This was a narrow basis on which to challenge the rival bus company, but Sceva knew that his company had no other legal recourse. [44]

The Park Service did what it could to protect the RNPC's interests. Preston informed Gray Line of the State Department of Highways regulation prohibiting vehicles with a gross weight in excess of 5,000 pounds from using the Chinook Pass route. [45] He urged the State Department of Highways to cooperate with the Park Service, adding that the gentleman's agreement between the two agencies "had worked so well down the years that it has almost become a tradition." [46] But recognizing the limitation on its authority under the 1931 act extending the boundary of the park, the NPS also insisted on an amendment of the RNPC's interim contract as follows:

> The right of the Company to provide and operate transportation facilities and services shall not be preferential or exclusive pursuant to Article IX of the original contract as to State Route No. 5 (U.S. Highway No. 410) to the Tipsoo Lake area within the Park. [47]

In the final analysis, Drury found that the NPS could not take any legal action to prevent the Gray Line's bus tours except to prohibit the sightseeing busses from leaving the highway right-of-way while in the park. The best approach was to cooperate with state authorities, Drury concluded, and he advised Preston "to work out some local arrangements with the State of Washington which will adequately cover the use of this highway if there still exists a need for such clarifying arrangements." [48] State officials were uncooperative, however, and the Gray Line Sightseeing Company's tours became a new fixture in the public use of Mount Rainier National Park. The RNPC grudgingly accepted the rival business under the terms of its interim contracts. [49]

THE OHANAPECOSH CONCESSION

The longtime owner and developer of the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs Company, Dr. Albert W. Bridge, had a stroke in 1944. One year later, two gentlemen with power of attorney for Bridge applied to the NPS for permission to transfer Bridge's concession contract to a new operator. Taking stock of this twenty-year-old development in the southeast corner of the park, Superintendent Preston recommended that the NPS allow the transfer to a new operator, but with the stipulation that there would be no expansion of facilities and that the NPS might insist on the elimination of the entire operation at a later date. Regional Director Tomlinson

concurred in this judgment. [50] Thus, the overall problem of the Ohanapecosh concession after World War II became one of finding an equitable way to phase it out of existence.

This process dragged on for fifteen years and ended sadly in a law suit with the concessioner. When Preston and Tomlinson articulated the Park Service's position toward this franchise at the end of World War II, their reservations about the Ohanapecosh concession focused primarily on its sanitarium-like atmosphere, which they deemed to be inappropriate in a national park. But by the early 1950s, park officials were becoming more concerned about the mental stability and competency of the concession's replacement operator, Martin Kilian. Suffering from alcoholism, Kilian displayed bouts of violent behavior that shocked park visitors and embarrassed park officials. Although the small hotel, cabins, and bathhouse were closed down in 1960, they were left standing for another few years while a law suit, Martin Kilian v. United States, remained pending in court. Kilian accepted an $18,000 out-of-court settlement in 1965.

From Sanitarium to Overnight Lodge

At the end of World War II, the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs resort consisted of the original log and cedar shake hotel with accommodations for about eighteen overnight guests, some thirty-one cabins, a dining room and grocery store, and a bathhouse with hot water piped in from the mineral springs. The hotel, now twenty years old, had been structurally reinforced a few years earlier and was not unattractive in appearance. The cabins, however, ranged from fair to poor in quality, with only the more recent ones being equipped with toilets and running water. The concession catered to a mixed clientele, some of whom desired only a night's lodging and meal service and others of whom came for longer stays in order to take the waters. [51] The trend appeared to be toward more and more use by transient park visitors who were not interested in the mineral baths. [52]

Preston's immediate aim was to prevent any further development of the Ohanapecosh concession along the lines of a sanitarium. A large swimming pool and dressing rooms, programmed for construction by the concessioner since 1937, were still listed on the master plan. In discussions leading up to the transfer of the concession contract to Martin Kilian, NPS officials informed the new concessioner that these developments would not be permitted after all. In fact, the NPS favored the elimination of the bathhouse, too, which would effectively convert the resort into an overnight lodging establishment. Kilian insisted on preserving the bathhouse, however, since it accounted for nearly a third of the company's revenues. In view of the company's marginal economic performance over the past ten years, Preston decided to permit the bathing facilities to remain. [53]

It fell to Preston's successor, Superintendent Macy, to terminate this contract in 1952. Instead, Macy extended Kilian's contract for one year, then another. In retrospect, this appears to have been a mistake, a case, perhaps, of taking the easy course. In Macy's defense it could be said that he had a much bigger concession problem to worry about at this time with the RNPC. In fact, Macy soon formed the idea that under new ownership the Ohanapecosh concession might evolve into something more in keeping with the park's needs. With the coming of the Mission 66 program, many things were possible.

One idea that Macy proposed was to divide the preferential concession rights in the park into two areas, giving the Paradise-Longmire area to one concession and the east side of the park to another. This would have the advantage, Macy argued, of promoting sound development of both the Sunrise and Ohanapecosh areas to a greater extent than in the past when the park's primary concessioner had stubbornly focused on the Paradise area. [54]

Another idea that Macy considered was to relocate the visitor facilities at Ohanapecosh to

some other site in the southeast corner of the park. The purpose would be to convert this concession into a low-elevation overnight lodging facility inside the park. With the anticipated opening of the Stevens Canyon Road in 1957, the lodge would receive some of the overflow from the Paradise area. The concession might be induced to give up the hot springs location in favor of a new site that would capture more of the expected flow of park visitors between the south and east sides of the park. [55]

It is a matter for speculation whether either of these proposals were really viable when the NPS was already experiencing difficulty in finding interested capital for the park's primary development at Paradise, much less its secondary developments elsewhere in the park. Yet it is conceivable that the Ohanapecosh concession might have evolved into something else had it been under different ownership. As it was, the troubled relations between the NPS and the concessioner, Martin Kilian, finally made it impossible to do anything with the Ohanapecosh concession other than get rid of it.

Terminating the Ohanapecosh Concession

Martin Kilian had been manager and custodian of the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs resort since the early 1930s. Park officials had found his performance mediocre at best, and relations with him were not cordial. But three years after Bridge fell ill, Kilian was still the only person expressing an interest in the concession. NPS officials reluctantly agreed to transfer the concession contract to Kilian partly out of necessity and partly out of a sense of decency to Bridge, for as Preston remarked to Tomlinson, he did not "think it would be a fair thing to insist that the contract lapse at this time when Dr. Bridges [sic] has been stricken." [56] The assignment of the contract was executed in Tacoma in March 1947 and approved by Assistant Secretary of the Interior C. Girard Davidson in October. [57]

Two incidents in the late summer of 1952 alerted park officials to the possibility that Kilian' s struggle with alcoholism was impairing his ability to operate the concession. On the night of August 16, Kilian berated four guests for parking their car in front of his garage. According to the registered complaint, Kilian acted in an irrational manner, drove his car into the garage such that he narrowly missed their vehicle, and returned later to shine a flashlight into their car where their children were sleeping. [58] On the night of September 23, Kilian caused another disturbance. District Ranger William Heckman was summoned to the lodge by Mrs. Kilian, who reported that her husband had become violent. Heckman took four men from the trail crew and entered the Kilian home where they found Kilian trying to dress himself and "shaking all over." Kilian said that he had awakened to find the room strung with electronic units that would explode on contact. Mrs. Kilian and Heckman called an ambulance and Kilian was taken away at 1:35 a.m. Two loaded guns were removed from under Kilian's bed. [59]

These incidents put a cloud over Kilian's contract extension. The regional director had already expressed qualms about Kilian the previous June, and reiterated those concerns at the end of October. Yet for reasons that are not completely clear, Macy overcame the regional director's objections and offered Kilian a "lease" for one year. Apparently the NPS hoped that Kilian would soon dispose of his holdings for a "reasonable value" to a successor, even though Kilian's latest asking price of $80,000—twice what he had paid for it—was "out of reason." If this logic was not dubious enough, NPS officials approved the contract extension despite their consensus "that Mr. Kilian's facilities are sub-standard, and that his past behavior makes it extremely doubtful that he can be counted on to conduct a satisfactory operation." [60]

As it turned out, Kilian would neither lower his extortionate price nor make any improvements to his sub-standard buildings. His feeling was that the government should

purchase his holdings at fair market value, just as it had bought the RNPC's buildings. Further, he urged the NPS to include $10,000 in its Mission 66 program for electrification of the 31 cabins. He complained to Senator Magnuson that the concession prospectus was unrealistic. When the Park Service finally located one potential buyer for the concession, Kilian allegedly told the man that he would not sell his property at its appraised value. Despite these difficulties, the NPS continued to extend Kilian's contract from year to year. From 1953 to 1959, the park administration simply endured this unsatisfactory situation. [61]

After negotiations with the prospective buyer fell through, Macy recommended that the concession be terminated. It was now clear that Kilian would sue the government for what he thought was a fair price for his holdings, and the government therefore began to prepare its case. First, instances of Kilian's instability and poor management were documented back to 1949. Second, documentation was assembled to show that the NPS had made a good faith effort to secure another concessioner—counter to Kilian's allegation that it had deliberately undermined such course of action. Third, Kilian was given a further one-year lease provided that he would hire a manager and avoid any contact with guests himself. Kilian agreed to the terms but the manager soon quit; on January 9, 1961, the NPS notified Kilian that his contract was terminated and that he must remove himself from the premises. [62]

That summer, while park officials boarded up the buildings and posted U.S. government property signs, Kilian obtained an independent appraisal which placed the value of the Ohanapecosh lodge and cabins at $117,000 (nearly three times what he had paid for them in 1947). The NPS placed the facility's "book value" at $3,000. An item was included in the park budget for 1962 for removal of the buildings, but the project had to be postponed in the event that it might prejudice the government's legal case.

Kilian sued in the U.S. Court of Claims in 1962. The case of Martin Kilian v. United States turned on the court's interpretation of Section 12 (b) of the concession contract, which required the NPS to compensate the concessioner for the "book value" of the property in the event that the concession was terminated. After three years on the court docket, the case was settled out of court on July 29, 1965, the plaintiff accepting a compromise offer of $18,000. [63]

All buildings formerly associated with the concession were torn down or removed in the following year.

THE GUIDE SERVICE

Mount Rainier began to draw increasing numbers of climbers after World War II. The number of summit attempts approached 300 in 1947, the most since the NPS began to keep accurate records. The number of summit attempts reached 400 in 1951, and 500 in 1956. The popularity of the climb increased steadily through the early 1960s, then jumped into the 2,000-3,000 range after 1965—boosted, it was thought, by the publicity which Mount Rainier received as a training ground for the first American assault on Mount Everest in 1963. [64]

The growing popularity of summit climbs raised two issues for the park administration. How was the park ranger force going to protect these visitors from mishaps or rescue them when accidents inevitably occurred? And how could a professional guide service be provided to the public most advantageously?

Development of Search and Rescue

As Americans pursued the sport of mountain climbing in record numbers after World War II,

there was a significant increase in the number of mountaineering accidents nationwide. In the summer of 1947, for example, there were eleven mountaineering fatalities in the United States. This was a smaller total than in the European Alps during the same period, but relative to the number of climbers on either continent it constituted a much higher accident rate than Europe's. The American Alpine Club tracked this "startling increase," and committed itself to a national mountaineering safety campaign. The club's directors voted on October 4, 1947, to form a Safety Committee of the American Alpine Club, whose purpose was to investigate the causes of mountaineering accidents and formulate a program of accident prevention. It is unclear whether the American Alpine Club directly prompted the Park Service to action, but a copy of the club's report did find its way into Mount Rainier National Park's files. [65]

When the Park Service's four regional directors met in January 1948, they proposed that the NPS establish mountain climbing and rescue training schools for NPS rangers and cooperating agencies. Director Drury approved the proposal on April 19, 1948. When it was decided that the Western Region should initiate the first school, Regional Director Tomlinson naturally picked Mount Rainier for the site. It had the most suitable terrain as well as a number of qualified instructors already on staff. [66]

Mount Rainier National Park hosted the nation's first mountain safety and rescue training school on September 13-17, 1948. The course drew participants from numerous national parks as well as the Forest Service, Army, Navy, Coast Guard, National Ski Patrol, and Seattle Mountaineers. Instructors for the course included nine Mount Rainier rangers—William J. Butler, Gordon K. Patterson, Robert Weldon, George Senner, Robert W. Craig, Bruce Meyers, Forrest Johnson, Cornelius Molenaar, and Dee Molenaar—as well as former Mount Rainier ranger Charles Browne. At least two of these instructors had trained on Mount Rainier with the 10th Mountain Division in World War II. [67]

The training school included half-day and full-day courses in ice work, rope work, rock climbing, improvisation and movement of stretchers, and accident prevention. Rangers from eleven national parks and monuments attended. Many of these men were already skilled mountaineers, and the object was to train these key men so that they could give instruction to their fellow rangers when they returned to their respective areas. An additional benefit of the school was to create closer ties between the park staff and other organizations with an interest in search and rescue, including The Mountaineers, National Ski Patrol, and various public agencies. [68]

Tomlinson considered holding another training school in 1950, but decided it was not necessary to repeat the school on a service-wide basis that often. He based this decision primarily on the cost of such intensive training, but pointed out also that the kind of rock and ice training to which Mount Rainier lent itself was more appropriate for some national park areas than others. It might be more worthwhile, Tomlinson suggested, to conduct mountain safety and rescue training in each region. [69]

While this was the end of Mount Rainier's role as a mountaineering and rescue training center for the entire national park system, the close relationship between Mount Rainier's ranger staff and the local climbing community continued to flourish in the 1950s. Park rangers participated in the establishment of the Mountain Rescue Council, with headquarters in Seattle, and prepared a search and rescue organization plan for the Council's use. The Mountain Rescue Council drew participants from an ever-widening circle of organizations. [70]

The large number of cooperating entities meant that the park had no shortage of volunteers when climbers got into trouble or turned up missing. Indeed, the outpouring of civic support

for search and rescue operations created its own set of problems. In the summer of 1956, for example, the park administration mounted two search and rescue operations that involved several hundred volunteer workers, and in the summer of 1957 there were two more searches in which volunteers assisted. Such operations were unwieldy and themselves hazardous. Superintendent Macy raised the question of whether the government was liable for volunteers who were injured during search and rescue operations. Was the government liable for volunteers who were injured while under the supervision of a park ranger? Was it liable for injuries to a person under volunteer leadership, but involved in a search and rescue operation under the overall direction of the park administration? Did the government's liability extend to injuries which might occur while a volunteer was in NPS quarters or an NPS vehicle? Macy also pointed out that there was a tendency to accept too much volunteer assistance. "Because of humanitarian considerations," he explained, "it is very difficult to state the minimum personnel needs for individual rescue operations." [71] Acting Regional Director C.E. Persons agreed. "To accept or refuse the assistance of volunteer help requires the exercise of considerable judgment and tact on the part of the search leader," he advised the director. "To refuse the offer of volunteers to locate a small child could no doubt lead to disastrous adverse publicity against the Service." [72] This made the question of liability all the more problematic.

Macy also raised questions about the costs of search and rescue. Should it be standard policy to feed volunteers at government mess or to provide them with sleeping bags? Could emergency volunteers be hired on a similar basis as firefighters on a forest fire, and if so, would the costs be reimbursable from service-wide contingency funds? The regional office relayed these points to the director, stipulating that the problem of large numbers of volunteers mainly pertained to searches. (A search was defined as the activity of locating a missing person, while a rescue was the activity of transporting a person or persons to safety.) But the Washington office preferred to keep a loose rein on search and rescue operations, which it saw as a local concern. To Macy's specific request for reimbursement of $1,788 for emergency search and rescue operations from the service's contingency fund, it replied that such payments would not be automatic but would be considered on a case by case basis at the end of the fiscal year. [73]

The Guide Service Becomes a Separate Concession

During World War II there was little climbing activity on Mount Rainier and the RNPC suspended its guide service. After the war, the Park Service converted the guide service concession into a separate, one-year permit, which it offered to a series of informal climbing partnerships. Veteran climber Ed Kennedy became chief guide in 1946, assisted by Gordie Butterfield, Jim Nussbaum, and international ski racer Bil Dunaway. Dunaway continued the operation in 1947 with Bob Parker, Chuck Welsh, and Dee Molenaar. The following year Dunaway and Parker went to Europe, Molenaar became a park ranger, and the park was once again without a guide service. Welsh took over the guide service in 1949, with assistant guides Bob Craig and Bob Kuss, both of Seattle. All of these men belonged to a local climbing fraternity; a number of them had served in Italy in the 10th Mountain Division.

In 1950 two French mountaineers and skiers, Roby Albuoy and Ollie Chiseaux, headed the guide service. Dunaway took it over again in 1951, recruiting for his assistant guides Jim and Lou Whittaker—young twins from Seattle who were destined to have a long association with the mountain. The Whittakers held the permit in 1952, turned it over to Paul Gerstmann and Dick Krizman in 1953 while they served in the army, and resumed their guide service in 1954. [74]

Dee Molenaar describes the Whittakers' accomplishments in his book The Challenge of Rainier:

> During 1938-42, and after the war until 1951, guided parties chiefly used the Kautz [Glacier] route. When the Whittakers began guiding in 1951 they concentrated on developing routes that could again utilize the cabins at Camp Muir. The twins reopened Gibraltar as a guide route in 1951 and thus virtually ended use of the Kautz by the guide staff
>
> The Whittakers were the first of the postwar generation of climbers to guide on the mountain. Many young mountaineers followed in subsequent years, both as guides and future participants in major expeditions to all parts of the world... .Doubtless the most widely heralded has been Jim Whittaker, who in 1963 was the first American to plant Old Glory on the summit of Mount Everest.
>
> The Whittakers continued guiding during the summers after their return from the Army, then went into the outdoor and recreational equipment business. Eventually Jim became general manager for Recreational Equipment, Inc. in Seattle while Louie opened Whittaker's Chalet, an outdoor-equipment store chain in Tacoma. Both men continue to climb Rainier and Louie currently (1970) serves during the summer as chief guide. [75]

During these years the mountain guides worked under a simple concession permit that authorized the permittees to lead park visitors on summit trips, glacier trips, and ski mountaineering tours, and to offer ski instruction. The NPS permitted the guide service to occupy the shelter at Camp Muir and one end of a duplex in the Paradise campground. The permittees were responsible for hiring qualified guides, registering their clients for all summit attempts, and lending support for rescue operations on the mountain. The NPS approved a modest schedule of rates and charged the guides a permit fee of $50 per year. [76]

Lou Whittaker described the guide service in his memoirs:

> In the fifties, we charged $28 for a two-day guided climb to the summit. Today, that same climb costs a little more than $300. In 1950, we also charged $4 per person to go to the ice caves. It was our most popular trip. The ice caves were a series of tunnels on the lower mountain, formed at the outlets of a few streams that emerged from the end of the Paradise-Stevens Glacier. Back then, we'd climb to the summit maybe twelve to fifteen times during the summer, but we'd go to the ice caves twice a day, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. We'd take anywhere from three to forty people each time. It was a three-hour round trip, and our biggest source of income. The ice caves were closed around 1970, because they had melted back and grown smaller. [77]

In 1956, the Whittaker brothers turned the guide service over to Dick McGowan and went into the recreational equipment business. That same year, Paul Sceva expressed a willingness to handle the guide service as a subcontract to the RNPC's concession. The NPS duly modified the RNPC's concession agreement in 1956. [78] Superintendent Macy did not like the new arrangement, but the guide service nevertheless remained a part of the main concession for sixteen more years. [79] McGowan served as chief guide for the RNPC from 1956 until 1965. [80]

MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART FIVE: CONTENTIOUS YEARS, 1945-1965

XVI. MISSION 66 FOR MOUNT RAINIER

INTRODUCTION

Mount Rainier National Park served as the pilot model for the two most significant planning efforts in the history of the national park system. Mount Rainier's role in the development of the master plan concept at the end of the 1920s was discussed in Chapter IX. In a reprise of that role nearly thirty years later, Mount Rainier figured as the first national park to have a development plan under the Mission 66 program of 1956-66. This was no accident. The park's proximity to a major metropolitan area and its location within a fast-growing region of the country made it a bellwether of changing public use patterns throughout the national park system. The three salient trends in national park visitation during the first fifty years of the Park Service—greater use of private automobiles, shorter stays, and growing use overall—each manifested itself early in Mount Rainier National Park. The first national park to admit automobiles, Mount Rainier continued to signal new management concerns for other national parks. Over the years, these management concerns included the demand for free public campgrounds, plummeting per capita revenues for the concession which accompanied the shift from overnight to day use, and problems with overcrowding. Since many of the problems that arose from changing patterns of visitor use needed attention in Mount Rainier before they did in other parks, it was logical that Mount Rainier should twice be a model for planning.

Director Conrad L. Wirth conceived of Mission 66 as a means of summoning administration and congressional support for massive federal investment in the national parks. Instead of going to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress for development funds in two- and three-year driblets, Wirth's idea was to submit a comprehensive plan for the renovation of the national park system over a ten-year span. The completion of the program in 1966 would coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the National Park Service.

Wirth was helped in this endeavor by individuals and organizations in the conservation movement whose writings in the mid-1950s brought about a heightened public awareness of the state of the parks. For example, Bernard DeVoto's scathing article in Harper's Monthly, "Let's Close Our National Parks," described the decaying infrastructure and demoralizing working conditions in the national parks, and an article in Reader's Digest by Charles Stevenson, titled "The Shocking Truth About Our National Parks," warned prospective visitors of the unsanitary, even slumlike conditions that were typical of the hotels and campgrounds. Closer to Mount Rainier, The Mountaineers added their voice to this rising chorus of protest. Addressing the director of the Bureau of the Budget, the president of The Mountaineers wrote:

> Our investigations of the matter show that the Parks are being placed on a stand-by basis in this time of national emergency. We feel that this is a false economy

> which will be more burdonsome [sic] in the years to come. Besides, the attendance in these parks, even though we have the emergency, have been increasing at an alarming rate. Over 100% in the last fourteen years. [1]

First and foremost, then, Wirth persuaded President Eisenhower and the key committees in Congress to support Mission 66 because it would rectify nearly fifteen years of neglect resulting from budget cutbacks during World War II and the Korean War; it would restore the parks to a condition that would satisfy the growing millions of Americans who used them each year.

Wirth also conceived of Mission 66 as an opportunity to rethink concepts of national park design. Like the master planning which the NPS undertook in the late 1920s, Mission 66 sought to address underlying problems in park design which stemmed from changing visitor use patterns. As Wirth remembered his instructions to his staff years later in his book, Parks, Politics, and the People, the Mission 66 staff and steering committee were to question any elements of national park design that they thought had outlived their usefulness.

> Nothing was to be sacred, except the ultimate purpose to be served. Men, method, and time-honored practices were to be accorded no vested deference. Old traditions seem to have determined standards far beyond their time; for instance, the distance a stagecoach could travel in a day seemed to have been a controlling factor in establishing public facilities in some parks. [2]

Like the earlier master planning effort, Mission 66 sought to provide the right mix and distribution of visitor services to alleviate crowding while satisfying public demand. If the first effort at master planning in the 1920s had followed the triumph of the private automobile over the old combination of railroad and stage in national park use, the new effort at master planning recognized the primacy of the day-use visitor over the overnight visitor. In Mount Rainier National Park, day users now accounted for fully 92 percent of park visitors; overnight campers amounted to 5 percent of the total while hotel visitors amounted to a mere 3 percent. [3]

Visitor use of Mount Rainier differed from most national parks in one important particular and that was its problematical winter season. Winter use of Mount Rainier had grown remarkably during the 1930s but had waned since 1946. In the early 1950s, park planners concluded that adverse weather conditions made Paradise less desirable for downhill skiing than other, newly developed Cascade locations, but local business interests prevailed on the NPS to keep the area open for winter use anyway. By 1954, the NIPS had adopted a compromise plan that would develop Paradise for day use but not overnight use during the winter. The future of overnight lodging in the Paradise area during the summer was left for further study. That further study, as it turned out, put Mount Rainier in a position to serve as a pilot park for the Mission 66 program. [4]

In February 1955, Wirth created a seven-member Mission 66 committee and a seven-member steering committee comprised of the supervisors of the people on the main committee. Mount Rainier's former park naturalist, Howard Stagner, sat on the Mission 66 committee; and the principal author of Mount Rainier's original master plan, Thomas C. Vint, sat on the steering committee. Wirth wanted the report on Mission 66 drafted and ready to submit to the President and Congress within one year. In the course of that year, the Mission 66 committee devoted more study to Mount Rainier than to any other national park. [5] The Mount Rainier development plan was the first to be completed by the Mission 66 staff after the Mission 66 program was approved by President Eisenhower and submitted to Congress on February 2, 1956.

Ironically, when Wirth unveiled the Mission 66 plan for Mount Rainier National Park on March 15, 1956, it plunged the park into controversy once more. The twin objectives of Mission 66 were (1) to upgrade and expand facilities for the rising tide of day-use visitors, and (2) to revamp visitor circulation in order to alleviate crowding. In Mount Rainier National Park these broadscale objectives translated into one overall solution: move all overnight guest and administrative facilities to lower elevations, if not entirely out of the park. After the recent controversies over the concession contract, government acquisition of the RNPC's buildings, and non-authorization of a permanent chair lift at Paradise, the plan appeared to be counter to everything that business interests and the state's political leaders had been advocating during the past decade. Ignoring the fact that Mission 66 promised to lavish $10 million on new development in the park, business leaders joined state politicians in denouncing the plan. They focused narrowly on the proposal to relocate overnight accommodations away from Paradise. Elsewhere in the nation Mission 66 was well-received by the public; in Washington state it met with opposition and rancor.

This chapter focuses on what Mission 66 actually accomplished for Mount Rainier National Park in terms of its twin goals of updating the physical plant and improving the circulation of visitors. The first section looks at the outcome of Mission 66 for overnight lodging. Since overnight lodging lay at the heart of the controversy, this section also treats the politics of the Mission 66 program, which had repercussions for other elements of the program in Mount Rainier as well. The second section discusses the plan to move park headquarters to a lower elevation, from Longmire to a site outside the park near Ashford. In the third and fourth sections, road and campground development are summarized respectively. The fifth section looks at changes in the interpretive program in this era, with particular reference to the role of visitor centers and wayside exhibits.

OVERNIGHT LODGING FACILITIES

On March 15, 1956, the Park Service announced that the Mission 66 plan for Mount Rainier called for more than $10 million in development over the next ten years in order to meet the needs of the one million visitors expected in the park annually by 1966. Of this amount, approximately $4.3 million would be for road development, $2.7 million for transfer of park headquarters to a new site, and $3.8 million for visitor use facilities, including visitor centers, campgrounds, and picnic areas. Overnight accommodations, according to the Park Service's first press release on the subject, would eventually be relocated to "scenic sites close to the park's borders." [6]

The press release quoted Wirth as saying that the present RNPC concession contract would be renewed on an annual basis, if necessary, until privately-owned and operated lodging facilities were available at new locations. "In seeking the most practical and desirable solutions to the problem of overnight accommodations," Wirth explained, "all the facts indicated that such facilities should be located at lower elevations. The normal development of motels along the approaches to the park can be expected to take care of much of the need, but we shall continue to seek the best possible place, in or out of the park, for development of new accommodation centers." [7] The $3.8 million apportioned for visitor use facilities would go primarily to day-use facilities. This was a reasonable allocation in light of the fact that 92 percent of park visitors did not stay overnight.

Wirth anticipated that the plan would meet with objection from Washington state business interests. When he informed the RNPC's Paul Sceva of the plan, Sceva immediately raised such strong reservations that Wirth found it necessary to request Sceva's confidence until the plan was made public, and more, to order Superintendent Macy and all park staff to refrain from any discussion of the plan with Sceva until they were instructed differently. Sceva

denounced Wirth' s directive as a "gag order" and fumed about it six months later to a committee of Congress. Sceva also criticized the NPS for not seeking the RNPC's input sooner in view of the company's forty years of experience as the park concession. [8] Wirth retorted that Sceva had acted irresponsibly by leaking information to selected pro-development groups. Moreover, the RNPC had already explained its position on overnight accommodations at Paradise during the recent negotiations over its contract concession. Indeed, the NPS itself had been on record in favor of moving overnight accommodations to lower elevations for more than a decade as the problem had been under study since World War II.

Alternatives to Paradise and Sunrise

The concept of moving overnight accommodations out of Paradise and Sunrise to lower elevations had three sources, all of them originating in the period 1942-46. The first in time, if not importance, was the decision in 1943 to evaluate alternative sites for the park headquarters. While the paramount consideration in this case was the danger of flooding by the Nisqually River, Longmire's 2,000-foot elevation and the dark and damp conditions prevailing through the winter at the base of Mount Rainier were also cited as reasons for relocating the headquarters to a lower elevation in or outside the park. This proposal was under consideration all the time that NPS officials deliberated over the future of visitor facilities at Paradise.

The second precedent for this important concept was the removal of the 425 housekeeping cabins located at Paradise and Sunrise in 1943-44. The RNPC maintained that the primary reason it got rid of the cabins was that they were obsolete; park visitors wanted better accommodations. But company officials acknowledged that the drafty, unheated cabins had never proven popular with the public and that the cabins were structurally unfit to withstand the winters. Several had collapsed under snowloads, and maintenance costs for all the others were high. When the RNPC sold the cabins for emergency housing during the war and had them removed, RNPC and NPS officials agreed that the cabins were a failure and would not be replaced, at least at such high elevations. [9] After the war, Superintendent Preston discussed with officials of the neighboring Snoqualmie National Forest the need for cabin developments at lower elevations, perhaps along the White River outside the northeast corner of the park. Although nothing definite came from the talks, it was the first instance of the park administration seeking to develop visitor accommodations outside the park. [10]

The third and most important source for this concept was the pressure which state politicians and the tourist industry brought to bear on the NPS to develop new all-year visitor facilities. At the end of World War II, Governor Mon C. Wallgren accorded high priority to the development of Washington state's tourist industry. Tourist industry representatives contended that Mount Rainier National Park ranked as the premier tourist attraction in the Pacific Northwest. Overnight accommodations must figure prominently in the postwar development plans for the park, they insisted. Each tourist turned away from Mount Rainier for lack of hotel space constituted a reduction in the state's tourist industry. It was incumbent on the NPS to maximize the national park's vacation potential. Specifically, the governor and the tourist industry demanded the development of new visitor facilities at Paradise. [11]

Everything that the NPS had learned from its experience with the RNPC argued against such a development. Even if day-use facilities and a range of overnight accommodations were combined into one building, and the building were given a vertical design in order to minimize the snowload, and it were made of concrete to ensure fire safety—even then, NPS architects cautioned, it would cost about $2 million. Surely there were better areas where $2 million could be spent on new visitor facilities in Mount Rainier National Park. Thus did state politicians and the tourist industry provide the third source of inspiration for moving

visitor accommodations to a lower elevation. In 1946, NPS planners began to scour the park for alternative sites for a $2 million visitor facility.

Two alternative sites emerged as favorites, one for Sunrise and one for Paradise. On the east side, the favored development site was found along the lower portion of Crystal Creek. Consisting of several acres on either side of the creek, the site was located a short distance off the Mather Memorial Parkway inside the northeast corner of the park. With some clearing of trees it would afford a fine view of Mount Rainier and it was convenient to Sunrise, the Tipsoo Lake-Cayuse Pass area, and the proposed Corral Pass ski area northeast of the park. On the south side, NPS planners considered an area along Kautz Creek south of the park road, but ended up in favor of a site on Skate Creek, just outside the boundary of the park on the south side of the Nisqually River. The site would be accessed by a new state road between Ashford and Packwood (Skate Creek Road) and a short connecting road to Longmire. [12]

By the time these two sites were included in Mission 66 for Mount Rainier, the Park Service had determined that private capital should be sought to develop them. Apparently NPS planners believed that the gentler climatic conditions found at these lower elevations, together with the growing amount of park visitation, would induce private capital to invest in overnight accommodations at the edges of the park if not in its center. Ironically, they compared their vision for Mount Rainier to the situation in Great Smoky Mountains. There, virtually all concession services were furnished by the community of Gatlinburg, Tennessee —a place that would become so overrun by the tourist industry in the 1960s and 1970s that it would stand as the most notorious example in the nation of a national park gateway town. [13]

The plan struck developers as odd and inconsistent. Although the Secretary of the Interior's concession policy statement of 1950 had endorsed the idea of government ownership of visitor facilities, the NPS now seemed to be going back to Mather's idea of placing greater reliance on private capital for visitor accommodations. The Mission 66 plan declared: "It is a long-standing National Park policy—a policy in which Congress has repeatedly manifested its concurrence—that the construction and operation of concessions are proper functions of private enterprise." [14] This was somewhat disingenuous in view of the recent act of Congress which had authorized the government to purchase the RNPC's buildings.

Neither the Crystal Creek site nor the Skate Creek site was ever developed. Washington business interests and politicians and Washington's congressional delegation rejected the very concept of moving overnight accommodations to lower elevations in or outside the park. This crucial part of Mission 66 for Mount Rainier was eliminated, and the Park Service was forced to go back to the drawing board and explain how it would redevelop the Paradise area for overnight use.

Paradise Reconsidered

Senators Magnuson and Jackson played a key role in amending Mission 66 for Mount Rainier. In March 1956, the two senators wrote a joint letter to Senator James Murray, chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, questioning the wisdom of the development plan and requesting a hearing. The two Washington senators subsequently grilled Director Wirth at two hearings, the first held on Capitol Hill, the second in Tacoma. At the second hearing, held in October 1956, David Brower of the Sierra Club tried to educate the senators to a central tenet of the NPS 's opposition to overnight accommodations at Paradise: that the hotel would draw so many people as to exceed the "carrying capacity" of the area. But this unfamiliar concept sailed over the heads of the senators. Not satisfied with the work of the Park Service's own Mission 66 committee, the senators directed Wirth to

make two further studies: one to determine what inducements could be offered to private enterprise to build or operate overnight accommodations at Paradise; the other to present alternative sites and building plans for overnight accommodations, regardless of whether they were built by private or public funds. [15]

The NPS completed the latter report in March 1957. The building design was so odd and incongruous in a national park as to be impossible to consider seriously. Taking into account snowloads, NPS architects proposed a ten-story building that would house all government and hotel operations at Paradise. The first three floors would be used for parking, the fourth floor would be on a level with the average depth of snow in winter and would contain the lobby and dining room. The six floors above this would contain 270 guest rooms, 60 employees' rooms, and an employee dining room. The estimated cost for the building was $5 million. [16] Upon receiving this report, Senator Jackson wrote to Wirth, "I am pleased that the report is labelled 'preliminary,' because, frankly, it strikes me that some more feasible plan could be devised than for a 10-story hotel that will lose more than $318,000 a year." [17]

Senator Magnuson, working with House conferees on the House appropriations bill, had an item included in the Senate report directing the Park Service "to complete its studies and make recommendations as to how private enterprise might be encouraged to do the job." Acting on this directive, Senator Jackson invited Laurance S. Rockefeller of Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc., to conduct this feasibility study on the Park Service's behalf. [18] Three months later, on October 15, 1957, Wirth agreed to fund such a study by Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc.

The Board of Trustees of Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc., appointed a committee to oversee the study. Former director of the NPS Horace M. Albright was appointed chairman. Other committee members were Raymond C. Lillie, vice president and general manager of the Grand Teton Lodge Company; Eldridge T. Spencer, an architect who had designed visitor accommodations in Yosemite, Grand Teton, and other national park areas; and Allan C. George, a partner in the hotel consulting firm of Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company. Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company performed a market analysis of overnight visitor demand in Mount Rainier National Park in conjunction with Jackson Hole Preserve's feasibility study. [19]

In the course of several visits to Mount Rainier during different seasons of the year and with the benefit of many interviews with prominent businessmen, civic leaders, and conservationists in the region, Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc., found that there were "no completely satisfactory solutions" to the problem of overnight accommodations in Mount Rainier National Park. "If there had never been any development," Rockefeller stated to Jackson, "the problems would seem much simpler." Instead, the adverse climate conditions at Paradise had to be weighed alongside the tradition of visitor accommodations, the location of Paradise relative to the existing road system, and the aim of Mission 66 to develop extensive day-use facilities in the park.

In January 1959, Jackson Hole Preserve gave qualified support to the proposal to build new overnight accommodations at Paradise:

> Our conclusions without question support the view of Director Wirth of the National Park Service that overnight facilities in Mount Rainier National Park cannot be operated on a profitable basis if interest and depreciation on the initial investment are taken into consideration. On the other hand, our Trustees, with one exception, feel that if a way can be found to finance the construction of modern and adequate facilities at Mount Rainier, the most desirable site appears to be in the Paradise area. We believe that it is practical to construct facilities in that area, and that such facilities so located might more satisfactorily serve the

> public need than in any other location. We further believe that the idea of coordinating National Park Service plans for day use facilities with overnight accommodations in the Paradise area, all to be operated by one concessionaire, has merit. [20]

As might be expected from such an equivocal finding, Jackson Hole Preserve's report was interpreted in opposite ways. To Acting Secretary of the Interior Roger Ernst, the report supported the Park Service's longstanding contention that a lodge at high elevation in Mount Rainier was not economically feasible. Moreover, Ernst pointed out, the subsidiary report by Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company overlooked the imperative to protect basic national park values. Jackson Hole Preserve had provided no compelling reasons for building a lodge at government expense, and absent any legislation by Congress the NPS had no intention of undertaking such a project. [21]

But Washington's congressional delegation argued that Jackson Hole Preserve had endorsed the idea of a government-subsidized hotel development. In the spring of 1960, Representative Tollefson and Senators Magnuson and Jackson introduced House Joint Resolution 774 and Senate Joint Resolution 193, "To Authorize the Construction of a Hotel and Related Facilities in Mount Rainier National Park," and when the joint resolutions failed the first time the three men reintroduced them the following year. Representative Tollefson claimed that 85 percent of Washington residents favored overnight accommodations at Paradise, as did nearly every daily newspaper in the state. According to Tollefson, the Rockefeller Foundation endorsed this view. [22]

Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall requested, through the Office of the Solicitor, a report by the NPS director on the House and Senate joint resolutions. Wirth stood firm. He reiterated what he had said (and what David Brower had described more pointedly) in the congressional hearings, that the development of overnight facilities at Paradise would jeopardize basic park values by bringing too many people into a fragile area. "It is not simply a matter of finding space for a hotel, but of finding adequate space needed for a facility which in itself becomes a magnet in holding people in the area beyond the time devoted to scenic enjoyment and recreational pursuits." He also reemphasized the economic argument that a government subsidy would not only be necessary, but would need to be large. Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company had estimated that a 300-room capacity hotel would cost $6.9 million. Wirth declared that this estimate was conservative, and when the rebuilding of water and sewer systems were taken into account, the cost would be at least $12 million. [23] Secretary Udall personally inspected Paradise that summer, backed up the NPS director, and reported unfavorably on the joint resolutions to Congress.

Diversion: The Crystal Creek Site Proposal

But Udall was too astute a politician to try to let the matter simply drop. He offered a consolation prize to the Washington delegation: the Department of the Interior would cooperate with the Department of Agriculture in a joint survey of high elevation sites on the northeast side of the park where snowfall was less. Assistant Director Hillory A. Tolson explained that the goal of the survey was to "provide a long-needed first-class mountain inn so located as to save Mount Rainier's wilderness and snow areas without disturbing its natural beauty." [24] In October 1961, the Department of the Interior announced that a tentative site for all-year overnight accommodations had been selected. [25]

The Interior Department's Director of Information James N. Faber made the announcement at a closed meeting in Seattle attended by Magnuson, Jackson, and a dozen public officials and businessmen from Seattle, Tacoma, and Olympia. The site was on Crystal Creek, proposed five years earlier in the original Mission 66 development plan; it was not at a high elevation

though it was inside the park. Now, however, it could be developed in conjunction with the new Crystal Mountain ski resort in Snoqualmie National Forest—a federally-subsidized hotel in the park, and a privately-financed ski resort and chair lift on nearby Crystal Mountain in the national forest. Business representatives said that the proposal was a trial balloon to test whether local public opinion would settle for something more modest or continue to demand new overnight accommodations at Paradise, They also thought the site was flawed; located deep in the forest, hotel guests would find nothing to do there. Faber insisted that the Crystal Creek proposal was the best plan that Washington residents could expect to get from Congress. As a reporter for the Tacoma News Tribune interpreted Faber's announcement, "It appears it is Crystal Creek or nothing—all locked up, signed, sealed and delivered." [26]

But Washington's politicians successfully reopened the issue. In November, Governor Albert D. Rosellini set up a six-member citizens' advisory group to study the problem of overnight accommodations in Mount Rainier National Park. [27] In January, Rosellini suggested that the NPS reconsider the development of a chair lift at Paradise. Even more ominously, he appointed Clayton D. Anderson to the directorship of Washington State's Department of Parks and Recreation. Anderson, a former horse wrangler at Paradise, had already spoken out against the Mission 66 plan to move campgrounds to lower elevations. [28] Out of this fractious debate emerged another political deal: the Department of the Interior and the Washington State Department of Commerce and Economic Development would each contribute $10,000 toward yet another study, this one to consider four sites in the park for development: Paradise, Longmire, Crystal Creek, and Klickitat Creek. [29]

The governor and the Department of the Interior took more than a year to agree on a consultant for the study and finally the contract was awarded to Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company, the consulting firm which had participated in the study by Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc., four years earlier. Two members of that firm, Henry Maschal and Richard Raymond, visited the park in May and June, 1963. The firm considered each site from the standpoint of winter and summer use, local natural features, climate, and historical development. The findings by Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company were emphatic. "We do not recommend the construction of any hotel type accommodations within Mount Rainier National Park," the report stated. [30]

Washington state officials were dismayed by the conclusion. [31] At the closed-door briefing on the report, held at the Hilton Inn in Tacoma on August 7, 1963, one state official wanted to know why Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company had made an apparent complete reversal from the Rockefeller report. Maschal replied that the earlier study had looked at the feasibility of overnight accommodations based on the assumption that the government would provide $9 million. The latter study proceeded on no such assumption. [32] Moreover, the Park Service's insistence that visitor facilities must be oriented to the rising tide of day-use visitors had finally made a strong impression. "The very limited areas available for development are and will in the future be increasingly needed for day use facilities and accommodations and for overnight camping," the report stated. "Camping facilities are in this respect favored over hotel type facilities because such camping facilities can be provided in available areas unsuited to hotel sites and because of the appreciably lower cost of facilities and operation per person accommodated." [33]

Conservation groups applauded the study's findings. The findings squared with the position taken by The Mountaineers, that the purposes of the national park would be best served if the significant features of the park were preserved for recreational, educational, and inspirational enjoyment, while overnight accommodations were relocated to less fragile and significant areas of the park. [34] The findings were welcomed by the National Parks Association, which went on record in favor of eliminating overnight accommodations at Paradise at the end of the Paradise Inn's useful life. [35]

Even in the face of the study's negative recommendations, pro-development interests did not give up. The governor's Mount Rainier Study Committee asked the authors of the study, Maschal and Raymond, to include in their final report what they thought could be done with a $2 million appropriation. [36] And before waiting for the final report, Representative Tollefson made a last-ditch effort to get new overnight accommodations at Paradise by introducing House Joint Resolution 685 in the House of Representative on September 5, 1963. The resolution called upon the Congress to donate matching funds for the construction of overnight facilities at Paradise, and it cited the independent study by Jackson Hole Preserve, Inc., for support (saying nothing of the adverse finding by Harris, Kerr, Forster & Company). Once again the NPS advised the Secretary of the Interior, through the Department's legislative counsel, to recommend against the adoption of H.J. Res. 685. [37]

The Paradise Visitor Center is under construction as Paradise Lodge burns in the background, June 3, 1965. The destruction of Paradise Lodge stirred local sentiment about Mount Rainier's other historic buildings. *(Ed Bullard photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

Compromise: The Paradise Visitor Center

Senators Jackson and Magnuson, meanwhile, had set to work on a more promising line of approach for promoting new development. In the early summer of 1963, Senator Jackson made his own inspection of Paradise, Longmire, and the Skate Creek site, and decided that Paradise should be developed for day use only. Whether overnight facilities should be located at Longmire or Skate Creek he could not decide, but now his first priority was to secure funds for a new visitor center at Paradise. The senator may have arrived at this decision out of personal conviction after his tour of the park with Superintendent John Rutter; he may have been impressed by the growing determination of conservationists to resist new, overnight hotel development in the park; or he may have simply decided that a good many of his constituents who used the park would regard half a loaf as better than none. [38] In any case, Jackson obtained Magnuson's help in securing $465,900 for the NPS budget for the 1964 fiscal year as a start toward construction of an all-year day-use building or visitor center at Paradise. The visitor center was to include a restaurant, museum, information center, ski rental shop, and warming hut. [39] Construction of the Paradise Visitor Center

began in 1964 and reached completion in 1966. As expected, its eventual cost far exceeded the original allocation. Indeed, the Paradise Visitor Center preempted NPS plans for a new visitor center at Sunrise. [40] At $2 million, it was the most expensive building in the national park system. [41]

The public's response to the new facility was mixed. The building's modern design pleased some and disappointed others. Designed by the two architectural firms of Wimberly, Whisenand, Allison and Tong of Honolulu and McGuire and Muri of Tacoma, the building's round layout and conical roof were supposed to relate the structure to its mountain setting. Other visual design features included "the swooping, bough-like shape of the beams, the branching 'tree' columns, the 'switchback trail' ramps, and the sloped 'cliffs' of the stone base." [42] To many people's way of thinking, however, the building did not harmonize with the landscape in the least. People complained that it looked like a satellite, pagoda, or flying saucer. Its weird, extraterrestrial effect was enhanced when Paradise was shrouded in fog, as was often the case. Or when snow still lay on the ground, people joked that the new visitor center looked like the Seattle Space Needle—up to its neck in snow. And when it became known that Senator Jackson had used his influence to get the Department of the Interior to contract with a Honolulu-based architectural firm to design the building, a legend grew among the park's devotees that the building had been designed for a site in the Hawaiian Islands but had been dumped on Mount Rainier instead. This was not true, however. [43]

The modern design of Paradise Visitor Center met with mixed reactions. *(R.L. Lake photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

The public not only felt dubious about what they had gained, they mourned what had been lost. Ironically, the opening of the Paradise Visitor Center in the summer of 1966 coincided not only with the conclusion of Mission 66 but with a burgeoning public sentiment for the preservation of historic buildings and places. The National Historic Preservation Act, which would have profound implications for the Paradise area in years to come, was passed by Congress that same year. It was a sign of the public's growing unease about the pace of new development that the most newsworthy event during the construction of the Paradise Visitor Center occurred on June 3, 1965, when Paradise Lodge was burned to the ground to make

room for new parking. No sooner was the building destroyed than NPS officials were having to make assurances that the Paradise Inn would remain standing; the obliterated building was only the more modest and recent of the two hotels at Paradise. [44] To these officials it seemed like only yesterday that the public was agreeing with them that the old buildings had outlived their usefulness; now the public valued the buildings for their age—the older the better.

Congress's approval of funds for the Paradise Visitor Center proved to be one of two crucial decisions that perpetuated Paradise's long-held and perplexing role as a focal point of visitor use in Mount Rainier National Park. The second crucial decision came more than ten years later with the designation of Paradise Inn as an historic building in an historic district (see Chapter XX). The latter decision finally resolved the long public debate over new overnight facilities at Paradise by establishing a third alternative that no one had even bothered to consider during the whole Mission 66 era: to preserve the original Paradise Inn as a charming reminder of the park's early years.

Unfortunately, these two decisions undermined the main organizing principle of Mission 66 for Mount Rainier. That principle was to separate day use from overnight use by relocating key visitor facilities to lower elevations in or outside the park. Jackson's and Magnuson's forceful intervention on behalf of the Mount Rainier development lobby in the 1950s and 1960s had lasting consequences for the pattern of visitor use in the park. The episode stands as one of the best examples in the park's history of how local interests intertwined with Park Service initiatives to reshape the park as a cultural landscape.

RELOCATION OF PARK HEADQUARTERS

As suggested in the previous section, the idea of moving headquarters from Longmire to a new site outside the park was one of the wellsprings of the Mission 66 development plan for Mount Rainier. There were many advantages to be gained by moving headquarters to a lower elevation outside the park. Costs for building maintenance would be lower farther from the base of the mountain where snowfall was lighter. Employee morale would be better if park employees and their families had easier access to schools and other community services located away from the park. Congestion in the confined area around Longmire would be alleviated. Most importantly, headquarters would not be in danger of destruction by an outburst flood or mudflow coming down the Nisqually River. These arguments preceded Mission 66's general proposition that major development sites in Mount Rainier National Park should be located at lower elevations farther from the mountain.

Unlike the plan to relocate overnight accommodations to lower elevations, however, the plan to move headquarters outside the park did not elicit much public debate. Congress balked at the plan simply because of the costs involved. It questioned spending $2.5 million for administrative buildings when the money could be put to visitor facilities instead. [45] For this reason alone, the Park Service's efforts to move headquarters outside the park took some 35 years to bear fruit.

Since the plan to move headquarters was relatively uncontroversial, its chronological development can be sketched briefly. The idea first formed in 1943 and received serious study in 1945-46; it became an integral part of Mission 66 development planning in 1955-56; Congress authorized the purchase of an administrative site, called Tahoma Woods, near Ashford, in 1960; and the new headquarters buildings were completed and occupied in 1976. Relocation of headquarters received low priority because it had low public visibility; therefore, the plan progressed very slowly.

This section examines the four main factors that weighed in the decision to relocate park headquarters: (1) cost efficiency, (2) living conditions, (3) protection of park values around Longmire, and (4) risk assessment of the potential for a natural disaster at Longmire.

A Search for Cost Efficiency

As park planners updated the master plan for Mount Rainier during World War II, they pointed out a need for much new construction at park headquarters. They anticipated that park operations and staffing would grow with the expected boom in visitation after the war, and they noted that many of the existing buildings were obsolete or deteriorated and would need replacing. Yet expansion and rehabilitation of the headquarters area at Longmire posed some problems. The amount of level terrain was limited, the ground was rocky and costly to excavate, and additional forest would have to be cleared. In addition, further flood control work on the Nisqually River would be necessary before the terrain could be safely occupied. All of these cost factors suggested that it might be more efficient to begin with a new headquarters site somewhere else. [46]

Park planners investigated three alternative sites in 1943. These were at the confluence of Kautz Creek and the Nisqually River inside the park, at Nisqually Entrance immediately outside the park, and near the town of Ashford about six miles outside the park. [47] The Kautz Creek site was eliminated after the Kautz Creek flood of 1947, and the Nisqually Entrance site did not have much to recommend it, so the Ashford site emerged as the favorite. In 1951, Director Wirth recommended a site on the Mather Memorial Parkway immediately north of the park, or in the town of Enumclaw. Relocating park headquarters to the east side of the park seemed desirable only if the park's major winter use area was to be on the east side, so that idea was abandoned soon thereafter. [48]

Detailed cost comparisons were made between Longmire and the Ashford site. While river protection revetment at Longmire would cost an estimated $55,000, similar costs would be incurred near Ashford for building an access road and water and sewer systems. Approximately the same number of new buildings were listed in either plan. One important difference was that the Longmire plan called for a new museum building, while the Ashford plan called for a new administration building and conversion of the administration building at Longmire into a museum. The cost comparison made in 1943 ended up with two very similar figures: $668,780 for expanding the Longmire administrative site as compared with $631,750 for developing a new administrative site near Ashford. [49]

The Park Service more than tripled these cost estimates in 1955. Labor and construction costs rose sharply in the postwar era, and the need for employee housing expanded considerably during the decade, too. Once again, the two figures were remarkably close—$2,078,700 as opposed to $2,067,350. The cost of additional residences and equipment storage sheds in the Ashford plan was more than offset by the cheaper construction costs overall due to the milder climate, better soil conditions, smoother terrain, and shorter haul for building materials. Park planners did not venture to make a detailed comparison for operation and maintenance costs, but they offered the following points:

1. The Ashford site was more convenient to local business centers for pickup and delivery of equipment and supplies.

2. The Ashford site was within the fifty-mile zone for office machine repair, thereby allowing the park administration to pay for repairmen to come to the site rather than having to take broken equipment to repair shops in Tacoma or Seattle.

3. The Ashford site was adjacent to a regular distribution line of public power and telephone. Public services to the employee residences would reduce park operation and maintenance costs.

4. Costs of snow removal would be comparatively minor at the Ashford site. With headquarters personnel and their families located at Longmire, it was sometimes necessary to plow the park road early in the morning and again in the afternoon to permit the school bus to get in and out.

5. The milder climate at Ashford would reduce heating costs.

6. Increased travel time for personnel to and from the park would be partially offset by reduced travel time between park headquarters and other points such as Tacoma and Olympia.

In the final Mission 66 prospectus, it was estimated that development of the Ashford site would cost $2,355,700. Acting Secretary of the Interior Roger Ernst approved the plan, as did the Bureau of the Budget. Congress did not question the cost efficiency of the Ashford site as compared with similar headquarters development at Longmire; rather, it questioned spending $2.5 million for buildings which almost all of the visiting public would never see. Was there really a need?

A Need to Improve Living Conditions

When park superintendents submitted their budget estimates, employee housing was usually the thing they least wanted to ask for. Practically everything else in the budget could be justified to Congress either in terms of a public need which visitors could directly perceive, or as a resource which the NPS was charged with protecting. But employee living conditions had no immediate effect on either the public's enjoyment or preservation of national parks, so to apportion more funds for employee housing always required the strongest proofs for Congress. Living conditions generally had to decline to the point that they were demonstrably undermining employee morale before the superintendent could expect to get anything done about it. Yet no superintendent wanted to report that his staff had low morale. The problem of personnel housing placed park superintendents in a Catch-22 situation.

Seasonal park employees lived in "Tent City" at Ohanapecosh. These housing conditions persisted into the 1960s. *(J. Boucher photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

In their 1943 study of the headquarters relocation question, Regional Engineer R.D. Waterhouse and Regional Chief of Planning E.A. Davidson stated that there were twenty-six residential quarters in Longmire. Of these, seven were relatively new and on a par with modern housing standards, ten were sub-standard and in need of replacement, five were fit for summertime use only, and four were unfit even for summertime use. In addition to these poor housing conditions, Longmire residents had to contend with large amounts of snow when their neighbors fifteen miles down the road generally did not, and they had to drive long distances for schools, groceries, and social activities outside the park. Furthermore, Longmire could be an oppressive place to live; the forest setting greatly reduced the amount of light and sunshine. Waterhouse and Davidson concluded, "there is a definite increase in labor efficiency in an area which is free from snow, with consequent savings to the government." [50]

The housing shortage in Longmire became acute as former park employees returned from military service after World War II, some of them accompanied by new families. In 1946, Superintendent Preston suggested to Regional Director Tomlinson that a stopgap solution might be to convert the Longmire Mess Hall into living quarters and to relocate the old CCC mess hall from Paradise to a site near the Longmire Community House and turn it into apartments. [51] Two years later, when no appreciable progress had been made, Preston described the situation as desperate. Tomlinson informed Drury that employee housing at Mount Rainier had been neglected so long as to be mostly a product of "salvaged material, contributed labor and piecemeal throwing together." Preston's report on the situation suggested to Tomlinson "that we can no longer neglect the vital question of housing of our employees—we must place their housing at or near the top of our priority lists." [52]

Ten years after the end of World War II, it only seemed reasonable that Mission 66 for Mount Rainier should carry a large item for rehabilitation of park headquarters—including employee housing—along with funds for road, trail, and campground development and new visitor centers. Indeed, the $2.5 million price tag for relocation of headquarters constituted one

fourth of the total Mission 66 program. But NPS officials recognized that it would still be a tough sell to Congress. As if conceding that the various items directly related to visitor use would be given priority, NPS officials consistently buried the $2.5 million item at the back of each Mission 66 development plan. Even then, they eschewed any mention of new employee housing.

There was one exception. An in-house report, drafted in the summer of 1955, provided a frank discussion of the need to improve living conditions for park staff. The report gave seven reasons why employees might prefer living near the Ashford site to living at Longmire. [53]

Park employees who were stationed at headquarters had to wait many years before they were provided with new housing at Tahoma Woods. However, one of the later Mission 66 projects involved the construction of NPS housing units for employees who were stationed on the east side. Located in a secluded site near the Ohanapecosh developed area, the site had many of the advantages that were sought in the site near Ashford. The project took precedence over Tahoma Woods because it was located in rural Lewis County, thereby making it eligible for partial funding under the Accelerated Public Works program.

Protection of Park Values at Longmire

Park planners argued that Longmire must not be permitted to grow much larger because the administrative site itself would detract from the scenic and natural values of the national park. Waterhouse and Davidson declared this unequivocally in their 1943 report. "Growth and expansion of villages within the boundaries of national parks is diametric to principles of preservation as stated in basic park law," they wrote. One particular concern was that the additional clearing of forest needed to expand facilities would be clearly visible from high points such as Ricksecker Point, forming an unsightly hole in an otherwise "practically virgin forest landscape." [54]

Waterhouse and Davidson contended that the "pioneer" period of development at Longmire had passed, and most of the buildings were at the end of their useful life. Rather than rebuild them on the site, they should be replaced with buildings at another location. Eventually, they argued, the Longmire area should be either devoted exclusively to hotel and campground development or returned to a natural condition. [55]

What was evident in the report by Waterhouse and Davidson was a change in thinking about the proper presentation of government buildings in national parks. In the Park Service's early years, government buildings were given prominent placement. The administrative building at Longmire, for example, faced a curve in the road such that motorists coming from the Nisqually Entrance could not fail to see it as they broke out of the forest and rounded the meadow. Similarly, the administrative building at Sunrise was placed at the end of the plaza, in clear view on the approach through Yakima Park. Government buildings were perhaps never more conspicuous in the national parks than in the 1930s, when the architectural style known as National Park Service Rustic made its mark. By contrast, the Mission 66 development plan for Mount Rainier offered the following commentary on government buildings in the park:

> A headquarters development includes no public use facilities. It is the administrative center and the service center for the Park, and includes offices, shops, warehouses, garage and storage facilities, and the residential area for headquarters employees—behind-the-scenes facilities which the visitor seldom needs to see or use. [56]

An unusually sharp exchange on this subject occurred between Davidson and Preston in 1943. It seemed to Davidson that the Park Service was serving the public most effectively when it was serving them unobtrusively. Park visitors should be allowed to indulge in the feeling of driving through an uncrowded, wild, and unencumbered landscape. Davidson wrote, "It is difficult to imagine a more beneficial or desirable use of parks than the opportunity they afford for people to escape from the regimentation of their daily lives into a natural and wide open, unregulated (to every possible intent), and free out-of-doors! Just as far as we MUST infringe on this Utopia, to that extent we lessen the highest service and enjoyment a park can render." [57]

Preston took exception to the implication that the NPS had previously wanted to make itself conspicuous "in order to impress visitors...and regiment all who come within our scope." With regard to buildings, it seemed to Preston that they should always be located wherever there was a public need. "Time and again in my experience this has been one point the landscape people forget. If we are going to construct a building, why not put it where it will be used most effectively?" Preston asked. "If in the interests of the preservation of the natural scene, we have to place it where it is not effective for its intended use, why build it?" [58] Preston, together with his assistant superintendent, chief clerk, chief ranger, and park naturalist, submitted a lengthy report in 1943 that sought to refute the need to move headquarters out of the park; they preferred to expand the facilities at Longmire. [59]

The impact of headquarters development on park resources had to be figured in relation to other factors such as cost efficiency, employee morale, and public safety. But those in favor of moving headquarters out of the park could always insist on the primacy of resource protection. Regional Landscape Architect Sanford Hill underscored this point in a planning report for Mount Rainier in 1946. "Conservation, Protection, and Preservation, must be considered in number one priority in any discussion of the Overall Plan," he wrote. "These responsibilities dictate a conservative approach on all proposed facilities." [60] Eventually this planning principle proved decisive in resolving the question of where park headquarters should be located.

Reckoning with the Threat of a Natural Disaster

The most problematic question involved in the possible relocation of park headquarters was the extent to which Longmire was threatened by natural disaster. The Longmire area straddled the Nisqually River and was built in its flood plain. The Nisqually River had flooded a number of times since the creation of the park. The floods seemed to be correlated with heavy rainfall, but they emanated from the river's glacier source and were sudden, violent, and not well-understood. According to Regional Engineer H.L. Crowley in 1943:

> The River is fed by the normal rainfall and the melting glacier. Apparently these sometimes combine to produce surges of water brought about, according to observers, when a series of small lakes form in depressions in the ice and the upper one overflows, cutting a channel in the ice to one lower down. This causes the lower lake to overflow and cut a channel and so on until the series is drained, thus developing a surge such as piled 15 feet or more of debris and rocks on the Nisqually Bridge several years ago. Another cause for the surges has been given as the damming of the River by the moraine which forms a lake. When the dam is topped it washes out and a flood occurs. [61]

During the CCC era, log cribbing and rock revetments were built and maintained to protect Longmire from flooding. But more extensive revetment seemed to be required. Proposed strategies and cost estimates for flood control in the Longmire area varied widely.

One important result of the concern about a natural disaster was to eliminate other potential administrative sites—the Kautz Creek site and the Nisqually Entrance site—from consideration. They, too, were situated on the Nisqually River and would be threatened by natural disaster. The Kautz Creek flood in 1947 made the point most forceably, inundating an area that had been suggested for park headquarters only four years before. This left the site near Ashford, if in fact Longmire was to be abandoned because of the flood hazard. [62]

The threat of a natural disaster played well before Congress, too. Like the problem of snowloads, it was a condition unique to the area that demanded special consideration. In the brief congressional debates that preceded the Act of Congress of June 27, 1960, authorizing the Department of the Interior to acquire the Tahoma Woods administrative site for Mount Rainier National Park headquarters, the flood hazard at Longmire figured prominently.

ROADS AND TRAILS

When the NPS initially spelled out Mission 66 for Mount Rainier, the development plan included an estimated $4,265,000, or 42 percent of the estimated total investment, for construction and improvement of roads. The main projects were (1) completion of the Stevens Canyon Road, (2) construction of the new winter access road to Paradise (now called the Paradise Loop Road, because it allowed traffic to flow in a loop through Paradise Valley during the summer), and (3) improvement of the Westside and Mowich Lake roads. This constituted the third and final spate of road-building in the development of the park.

Road development was central to the basic thrust of Mission 66, which aimed to head off overcrowding by dispersing visitors more widely around the park. Most day-use visitors were highly mobile, dependent on their cars, and essentially roadbound. NPS planners thought that by modernizing the park infrastructure to suit the day-use visitor, they could keep traffic flowing, reduce the feeling of crowding, and thereby increase the park's visitor carrying capacity. To this end, the driving tour would be encouraged; the car, the road, and the wayside exhibit would increasingly frame the common visitor experience at Mount Rainier. The Park Service's March 1956 press release on Mission 66 for Mount Rainier said as much when it announced that "numerous scenic overlooks, picnic areas and campgrounds provided in the 10-year program will encourage the dispersal of visitors over a wide area and [will] reduce the damaging overcrowding at Paradise and other popular centers within the park." [63] A memo on Mission 66 dated August 31, 1956, expressed even greater enthusiasm about the potential for roads to disperse the public: "This entire road system will be treated in such a way that the visitor will enjoy numerous scenic, recreational, and interpretive experiences as he drives through the park." [64]

Stevens Canyon Road

Although the completion of the Eastside Road in 1940 had finally given the park a through-road, few park visitors used the road connections with U.S. Highway 410 and U.S. 12 to make a grand loop around Mount Rainier. To fulfill the longstanding idea of an around- the-mountain auto trip it was necessary to tighten the loop. That was the main purpose of the Stevens Canyon Road. Motorists would be able to make a complete trip around the mountain leaving Seattle or Tacoma in the morning and returning the same day. A secondary purpose was to connect the two main centers of the park at Paradise and Sunrise in order to improve administrative efficiency.

Local business interests saw the completion of the Stevens Canyon Road as a potential boon. If it were possible to explore both sides of the park without having to drive out of the park, they reasoned, then Mount Rainier might attract more of the kind of destination tourists that

the park's boosters had always desired to attract. For the Rainier National Park Advisory Board's Elmun R. Fetterolf, it seemed that "the completion of this highway will do much to hold visitors within the park area." [65] The RNPC was skeptical about what the through-road would do for its hotel business, but it entertained high hopes for a lucrative around-the mountain transportation service. Martin Kilian, owner and operator of the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs concession, believed that the completion of the Stevens Canyon Road would bring substantially more business to the southeast corner of the park. [66]

Completion of the Stevens Canyon Road was the most anticipated Mission 66 project for Mount Rainier. This is opening day, September 4, 1957. *(Richard Neal photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

No one could predict with any certainty how the completion of the Stevens Canyon Road would affect visitor use. Some park planners anticipated that the Stevens Canyon Road would entice a considerable percentage of day-use visitors to enter the park from one side and exit from the other, thereby spreading use more evenly around the park. Others thought that an overnight center in the lower part of Stevens Canyon would be needed to draw people away from Paradise and Sunrise, or cautioned that the new road might attract large numbers for the first few years and then fall into disuse. [67] The Mission 66 committee optimistically predicted that completion of the Stevens Canyon Road would "revolutionize the present travel pattern within the park." [68] Skeptics predicted—most accurately as it turned out—that the vast majority of day-use visitors would continue to drive to either Paradise or Sunrise and return by the same road.

Construction of the Stevens Canyon Road had begun in 1931, with most of the right-of-way reaching completion by World War II. After an eight-year hiatus, construction of the Stevens Canyon Road resumed in 1950. Between 1950 and 1952, contractors built bridges at the Muddy Fork and Nickel Creek, viaducts below Stevens Creek, a tunnel near the Muddy Fork, and masonry retaining walls and parapets. By the summer of 1952, the road was passable to trucks and was used to a limited extent for administrative purposes. [69] Mission 66 provided the last burst of funds to bring the project to completion, 25 years after it was begun. By then, the Stevens Canyon Road was no longer the biggest item in the park's road

construction program; this honor belonged to the new winter road from Narada Falls to Paradise. But the long anticipated road had the highest public profile. The road was opened to the public in the summer of 1957.

Paradise Loop Road and Parking

Mission 66 for Mount Rainier included construction of a new road from Narada Falls to Paradise. The road began at Marmot Point and ascended the mountain by switchbacks to the relatively level ground known as Barn Flat which stretched to the south of the Paradise Lodge. The road had a dual purpose: in summer, it would form a loop with the existing road through Paradise Valley, easing weekend traffic congestion; in winter, it would provide a safer route to Paradise, obviating the need to use the avalanche-prone section of road at the lower end of Paradise Valley.

The Paradise area had always been plagued by a shortage of parking, and it was clear that the new road would not alleviate this situation by itself; additional parking space must be developed, too. Mission 66 aimed to double or triple the amount of parking. The main question was whether to put the additional parking space underground, on the surface, or in a multi-level enclosed structure. The architectural model for this last option was the new, eleven-story Downtown Center Garage in San Francisco. To build a large parking garage in a national park was a novel concept and certainly pointed up the dimension of the parking problem. Although the plans for underground or multi-level parking were eventually rejected in favor of additional parking space on the surface, it is worth reviewing the arguments for and against such a development.

The main argument in favor of underground or multi-level parking was that either one would take up less ground surface and reduce the amount of scarring of the landscape. The plan for underground parking envisioned two or three sublevel floors of parking underneath a new day-use building; it would be the least obtrusive, visually. The plan for an above-ground parking garage envisioned a concrete structure similar to the one in San Francisco, but with exterior walls made of reinforced concrete in order to brace the building against inclement weather and snowloads. Another advantage to both of these designs was the fact that they would obviate the need for snowplowing the existing parking lot or any additional parking lots. [70]

The disadvantages varied between the underground and above-ground parking garages. The main drawback of the underground parking garage was that it was thought to be prohibitively expensive—perhaps $3 million (in addition to the cost of the day-use building above it). The above-ground parking garage would be expensive, too—perhaps $2,250,000 for 1,200 parking stalls. But it had the further disadvantage that it would be unsightly and unappealing to use. The aesthetics of parking would be especially important during the summer, when visitors would have a choice of parking in the open air near the Paradise Inn or driving into a parking structure. Certainly they would prefer the former. If the government were to build a parking garage and try to recover some of the cost by charging parking fees, it would not do to have the parking garage serve as overflow parking, standing empty and not drawing any revenue most of the time. [71]

Westside and Mowich Lake Roads

Mission 66 for Mount Rainier provided the clearest statement of policy on road development for the west side in twenty years. It can be viewed as a turning point for that section of the park. The Westside and Mowich Lake roads would be improved, but they would not be extended or joined together as originally intended. The area in between the ends of these two roads would be retained in a wilderness condition. The Park Service' s emphasis on

wilderness values on the west side was not seriously contested until many years later, when road and campground closures brought protests from some user groups.

It will be recalled that the original plan was for the Westside Road to connect with the Carbon River Road, forming a leg in the eventual around-the-mountain road. Later, the steep topography around Ipsut Pass convinced NPS officials to modify the plan such that the Westside Road would exit the park near Mowich Lake. Rather than forming a leg in an around-the-mountain road, the Westside Road would create a spectacular loop drive intersecting the west side of the park. To get this started, Pierce County was encouraged to build a road to the park boundary west of Mowich Lake, and the NPS would complete the Westside Road via the North Puyallup Canyon, Sunset Park, the Mowich River, and Mowich Lake. In 1931, road crews completed clearing work on the right-of-way approximately half the distance from the North Puyallup River to Sunset Park; in 1932, the road was opened to cars as far as the North Puyallup River. At the other end of the road, meanwhile, the county had a passable road completed to the park boundary by 1933, when the new park entrance was dedicated in honor of Dr. William Tolmie's visit to the area exactly one hundred years earlier. But then people began to express doubts about the project.

Landscape Architect Ernest A. Davidson offered the most forceful criticism of the Westside Road in 1934. He wrote,

> Surely the most rabid road enthusiast will agree that highways enter a satisfactory number of spectacular canyons about Mt. Rainier when he finds that roads and highways enter Nisqually Canyon, Stevens Canyon, Cowlitz Canyon, Ohanapecosh Canyon, White River Canyon, Carbon River Canyon, Tahoma Creek Canyon, South Puyallup Canyon and North Puyallup Canyon... .This has carried highway development far enough for a small park. [72]

Others expressed similar concerns, and road development on the west side was all but suspended. On September 9, 1938, Secretary of the Interior Ickes advised that no further road construction would be authorized in Mount Rainier after the completion of the Stevens Canyon Road, and Director Cammerer had the master plan revised accordingly. [73]

Responding to public pressure after World War II, Superintendent Preston and Landscape Architect Vint proposed to complete the six miles of road from the park boundary to Mowich Lake so that Pierce County would have something to show for its investment. [74] Regional Director Tomlinson argued that this would only excite more demand—demand for completion of the Westside Road as envisioned earlier, demand for overnight accommodations at Mowich Lake, and possibly even demand for development of another ski area at Spray Park. In short, Tomlinson visualized all the difficulties of Paradise being duplicated on the northwest side of the mountain.

> The surfacing of the road will head us squarely into all the difficulties of a dead-end road which would open one of the choice areas of the park nearer to centers of population than any of the other developed areas of the park. Not only will pressure develop for overnight accommodations, but there will be increasing demand for facilities for winter use of the area. [75]

Tomlinson won his point, and the road was not opened to Mowich Lake until 1955. By then, it was evident that there would be no serious pressure for overnight accommodations or ski facilities in that area.

Mission 66 provided funds for repairs and resurfacing of the whole length of the Westside Road.

Trails

Park staff predicted in 1955 that backcountry use would increase over the next ten years but to a lesser extent than total visitation. [76] Citing the fact that the park already had 290 miles of trails, Mission 66 for Mount Rainier gave trail development low priority. The Mission 66 development plan did include two major trail projects, however.

The first trail project was to build a new trail between Paradise and Indian Bar. The trail would replace sections of the Wonderland Trail which had been obliterated by the Stevens Canyon Road. Some wanted a highline route along Stevens Ridge. The highline route was rejected, however, which left this southern segment of the Wonderland Trail within sight and sound of automobile traffic on the Stevens Canyon Road. [77]

The second trail project, called the Tatoosh Trail, was intended to connect the Pinnacle Peak Trail and the Eagle Peak Trail. Starting at the saddle of Pinnacle Peak, the trail was to traverse along the crest of the Tatoosh Range to the shoulder of Eagle Peak, providing a spectacular alternative route between Reflection Lake and Longmire. (The existing route paralleled the road except where it went up the lower Paradise River Valley, below Ricksecker Point to Narada Falls.) For reasons that remain unclear, the Tatoosh Trail was never built.

Taken together, these two projects appear to have been aimed at mitigating the effects of the Stevens Canyon Road on wilderness use. The Mountaineers had expressed concerns about the completion of that road. Had the two trails been built, they would have given Wonderland Trail hikers a spectacular highline route all the way from Longmire to Summerland, with only the single road crossing at Reflection Lakes. Instead, with neither a trail along the crest of the Tatoosh Range nor a trail over Stevens Ridge, hikers of the Wonderland Trail had no alternative but to take the old Caner Falls Trail from Longmire to Reflection Lakes and the new Stevens Canyon Trail from Reflection Lakes to Box Canyon. From the standpoint of the around-the-mountain hiker, the south side segment of the Wonderland Trail left much to be desired compared to the west, north, and east sides after the opening of the Stevens Canyon Road.

CAMPGROUNDS AND PICNIC AREAS

Mission 66 for Mount Rainier included plans to develop 1,200 new camping and picnic sites, or nearly four times what the park already had. The goal was to be able to accommodate 3,500 additional visitors per day by 1966. Two key components of the plan were to separate day use and overnight use areas, and to locate the latter almost entirely at low elevations. As in the case of road development, NPS planners expressed optimism that new campgrounds and picnic areas could disperse use more widely through the park. These developments would "enable the Park to absorb two or three times its present travel, satisfy more fully the needs of all visitors, and do so without further encroachment upon or impairment of the primary scenic areas." [78]

In 1956, the park had eight campgrounds and nine picnic areas, some of them quite small and primitive. There were three campgrounds at high elevations (one at Paradise and two at Yakima Park), and five at low elevations (Longmire, Ohanapecosh, White River, Ipsut Creek, and Tahoma Creek). The Mission 66 development plan proposed to expand the five campgrounds at low elevation, while keeping the campgrounds at Paradise and Yakima Park small with a view to eliminating them altogether eventually. It also proposed new campgrounds and picnic areas at Sunshine Point, Mowich Lake, and Klickitat Creek, and new picnic areas at Stevens Creek, Box Canyon, Cayuse Pass, and Tipsoo Lake. [79]

This scheme was modified somewhat in the course of the ten-year program. A new campground and picnic area were laid out at Paradise in the meadow known as Barn Flat, and the old campground was abandoned. The old CCC-built campground and picnic area at Sunrise (near Shadow Lake) was rehabilitated and the smaller campground beside the visitor center was converted to a picnic area. At Ohanapecosh, a steel bridge was built across the Ohanapecosh River and several new loops were added to the campground. Additional loops were added to the south and east sides of the Longmire campground, and the Ipsut Creek and White River campgrounds were enlarged as planned. Small campgrounds were established at Mowich Lake and Sunshine Point. Plans for the campground and picnic area at Klickitat Creek were abandoned, and instead a large campground and picnic area was built at Cougar Rock, two miles up the road from Longmire. [80]

Campground and picnic area at Sunrise, July 1960. Mission 66 called for the development of 1,200 new camping and picnicking sites mostly at lower elevations in order to disperse visitor use and alleviate crowded conditions such as seen here. *(J. Boucher photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

MUSEUMS AND WAYSIDES

The Mission 66 development plan sought to integrate all areas of park development into a unified whole. As part of that plan, the Mission 66 committee crafted an interpretive program for the park that would serve the day visitor better and would assist with the overall goal of spreading use more evenly throughout the park. The interpretive program had two main elements: a decentralized museum plan that divided the park story between four museums at Longmire, Paradise, Sunrise, and Ohanapecosh; and an emphasis on wayside exhibits that facilitated self-guided automobile tours of the park. Mission 66 was a turning point in the evolution of Mount Rainier's interpretive program both in terms of design and funding.

Like other elements of the Mission 66 development plan, the interpretive program sought to

take into account changes in the visitor use pattern since World War II. Statistics compiled on the number of visitor "contacts" made by the interpretive program from 1940 to 1956 demonstrated the declining effectiveness of the interpretive program in the face of this changing pattern of visitor use:

Visitor Contacts by Interpretive Program, 1940-1956

Travel Year	Total Visitors	Percent of Visitors Contacted by Interpretive Program
1940	456,637	70.6
1941	476,776	59.4
1942	343,575	56.1
1943	124,474	73.2
1944	135,277	50.4
1945	304,227	69.1
1946	470,903	65.2
1947	519,698	58.8
1948	570,053	69.4
1949	584,004	42.9
1950	573,685	72.1
1951	873,877	38.2
1952	877,388	46.7
1953	768,015	60.0
1954	794,955	61.2
1955	839,214	48.7
1956	850,747	45.3

Not only was total visitation rising in proportion to the number of naturalists on the park staff, but the number of local visitors was increasing in proportion to the number of out-of state visitors. It was the out-of-state visitors who were most likely to stay overnight in the park, attend interpretive programs, and visit the park museums. Local visitors were most inclined to come only for the day and make their own way around the park. Local visitors might take advantage of wayside exhibits or, at most, stop at a museum. Wayside exhibits and museums seemed to be the best means of serving this group.

Another important feature of the Mission 66 development program was the "visitor center." The idea of placing visitor information, park interpretive exhibits, and day-use facilities together in one building and encouraging park visitors to make the visitor center their first stop in the park was a significant innovation. The visitor center was an effective tool for managing visitor circulation and use, and other federal and state agencies and even private enterprises soon adopted it. [81] By the end of the Mission 66 era, Mount Rainier had two new visitor centers at Ohanapecosh and Paradise.

Museum Development

Mission 66 for Mount Rainier called for the development of three main visitor centers at Paradise, Sunrise, and Longmire, and three smaller establishments at Ohanapecosh, Crystal Creek, and on the south bank of the Nisqually River by Skate Creek Road. Of the six, only the first four would have museums. The latter two sites, located outside the park boundary, were later dropped from the plan. [82]

Anticipating that the typical day use visitor would have a very limited amount of time to peruse the museum exhibits, the plan called for a select number of exhibits in each museum that would focus on one aspect of the Mount Rainier story. At Paradise, the museum exhibits would emphasize the glacier story of Mount Rainier. The visitor center at Sunrise would present the story of volcanism at Mount Rainier. The Ohanapecosh visitor center would give the story of the lowland forests. At Longmire, the museum exhibits would emphasize the national park idea and local history. [83]

The origins of this plan could be traced back to Park Naturalist Brockman's museum prospectus of 1939, which was never fully implemented due to lack of funds. Park Naturalist Stagner updated the prospectus in 1947. The only significant change in museum design from that prospectus to the Mission 66 development plan was to reverse the subject matter of the museums at Paradise and Sunrise, presenting the glacier story at Paradise and the volcanic story at Sunrise. Stagner' s presence on the Mission 66 committee gave the Mount Rainier interpretive program a strong measure of continuity from the Brockman era to the Mission 66 era.

Mission 66 was imprecise about the facilities that would house these museums. The Sunrise museum was moved from the first floor of the south blockhouse to the camper's shelter in the late 1940s or early 1950s after the latter building was enclosed, and this became the Sunrise visitor center. At Ohanapecosh a new visitor center was completed in 1964. [84] But the visitor centers at Longmire and Paradise were more problematical. The initial press release on Mission 66 for Mount Rainier stated that the administration building at Longmire would be expanded into a visitor center. A subsequent press release on April 27, 1956 indicated that a new visitor center building would be constructed at Longmire, located such that it would face the mountain. As discussion of the administration building continued, however, Superintendent Macy and Assistant Superintendent Curtis K. Skinner argued strenuously against remodeling and expanding this old building to serve as the visitor center. Not only was the building situated without a view of the mountain, but the boulder facade on the walls would make it very difficult and costly to expand. [85] Eventually it was decided to forego construction of a new visitor center and an extensive remodel of the administration building. Instead, the existing museum building was moved across the plaza so that it would be near the administration building, and visitor services were divided between it and the front room of the administration building.

The visitor center at Paradise was the most controversial. Originally, the museum was to be housed in the Paradise Lodge, which would undergo extensive remodeling to serve as an all-season day-use building or visitor center. The Park Service's plans for Paradise became so embroiled in politics, however, that this plan was dropped in favor of the development of a large, new visitor center (described above).

Wayside Exhibits

Wayside exhibits fitted neatly with the intent of Mission 66 to disperse visitor use around the park. According to the Mission 66 development plan:

> The road system will be given full interpretive treatment, with integrated roadside exhibits, informational signs, and markers. The idea behind this is to use the natural scene, interpreted by roadside exhibits and markers, to reveal a progressive story of the Mountain, its features, and their origin. This method of interpretation is well adapted to the characteristic day use pattern and to the mobility of visitors to this Park. The trip around the Mountain will become a continuous experience in seeing, understanding, and appreciating the natural scene. This development, too, will play its part in dispersing use, taking some of

> the load from Paradise and Sunrise, holding the visitor for a longer period along the road and in roadside developments, and making more of the Park interesting, appealing, and meaningful. [86]

Park officials originally viewed wayside exhibits as a stopgap measure with which to compensate for inadequate museum facilities and naturalist staffing. In the late 1940s, wayside exhibits were established at Tipsoo Lake and in the Kautz Creek flood area. Park officials were surprised by the immense popularity of these two exhibits, and began to consider that the "outdoor museum" idea might be the most effective means of communicating interpretive material to the public. [87] As Stagner observed in his museum prospectus of 1947,

> The effectiveness of such devices in implanting an idea is enhanced by the fact that its exhibit material is the real object—not a photo or a model—but the natural feature itself; and by the fact that one idea only is presented in a single exhibit. Attention of the spectator is concentrated on only one object and that object is the real thing. A wayside exhibit is a supplement or an aid to a natural exhibit in place. [88]

Information booth near Box Canyon of the Cowlitz. A central goal of Mission 66 was to facilitate self-guided driving tours with wayside exhibits and information stations such as this. The interpretive program was redirected toward the day visitor. *(Tyers photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

Stagner proposed nine new wayside exhibits, which he considered to be only a modest start "considering the travel and recreational habits of the average visitor." These were (1) Nisqually forest exhibit, (2) Puyallup Canyon exhibit, (3) Longmire homestead cabin rehabilitation, (4) Nisqually Trail trailside exhibit, (5) Canyon Rim exhibit, (6) Reflection Lakes exhibit, (7) Box Canyon exhibit, (8) Tipsoo Lake exhibit, and (9) Carbon River forest exhibit. In addition, he proposed to establish "viewfinders" at Ricksecker Point and Sunrise Point, and "text signs" at Christine Falls, Narada Falls, Glacier Bridge, Ohanapecosh Hot Springs, White River Bridge, and beside the andesite columns on the road to Sunrise. [89] A decade later, most of these had been completed and the master plan called for a dozen more.

[90]

The Park Service's enthusiasm for wayside exhibits may have reached a peak in the mid-1950s as the Stevens Canyon Road neared completion. This section of road was supposed to draw people away from Paradise and Sunrise, so it was not surprising that wayside exhibits should figure prominently along its length. At the lower end of the Stevens Canyon, the road crosses the Box Canyon of the Cowlitz. NPS officials planned to have a short trail to this remarkable natural feature, together with a picnic area, restrooms, and information station. Detailed plans were under way as early as 1954. By 1959, two years after the road opened, it was reported that Box Canyon was receiving a good deal of use, presumably taking pressure off other areas in the park. [91]

Mission 66 did not abandon the more traditional elements of the interpretive program—the guided walks and evening lectures—but it tried to maximize visitor contacts by putting ranger-naturalists where the day use visitors could be found. Thus, on summer weekends ranger-naturalists were posted at popular scenic overlooks and waysides like Ricksecker Point and Box Canyon in order to provide information to the steady stream of visitors who pulled off the road for a few minutes. A study made in July and August 1958 revealed that nearly half the motorists on the Stevens Canyon Road stopped at Box Canyon, typically for twenty to twenty-five minutes, and that this was one of the "finest contact areas in the park," with nearly one-fourth of the questions asked by visitors relating to natural history. [92]

As the park administration assigned more interpreters to wayside duty in order to reach the day-use visitors, campfire programs were limited to the larger campgrounds, and guided walks were offered only intermittently. Several self-guided nature walks were developed. The park's original self-guided nature walk, Trail of the Shadows, was improved with numbered sites along the trail matching numbered paragraphs in a leaflet the visitor could pick up free of charge at the trailhead.

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XVII. NATURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION MARGINALIZED

INTRODUCTION

Natural resource issues received short shrift during the contentious years of Mount Rainier National Park administration following World War II. With so much energy devoted to winter use, concessions, planning, and construction under Mission 66, park administrators had relatively little time left for natural resource protection. NPS scientists and natural resource specialists in the regional and Washington, D.C. offices were similarly stretched. Indeed, senior NPS scientists were placed under the Division of Interpretation and given relatively trivial assignments. The downplaying of natural resource protection in Mount Rainier National Park followed a trend throughout the national park system during the period 1945-1960, as resource management problems were accorded low priority until they became too large or politically sensitive to be left alone. [1]

FORESTRY

The number one concern of forestry in Mount Rainier National Park continued to be forest fire control. It was a primary function of the Protection Division and unlike all other natural resource concerns, it received high priority from the park administration overall. The number two concern of forestry, control of tree diseases, was more problematic and involved consultation with experts from the Forest Service and the Bureau of Entomology. A third and relatively minor forestry concern of the park staff, but one that was potentially controversial, was salvage logging.

Forest Fire Control

The Park Service continued to follow an aggressive policy of fire suppression throughout the Mission 66 era. Under this policy, all unplanned fires in natural areas in Mount Rainier National Park were suppressed. Fire suppression took precedence over all other park activities except for the protection of human life. The objectives of forest fire control were to detect and suppress forest fires as quickly as possible and to confine them to as small an area as possible. [2] As a result, the park did not experience any catastrophic fires throughout this period; the largest fire in the park's history remained the Sunset Park fire of 1930. [3]

The chief park ranger headed the Protection Division and thus the fire control program. At the next level in the organization, the district rangers were responsible for fire suppression in their districts. During the fire season from June through September, each district ranger had the assistance of a number of seasonal rangers who could be assigned to fire patrol during

times of high to extreme fire danger, and one or two fire control aids who were permanently assigned to lookout stations. It was the district ranger's responsibility to ensure that the seasonal rangers and fire control aids received adequate training and that the handful of fire tool caches in his district were ready for use. Training of seasonal employees normally consisted of a three-day "Orientation and Indoctrination School" held in June and an additional half-day of training devoted specifically to fire fighting. District rangers and selected seasonal rangers received special training in equipment operation. First aid training was offered to those interested. [4]

Mount Rainier National Park was divided into six ranger districts in the 1940s as it had been since the 1920s: White River, Ohanapecosh, Paradise, Nisqually, Carbon River, and Longmire. In 1950, the number of districts was reduced to five with Longmire and Paradise being combined. By 1969, the number was reduced to three, with Nisqually, Carbon River, and Longmire being combined to form the Western District. Lookout stations remained key to the system of forest fire detection through the end of the Mission 66 era. All were equipped with Osborne fire finders. Five lookouts were in use throughout the 1950s and 1960s at Gobblers Knob, Sunset Park, Tolmie Peak, Mount Fremont, and Shiner Peak. [5]

The park's communication system always had an important influence on the park's forest fire control program. After World War II, Superintendent Preston advocated further improvement of radio communications, including the replacement of various telephone connections by radio. When the severe winter of 1948-49 caused extensive damage to the park's telephone lines, it was found that the cost of fully equipping the park with radio would be less expensive than rehabilitating the radio-telephone system, to say nothing of the reduced maintenance costs and improved service that radio would bring. Consequently, the radio telephone network was maintained only in conjunction with local and long distance telephone systems outside the park, and many telephone lines in the park were removed. Use of radio in turn increased the efficiency of the forest fire control program. [6]

The park administration strengthened its program of forest fire suppression by educating the public, too. Bulletin boards at campgrounds and visitor centers displayed educational posters on fire prevention. Trailhead notices announced, "No Smoking While Traveling." Rangers manning the entrance stations informed visitors when there was high fire danger. Backcountry users who wished to build campfires in the backcountry had to obtain fire permits. [7]

In 1949, the NPS entered into a new cooperative fire control agreement with the U.S. Forest Service in Washington State. The cooperative agreement essentially pooled the available manpower of the two agencies, with the stipulation that the costs of suppressing a given fire were born by the agency on whose land the fire had occurred. In the event of a single fire burning on both sides of a boundary, each agency was responsible for suppressing the fire in its own area, and costs of suppression were prorated against each agency according to the amount of acreage burned on each side. [8] The NPS also made a local cooperative agreement with the Washington State Department of Natural Resources covering fire suppression activities in a "common protective zone" that ran along the north and west boundaries of Mount Rainier National Park. [9]

Tree Disease

The NPS continued to take a close interest in forest infestations after World War II, particularly the white pine blister rust disease. It will be recalled that white pine blister rust control was one of the labor-intensive activities undertaken by the CCC during the 1930s, and consisted of systematically eradicating ribes bushes (the alternate host plant in the life cycle of the disease-causing organism) from around each stand of white pine. Fortunately,

this task was already well-advanced when the CCC was terminated in 1942, so that the park administration was able to bring the job to completion with smaller crews after the war. In 1948, the whole park was placed on a maintenance basis—that is, areas were reworked from time to time but no new areas were added to the program. In 1956, experts judged that the blister rust had been successfully controlled and no more trees had been infected since 1948; therefore, even the maintenance program could be discontinued.

The program owed its success to a combination of factors. First, it was limited in extent to a few conspicuous stands of white pine along the White and Cowlitz rivers and in the Longmire area. Second, the Park Service was aided initially by the use of CCC labor, and subsequently by the use of a labor-saving herbicide, 2-4-5-T. Although the NPS was generally reluctant to approve the use of poisons, it followed the Forest Service's lead in adopting this one. The herbicide could be sprayed from a cannister worn on the back, and it proved quite effective against ribes. Park officials even used this chemical with effect on an exotic thistle which they found in the southwest corner of the park. [10] Third, the ultimate aim of blister rust control in the national park was not to sustain a crop of white pine (as it was in the national forests), but to accomplish a sort of holding action while the process of ecological succession followed its natural course. The white pine in the park mostly occurred in nearly pure stands in the wake of fire. These stands were in the process of replacement by shade-tolerant fir and hemlock. Eventually the forest composition would change regardless of the blister rust disease. As one expert explained, "The problem is to maintain the pine cover until the time when its death will not seriously affect scenic values." The objective of a sound program of disease control was "to prevent this change from occurring all at once and at an inopportune time." [11]

In the 1950s, the picture was complicated somewhat as the white pine came under assault from another forest pest, the mountain pine beetle. The NPS had been controlling the mountain pine beetle, Dendroctonus monticolae, in Mount Rainier National Park since 1930 by cutting, peeling, and burning infested trees. But in the 1950s this work was abandoned. Unlike blister rust, the mountain pine beetle infestation was indigenous to the region and usually struck white pine when it reached an age of about one hundred years. While blister rust control could be justified in the national park setting on the grounds that it was an exotic tree disease, at some point disease control crossed the line from preserving to disturbing natural conditions. The decisive factor in discontinuing the program of blister rust control in 1956, therefore, was the recognition that saving the white pine would require a heavy investment in beetle control as well as blister rust control, and that the work would perhaps cross that fuzzy line between what was natural and what was unnatural. [12]

Salvage Logging

Superintendent Macy oversaw a number of contracts for salvage logging in Mount Rainier National Park during the 1950s. These involved trees which were either wind thrown, diseased, hazardous, or in the way of new construction. Some trees were scaled and sold by the board foot; others were utilized in the park by the NPS or the concessioners. The quantity was not large, but the practice of selling national park timber was potentially controversial. At the same time that Macy was approving these operations, the National Parks Association (NPA), the Wilderness Society, and other conservation organizations were criticizing Macy's friend and colleague, Superintendent Fred Overly, for similar practices in Olympic National Park.

Conservationists objected to salvage logging on two grounds: (1) allowance of even small timber sales gave all park timber a market value and could lead to abuse; "The resources of the national parks should not be regarded as sources of potential revenues," according to a statement by the NPA; and (2) removal of dead or damaged trees constituted an intrusion

upon the natural scene; "Every alteration of the natural landscape, however slight, by such activities as logging.., is a direct violation of a fundamental principle of national park management," in the NPA's words. [13] The debate was given full exposition, including a thoughtful response by Overly, in successive issues of National Parks Magazine during 1957.

Macy's small timber sales in Mount Rainier did not attract attention like Overly's did, but the same objections might have been raised with regard to them. On the grounds that park timber should not be given a market value, it might have been observed that one C.A. Miller of Tacoma conducted logging operations in the park in three successive years under two separate contracts—the first for clearing merchantable timber along a new section of powerline between Nisqually Entrance and Longmire, the second for removing hazardous trees along the Westside Road. Altogether, Miller removed more than 300,000 board feet of green Douglas fir, hemlock, and red cedar from the park between 1956 and 1958. Other merchantable timber was logged by construction companies under contract to clear the new road to Paradise, the Box Canyon picnic area, and the Ohanapecosh residential area. These operations, too, amounted to more than 300,000 board feet altogether. The timber salvage constituted several thousand dollars of revenue—either paid directly into the U.S. Treasury or deducted from the amount that the government owed to the construction contractor. [14]

Meanwhile, on the grounds that even salvage logging could potentially affect natural values adversely, conservationists might have objected that some of Macy's timber sales involved wind throws, trees toppled by avalanche, and in one instance, "351 snags and culls." It would be hard to defend the removal of such trees against the NPA's charge that fallen trees were a natural part of the forest, except to point out that the forest edge along a roadway was unnaturally vulnerable to windstorms, and further, that an unnatural number of decaying wind throws would weaken the forest edge even more. But this would still not explain the "351 snags and culls," which suggests a kind of salvage logging that was oddly reminiscent of the logging done in the park around 1910. [15]

Not all of the salvaged timber went to market. Park operations consumed a substantial portion of what was logged in the park. In one year, park trail crews utilized 86,143 board feet of fir, Alaska cedar, and western red cedar in repairs of bridges and shelter cabins and construction of railings at Box Canyon. All of this wood came from wind throws. The Park Service, the RNPC, and the Ohanapecosh Hot Springs Company consumed as much as 68 cords of wood each year for heating fuel. [16] Campgrounds consumed even more. Although campers stopped short of cutting down trees, their gathering of downed branches and logs for firewood threatened to strip the forest floor around the campgrounds.

The Park Service did not have funds with which to provide free campfire wood in the campgrounds. In 1955, the park administration installed a number of Presto-Log vending machines in the campgrounds and at the lodge and service station in Longmire in an effort to reduce down wood consumption. District Ranger Robert W. Rogers provided some interesting comments on the public's initial response to this novel measure:

> The picnickers and campers soon got into the swing of things and those who preferred not to use Presto-Logs, or couldn't afford to, began bringing in brush from around the campground. Then they started using their cars, driving up and down the road returning with their trunks full of wood. This could be seen practically any weekend during the latter part of the summer. The people seemed to get a lot of enjoyment out of rustling their own wood. Even when the immediate campground is cleaned there will be no shortage of "free" wood in the Ohanapecosh area as long as they use their cars as they did this year. All this isn't helping the sale of Presto-Logs though. [17]

The experiment with Presto Logs failed. For many years no solution was offered other than to close campground loops on a rotating basis before the forest floor in each loop was picked completely clean. Beginning in 1976, the Park Service issued a permit to a private vender who brought campfire wood into the park for sale. [18]

FISH

At the beginning of the postwar era the goal of Park Service fishery policy remained about the same as it had always been: to provide sport fishing opportunities to the public. The protective or non-consumptive philosophy on which NPS wildlife policy was built did not extend to fish. The only difference between sport fisheries in national parks and sport fisheries on other public lands was the emphasis on "quality fishing rather than quantity." [19] As Superintendent Preston expressed it,

> There is no greater sport than taking half a dozen pan-sized trout in an afternoon from a fast-running mountain stream. I might add that the pleasure is enhanced if that stream happens to run through a virgin forest, in contrast to a stream meandering through a section of cut-over land. In a national park, besides the pleasure of fishing, one gets the thrill of a day outdoors in conditions not altered by man. [20]

Mount Rainier National Park's fishing regulations were drawn for the amateur rather than the serious sport fisherman; they emphasized access over conservation. The park did not require a fishing license, nor did it impose strict limits on a day's catch. The only concession to serious sports fishermen was the closure of the Ohanapecosh River, after 1945, to everything but fly fishing. More in keeping with the spirit of national park fishery policy was Preston's suggestion to close one of the other creeks in the park to all fishing except by boys and girls twelve years old and under. [21]

Park Service officials had long recognized that NPS fishery policy was at variance with wildlife policy, which prohibited all taking of wildlife in national parks. The Park Service's first formal policy statement on fisheries, issued in 1936, aimed to limit the effects of sport fishing and stocking programs on natural fish populations. The new policy prohibited stocking of lakes and streams by other federal and state agencies without NPS authorization. It also protected waters that did not already contain non-native fish. By that time, however, so many park waters were already stocked with non-native and hatchery fish that the policy actually allowed for a generous amount of stocking to continue. [22]

The next important development in NPS fishery policy came in 1953, with Director Wirth's announcement that stocking of exotic fish would be discontinued wherever there was potential for restoring native fish populations. This policy, too, included a large caveat. "In waters where exotic species of fish are established and valuable for angling, planting of the exotic species may be continued temporarily with the approval of the Director, National Park Service... .When exotic species have become so firmly established that their replacement is impractical the fishery will be managed in a way similar to that for the native species of other areas." [23] The policy allowed for local deviation depending on social and natural conditions. At the urging of Superintendent Macy, Wirth soon made an exception for Mount Rainier National Park.

The park staff at Mount Rainier wholeheartedly supported the continued stocking of mountain lakes and streams where exotic species of fish were already established. Twenty-five of Mount Rainier National Park's fifty-one named lakes, originally barren of fish as far as anyone knew, had already been stocked. Macy argued that fishing pressure would soon

result in the extirpation of fish populations from all park waters, including the native cutthroat trout from the park's streams, if stocking were discontinued. His main point, however, was that to implement the new policy would be impolitic. Local sport fishermen would protest the decision at a time when the Park Service was already dealing with controversies involving the boundaries of Olympic National Park and winter use at Mount Rainier. "Why give park opponents another string to their bow, additional ammunition for their sniping at park policies?" Macy wrote. Due to the tradition of sport fishing at Mount Rainier and the extent to which the fishery was already altered, stocking of park waters was permitted to continue through 1972.

The stocking program was accomplished on a very low budget with assistance from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). It is not well-documented. Describing the program's accomplishments in 1951, apparently a representative year, Macy stated that the FWS and NPS personnel cooperated in stocking twenty lakes and thirteen streams with rainbow and cutthroat trout. The following year, 161,916 Montana black-spotted cutthroat trout fry were planted in park waters. The eggs were taken at Yellowstone Lake and hatched in the Washington State Game Commission's hatchery near Puyallup. Another source for fingerlings was the federal fish hatchery at Quilcene, Washington. [24]

The usual method was to plant the fish fry in one spot in lakes and at multiple points along streams. Prior to the Mission 66 era, most fish fry were transported to park waters by truck but nearly as much stocking was accomplished by pack horse and backpacking methods. During the Mission 66 era, many of the park's backcountry lakes were stocked from the air. From 1954 through 1959, the park administration arranged through the FWS for assistance from the Washington Department of Game in making aerial fish plants. Beginning in 1960, the NPS took over this program itself, contracting with a private individual to fly the aircraft. (The technique was to prepackage the fingerlings in five-gallon plastic bags, from which they could be poured, one bag full at a time, down a plywood chute mounted over a camera port in the bottom of the plane.) Rainbow and cutthroat fingerlings were planted from the air in Mystic, Chenuis, Green, Green Park, Bench, Marsh, Snow, and Three Lakes in 1960, and in Adelaide, Eleanor, George, Hidden, James, Marjorie, Oliver, and Palisades Lakes in 1961. A five-year stocking program for 1957-1961 was followed by a new five-year fishery management or stocking program for 1962-1966. [25] Finally, a ten-year stocking program for 1966 to 1975 was developed by the wildlife biologist at Mount Rainier and approved by the director, but the program was abandoned after 1971. [26]

Fishery research lagged behind the stocking program. Indeed, the first field survey of the park fishery, conducted by Assistant Park Naturalist Merlin K. Potts in the summer of 1947, was tied to the stocking program rather than the need to understand natural conditions. Potts's objective was to assess environmental conditions in the lakes and streams that were already stocked with trout, to determine how the conditions affected fish life in those waters, and to devise an effective restocking program. The goal of fish management was to "maintain a sufficient fish population to permit reasonably good recreational fishing." [27]

NPS Biologist Lowell Sumner surveyed the fish and wildlife resources of Mount Rainier National Park in the summer of 1949. Even though most of Sumner's report was concerned with preservation of habitat, his discussion of fish related almost entirely to the quality of fishing. In fact, Sumner's instructions were to limit his aquatic survey to fishing waters. Sumner's study of the fishery was preliminary and he concluded by recommending that the NPS either secure research assistance from the FWS or hire an aquatic biologist of its own. "We still don't know enough about the park waters to place fish stocking on a sound practical basis," he wrote. "Until we get this knowledge, the entire program will continue to operate by guess and by gosh." [28]

Lake George, Mount Rainier National Park's second largest lake, was a case in point. For several years anglers had found the fishing at Lake George to be very poor; the lake had been overrun by bullheads (catfish), which presumably had been brought in as live bait by some fisherman and then released. Park staff recommended using derris root to poison the bullheads, then restocking the lake with trout. This procedure was commonly employed in national parks to eliminate exotic fishes and "restore natural conditions." Regional Director Herbert Maier supported the plan, and Director Drury approved it. [29] But FWS and NPS personnel subsequently found that the lake was too large and deep for the poisoning to succeed; instead, they planted 9,280 rainbow fingerlings of extra large size in the hope that the rainbow fingerlings would escape the bullheads and in turn grow and prey on the bullheads. [30]

The NPS and the FWS cooperated on a fishery management study for Mount Rainier National Park in 1958. NPS Biologist O.L. Wallis and FWS Biologist William M. Morton made a joint study of Mount Rainier's fishery in July and submitted three reports. They suggested that the park fishery had been so altered by humankind—both by the stocking of fish and by the damming of rivers outside the boundaries of the park—that it would be difficult or impossible to restore natural conditions. They concluded that the significance of Mount Rainier's fishery was mainly recreational, and that few if any of Mount Rainier's lakes were large enough to sustain populations of trout without continual restocking. But Wallis and Morton emphasized that good recreational fishing was fairly incidental to the purposes of the park. This was essentially the same thing Sumner had concluded ten years earlier. [31] Biological investigation of the park's fishery remained at this basic level through the end of the Mission 66 era. It was not until 1966-1967 that a research team from the University of Washington undertook the park's first limnological study at Mowich Lake.

WILDLIFE

Wildlife management concerns in Mount Rainier National Park tended to cluster around the various large species of mammals found in the park: black bear, cougar, deer, elk, mountain goat. These were the animals that park visitors most wanted to see, and some problems arose directly out of the interactions between park visitors and wildlife. Other wildlife management issues related to protection of habitat inside the park and loss of winter range outside the park.

Bear Management

Although bears were never associated with Mount Rainier the way they were with Yellowstone or Glacier, bear encounters were once a common enough event in the park so as to constitute a popular attraction. In the 1920s and 1930s, the park administration regularly fed the bears garbage at a designated bear pit so that park visitors could be assured a close view of this interesting animal. [32] Bears learned to forage for garbage and beg for handouts in other areas, too; they begged for food along park roads, raided the garbage cans in park campgrounds, and frequented CCC camps.

By the mid-1930s, some NPS officials were conceding that park bear populations such as the one in Mount Rainier had been mismanaged and that these problems were partly of their own making. Superintendent Tomlinson described the necessary measures for "renaturalizing the bear population." These included the development of bear-proof garbage cans, use of food caches in campgrounds, and posting of "strongly-worded signs" to warn visitors that feeding bears was no longer tolerated. [33] In 1938, the NPS promulgated a system-wide regulation against "feeding, touching, teasing, or molesting of bears." [34] This was the beginning of a new approach toward bear management. Now the main goal of bear management was not to

put the animals on display, but to restore a healthy distance between bears and people. For the most part, management strategies during the next two decades focused on keeping bears in the backcountry, where people were still very scarce.

Park officials took four broad courses of action. First, they sought to manage food storage and garbage in such ways as to discourage bears from coming into developed areas to forage. Food storage lockers and garbage containers were made bear-proof, and garbage was collected at the end of each day so that the cans would not be a target for night raids. Superintendent Preston considered frequent garbage collection the most important part of the whole program of bear management; certainly it took up the largest amount of staff time of any bear management activity. [35]

Second, NPS officials sought to educate the public about the problem in order to change visitor behavior toward bears. In 1951, the NPS announced that it would step up enforcement of the no feeding rule; violators would no longer receive a warning but would face a stiff fine for the first offense. [36] In 1953, the NPS began distributing bear warning notices as visitors entered the park; these leaflets emphasized that "bears are wild animals." [37] Park naturalists were enlisted in the campaign to change visitor behavior. The NPS director commented that naturalists could be "a potent force in the public relations program. The bear problem should be a regular feature of interpretation in the areas affected." [38]

Third, park officials tried various kinds of "aversive conditioning," which might change bear behavior by making the bear's foray into a developed area a bad experience. Superintendent Preston reported that the park had experimented with some bear repellants but without success. [39] The park administration had more success with electric wire fences. Electric fences were placed around campgrounds and cabin developments and around the Paradise Inn, where Superintendent Macy reported that "bears were breaking into the kitchen and storerooms nightly until an electric fence was set up." [40] Macy described the park's success with electric fences in 1951:

> We believe one reason it is effective against bear is because of the good ground contact made by the bear's big, flat feet, as compared to the relatively smaller hooves of hoofed animals. Damp ground naturally makes a better ground than dry. It has been recommended that grounded wire netting be laid over very dry or rocky soil in front of the fence to provide a better ground, but we have not found this necessary. Another possible explanation of its effectiveness against bears is the bear's habit of sniffing the wire before trying to go through it. The resultant shock to the bear's sensitive nose seems to be quite effective. [41]

Another tactic was to chase marauding bears out of campgrounds with a fearsome display of ranger vehicle aggression, using headlights, horn, siren, and whatever else came to hand, in the hope that the bear would not want to encounter another ranger vehicle again.

The fourth and final method for separating bears and people was to trap and relocate the ursine repeat offenders. Problem bears were lured into wheel-mounted bear traps, towed to remote locations, and then released. One favored drop-off site was Klapatche Point on the Westside Road where, with any luck, the bear became the problem of the Gifford Pinchot National Forest. Unfortunately, relocating problem bears was time-consuming, expensive, and hazardous, and did not always succeed in deterring the bear from returning to the original area or seeking out food in another developed area. Normally, problem bears were destroyed after two unsuccessful attempts at relocation. [42]

The popular image of bears as cute, clowning, oafish animals proved very difficult to overcome. Park visitors fed bears out of their hand and generally acted as though they did

not believe that bears were dangerous animals. As a matter of fact, no park visitors actually reported an injury from a bear encounter in Mount Rainier National Park before 1961. But this was deceiving; bears bore the burden for this remarkable safety record as park officials resorted to destroying occasional "nuisance bears." [43] Whether the process of "renaturalizing" the bears resulted in an overall winnowing of bear numbers in Mount Rainier National Park cannot be said. Recent estimates of the black bear population place it at 100 compared to an estimated 175-200 in 1930. [44]

Cougars and other Predators

The first reliable attempt to census the wildlife in Mount Rainier National Park placed the number of cougars at from 5 to 8 in 1930. Bobcats were thought to number from 10 to 30, coyotes from 75 to 140. There were an estimated 4 wolverines, and no wolves. [45] It was in the following year, 1931, that Director Albright firmly established the policy of protecting all wildlife in national parks, including predators. Annual inventories of the park's large animals by the ranger staff after that date suggested that the number of predators did not fluctuate markedly but remained lower than what they had been in the nineteenth century. [46]

Outside the NPS, however, old attitudes toward predators persisted. In 1947, the House of Representatives in the Washington State Legislature passed House Joint Memorial No.2, which petitioned the federal government to respond to an alleged overabundance of predators in Mount Rainier and Olympic national parks. According to the memorial, predators were breeding at a rapid rate in the national parks, where they enjoyed protection from hunters under federal regulation. Numbers of these predators were spilling out of the parks into adjacent areas, where they were destroying livestock and killing off big game and game birds. The memorial proposed that the federal government either control the predator populations with professional hunters, or else bring down their numbers by opening portions of the two national parks to sport hunting. [47]

At the request of President Truman and the Secretary of the Interior, Regional Director Tomlinson refuted the allegations in the House Joint Memorial item by item. His letter to the director stated in part:

> The statement that the predatory animals in the national parks of Washington kill many large game animals, as well as grouse and partridge, appears to be based on theory rather than on actual observations. We feel that such theories have been outmoded by the practical investigations of biologists in the parks and elsewhere. For example, the facts show that in recent years the elk of Olympic National Park have died in considerable numbers primarily from the activities of hunters when the animals crossed the park boundaries, and from local food shortages during certain severe winters, but only infrequently from predators. The principal predator on elk under natural conditions was the wolf, which has been exterminated. The cougar is not present in sufficient numbers to exert an appreciable effect upon elk.
>
> As far as Mount Rainier is concerned, so much of the total area is alpine land of comparatively low biological productiveness that neither game nor predators have sufficient natural habitat to exist in large numbers. [48]

Tomlinson's statement put Mount Rainier's handful of cougars and other predators out of immediate danger of extermination.

The allegation that predatory animals were increasing in Mount Rainier and Olympic National Parks was so groundless and the demand for predator control was so contrary to

park values that the memorial had no immediate effect other than to elicit a strongly-worded response from the Park Service and, one year later, a biological investigation of Mount Rainier National Park by NPS Biologist Lowell Sumner. However, insofar as the memorial registered local displeasure with NPS wildlife policy, it had wider repercussions. It influenced the decision to delay implementing the new NPS fishery policy in Mount Rainier National Park (see above), and it probably squelched further consideration of a southward extension of the park boundary to protect winter range for deer.

The Tatoosh Addition, as noted in Chapter XII, was first proposed in Fauna of the National Parks, by Wright, Dixon, and Thompson, in 1932. The authors suggested that Mount Rainier National Park could be made more of a whole biological unit, with both winter and summer range, by extending the south boundary "to include the Cowlitz River valley as far as Lewis; then swinging northwest to include Bear Prairie, by following the crest of Skate Mountain and the crest of the Sawtooth Range; then north to the Nisqually entrance." [49] The proposal was shelved in the mid-1930s because of concern that it would jeopardize the Park Service's fight for expanded boundaries for Olympic National Park. In July 1947, NPS Biologist Lowell Sumner revived the Tatoosh Addition proposal. His plan was to bring the southern boundary of the park down to the "V" formed by Skate Creek Road and the Cowlitz River. The addition would give greater protection to deer and elk. Superintendent Preston argued that the national forest already afforded adequate protection and that the addition would be strongly opposed. In November 1947, Director Drury stated that further study or consideration of the proposed Tatoosh Addition "should be deferred indefinitely." [50] It would seem that the memorial by the Washington State House of Representatives, passed earlier that year, weighed in Drury's decision.

Deer

Drury's decision to quash the Tatoosh Addition proposal committed the NPS to a cooperative management approach toward Mount Rainier's black-tailed deer population, which ranged out of the park in winter. This was not altogether a bad thing. During the 1930s, the NPS had found that ungulate populations in several parks were growing too large, overshooting the carrying capacity of the range, as a result of the reduction in the numbers of natural predators. One means of controlling the population was to encourage sport hunting of excess animals when they ranged out of the park. Thus, the NPS could work with state game departments to achieve a desired herd reduction without having to take the unpopular step of killing excess animals in the parks. At the time that Drury rejected the Tatoosh Addition to Mount Rainier National Park he was wrestling with this very problem in Rocky Mountain National Park, where park managers were attempting to lure excess deer and elk out of the park with salt chains so that they could be eliminated by the more palatable means of a late-winter, either-sex hunt in the adjacent national forest. [51]

Unlike Rocky Mountain, Mount Rainier did not yet have a problem of overgrazing. In 1949, NPS Biologist Lowell Sumner found the range to be in "excellent condition." [52] But NPS officials did express concern from time to time about the health of the deer population around Longmire. The animals had become so tame that they fed around employee residences and out of garbage cans and even begged from park visitors. In the spring of 1947, park officials reported an outbreak of a foot disease in this local deer population. The outbreak raised questions about what steps, if any, the NPS should take to control the spread of the disease. It was felt that the concentration of deer around Longmire was not natural but, on the other hand, NPS policy "should be to let the animals carry on their struggle for existence unaided, unless the survival of the species is threatened." [53] Out of this paradoxical situation came a commitment to discourage all feeding of wild animals in the park—deer as well as bears.

Initially, park staff sought to curtail feeding of deer by handing out an educational leaflet to

all visitors at the entrance station. The next step was to discourage the deer from begging. Sumner suggested that park personnel, disguised as tourists, answer the panhandling deer by spraying them in the face with a dilute solution of ammonia and tabasco sauce. If the deer did not learn from this, they would then be removed. [54] In 1951, national park regulations were amended to prohibit feeding of all wild animals. [55]

Elk

The 1940s and 1950s marked a hiatus in NPS concern about the elk population. Although the elk were still considered exotic—since they had been imported from Yellowstone and were different from the native Roosevelt elk—NPS biologists apparently chose to downplay this problem now. Perhaps they assumed that it was too late to eliminate the exotic elk, or that the imported elk had already hybridized with native elk. Perhaps they simply decided that there were more pressing concerns. In any case, the elk had not yet begun to overgraze the alpine meadows; that concern still lay in the future.

A wildlife survey in 1949 enumerated several small bands of elk in the southern, southwestern, and southeastern sections of the park as well as in adjacent areas of the national forest. [56] During the 1950s, park officials assumed that the elk population remained small. In 1962, however, an aerial count by USFS Biologist John Larson indicated the presence of 466 elk along the Cascade Crest, two-thirds of them in the park's Shiner Peak area. Although this raised the possibility that an exotic species was affecting the ecology of the park's subalpine meadows, the park lacked resources to track the elk population further. Some preliminary field research was done by establishing some exclosures with which to document the effect of elk grazing. More intensive research on the elk would get underway in the mid-1970s. [57]

Mountain Goats

Mountain goats were a significant wildlife resource in Mount Rainier National Park. Besides being an extremely interesting animal, the mountain goat possessed certain other advantages over other large mammals in the park. Unlike the deer and elk, the mountain goats in the park did not range out of the park; and unlike the black bear, their habitat and diet did not bring them into conflict with park visitors. Once the threat from poachers was overcome in the early years of the national park, it was relatively easy to keep humans and mountain goats safely apart.

Superintendent Preston took one protective measure for the mountain goats. After World War II, he insisted that the RNPC cease grazing its horses on Stevens Ridge during the summer months. A small band of mountain goats was frequently observed on Stevens Ridge, and Preston did not want them frightened out of the area nor having to compete with horses for food. Furthermore, he did not want to run any risk of the domestic stock transmitting a disease to the mountain goats. Cases had been reported from elsewhere of diseases passing from domestic horses, cattle, and sheep to deer, elk, bison, and mountain sheep. The previous year one of the horses at Sunrise had reportedly suffered from distemper and had passed the disease to some other horses which the NPS brought up from Packwood. Consequently, horses were no longer allowed to range on Stevens Ridge. [58]

In 1964, Roger Morrow, a graduate student at the University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, conducted a field survey and ecological study of mountain goats in the park under the direction of Dr. Murray L. Johnson. The project was undertaken on a shoestring budget and was discontinued after one season. Lowell Sumner commented that the resulting report "illustrates the gamble this Service takes when it decides to support a new research project with limited funds and with limited facilities for professional appraisal of the project and the

research team." [59] The mountain goat study occurred at a time when Congress was beginning to budget more money for scientific research in the national parks and the NPS science program was still adjusting to the change.

MEADOWS

Mount Rainier's high meadows were famous for their beautiful, snow-fed lakes and streams, fabulous floral displays, and tapering groves of alpine firs. The effort to protect the fragile beauty of the meadows was as old as the national park itself. At first, however, most of that effort focused on the prevention of so-called vandalism. Vandalism implied malicious intent or extreme negligence: cutting down trees, picking flowers, allowing campfires to escape, and so on. What was more destructive of the meadows than vandalism, park officials gradually discovered, was the cumulative impact of thousands of human feet.

A milestone in this growing awareness was Park Naturalist Howard R. Stagner's study of the park's grazing resources in 1944. Stagner developed a classification system for the park's alpine meadows based on each one's topographical and hydrological conditions and vegetative composition. His report, titled "Some Ecological Factors Relating to Possible Cattle Grazing in Mount Rainier National Park," provided an ecological framework for predicting how much use the meadows could sustain. Stagner concluded that appearances were deceiving: the meadows that were well-drained and covered by a dense mat of grasses and flowers were actually the most vulnerable; the plant cover was weakly rooted in loose volcanic ash, which was subject to wind erosion when exposed. [60] This was the first indication that the luxuriant meadows on Mount Rainier might be more fragile than alpine meadows at equivalent elevations in the Cascades.

Effects of Pack Stock

Before human feet came to be seen as a threat to Mount Rainier's meadows, Stagner's study pointed to the threat posed by pack stock. After World War II, park officials grew concerned about the effects of large horse parties on the vegetation. The Mountaineers and the Mazamas organized trips around Mount Rainier in 1946 and 1947 using pack strings of twenty to forty head, and the Sierra Club proposed a trip around the Wonderland Trail for 1948 using 100 head of pack stock. Unless the park administration took some kind of protective measures, large horse parties such as these would soon denude popular backcountry campsites. As Superintendent Preston described the problem:

> Though grain is carried for feed, horses graze to some extent when picketed or hobbled or otherwise restrained. Grasses growing in the soft, loosely bound volcanic ash soils of upland meadows in Mount Rainier are not at all firmly rooted. The typical bunch grasses easily become dislodged and are slow to recover when trampled by grazing stock. Considerable damage results. [61]

Preston proposed that the horse parties be required to camp in designated sites that were screened from view, and that stock be fed mainly on grain. Regional Director Tomlinson urged somewhat more stringent rules that would require large horse parties to carry their own hay and grain. Horses would be tied to rails while in camp. [62]

Horse party on the Wonderland Trail at Klapatche Park, August 1955. Park officials recognized in the 1950s that the impact of horse parties on the meadows and trails was far out of proportion to the amount of horse use in the park. *(Louis G. Kirk photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

The Park Service tightened control over the concessioner's grazing of saddle stock at this time, too. Prior to World War II, the RNPC had made a practice of grazing its horses on Stevens Ridge during midweek when business was at a low ebb. After World War II, the NPS phased out the RNPC's grazing privileges. Beginning in 1948, about 30 head of stock were kept in a bam and corral on Bam Flat, below Paradise, and another six or eight head were kept in a bam at Sunrise. The concessioner supplied all the feed during the summer and took the stock out of the park during the winter. [63]

But park officials recognized that grazing was not the only damage that horses caused to the meadows. It became apparent that horses and their riders were largely responsible for the wide trails, parallel trails, and gullied trails that marred the alpine meadows above Paradise Inn. Perhaps the park administration would have acted more aggressively to curtail the use of horses had it not been for the fact that park personnel used the concessioner's horses themselves to resupply patrol cabins and lookouts and carry out fish plants. Many NPS officials felt an affinity for horses and viewed their presence in the backcountry as part of the American wilderness tradition. Horse rentals persisted to the end of this era even though the proportion of park visitors who participated in that activity steadily declined. One dismayed park ranger complained to his superior in 1965,

> It seems paradoxical that such a marginal, lacking-of-demand operation should be allowed to exist, considering the great damage it does. The pleasure obtained by the very few who enjoy these horse rides is grossly disproportionate to the damage done to the beauty that might otherwise be enjoyed by the great numbers of non-horse riding park visitors. [64]

Horses, or more accurately, people on horseback, threatened to scar the landscape merely by

walking through it. Increasingly, park officials had to question whether the horseriding activity should be encouraged somewhere else instead, and if not, how the activity could be modified to minimize its impact on the landscape. By 1960, park officials had begun to ask the same questions about people on foot.

Effects of Foot Traffic

In 1959, the NPS contracted with C. Frank Brockman, former park naturalist at Mount Rainier and now a professor of forestry at the University of Washington, to make an ecological study of subalpine meadows at Paradise. This was followed by similar studies of Tipsoo Lake and Yakima Park in 1960. The purpose of the studies was to assess the longterm effects of foot traffic on these landscapes. Brockman's report offered evidence that, given the chance, areas denuded by trampling would revegetate. Superintendent Macy commented, "This is very important because some of us believed the situation at Paradise was hopeless." [65] Brockman followed up these studies with further investigation at Paradise meadows and Mowich Lake. [66]

Social trails at Tipsoo Lake, September 23, 1963. In the early 1960s. the park administration began to address the problem of keeping visitors on designated trails only. *(Ruben O. Hart photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

Two actions came from these ecological investigations. First, the park secured an allotment of $83,300 in 1961 for bituminous surfacing of selected trails in the heavily used Paradise-Reflection Lakes area. The theory was that people would be less likely to stray off a paved trail than an unpaved one. This effort to modify visitor behavior was augmented by the placement of signs and small exhibits to educate visitors about the fragility of the meadows. Second, the park requested funds for the obliteration of so-called "social trails." These were unplanned trails that had been worn into the meadow by trampling. Social trails would be obliterated by a combination of exclosures built to keep people off the trail so that vegetation could recover, and actual reseeding. [67]

Ironically, Mission 66 plans for a new campground in Paradise were being implemented at the same time that these prescient steps were being taken to rehabilitate the meadows. Mission 66 planners might have known better; they recognized the need to move overnight camping to lower elevations but apparently lacked the courage of their convictions. The Paradise campground, completed in 1963, was surely the grossest example of inappropriate development under Mission 66 in Mount Rainier National Park. No sooner had the new Paradise campground opened than Superintendent Rutter recommended that it would eventually have to be turned into a picnic area because "these meadows are unable to take the extensive use that camping areas receive." [68] That no natural resource specialist was on hand to point out the folly of this development was illustrative of how natural resource protection became marginalized during the Mission 66 era. It contrasted with the way CCC projects were handled in the 1930s, when each project received the consideration of a landscape architect and a wildlife biologist before it was approved.

CONCLUSION

Mirroring natural resource protection in the national park system as a whole, Mount Rainier National Park's natural resource program focused on individual problems as they arose: blister rust and mountain pine beetle infestations, black bear depredations, meadow deterioration. With the single exception of the Park Service's aggressive forest fire suppression policy, these were years of minimal attention to natural resource issues in Mount Rainier National Park. Spending priorities lay elsewhere—in the redevelopment of the park's infrastructure and the sensible accommodation of growing numbers of park visitors. There was virtually no attempt at environmental monitoring or baseline studies until the late 1950s.

The marginalization of natural resource protection in the national parks satisfied a broad sector of the American public who wanted good roads, campgrounds, and visitor centers and therefore supported the Mission 66 development program, but who did not understand the complexity of the Park Service's mandate to preserve natural conditions. The low priority given to natural resource protection did not satisfy conservation groups, however, who increasingly viewed all development (even by an agency such as the NPS) as fundamentally at cross-purposes with environmental health. Conservationists expressed a growing impatience with the NPS in the 1950s, which only contributed to making these years contentious ones for the Mount Rainier National Park administration.

By the end of the 1950s, parks were beginning to receive some funds for scientific research. Brockman's studies of plant succession in subalpine meadows and Wallis's study of fishery resources in Mount Rainier National Park were two early indications of this. But the increases in funds were slow to take effect. In the early 1960s, a series of reports written by scientists both inside and outside the NPS brought public attention to the need for more biological research in the national parks. The most famous of these was the Leopold Report of 1963. Together, the reports pointed the way toward a more vigorous kind of natural resource management commencing in the late 1960s. That new policy is the subject of Chapter XX.

MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART SIX: YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION, 1965-1995

XVIII. ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

From an administrative standpoint, Mount Rainier National Park has been a relatively quiet park since the Mission 66 era. Issues of resource protection and visitor access have not attracted a great deal of public comment, nor have any development proposals arisen to challenge the park's fundamental purposes. Yet the relative absence of controversy in Mount Rainier's recent administrative history should not be mistaken for a lack of challenges. Mount Rainier's past five superintendents have had one overriding concern—how to manage the growing number of visitors.

Superintendent William J. Briggle aptly described the park's administrative context in a 1995 newsletter on the general management plan:

> The Puget Sound area's population has grown tremendously since Mount Rainier was designated a national park in 1899. Today, it is one of the nation's largest and fastest growing metropolitan areas. With this growth, Mount Rainier has taken on the complexity and problems of a park in an urban setting. Growing threats to park resources and changes in the neighboring area accompany the two million annual visitors. Issues such as transportation to and within the park, along with protection of Mount Rainier's irreplaceable resources, must be addressed. [1]

These issues have been dominant for 25 to 30 years. The growth of complexity in managing Mount Rainier has been evolutionary rather than sudden, quiet rather than politicized.

Visitor use of Mount Rainier National Park grew 33 percent from 1965 to 1993. Although an upward trend is evident, the growth has been uneven. In 14 of those 28 years the park saw a decrease of visitor use over the previous year. In the two years 1976-1977, visitor use grew a whopping 54 percent above the level in 1975, and Mount Rainier posted a record-high visitation in 1977, when 2,437,332 people visited the park. In the recession year 1982, visitation fell 22 percent below the level in 1981. Increases of 12 to 15 percent occurred in 1986, 1989, and 1991, and visitation in 1992 approached the record high of fifteen years earlier. Mount Rainier's superintendents ascribed the year-to-year fluctuations in visitation to a variety of causes, including changing economic conditions, rising or falling gasoline prices, unusual weather, and even the 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens.

Figures for total park visitation obscure some of the particular stresses that increasing public use has placed on Mount Rainier National Park. For example, automobile use grew at more than double the rate of overall visitation as the average number of persons per vehicle declined. While Mount Rainier's lodging and campground facilities bore the increases in

visitation relatively well, park roads and parking areas grew more and more congested. Backcountry use grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s, then declined somewhat in the 1980s. The most dramatic increase in public use of the park occurred on the upper mountain itself, where the number of climbers attempting to reach the summit rose from 1,376 in 1965 to nearly 9,600 in 1993—an increase of nearly 600 percent.

The pressure from increasing visitation forms a backdrop to many of the administrative decisions of the past thirty years. Other changes in Mount Rainier administration are attributable to changes in the Park Service bureaucracy, some of it to new technology. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the modern staff and discusses some new features of personnel management in the period 1965-1995. The second section describes the evolution of the resource protection division. The third section traces developments in the interpretive division. The final section highlights some changes in the maintenance division.

THE MODERN STAFF

Changes in the Mount Rainier National Park staff organization since 1965 are mostly a reflection of changes in the Park Service as a whole. Major trends include staff specialization, reliance on technical support from regional offices, use of volunteers and Friends groups, and service-wide standardization of personnel training and safety standards. The size of the staff has grown modestly compared to the 33 percent increase in park visitation.

The Superintendents and a Management Overview

Five men have served as superintendent of Mount Rainier National Park since 1962. Their tours of duty have averaged about six years. John A. Rutter served from 1962 to 1967, John A. Townsley from 1967 to 1972, Daniel J. Tobin, Jr. from 1972 to 1977, William J. Briggle from 1977 to 1984, and Neal G. Guse, Jr. from 1984 to 1991. In 1991, Briggle returned for a second tour of duty as superintendent.

Mount Rainier National Park is one of a handful of national parks in which the superintendency is funded at a GS 15 grade level, and the park's recent superintendents have all been men of high standing in the service. Two of these individuals were second-generation Park Service (Tobin and Guse), three had prior experience in the Washington office or one of the regional offices (Rutter, Tobin, and Briggle), two went on to become regional directors (Rutter and Tobin), and one followed Roger W. Toll's career path to the Yellowstone National Park superintendency (Townsley). These five superintendents all shared a level of experience, competence, and career ambition that lifted them to the top ranks of the service.

Rutter's years as superintendent of Mount Rainier spanned the completion of the Mission 66 program and the beginning of the boom in outdoor recreation. Rutter's first interest was the front country—the roads and developed areas where the vast majority of visitors spent their time. He wanted the national park to "sparkle." Rutter's superintendency marked a time of transition in the national park from the Mission 66 emphasis on new development to the contemporary emphasis on backcountry management and protection of natural resources. [2]

Townsley was the first superintendent of Mount Rainier to concentrate on the park's backcountry resources. He initiated the backcountry management plan and revived the proposal to expand the park southward to include the Tatoosh Range. Townsley's interest in the backcountry stemmed in part from his own preferences and in part from the growing influence of the new wilderness preservation system on the NPS mission. In this sense he

might be considered the first Mount Rainier superintendent whose tenure reflected the service's shift in emphasis from visitor services to resource management.

Tobin's superintendency saw the height of the boom in wilderness recreation during the 1970s. More than Townsley or Rutter, Tobin oversaw the beginning stages of a profound change in the way the NPS managed natural resources. As Tobin himself described the change, resource protection policies were increasingly tied to scientific research and data collection rather than simple observation of the resource. [3] Biologists would begin to supplant rangers as key advisors to the superintendent on issues of natural resource management. Under Tobin's direction, biological research was begun on Mount Rainier's elk herds, forest community types, and alpine ecosystems.

Following Tobin's superintendency. Briggle managed to augment these programs in spite of cutbacks in Park Service funding in the late 1970s and early to mid-1980s. A handful of resource issues came to the fore—wilderness designation, elk overpopulation, rehabilitation of historic structures—but by and large Mount Rainier continued to be a park without major management controversies during Briggle's first tour.

The trend toward greater use of scientific method in the management of Mount Rainier's natural resources, which had first become pronounced in the mid-1970s during Tobin's superintendency, accelerated in the mid-1980s during Guse's superintendency. Tobin, as director of the Pacific Northwest Region, tapped Guse for the Mount Rainier job because of Guse's scientific background. Tobin wanted Guse to take a fresh look at the elk situation in Mount Rainier and evaluate whether the elk were really a problem after all. Guse had worked on a similar elk problem in Rocky Mountain National Park involving summer range in the park and winter range in the surrounding national forests which required coordination with state wildlife officials. Shortly after Guse started at Mount Rainier, the problem of day hikers' effects on subalpine meadows emerged as the most serious natural resource issue confronting park management. For help with this issue Guse turned to social scientists as well as biologists. [4]

Since his return to Mount Rainier in 1991, Briggle has made it the theme of his second tour to prepare the park for its centennial in 1999. A new general management plan for the park is in preparation at this time (1995) and major initiatives during the past four years have included staffing up the park's natural and cultural resources division, developing new ties between the Park Service and large financial donors in the private sector, and broadening the park's regional planning efforts particularly with reference to public transportation and tourist accommodations in gateway communities.

Volunteers and Friends Groups

The Park Service began to make considerable use of volunteers and friends groups in the 1970s. Reflecting the service-wide trend, the Mount Rainier National Park administration recruited employees and volunteers through various programs, including the Youth Conservation Corps, Young Adult Conservation Corps, Student Conservation Association, and Volunteers in Parks. These inexpensive employees and volunteers worked in all administrative divisions and all areas of the park during the summer season.

The Youth Conservation Corps (YCC), authorized by Congress in 1972, provided a valuable source of labor for rehabilitation projects in the backcountry. Teenage boys and girls and adult supervisors worked in crews of about ten individuals each, performing rehabilitation of backcountry camps, reconstruction of trails and backcountry ranger stations, roadside brushing, vista clearing, replanting of shrubs, and other tasks. These projects made it possible to accomplish many labor-intensive jobs that might not otherwise have been attempted.

Generally the YCC program had about an eight-week duration from mid-June to mid-August, with crews moving from place to place in spike camps. In at least one year YCC crews occupied the Macy Dorm at Longmire. [5]

The amount of YCC activity declined over the years. In its first year, the park enrolled 50 YCC volunteers. The number fell to around 40 youths through most of the 1970s and about 10-20 in the 1980s as funding for the program dwindled. In 1987, the last year that the YCC was active in Mount Rainier, the park administration received 93 applications for 13 funded positions. Total program costs in that year were $26,808 for completion of projects with an appraised value of $42,211. [6]

The Student Conservation Association (SCA), established in 1957, had a continuous presence in Mount Rainier until about 1984. The heyday of the program came in the 1970s. Two kinds of SCA activity occurred side by side in the park: high school students enrolled in 2-3 week "wilderness workshops," during which time they performed rehabilitation work in the backcountry similar to the YCC; and college-age "resource assistants" worked with NPS personnel on a variety of tasks. The park administration sought the latter group in particular. At a program cost of $2,000 per resource assistant for twelve weeks of labor, SCAs were a good deal for the NPS. The last year Mount Rainier hosted a high school-age SCA group was 1984. NPS officials found the group contentious and inadequately supervised, and park officials were dismayed when the group made campfires in a backcountry meadow. [7]

The Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC) had only a brief presence in Mount Rainier in 1979-81. YACC enrollees numbered about 25 each summer and worked on more substantial projects than the younger YCC or SCA work crews. The program was terminated by Congress in 1981. [8]

Volunteers in Parks, or VIPs, contributed the largest single contingent of volunteer labor to Mount Rainier National Park. Under the Volunteers in Parks Act, the NPS was authorized to pay incidental expenses such as transportation costs, meals, and uniforms for volunteers who served without salary. [9] The number of VIPs varied, but generally fell within the range of 75 to 150 individuals per year. VIPs came with a wide range of talent and experience, from medical doctors to Boy Scouts and from retirement to high school age. VIPs worked in a variety of fields including interpretation, backcountry management, environmental studies, resource management, visitor protection, and clerical. Most VIPs worked during the summer season but the park also utilized VIPs during the winter season for ski patrol, supervision of the snowplay area, and operation of the hiker center. [10] Despite a very aggressive effort by the park administration to use VIPs, there were usually more VIP applicants than the park could use.

In recent years one or two VIPs were employed in supervising the VIP workforce, liberating NPS personnel from this duty and effectively jump-starting each summer's volunteer program. [11] In 1994, VIPs logged more than 30,000 hours of work. This was an impressive achievement. It was emblematic of what could be called the era of entrepreneurial management at Mount Rainier.

Personnel Management

Personnel management has grown considerably more complex in the past thirty years. Diverse kinds of employee training, increased emphasis on employee safety, and greater reliance on middle management are some ways in which it has changed. Changes in personnel management in Mount Rainier National Park have mostly reflected service-wide trends, although the relatively large size of Mount Rainier's staff has sometimes placed it in the vanguard of new developments.

Training. For many years the training of summer seasonals has followed an established pattern. Each June the park administration directs its efforts to two weeks of formal training of the new employees. Seasonal rangers receive fire management, search and rescue, and law enforcement training; interpreters receive training in public speaking. These are frenetic days as the park races to complete the new staff training in time for the July 4 weekend and the start of the main visitor season. [12]

In addition to this intensive training exercise, the park administration has facilitated other forms of training for permanent staff members throughout the year. The park administration has conducted much of the staff training in-house, using permanent employees as instructors for training other employees. Some training courses held at Mount Rainier have drawn NPS employees from other areas; for example, an avalanche fundamentals seminar held in 1977 drew rangers from Olympic, North Cascades, and Crater Lake. The Mount Rainier staff likewise has availed itself of training opportunities outside the park. [13] Law enforcement, emergency medical, safety, and management training has accounted for most of this professional training afield, which can total a few thousand man-hours in a year.

In recent decades, rangers have received the most on-the-job training. Each ranger has to have a minimum of 40 hours of law enforcement training per year. Characteristically Mount Rainier rangers have attended law enforcement training with other NPS rangers at Fort Worden, Washington, supplemented by a set amount of time on a firing range. For many years park rangers practiced weapons firing on a local range at Tahoma Woods, but this range was closed down due to lead contamination in June 1994. The activity was moved to a local police firing range, thus ensuring that firing qualifications would be maintained. [14]

Safety. Reflecting another service-wide trend, the park administration has placed increasing emphasis on employee safety since the 1970s. The drive for efficiency underlay the safety program, as rising costs of health care, disability benefits, and liability cases made safety precautions more and more cost effective. An early indication of this trend in Mount Rainier was the appointment, in 1977, of a seasonal safety technician who conducted safety inspections and assisted park personnel in improving the safety management program, followed a few years later by the appointment of a full time safety officer, the only such position in any park in the Pacific Northwest. The park administration formed a loss control management team to hear and act upon employee safety suggestions. The park administration also sponsored frequent "tailgate" safety meetings and distributed thousands of safety booklets and pamphlets to employees. As a result of these various efforts, the number of employee accidents and the amount of lost work days resulting from injuries decreased. [15]

The safety program targeted a variety of concerns. One area of special concern was motor vehicle safety. The informal tailgate meetings placed strong emphasis on driving safety and the park charted a general decline in the employee motor vehicle accident rate. Another area of special concern was hearing loss prevention. In 1981, Mount Rainier instituted a hearing conservation program for employees who worked with loud heavy equipment. Setting up the program involved the purchase of a testing booth and testing equipment, the compilation of baseline audiograms for all heavy equipment operators, and the recording of sound levels for each item of heavy equipment with a noise dosimeter. [16] In 1988, the park implemented a comprehensive hazardous waste plan. The plan included the designation and training of hazardous waste coordinators and the construction of a hazardous materials storage facility. [17] Other safety programs included asbestos removal, safety instruction for the use of explosives, and safety education on blood-born pathogens. [18]

Computerization. Beginning in 1984 with the acquisition of its first five IBM computers, Mount Rainier National Park established itself as a pace-setter in the use of computer technology. A full-time computer specialist was added to the park staff in 1985. Personnel

and accounting were the first administrative functions to become computerized, followed by the backcountry reservation system in 1986. Mount Rainier was the first park to link personal computers in a network, beginning with those at headquarters at Tahoma Woods and soon including all of the personal computers in the park. By 1995 the park had 114 computers, or virtually one computer for every employee with a desk. Employees were linked by electronic mail with other NPS employees throughout the nation. [19]

Mount Rainier National Park adopted Geographic Information Systems, or GIS, as soon as it became available in the Park Service. This computer program provides the means for cataloguing biological data by location within the park in a way that makes the information readily accessible. In 1993 the system was substantially upgraded with the purchase of Arc/Info, Arc/CAD, and Arc/View GIS software, and a permanent GIS specialist position was added to the park staff. [20]

Employee Morale. In recent decades employee morale in Mount Rainier National Park has been uneven. Many intangible factors are involved in raising or lowering a park staffs morale, including the vagaries of climate, housing conditions, the receptivity of local communities to service employees, and the personalities and management styles of park superintendents and their division chiefs. Remedying low employee morale is as difficult as pinpointing its causal factors.

Park managers have always recognized the effect of climate on employee morale. Mount Rainier's cold and damp weather, together with the deep shade found in such heavily forested areas as Longmire and Ohanapecosh, generally make for difficult living conditions. The push to develop staff housing outside the park at Tahoma Woods has improved the situation somewhat, but Mount Rainier's climate continues to be an inescapable burden for the park staff.

Arguably the quality of staff housing in and outside the park has not kept pace with the rising standard of housing in the surrounding region. Certainly the service has attracted an increasingly diverse personnel in the past thirty years for whom substandard housing represents more of a hardship. While the problem of NPS housing is hardly unique to Mount Rainier, high property values in the fast-growing Puget Sound region exacerbate the situation for members of this park's staff.

The contrasting management styles of Mount Rainier's recent superintendents and their division chiefs have also affected employee morale. Disgruntlement over personnel management led staff members to vote 38 to 10 in favor of forming a union. This vote, taken on December 1, 1980, gave the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) the exclusive right to represent park employees as their collective bargaining agent. Union representatives negotiated the park's first labor-management contract agreement in July 1981. [21] Since then, a wide array of personnel issues have been covered under biennial agreements between park management and Local No. 1501 of the AFGE. The union agreements have addressed such issues as the contesting of position descriptions and classifications, procedures for performance standards and appraisals, procedures for disciplinary and adverse actions, and provision for an employee counseling service program. [22]

Friction between employees and management continued after the union was formed. In 1983, an operations evaluation team interviewed 23 employees on the subject of employee-management relations. The team found that there was a significant employee morale problem which appeared to stem from the management style of the superintendent and the administrative officer. The interviewees made two principal complaints. First, the superintendent's method of giving employees direct and specific orders, by-passing

intermediate levels of supervision, had a demoralizing effect on some lower level supervisors and employees who complained of being "caught in the middle" between their supervisors and the superintendent. Second, and more seriously, some employees complained of mistreatment by the superintendent, "management by intimidation," and "flagrant personal assassinations." [23] Perhaps in tacit acknowledgement of how mercurial and subjective the problem of management-employee relations could be, the operations evaluation team did not recommend any specific action to the regional director, and none was taken.

The employee union still exists. It has not raised any grievances against the superintendent for several years.

THE PROTECTION DIVISION

Traditionally the ranger or protection division formed the core of the park staff The full title of the ranger division—the Division of Resource Management and Visitor Protection—hinted at its wide-ranging scope. The ranger performed a variety of duties from law enforcement to fire management, wildlife surveys, backcountry trail construction, and search and rescue. The versatile "do anything" ranger had traditionally been the backbone of the Park Service, and the ranger who acquired a variety of skills and experience was rewarded with advancements in the ranger organization. In the years since 1965 this picture began to change; the ranger's stature declined relative to that of various specialists. By 1991, proper training and professionalization of the ranger force had become a topic addressed in the Vail Agenda. [24]

There have been two salient developments in Mount Rainier National Park's Protection Division since 1965. The first development has been the need for redistricting as park managers have had to trim the Protection Division's budget and staff and shift resources from the backcountry to the front country in response to changing visitor use patterns. The second development has been an increasing emphasis on law enforcement and law enforcement training as the service has sought to redefine the ranger's role.

Ranger Districting and Staffing

Superintendents Rutter, Townsley, and Tobin presided over a steady growth of the ranger force during the 1960s and 1970s. As Rutter pointed out in the early 1960s, growing public use of the backcountry required a larger number of backcountry patrols. The backcountry management plan of 1973 required more rangers to handle meadow restoration work. The number of seasonal rangers reached an all time high in the mid-1970s, when the park had as many as seven rangers assigned solely to the backcountry. [25] In the early to mid-1980s, increasingly diverse demands on the Park Service budget forced this number steadily downward. Moreover, nearly ten years of restoration work in the backcountry had had a pronounced effect. Visitor impacts were now most evident in front country areas such as the Paradise meadows, suggesting the need to redirect priorities once more.

It fell to Superintendent Briggle to address the twin problems of the budget squeeze and the changing visitor use pattern. In 1983 Briggle reorganized the Protection Division by reducing the number of ranger districts from three to one, eliminating two district ranger positions. The chief ranger, who had formerly supervised day-to-day operations, was reassigned to long-term planning activities, while the remaining district ranger took charge of day-to-day operations of the division. [26] Briggle brought the number of seasonals back up and obtained a $51,300 addition to the park's base funding for ranger staffing of high-use visitor areas during the summer season. [27]

Briggle instituted a second reorganization of the Protection Division in 1994. The

superintendent divided the park into two districts, Mather District and Muir District, embracing front country and backcountry. Whereas the reorganization of 1983 had kept a semblance of the old division of the park into geographic units, the latest reorganization swept that away altogether in favor of functional units. The Mather District covered entrance stations, campgrounds, fee collection, structural fire protection, law enforcement, emergency medical aid, and search and rescue in the front country. The Muir District covered backcountry patrols, wildland fire management, wilderness management, climber registration and human waste management in the alpine zone, search and rescue in the backcountry, and maintenance of all backcountry structures. A notable innovation was the transfer of trail maintenance from the maintenance division to the Protection Division in order to consolidate all backcountry activities under one administrative unit. [28]

Law Enforcement

In the past ten years, Mount Rainier's rangers have seen a dramatic increase in the amount of time they devote to law enforcement. Once again the change in Mount Rainier National Park reflects a service-wide trend. Everyone agrees that the change is an unfortunate one; opinions vary as to whether the emphasis on law enforcement has gone too far. Some park employees feel that the effort is disproportionate to the level of crime, that police duties tarnish the ranger's public image, and that the emphasis on law enforcement may be driven in part by the protection division's need to carve out a distinct and indispensable role for itself. [29] Others see the increased emphasis on law enforcement as a necessary evolution of park adminstration since crime has infiltrated Mount Rainier and a more diverse visitor population is committing more resource violations. [30]

Park officials began tracking the frequency of criminal cases in the park during the 1970s. The most prevalent criminal cases involved vehicle break-ins or "car clouts." Incidents of theft or vandalism rose approximately twenty-five percent from 1980 to 1990. [31] Park officials thought that a considerable percentage of car clouts were the work of a single professional thief who systematically worked national park campgrounds across the nation. [32]

Probably the most memorable single incident of theft occurred in 1973 with the disappearance of a valuable Indian dress from the Longmire Museum. Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation apprehended the thief the next year and the artifact was returned to its owner, the University of Washington. [33]

Despite the common perception that national parks were no longer the sanctuaries from crime which they had once been, violent crimes remained relatively rare in Mount Rainier National Park. In 1978 a double rape and armed robbery occurred on Rampart Ridge which led to an extensive manhunt both inside and outside the park. The perpetrator, a soldier from Fort Lewis, surrendered to authorities outside the park. In 1981 an armed robbery occurred at the National Park Inn. In 1987 park rangers and FBI agents carried out a joint investigation of a homicide after a body was discovered on the east side of the park. The victim had been shot in the back of the head. The unsolved murder case was thought to have been drug-related. [34]

Drug trafficking was another concern. Tipped off by both the Washington State Patrol and the Drug Enforcement Administration, park officials believed that migrant workers were running illegal drugs from the Yakima Valley via Highway 410 to the Puget Sound area. They also learned through two seasons of undercover investigation that concession employees were buying, selling, and consuming a significant quantity of illegal drugs at Paradise. The park obtained a special appropriation for drug control efforts in 1991. [35]

Two other areas of law enforcement, traffic and resource violations, were certainly not new to the park staff. Rangers issued the largest number of citations for driving infractions, including speeding and driving under the influence. Through-traffic on Highways 410 and 123 accounted for a considerable percentage of these offenses. Rangers also investigated several dozen motor vehicle accidents each year; sometimes these involved fatalities, criminal charges, or both. Park officials found a correlation between law enforcement and vehicle accidents: when rangers issued more citations, the number of accidents went down. On the other hand, each additional citation involved a lot of staff time. Rangers had to fill out incident reports and make a court appearance for each citation, and when the U.S. Attorney's Office eliminated the magistrate position at Mount Rainier in 1992, rangers had to attend court in Tacoma. If this was not frustration enough, numerous visitors failed to appear for their court date and the magistrate, rather than issue an arrest warrant, usually dismissed the case. Faced with these constraints, the park administration had to find the lowest level of law enforcement that was effective. [36]

The park administration cracked down on poachers in the late 1970s. Park officials jointly investigated a 1977 incident involving an elk shot in the park with officials of the Washington Department of Game and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Three individuals were fined and sentenced to the maximum jail terms allowed under the Lacey Act. Two more hunters were found guilty of poaching and fined in 1979, and six separate incidents involving illegal hunting on the boundary of the park were turned over to state authorities the following year. [37]

While wildlife poaching was brought under control, however, another kind of activity began to threaten park resources. People started harvesting certain plants in the park to sell. Rangers recorded instances of people bringing bushels of mushrooms out of the forest, or cutting acres of beargrass which they loaded into their pickups, or collecting moss which they sold to floral shops. Rangers faced two challenges in dealing with this problem: first, scientific information was lacking on how these activities would impact the park's ecology, and second, the harvesters by and large came from a sector of the population which had not frequented national parks before and did not have a recognizable preservation ethic. If scientific investigation indeed confirmed that there was a need to prohibit these harvests, it was clear that educating the harvesters about the purposes of the park and obtaining their cooperation would not be easy. [38]

THE INTERPRETIVE DIVISION

Mount Rainier's interpretive program was fifty years old in 1970. The basic interpretive themes of the park—mountain-building, glacial action, and biodiversity (the "arctic island in a temperate zone")—were well-established. The interpretive program's infrastructure was mostly completed, and consisted of four museums, a system of wayside exhibits and self-guiding nature trails, and campground amphitheaters. The principal factors influencing the interpretive program such as the predominantly local origin of park visitation, the park's intensive weekend use, its status as a "destination park," and its large amount of inclement weather remained unchanged. In the years since 1970, the central challenge for the interpretive division has been to continue updating this long-standing program so that it will remain interesting to a local public and at the same time use the interpretive program as a vehicle for instilling a preservationist ethic among park visitors.

Major Programs and Staffing

In recent decades the interpretive division has comprised a staff of four to six permanent full time individuals plus 25 to 30 seasonal ranger-naturalists. As the program goes into high gear

each summer, most of the activity focuses on the four main developed areas of Paradise, Longmire, Sunrise, and Ohanapecosh. Characteristically, the interpretive division has made visitor contacts through a variety of activities including guided walks, slide programs in the visitor centers, campfire programs in the campground amphitheaters, roving interpretation (allowing ranger-naturalists to seek out concentrations of visitors) and point duty (assignment of ranger-naturalists to specific sites).

More than in the Mission 66 era, the interpretive division in recent decades has striven to separate the park visitor from his or her automobile. Whereas NPS planners and park officials had earlier displayed an enthusiasm for wayside exhibits and a highly mobile visitor use pattern, now the interpretive division sought to disperse visitors by getting more people onto self-guiding nature trails and guided walks. A statement in the interpretive prospectus for Longmire (1976) indicated the change in attitude toward the automobile:

> One of the real tragedies of American life is the attachment of Americans to their automobiles. Often a visitor will only experience a beautiful natural area through the windows of his car. Not only does he fail to use his nonvisual senses—smelling, hearing, touching, tasting—but his visual world is often marred by greasy fingerprints and false images. We must entice the visitor to leave his car. [39]

Yet the tradition of the drive-through park persisted. The same prospectus recommended the development of an audio message system for automobilists:

> Signs just outside the Nisqually entrance gate will notify visitors to turn on their car or transistor radios for information concerning the park. Pretaped messages will come on at an appropriate distance from the next point of interest so that people can decide beforehand whether or not to stop... .It will.. .enable the driver and passengers to enjoy the environment without having to follow an interpretive message in a brochure—a distraction that might lead visitors to ignore the interpretive message altogether. [40]

Ostensibly the purpose of the audio message system was to advertise local attractions such as could be found at Longmire and provide inducements for getting the automobilist to stop and explore. At the same time, however, it pandered to the automobilist's desire for autonomy; the driver could make decisions about his or her park itinerary without getting out of the car. [41]

In addition to the standard fare of museum exhibits, slide presentations, and campfire programs, visitors have been able to take advantage of an ever changing selection of ranger accompanied outdoor activities. A "living history" presentation, featuring two VIPs who demonstrated the evolution of climbing equipment, clothing, and technique, drew appreciative audiences at Paradise in the summer of 1972. Beaver watches, consisting of walks around the Longmire meadow to observe beavers, attracted several hundred participants each summer during the late 1970s and early 1980s—until the natural succession of the meadow made the beavers go elsewhere. The park staff first offered guided snowshoe walks at Paradise during the winter of 1973-1974 and this popular program has persisted for more than twenty years. Popular guided walks to the Paradise ice caves, a favorite of the interpretive program for more than fifty years, had to be suspended after 1981 due to deteriorating ice conditions; in that summer two visitors were injured by chunks of ice falling from the ceiling in two separate incidents. Naturalist-rangers tailored walks to specific age groups and audiences, including walks for the elderly, walks for children, early morning walks for birdwatching, and night walks for encountering sounds and smells. [42] Each year the interpretive division devised new programs and eliminated others which seemed to be

losing their public appeal.

Some new interpretive programs developed out of servicewide initiatives. For example, Chief Naturalist Norman A. Bishop added night sky interpretation to the repertoire of programs in 1972 following a two-day workshop held in the park by Michigan State University astronomer Dr. Von Del Chamberlain. This circuit-riding astronomer conducted similar two-day seminars in other western national parks that summer. Night sky talks proved popular with park visitors, who recognized that the exceptionally clear air often found at Mount Rainier was a valuable park resource. [43] Another example of a servicewide initiative was Mount Rainier's participation in the National Environmental Education Development (NEED) program in the early 1970s. While the NPS worked with the Educational Consulting Service on environmental education materials for schools, parks such as Mount Rainier established Educational Study Areas (ESAs) for use by school groups using the NEED materials. In 1974, the interpretive division set up two ESAs at Tahoma Woods and Carbon River. [44]

In the 1990s Chief Naturalist William Dengler and Education Specialist Loren Lane developed a new outreach program for Mount Rainier aimed at bringing more naturalist talks and slide presentations to schools and other venues outside the park. Early park naturalists including Schmoe, Brockman, and Stagner had conducted similar activities, and the new program represented the latest wave of enthusiasm for exporting national park values to surrounding communities. By 1995 Mount Rainier had received two grants for developing the new outreach program under a systemwide initiative called "Parks as Classrooms." [45]

Until recently the interpretive division was organized geographically into two districts, a Nisqually District which included Longmire and Paradise, and a Pacific Crest District which included Sunrise, White River, Ohanapecosh, and Box Canyon. The chief naturalist gave overall direction to the park interpretive program, while two district naturalists supervised day-to-day operations. Other permanent staff positions—the librarian-curator, Longmire area naturalist, audio-visual specialist, and secretary—were duty-stationed at Longmire. About two- thirds of seasonal ranger-naturalists were assigned to the Nisqually District and one-third to the Pacific Crest District. [46]

In 1992 the interpretive division was reorganized. After two resignations and a retirement left three of the seven permanent staff positions vacant, the two districts were abandoned and the district naturalist positions were converted into assistant chief naturalist and education specialist positions. The education specialist supervised outreach activities, the assistant chief naturalist directed day-to-day operations in the park, while the chief naturalist devoted more time to parkwide issues as a member of the superintendent's staff. Meanwhile, the separate librarian and Longmire area naturalist positions were combined into one position, the audio-visual specialist position was left unfilled, and seasonal ranger-naturalists were assigned more or less to the four main developed areas of Paradise, Longmire, Sunrise, and Ohanapecosh. [47]

Museums, Waysides, Amphitheaters, Nature Trails

The interpretive division developed a prospectus for each of the four main developed areas of Paradise, Longmire, Sunrise, and Ohanapecosh in 1962-1964. [48] The focal point of each prospectus was the new visitor center planned for that area. While the park dedicated new visitor centers at Ohanapecosh and Paradise in 1964-1965, new visitor centers planned for Sunrise and Longmire were never built. Instead, existing museum exhibits in the administration building at Sunrise and in the old administration building at Longmire were updated in the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile, the park developed self-guiding nature trails in all four areas and added more wayside exhibits around the park road system.

The exhibits in the Sunrise Visitor Center acquired a facelift in 1974. The park remounted the old exhibits to make them more appealing, installed new touch tables, bulletin board materials, and a pair of mounted viewing telescopes, and added a publications display rack. The park also obtained an inflatable auditorium which could seat 75 to 100 people and used it in the stockade behind the visitor center for screenings of the new film "Fire and Ice." [49] A few years later park staff collaborated with interpretive specialists from Harpers Ferry Center in redesigning the displays into a more free-flowing plan. This was part of the "new look" in exhibitry that the NPS was implementing throughout the system. The concept was to get away from the "book on the wall" approach by bringing forward a few arresting exhibits that would entice the visitor without impinging too much on the visitor's limited time. Another aim of the new look was to work environmental education into the content of the exhibits. At Sunrise, the geological story was broadened to include displays on high altitude tundra and visitor impacts in the subalpine and alpine zones. [50]

About the same time that the Sunrise visitor center was being updated, park staff worked with the Harpers Ferry Center and the Denver Service Center on a new interpretive prospectus for the Longmire area. Drafted in 1975 and finally approved in 1981, the prospectus sought to integrate the area's historical and ecological themes and to encourage use of the area as an alternative to Paradise. Originally the prospectus called for turning the administrative building into a new visitor center that would combine visitor information, audiovisual programs, and a publication sales area, while museum exhibits would be retained in the old museum building. [51] By 1981, park officials had decided to keep all but the front room on the ground floor of the administration building for administrative use and to make the front room a hiker information center. The museum, meanwhile, escaped the "new look" because the museum exhibits themselves became contributing elements in the Longmire historic district. With its historical ambiance and rustic architecture, Longmire was an ideal place to convey the national park story. As the superintendent reported in 1982,

> The Longmire Museum received a new old-time look this year. All the exhibit cases were stripped down to raw wood, stained dark mahogany and varnished. The cases were complimented [sic] by off-white paint and Victorian lighting. The grey deck paint on the floor gave way to a light brown carpet. The overall effect is Vintage Early Museum. [52]

Loren Lane prepared a new exhibit for the museum entitled "Pioneer Naturalists of Mount Rainier," featuring former naturalists J.B. Flett, Charles Landes, Floyd Schmoe, and C. Frank Brockman.

The Park Service lost none of its enthusiasm for wayside exhibits after the Mission 66 era. It continued to add new wayside exhibits to road and trail overlooks throughout Mount Rainier's front country. A Wayside Exhibit Team, comprised of park staff, regional planners, and specialists from the Harpers Ferry Center, developed a plan in 1977-1978 for 41 additional waysides in the park. Installation of these wayside exhibits began in 1979, and continued for two more years. [53] The content of the wayside exhibitry covered the gamut from geology to history, but much of it reflected the Park Service's heightened emphasis on environmental education.

The virtue of wayside exhibits was that they interpreted park features at the actual points of interest. Their drawback was that the exhibits were exposed to all kinds of weather, from beating sun to freezing rain, from high winds to immense loads of snow. Wooden signs did not hold up under these conditions. The park used aluminum signage in the 1950s, then went over to fiberglass in the late 1970s, and most recently pioneered the use of porcelain enamel. Development of wayside exhibits involved not only the addition of new exhibits but the upgrading of existing ones with these new and improved materials. Currently most of the

park's trailhead signs use the porcelain enamel finish, but many of the old fiberglass exhibits remain and need replacement. [54]

Another disadvantage of the use of wayside exhibits was the amount of vandalism that they incurred. Wherever roving interpreters or self-guiding pamphlets could convey the same information as a wayside exhibit, the cost of vandalism had to be taken into account. So far, vandalism of waysides in Mount Rainier National Park has remained at fairly low levels. Perhaps the most important test of vandalism and signing involves the recent installation of trailside exhibits along the Trail of the Shadows, which obviates the need for self-guiding booklets. As long as the signs are not wrecked by vandals, they are a superior and cost-effective alternative to booklets. [55]

The interpretive division has long staged evening campfire programs in campground amphitheaters at Longmire, Cougar Rock, Sunshine Point, Ohanapecosh, and White River campgrounds. As attendance rose at these ritual national park gatherings, and as interpreters worked audiovisual media into their presentations, it was necessary to enlarge and update some of the amphitheaters. [56]

The interpretive division took the initiative in proposing and developing new self-guided nature trails. The Trail of the Shadows, the oldest nature trail in the park, was redeveloped in the early 1980s to give more emphasis to the local history of the Longmire meadow. Park naturalists developed self-guiding booklets for nature trails at Nisqually Vista, Carbon River, Ipsut Creek, Ohanapecosh, Emmons Vista, and Sourdough Ridge, while the Grove of the Patriarchs trail was fitted with in-place metal photo plaques. [57] The interpretive prospectus for Longmire proposed adding a nature trail beginning on the south side of the road bridge across the Nisqually River, with small waysides focusing on the plants found along the river, the structure of the streambed, and effects of flooding. This project, however, never materialized. [58]

The Challenge of Visitor Diversity

Despite the fact that the vast majority of Mount Rainier's visitors have come from the Pacific Northwest in recent years, foreign tourists and recent immigrants have accounted for a growing number of park users. These groups present a special challenge for the park administration. Many are not fluent in English. More importantly, many are unaware of American cultural values pertaining to national parks and wilderness areas. Foreign tourists and recent immigrants often behave in ways that may be normal within their frame of reference but appear as insensitive to experienced national park visitors. Shortcutting on trails or spreading out picnic blankets in the Paradise meadows are common examples of this type of behavior. The challenge for the interpretive division is to reach out to these groups, make them feel welcome, and effectively inform them of the Park Service's efforts to preserve the resources.

The park administration recognized the special needs of foreign tourists and recent immigrants as early as 1977, when foreign-language interpretive handouts were prepared and distributed in German, Spanish, and Japanese. [59] By 1995, some printed materials were published in as many as eight foreign languages. The park administration also sought to reach non-English speaking visitors by hiring seasonals who were fluent in foreign languages. Recently, the park entered into an agreement with Recreational Equipment, Inc., to develop stay-on-the-trail signs addressed to foreign tourists. The aim was to come up with suitable messages that would not only convey the park regulation, but obtain the foreign visitors' compliance by appealing effectively to their cultural values. [60]

Another social group with whom the interpretive division took a special interest were local

American Indians. In 1988, Chief Naturalist William Dengler initiated contacts with neighboring tribes to learn about their ancestral use and association with Mount Rainier. Cecelia Carpenter, a Nisqually tribal historian, provided a training session for all seasonal ranger-naturalists. The park administration invited Carpenter to compile Indian legends and myths regarding Mount Rainier for use by park staff. [61]

THE MAINTENANCE DIVISION

Mount Rainier's maintenance division has had a relatively large budget and staff for as long as the park administration has been divided into departments, or since the late 1920s. During the past decade the maintenance division has absorbed approximately 40-50 percent of the park's annual budget. [62] Several features of Mount Rainier National Park have contributed to the large scale of the maintenance operation: a well-developed physical plant, including one of the highest ratios of road miles to square miles among western national parks; aging buildings, many of which possess historic value; heavy snow fall, entailing high costs for snow removal and structural repairs; and a topography and climate which combine to create many powerful forces of erosion, including rockslides, snow avalanches, downed trees, washouts, floods, and mudflows.

Core maintenance activities in the front country have not changed very much since the division was created. The primary function of the division has always been to maintain buildings, roads, and trails, and it has always accomplished this work by a combination of contracts and in-house task directives. Since World War II, the maintenance division has also had responsibility for radio and telephone communications, power utilities, and water and sewage systems; these functions were formerly assigned to separate electrical and engineering departments within the park administration. More recently the maintenance division has shared responsibility with the protection division for youth programs, meadow restoration projects, and human waste management in the alpine zone.

The maintenance division's activities in the backcountry have changed more than its activities in the front country. In the first place, the logistics of hauling materials into the backcountry have changed dramatically. Until the mid-1980s the park still had its own pack stock and an animal packer for trail maintenance; now army helicopters do the work in a few hours that it would take a pack string and packer many days to accomplish. Helicopters not only airlift logs, supplies, and equipment for trail and bridge construction, but they also transport hundreds of sacks of gravel and dirt for use in meadow restoration—heavy materials that would be completely beyond the means of pack stock to carry into the backcountry. This use of helicopters is made possible through a joint U.S. Army Reserve-NPS training and resource management operation: the Army Reserve's helicopter pilots acquire high-altitude flight experience while the NPS gets these materials airlifted at no cost to the Park Service. [63]

The maintenance division's other responsibilities in the backcountry have always overlapped with those of the protection division. Trail maintenance, the rehabilitation of some backcountry buildings and the removal of others, meadow restoration around popular backcountry camp sites, the creation of new backcountry camp sites—all of these activities have been accomplished by both divisions during the past twenty to thirty years. In an effort to resolve this blurring of responsibilities, Superintendent Briggle transferred the entire program of trail maintenance from the maintenance division to the protection division's newly established Muir District in 1994. [64]

Helicopter and firefighters at Sunrise, staging area for the Grand Park fire, August 1, 1965. Helicopters have had a large influence on park operations in the backcountry. *(C.J. Gebler photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

For a long time the maintenance division staff has been organized into two main bodies with a general foreman in charge of each. Buildings and utilities (B & U) forces include mechanics, painters, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and utility and sewage system operators. The roads and trails operation includes a force of motor vehicle and engineering equipment operators as well as a vehicle shop and sign shop. [65] For a number of years the maintenance division had a landscape architect and historical architect on board as well.

Major buildings and utilities projects during the past thirty years have focused primarily on rehabilitation and upgrading of the existing plant. The new visitor center at Paradise required a great deal of finishing work in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Wastewater treatment systems were reconstructed under contract at Ohanapecosh, Tahoma Woods, and Paradise between 1976 and 1979, and at Sunrise and Longmire in 1985. Rehabilitation of the Paradise Inn, including structural reinforcement, upgrading of the electrical system, and improvement of the fire suppression system, became a major priority of the maintenance division in the late 1970s, and this work continued into the 1980s. Rehabilitation of the National Park Inn, also under contract, was the outstanding accomplishment of the late 1980s. While tackling these projects somewhat sequentially, B & U forces attended to a swarm of minor projects each year, many of them arising on the cyclic maintenance program. [66]

The scope of road maintenance projects, even more than B & U projects, increased in years of severe weather. The amount of winter snowfall had a decisive influence on the cost of snow removal operations each year. After the record snowfall of 1972, for example, the Maintenance Division expended an extra 1,680 hours in the use of heavy equipment at a cost of $24,800. Heavy snowloads also destroyed trail bridges and an occasional road bridge and damaged roads. The division had to replace eight trail bridges and one road bridge, repair 340 feet of rock wall on the Stevens Canyon Road, and restore the road surface in twelve places where the pavement had subsided under the snowload. [67]

The worst damage to roads and bridges in recent years occurred in November 1990, when

fourteen inches of rain fell in five days. The flooding damaged the dike at Longmire, undermined the bridge abutments at Kautz Creek, damaged the riprap protection above and below the Tahoma Creek Bridge, washed out sections of the Westside Road at and above Fish Creek, damaged the Stevens Canyon Road below Bench Lake, and wiped out a turnout on the Carbon River Road at Chenuis Falls. The estimated cost of repairs was $2,177,450; the park received a mere $487,814. [68] Consequently the Westside Road was closed at Fish Creek.

A significant innovation in road maintenance operations was the decision in 1984 to rent the park's entire motor vehicle fleet, including front end loaders, dump trucks, snow plows, and rotary snow plowers, from the Government Services Administration (GSA). This action allowed the park to upgrade all of its equipment without making an initial capital outlay. The system proved to be cumbersome, however, as NPS mechanics continued to service the GSA's heavy equipment in the motor vehicle shop at Longmire, and GSA officials tried to control the heavy cost of maintaining these vehicles. Ten years after the GSA agreed to this arrangement, the NPS remained the only federal agency which rented heavy equipment from the GSA, and most national parks still owned their own motor vehicle fleet. [69]

Commencing in the late 1980s, the maintenance division assisted with the human waste management program (Chapter XIX) by taking charge of installing and removing privacy screens and temporary toilets in the alpine zone each spring and fall. Privacy screens were installed at Camp Muir, Camp Schurman, and Ingraham Flats. A portable toilet was placed at Panorama Point each summer beginning in 1989. The maintenance division contracted with a helicopter outfit to airlift human waste off the mountain. [70]

The superintendent put the maintenance division in charge of a recycling program in 1990. In February 1991, representatives of Dow Chemical Company visited the park and proposed an enlargement of the recycling program along similar lines to Dow's partnership programs at Great Smoky Mountains, Grand Canyon, and Acadia National Parks. Dow assumed all costs for the first five years of the expanded recycling program at Mount Rainier, which was formally inaugurated at the Henry M. Jackson Memorial Visitor Center in August 1991. [71]

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART SIX: YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION, 1965-1995

XIX. ZONING THE PARK

INTRODUCTION

NPS planners in the Mission 66 era regarded visitor circulation as the key to good national park planning and management. In the 1960s and 1970s they changed their focus to land classification, or zoning. Zoning would help managers restrict various types of development, visitor use, and administrative activity to appropriate areas in the park. Zoning would provide a more precise and ecologically sensitive framework for land management. The change in focus from visitor circulation to land classification reflected the Park Service's deepening commitment to good environmental stewardship. It signalled a greater attentiveness to natural resources, a shift in the scales between preservation and use, a change of outlook that national park historian Alfred Runte has called "a new seriousness." [1]

Mount Rainier National Park was zoned three times between 1964 and 1972, and each zoning had a lasting effect on the management of the park. In the first zoning, the entire park was classified as a "natural area" within the national park system. It was Director Hartzog's plan (approved by Secretary Udall in 1964) to classify all units in the national park system into three categories of areas: natural, historical, and recreational. According to Hartzog's scheme, each classification required a separate management concept to conform to its management plan. The primary goal for managing a natural area would be to perpetuate or restore its natural values. In such an area, historical and recreational values would be subordinated to natural values. Any significant historic features that were present would be maintained "to the extent compatible with the primary purpose for which the area was established." [2] Separate policy manuals were prepared for the three classifications and published in 1968.

The next important zoning of the park came in response to the Wilderness Act of 1964. In that landmark piece of legislation, Congress required all federal land management agencies, including the Park Service, to recommend areas for inclusion within the new wilderness preservation system. The NPS duly completed a wilderness proposal for Mount Rainier in 1972. Although the plan did not finally win legislative enactment until 1988, park officials administered the area as de facto wilderness for the next sixteen years. Meanwhile the park's backcountry management plan, completed in 1973, subdivided the area into a trail zone, crosscountry zone, and alpine zone.

The third and most detailed zoning of the park was contained in the master plan for Mount Rainier in 1972. Using the land classification system developed for natural areas, the authors of the master plan zoned Mount Rainier National Park into five separate areas. The first classification, defined as "general outdoor recreation areas," included the intensive use areas at Longmire, Paradise, Sunrise, White River, Ohanapecosh, Carbon River, Mowich Lake, and Cougar Rock, as well as the primary park road system. The second classification, defined as "natural environment areas," constituted a buffer zone around the former areas and included

minor roads, secondary use areas, utility systems, and a strip along the park boundary near Crystal Mountain Ski Area. The third classification, defined as "outstanding natural areas," embraced the glacier and alpine areas on Mount Rainier together with the alpine area of the Tatoosh Range and the lowland forest along the Carbon River. The fourth classification, defined as "primitive areas," included the rest of the park area that was suitable for wilderness designation. Finally, the Longmire meadow fell into a fifth classification as the park's lone historic site. [3]

Subsequently the precise boundaries and uses of these zones underwent adjustments here and there, and three further historic districts were recognized, but by and large the zones established in 1972 provided a starting point for most management decisions in Mount Rainier during the next twenty years.

WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT

If zoning was the land management strategy of choice in the 1960s, wilderness preservation was its primary goal. NPS officials recognized wilderness to be a finite resource and a crucial national park value, and they dedicated themselves to protecting it from creeping development and overuse.

Wilderness preservation began with the question, what is wilderness? Preservationists generally agreed that wilderness was a state of mind, an entity so subjective in its substantive criteria that it resisted easy definition. Yet define it they must or wilderness would not have the protection of law. The Wilderness Act of 1964 defined wilderness as "an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain." The key word in this definition, "untrammeled," was itself subject to various interpretations; it connoted freedom from crowds, freedom from regulation, and freedom from physical traces of modem civilization. [4]

Given the subjective nature of the resource, wilderness managers came to recognize that it was impossible to preserve wilderness without protecting "the wilderness experience." In fact, park managers already had some familiarity with this problem; in view of the Park Service's dual mandate of preserving natural resources while providing for their use and enjoyment by the people, park managers had found it necessary from time to time to identify and protect "the national park experience." This varied with time and place. During the winter seasons at Paradise in the 1930s, for example, park managers tried to prevent the development of a carnival-like atmosphere on the ski slopes precisely because they believed it would cheapen the park experience. After World War II, park managers provided campfire wood in the campgrounds and stocked Mount Rainier's lakes with fish—two examples of measures which park managers took to provide visitors with what they perceived to be the proper park experience.

After the Wilderness Act of 1964, social scientists developed a more scientific method for defining "the wilderness experience" and "the national park experience." Their method was based on the concept of carrying capacity. Range and wildlife managers, years earlier, had developed the concept of carrying capacity to define the amount of use (usually by grazing animals) that an area of land could support on a sustained basis without exhausting the resource base. [5] The social scientists proposed that wilderness and national park areas had a "recreational carrying capacity." It was this concept which the Sierra Club's David Brower had conveyed in 1956. According to sociologist J.A. Wagar, recreational carrying capacity was "the level of recreational use an area can withstand while providing a sustained quality of recreation." [6]

So what was quality? To measure quality, the concept of recreational carrying capacity evolved over the next decade into a dual system of psychological and ecological components. The psychological component of recreational carrying capacity measured perceptions of crowding and user satisfaction through visitor questionnaires; the ecological component measured the effects of recreational activity on soils, vegetation, water quality, and wildlife behavior through field study and analysis. The goal was to identify levels of sustainable use which would assist managers in achieving their twin objectives of preserving the resource and providing for the public use and enjoyment of the resource. [7]

The concept of recreational carrying capacity first emerged on a policy level in the Park Service's backcountry management plans in the early 1970s. Backcountry management plans were put in place for Mount Rainier, Yosemite, Glacier, and several other national parks. Systemwide, the plan which attracted by far the most sociological study and national media attention was a plan for restricting recreational use of the Colorado River in Grand Canyon National Park. Mount Rainier's backcountry management plan generated a significant amount of local interest, and eventually Mount Rainier's backcountry users would be the subject of sophisticated sociological study too. As much as park officials hated to restrict wilderness users (they generally sympathized with the notion that freedom from regulation was one of the essential qualities of wilderness), they came to the conclusion that the alternative of unrestricted use was much worse. As one seasonal park ranger remarked, "I like to think that it isn't really wilderness when you have to find your assigned campsite along well-marked trails. It may not be wilderness but it's the best we have." [8]

The Backcountry Management Plan

The physical wear and tear on Mount Rainier's backcountry had reached disturbing proportions by the 1960s. Trails were gullied, shortcuts were ubiquitous and badly eroded, and parallel trails were established across many meadow areas. Heavily used campsites, easily recognizable from the sprawling bare patches that developed around them in the subalpine meadows, were sprinkled helter skelter around the most scenic beauty spots in the backcountry. Campfire rings abounded. [9]

People who experienced the park's backcountry then, and are familiar with it today, can testify to the backcountry's poor condition at the time that the backcountry management plan was adopted. Ranger John Wilcox, who transferred to Mount Rainier in 1972, found that backcountry users' impacts were much more noticeable and bothersome in Mount Rainier than in Glacier, where Wilcox had worked during the mid to late 1960s, despite the fact that Glacier saw more horse use than Mount Rainier. [10] Ranger Gene Casey, who joined the park staff in 1974, thought Mount Rainier National Park was the most "beat up" national park he had seen. [11] Superintendent John Rutter found the Mowich Lake area "beaten to death" in the 1960s; the lake shore was virtually denuded of vegetation. [12] Observations on the condition of the backcountry had no scientific foundation at this time—the park had no hard data to document the effects of backcountry users and horses on soil compaction, defoliation, water quality, or animal behavior, for example—but the impacts were plainly evident aesthetically.

Ranger John Dalle-Molle deserves credit as the first individual to recommend a backcountry management plan for Mount Rainier. Dalle-Molle wanted to restrict backcountry use in order to give these impacted areas a respite. Dalle-Molle was convinced that large parties were causing the most damage. A devastating example was the party of Boy Scouts who allowed a campfire to get out of control in Berkeley Park, creating an enormous fire ring in the lush meadow. Dalle-Molle took advantage of this unfortunate episode to make yearly measurements of the revegetation of the blackened area. His study, which eventually spanned six years, demonstrated how slowly Mount Rainier's subalpine meadows recovered from such

scarring. Dalle-Molle's study was significant because it predated the systemwide initiative in 1972 to develop backcountry management plans for several national parks. [13]

The Seattle Mountaineers recognized that there was a problem at Mount Rainier too. In a 1969 report, "Recommendations for Future Development of Mt. Rainier National Park," the club's conservation committee commented that many fragile areas in the park could not tolerate the heavy use they received. The report specifically mentioned Spray Park, noting that the area "suffers from typical back-packer abuse.. .and is in much the same situation as many of Mt. Rainier's meadow areas." For the Seattle Mountaineers, the solution was to close the Mowich Lake and Westside roads, making access to some of these areas more difficult and the hikes more rewarding. [14]

Park Service officials sought to increase local public awareness of the problem by presenting a forum on "The National Park Service in the 70s and Beyond" at the University of Puget Sound. Held in observance of the Yellowstone centennial in 1972, the forum focused on the need to limit visitor access to the more popular national parks. "We're up to our ears in people," Mount Rainier Superintendent Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., told the Tacoma-area audience, "and people cause trouble in managing a wilderness resource." Tobin announced that the park was formulating plans to restrict vehicular traffic, limit the number of backcountry campsites, and institute a reservation system for overnight backcountry use. Regional Director John A. Rutter emphasized that the impending changes in Mount Rainier National Park were part of a larger trend toward limiting park use. The NPS had restricted vehicular traffic in Mount McKinley and Yosemite the previous summer, Rutter said, and park officials had reported that the restrictions were "very well accepted" by the public. This forum, together with other NPS announcements on the coming backcountry management plan, received sympathetic coverage in the local press. [15]

Superintendent Tobin directed his ranger staff to develop a backcountry management plan for Mount Rainier during the winter of 1972-73. The rangers aimed the plan mainly at horse parties and overnight campers, who were thought to be causing far more damage to the resources than day hikers, picnickers, and other day users. In the plan, horse use was virtually eliminated in the subalpine areas of the backcountry. Horse parties could only camp in designated sites and no more than six horses were allowed at one site. [16] As for backcountry campers, the plan restricted their activity in three ways.

First, the plan instituted a more restrictive policy on campfires in the backcountry. Campfires were only allowed in designated sites; no campfires were allowed in subalpine areas. (There was an unforseen consequence of this policy: the amount of litter around backcountry campsites fell off remarkably, suggesting that people who cooked over stoves tended to keep a cleaner camp than people who cooked over open fires.) [17]

Second, the plan zoned the backcountry into trail, crosscountry, and alpine zones. In the trail zones, camping was only permitted at designated sites and no more than two tents could occupy a site. In the crosscountry zone, the overnight user had to follow certain guidelines in selecting a campsite, which included minimum distances away from the trail and away from any standing or running water. No more than six people could camp in a site, larger groups had to use group sites. In the alpine zone, every identifiable route of ascent on Mount Rainier was assigned a capacity: three parties per route on the southern side of the mountain; two per route on the northern side. Large climbing parties had to use Camp Muir or Camp Schurman.

Third, the plan set limits on the number of people which each trail zone or crosscountry zone could accommodate overnight. When these capacities were reached, no more permits for the area would be issued. For the convenience of the public, backcountry reservations could be made through the mail.

The public accepted the backcountry management plan with more or less equanimity. When Superintendent Tobin explained that the restrictions were necessary to stem the proliferation of unplanned trails and campsites, the trampling of meadows, and the contamination of backcountry streams by human wastes, local people who were familiar with Mount Rainier's backcountry generally knew what he was talking about. [18]

The one source of visitor dissatisfaction was the reservation system. After the experience of the first summer, the authors of the plan readily acknowledged that this part of the plan was a mistake and the park administration henceforth abandoned it. In theory, the reservation system was a convenience for the public: eighty percent of backcountry sites could be booked in advance by mail, while twenty percent would be allotted to people on a first come-first served basis at the park. The problem with the reservation system, park officials soon discovered, was that people in Seattle and Tacoma would make reservations for three or four different weekends with the expectation of going to the park on the first weekend when the weather appeared favorable. As a result, many people who drove up to the park in the hope of obtaining one of the first come-first serve campsites found themselves out of luck, while many backcountry campsites stood vacant. The reservation system was admirably suited for the Wonderland Trail hiker, who might wish to plot out the 93-mile trip around the mountain weeks ahead of the event; but it utterly failed the spontaneous weekend backpacker, who was apt to throw some gear in the trunk of the car on a Friday evening, check the late-night weather forecast, and drive to the park next morning. This latter type of backcountry user occurred commonly in the Puget Sound area, where the third largest population of backpacking enthusiasts in the nation (after Denver and San Francisco) lived within a three-hour drive of Mount Rainier. [19]

After the park administration dropped the unpopular reservation system in 1973 it still had another bee in its bonnet—a cantankerous individual by the name of Larry Penberthy. As an experienced mountaineer and founder of Mountain Safety Research, Inc. (MSR), Penberthy objected strongly to the restrictions which the NPS placed on the most heavily used climbing routes on Mount Rainier. What made this mountaineer and engineer such a noteworthy critic, however, was his reputation for filing lawsuits "at the snap of a carabiner." [20] In the 1960s Penberthy had won a hefty settlement against a manufacturer of climbing equipment who allegedly infringed on his patented hardware, and around 1970 he had threatened similar action against the Seattle-based cooperative, Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI). As Penberthy began his one-man crusade against the park's backcountry management plan, many NPS officials felt he was laying the groundwork for a suit against the government. [21]

Penberthy opened his campaign at a public hearing on the proposed master plan held at Longmire in January 1974. Addressing Superintendent Tobin, Regional Director Rutter, and other NPS officials at the hearing, Penberthy complained that the master plan had been prepared by "outsiders" who did not understand the local population's attachment to the park. "A park should be a park," Penberthy testified, "a place for the benefit and enjoyment of people. A place for restoration of tranquility. It should not be a wilderness. If it is, then lock the gates and put on guards. We need a park for the Sunday people, the weekend people." Penberthy was the only member of the public to speak at the hearing. Regional Director Rutter, adjourning the meeting after Penberthy had finished, commented to a reporter that it was unfortunate only one point of view had been presented. [22]

Penberthy then began writing letters to Superintendent Tobin, requesting permits for large climbing parties that he knew would not be granted under the new regulations. The requests appeared to be in good faith, but park officials thought that he was probably preparing a legal case. Penberthy also complained when the Park Service did not supply him with a final copy of the backcountry management plan as it was printed in The Federal Register on June 24, 1975. That summer, after the park denied his request for a three-day climbing permit,

Penberthy filed suit. [23]

In Penberthy v. Tobin et al., the court upheld the right of the federal government to restrict park use. But the court also ruled that Penberthy's allegation that the NPS had established "arbitrary and capricious" restrictions was not without merit. Consequently, the court ordered the Park Service to drop the restriction on the number of parties using each climbing route, to prepare an annual climbing report, and to submit any further restrictions to the public review process. [24]

The Penberthy case underscored the need for hard data in determining the recreational carrying capacity of the backcountry. There was no scientific method, no systematic consideration of psychological and ecological factors in the preparation of the original backcountry management plan. The rangers simply picked out suitable campsites and established a limit for each backcountry zone based on their own experience and intuition. After a few years, they found that their limits had been too low, and the park administration relaxed them somewhat. When Penberthy sued the NPS a second time in 1986, the park administration had scientific evidence of the impacts which backcountry use had on environmental quality, and the judge dismissed the case. [25]

The backcountry management plan produced significant changes in the "wilderness experience" at Mount Rainier. Backpackers now entered a more regulated environment, an area where backcountry rangers were apt to make them show that they had the necessary permit, and where the permit itself required that they camp in certain designated backcountry camps or crosscountry zones and follow certain camp procedures. The camp procedures had a slightly antiseptic quality, as backpackers now cooked over stoves, filtered or boiled their water, hung their food at night, and conscientiously packed out every particle of trash. Gone were the days when backpackers could camp in their favorite subalpine meadow or next to their favorite mountain tam; now they typically camped in forest settings like that found at the new Devil's Dream Camp, where eight numbered sites and a privy were staggered up the trail a half mile below Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. Yet if something in the wilderness experience had been lost in all of this, it was only necessary to contemplate the alternative of unrestricted use to see how much had been preserved.

Backcountry shelter at Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. This was one of several shelters that were eliminated under the backcountry management plan. The shelters were in disrepair and the ground around them tended to be severely trampled. *(Photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

The backcountry management plan had the desired effect on the condition of the wilderness. Many areas that had been denuded by trampling began to recover in the 1970s and 1980s. Trail crews stabilized eroding sections of the trail, obliterated unplanned trails, covered up shortcuts with debris, and took out a number of overnight shelters that had fallen into disrepair. The latter project included the destruction of the old three-sided shelters at Van Trump Park, Golden Lakes, Deer Creek, Berkeley Park, Lake James, Mystic Lake, Klapatche Park, and Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. [26]

For all that it accomplished, it is an open question whether the park's backcountry management plan ever really identified a recreational carrying capacity for the park's backcountry. While park officials generally agree that the condition of the backcountry improved markedly during the 1970s and 1980s, their explanations for this vary. Some feel that the restrictions placed on horse parties and large groups had the most dramatic effect, while others feel that it was the many small changes in the way backpackers camped that made the most difference. Either view underscored the fact that the recreational carrying capacity could not be expressed as a flat population limit but rather had to take into consideration the character and composition of the recreationists themselves. Still another view suggests that the condition of the backcountry improved primarily because overall backcountry use peaked in the 1970s and then declined. One interpretation of this "peak" is based on demographics: baby-boomers invaded the backcountry in force when they reached

their young adult years, and retreated from the backcountry when they started to have children. Another interpretation of the "peak" is based on climate change: beginning in the late 1960s, warmer, drier weather made Mount Rainier's backcountry more accessible. Both of these interpretations suggest that trends in backcountry use over the past three decades were largely independent of the backcountry management plan. Whatever combination of factors were at work in correcting the problem, park officials generally agree that the level of backcountry use overshot the backcountry's recreational carrying capacity for a time in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Special Concerns in the Alpine Zone

The backcountry management plan defined the alpine zone as "those areas on Mount Rainier generally above 7,000 feet or elsewhere on glaciers." [27] Except for the Paradise ice caves area and the two heavily-travelled corridors leading to camps Muir and Schurman, the alpine zone saw little use by non-climbers. The backcountry management plan stated: "The climbing zone is generally the domain of persons wishing to experience the thrills of snow and ice climbing and glacier navigation... .The zone is accordingly managed to provide opportunities for a type of wilderness experience found in few other areas of the contiguous 48 states. It is the climbers who are the primary beneficiaries of this opportunity." [28] These climbers numbered in the thousands each summer.

Mount Rainier's extensive alpine zone presented special, and in some ways unique, challenges for backcountry management. These challenges included visitor safety, problems of crowding, and human impacts on the fragile ecosystem. The severity of weather conditions in this zone, combined with the growing number of people willing to confront this extreme environment, created new challenges for the park administration which had few parallels in the national park system.

Search and Rescue (SAR). Most search and rescue operations in the alpine zone involved the evacuation of injured climbers; some required bringing out bodies after fatal climbing accidents or airplane crashes; others entailed searching for missing persons.

Despite mounting costs for search and rescue operations and a surfeit of volunteer SAR groups in the Pacific Northwest who were willing to help, the park administration normally took the lead in organizing SAR operations on Mount Rainier. There were several reasons for this. First, quick response time was a critical concern in most search and rescue operations; typically the emergency call came late in the day and the SAR team would be pushing daylight as it started toward the scene of the accident. The park staff, with its contingent of experienced "climbing rangers" assigned to the Paradise district, was in a much better position than any volunteer SAR group to respond quickly to an emergency. Sometimes the park administration used Rainier Mountaineering, Inc. (RMI) guides who were at or close to the scene. [29] Second, park officials could readily coordinate with the Army for helicopter support. The U.S. Army helicopter stationed at Gray Army Air Base at Fort Lewis, assisted with medical evacuations on numerous occasions in the 1970s. [30] Army helicopters were also used to insert SAR teams into inaccessible areas on the east, north, and west sides of the mountain, lowering rangers to the ground by a cable device known as a "jungle penetrator." Helicopters began assisting with high altitude (above 10,000 feet) SAR operations in the 1980s. Helicopters were also used for "short haul" rescue operations, in which a ranger and litter were carried in a sling below the helicopter to the scene of the accident. [31]

A third reason that the NPS did not rely on volunteer SAR groups was that these operations were frequently dangerous as teams worked at night or in adverse weather conditions. Use of volunteers always carried the risk that the volunteers themselves would get into trouble. Volunteers could assist park rangers but they were rarely put in charge of search and rescue

operations. The NPS most often deployed volunteers in long ground evacuations or searches —the most labor intensive kinds of SAR operations. [32]

Beginning around 1990 the park administration had to make do with only five or six climbing rangers on staff. Faced with the need to assign more rangers to the front country where the greatest number of visitors were, the park administration adopted a new strategy in 1994 that it called "preventive search and rescue." The principle of preventive search and rescue was to place more emphasis on climber education in the hopes of reducing the number of climbing accidents. In the past, climbing rangers were assigned the task of registering climbers at Paradise at which time they checked each party's equipment, evaluated its level of experience, and dispensed information on routes, snow conditions, and the weather forecast. Under the new system, interpretive rangers had the job of registering climbers at Paradise, while climbing rangers were stationed at Camp Muir. This not only placed the climbing rangers higher on the mountain in case of emergency, it gave the climbing rangers an opportunity to visit with each climbing party in a more conducive setting. At Paradise most climbers were eager to get going and had little patience for a ranger's counsel; once they had reached Camp Muir, however, they were ready for a rest and some instruction, and whatever information they obtained had more immediate application. Chief Ranger John Krambrink expressed tentative satisfaction with the outcome of this new system after the first year. [33]

The need for SAR highlighted the fact that despite the many successful ascents of Mount Rainier each year, the upper mountain was an exceptionally dangerous environment for park visitors and employees alike. Tragedy struck the SAR team in August 1995 when a seasonal climbing ranger and an SCA park employee were killed in a fall on the Emmons Glacier. The two men were enroute to the 13,400-foot level to aid a climber with a broken ankle when the accident occurred. The ranger was in his second season at Mount Rainier, while the SCA park employee was in his first season. [34]

Crowding on the Climbing Routes. Climbers encountered extremes of solitude and crowding in the alpine zone. Climbers who were in search of solitude could probably find solitude during certain times of the year or days of the week or on lesser-used routes—and no doubt the cold, austere environment above 7,000 feet tended to accentuate whatever degree of solitude there was to be found. But climbers who took the standard routes on weekends during the summer had a very different experience. They were apt to follow a beaten path over the snow, compete for bunk and cooking space at Camp Muir, and share the summit with a few dozen other climbers. As the number of climbers rose sharply from about 2,000 annually in the late 1960s to 3,997 in 1972 and 4,471 in 1973, park officials worried that crowded conditions along the major climbing routes would diminish the wilderness experience. Thus, in the backcountry management plan of 1973, they limited the number of climbing parties on each route to two per day on the northern side and three per day on the southern side of the mountain.

The NPS eliminated these quotas in the aftermath of the court's decision in Penberthy v. Tobin et al.. In the revised backcountry management plan of 1981, the only use limits imposed in the alpine zone were for two designated climber camps, Muir and Schurman. The park administration felt justified in relaxing its policy because the number of climbers appeared to be leveling off. [35] Moreover, a 1980 survey of climbers indicated that most climbers did not feel that the mountain was too crowded. Park officials discerned that there was an important difference between backpackers and climbers in what they wanted to get out of their park experience: by and large obtaining a feeling of solitude mattered much more to the former group than the latter.

Nevertheless, park officials remained uneasy as the number of summit attempts reached 9,600 in 1993. If the upward trend continued, the park administration would eventually have

to limit the number of climbers. In the meantime, it sought to raise the recreational carrying capacity of the mountain by spreading out use. After RMI's contract expired in 1992, park officials considered allowing a second guide service to offer trips on the Emmons Glacier route via Camp Schurman. RMI was not interested, and it remained to be seen whether another concessioner could be found or what the public response would be if the park administration moved toward a new quota system. [36]

Crowding at the Climber Camps. Camp Muir presented unique problems. At 10,000 feet elevation, the camp was a popular destination for day hikers out of Paradise. It was also a popular overnight shelter for independent climbers, a base of operations for the guide service, and an important staging area for search and rescue. Increasingly crowded conditions at the camp in the late 1960s and early 1970s raised a number of important questions. How should the limited facilities be shared among these different user categories? How should sewage and water supply problems be resolved? Should the area be given wilderness protection?

There were three old stone buildings at Camp Muir: the Guide Hut built in 1916, the Muir Hut built in 1921, and a storage building (date unknown). In 1969, the park administration built an A-frame rangers' shelter (the Butler Shelter) and two new privies. The following year, it authorized RMI to build a prefabricated client shelter. Now the buildings were divided functionally between (1) the public (Muir Hut and privy), (2) RMI and its clients (Guide Hut, client shelter, and privy), and (3) the rangers (Butler Shelter and storage building). The new buildings did not have the aesthetic appeal of the stone structures and the camp as a whole had a haphazard appearance, yet the people who frequented Camp Muir generally felt that the camp's rough character was appropriate to the setting and a favorable part of the climbing experience. [37]

In 1973 there were 4,790 visitors to Camp Muir, approximately triple the number ten years earlier. About 3,000 of these visitors were overnight climbers, more than ten times the number a decade earlier. Such intensive use created problems of human waste disposal, particularly since human waste decomposed very slowly at such a high elevation. The Park Service built two new privies in 1969, each consisting of a wood frame building mounted over a 10-foot deep pit which was excavated into the bedrock and lined with concrete blocks. This system replaced two privies of unknown age which simply discharged wastes over a cliff onto the Cowlitz Glacier. Once each season, a ranger was assigned the duty of removing the solid wastes from these new pit toilets using a post hole digger and shovel, and placing it in barrels to be airlifted out by helicopter. [38]

In 1985 the Park Service installed a solar-assisted toilet at Camp Muir. The unit was designed to separate liquids from solids and evaporate liquids using passive solar energy. The unit was experimental, being the first of its kind to be used at high elevation in the Cascade Mountains. It required numerous refinements. A decade after its introduction, the park administration counted the solar-assisted toilet a mild success, although it still had concerns about liquid waste disposal in the unit. [39]

Mount Rainier's second climber camp, Camp Schurman, was a lesser concern. In the early 1960s, the Park Service authorized the Seattle Mountaineers to erect a quonset hut at the heavily used campsite near Steamboat's Prow. In the course of the decade the number of climbers using the Emmons Glacier route grew far beyond the hut's limited capacity to accommodate them all. By agreement with the climbers, the Park Service took over the quonset hut for use by rangers, principally for equipment storage. The building also functioned as an emergency shelter. [40]

By the 1980s, Camp Schurman was attracting an average of ten day-hikers per day during the summer as well as numerous climbing parties who pitched their tents at the site on their

way to the summit. Such a gathering of hikers and climbers at 10,000 feet elevation created another human waste disposal problem similar to that at Camp Muir. In 1982, the park administration installed privacy screens at Camp Schurman in an effort to concentrate fecal matter and make cleanup easier. [41]

Human Waste Disposal on the Climbing Routes. In the early 1980s, park officials began hearing complaints from climbers about the unpleasantness of encountering deposits of human waste on the upper mountain. Human waste deposits were most commonly encountered on the Emmons Glacier, Ingraham Flats, the top of Disappointment Cleaver, and Columbia Crest. Moreover, it seemed that human waste on the upper mountain might be linked to higher bacteria counts in stream run-off from these areas. The accumulation of human waste at high elevations was not unique to Mount Rainier; a 1980 report to Congress on "The State of the Parks" indicated that this was a significant environmental threat in other national parks with alpine areas too. Between 1982 and 1986, Mount Rainier National Park took the lead in developing systems for high altitude human waste management. [42]

There were five elements in the human waste management program. First, there was the existing program of helicopter support for removing the several barrels of waste which accumulated annually in the pit privies at Camps Muir and Schurman. Second, there was the aforementioned solar-assisted toilet, designed under supervision of the Denver Service Center and installed at Camp Muir in 1985. Third, the park administration experimented with privacy screens—both at Camp Schurman and on Ingraham Flats. This system, requiring frequent ranger patrols to insure site cleanliness, later had to be abandoned. Fourth, park rangers dispensed "blue bags" to climbers at Camps Muir and Schurman so that they could carry out their own defecated material. This method proved most successful. Finally, the park staff made a concerted effort to educate the climbing community about the problem. This effort included the preparation of an educational handout, produced jointly by the Park Service and Recreational Equipment, Inc.; posting of weatherproof signs on the privacy screens and in and around the huts and privies at the two climber camps; cooperation by RMI guides in informing clients of the problem at Camp Muir; and completion of a climbers survey by the Cooperative Park Studies Unit, University of Washington, in 1985 to give park personnel an idea of how effectively they were communicating the problem to the climbing community. [43] Park staff felt encouraged by the overall results of this program. Yet faced with a continuing upward trend in the number of summit attempts each year, officials were skeptical whether the problem of human waste had finally been surmounted.

A proposal in 1994 to require a $100 permit fee for each summit attempt was aimed in large part at this problem. Fees collected from climbers would be used to defray costs of human waste management as well as search and rescue operations. Effective July 1, 1995, however, the climbing fee was set at $15 per person per climb (regardless of the number of nights) or $25 per person per year. [44]

Human Impact on Alpine Flora. In the 1970s, park officials began to suspect that climbers were having an impact on the flora in certain heavily used areas of the alpine zone. Their concern focused on the fellfields located between 7,000 and 10,000 feet elevation, where tiny plants grew in the loose, pumicy soil and lay dormant under snow for ten months out of the year. Vegetation studies by Ola Edwards, completed in the early 1980s, confirmed that heavy use of some areas was causing defoliation. [45]

The park administration tried to reduce human impacts in the heavily traveled Muir corridor by requiring climbers to camp only on snowfields. Elsewhere, park officials sought to reduce human impacts by stepping up visitor education, monitoring vegetative conditions, and increasing ranger patrols in particularly sensitive areas. [46]

Designating a Wilderness Area

The Wilderness Act of 1964 called for the Park Service to study all lands under its jurisdiction and submit proposals to Congress for adding appropriate lands to the National Wilderness Preservation System. The NPS made little headway on this task while George Hartzog was director because he believed that wilderness designation within the national park system was redundant. Soon after Hartzog retired, the NPS made wilderness recommendations for dozens of national parks and swamped the process. Mount Rainier's 1973 wilderness recommendation, however, never reached Congress.

In the mid-1980s Superintendent Guse revived the wilderness proposal. Guse wanted to enclose even more of the park in wilderness than the NPS had proposed in 1973. For example, he wanted to include the well-traveled corridor between Paradise and Camp Muir whereas this area had been excluded from the wilderness recommendation in 1973. In essence he wanted everything but the existing roads and developed areas committed to wilderness protection.

The regional office held back the Mount Rainier wilderness proposal until NPS planners had completed similar proposals for North Cascades and Olympic National Parks. The three wilderness proposals were then combined in one bill, which Congress enacted on November 16, 1988. Title III of the Washington Park Wilderness Act designated 216,855 acres of Mount Rainier National Park, or approximately 95 percent of the park's total land area, as the "Mount Rainier Wilderness." [47] As such it became a component of the National Wilderness Preservation System and subject to all the protections of the Wilderness Act of 1964. Together with adjacent areas under Forest Service management which had been designated wilderness in 1984, the Mount Rainier Wilderness afforded a greater degree of protection from threatened development. [48]

PLANNING IN THE FRONT COUNTRY

The park administration contended with the same basic problems in the front country that it did in the backcountry: environmental degradation, crowding, and the legitimate desire of the national park visitor to escape regimentation. With regard to environmental degradation, the main strategy for the front country was to move visitor concentrations to lower elevations on the mountain. This concept had originated with the Mission 66 plan for Mount Rainier yet it was not until the 1970s that it really bore fruit, with campground closures at Paradise and Sunrise and the removal of park headquarters to the Tahoma Woods administrative site.

Alleviation of crowding in the front country was more complicated. Historically, park planners had recommended additional roads and development areas to disperse visitor use, beginning with the Westside Road in the 1920s, continuing with Sunrise and the Eastside Road in the 1930s, and ending with the Stevens Canyon Road in the 1950s. Now that the park was fully developed, park planners had to look for other ways to alleviate crowding. Their efforts focused on the existing development areas and automobile use. Reconfiguration of traffic flow and parking lots at Paradise, Longmire, and Sunrise helped somewhat, but what planners wanted most was to introduce mass transit and reduce or even eliminate automobile access to some areas.

The master plan of 1972 conceived of mass transit as the wave of the future for Mount Rainier National Park. Twenty-three years later, the same concept may be part of the new general management plan. The problem with mass transit is that it runs up against another primary objective of park planning, and that is to preserve the visitors' sense of freedom in the national park. For the majority of front country users, driving their private automobiles

over scenic roads continues to be the quintessential national park experience. [49] How to alleviate crowding without subjecting park visitors to unwanted regimentation is a problem that continues to confound park planning efforts.

Developed Areas

The 1972 master plan listed fifteen "developed areas" in the park excluding the road system. Only three of the fifteen—Tahoma Woods (just outside of the park), Cougar Rock, and Stevens Canyon Entrance—were of recent origin. The other twelve were Paradise, Longmire, Sunrise, Ohanapecosh, Nisqually Entrance, Carbon River Entrance, White River Entrance, Tipsoo Lake, Camp Muir, Mowich Lake, and Carbon River-Ipsut Creek, all of which dated from before World War II. The master plan classified all of these areas except Camp Muir and Tahoma Woods as Class II lands, or "General Outdoor Recreation Areas." The master plan stated that "the area included in this classification is sufficiently large to accommodate projected use." [50] There would be no more developed areas in Mount Rainier National Park; by and large, the park facilities would be renovated or replaced but not expanded.

The master plan called for removal of some facilities. Automobile campgrounds at Sunrise and Mowich Lake would be changed to walk-in campgrounds, and the campground at Paradise would be eliminated altogether. The administrative offices at Longmire would be replaced with new offices at Tahoma Woods. Over the next few years these plans were implemented. The changes to these facilities represented significant planning and policy choices which originated in the Mission 66 era but only came to fruition in the 1970s.

It is not clear why Mount Rainier's alpine car campgrounds persisted as long as they did, for the development of Cougar Rock campground in 1960-61 was supposed to have eliminated the need for them. The environmental costs of operating public campgrounds at such high elevations were perhaps most evident at Sunrise, where the alpine tundra vegetation was especially vulnerable to trampling and wind erosion. There were two campgrounds at Sunrise in the early 1960s: a small, upper campground adjacent to the visitor center and a lower one by Shadow Lake. Superintendent Rutter closed the upper campground around 1965 but kept the lower one open. It was Rutter's plan to expand the White River campground before closing the lower Sunrise campground. While awaiting funds with which to expand the White River campground, Rutter had his maintenance division renovate the CCC-era comfort stations in the lower Sunrise campground. In 1973, Superintendent Tobin converted this campground to walk-in campsites (mainly for the benefit of Wonderland Trail users). The comfort stations were closed and all but one were removed a few years later. [51]

Still more surprising was the decision in the early 1960s to develop a new public campground at Paradise. Apparently the idea was to redevelop the old campground area into a day-use picnic area in order to compensate for the planned removal of the Paradise Lodge and horse concession. The newly-built campground was located on the inside of a wide horseshoe bend in the two-way road to Paradise, just below the picnic area. But Superintendent Rutter soon recognized that the new campground was ill-conceived, for it was built in a depression that stayed snowbound until late July and had poor drainage for the remainder of the summer. In 1973, the park administration began operations to remove all facilities from this campground, and in the 1980s an effort was made to restore the area to a natural state. [52]

Perhaps the reason Mount Rainier's high-elevation campgrounds persisted as long as they did was that the low-elevation sites posed their own set of problems, mostly relating to visitor safety and maintenance. In 1963, debris from a massive rockfall on Little Tahoma came to rest within a few miles of the White River campground. This striking event served to remind everyone that Mount Rainier's glacial river valleys were pathways for the mountain's most destructive forces. In 1967, a glacial outburst flood inundated the former Tahoma Creek

campground after it had been converted to a picnic area. Mission 66 plans to develop a campground at Klickitat Creek never materialized, while plans to develop a campground at Mowich Lake were scaled back in the 1960s as it became evident that that area was already sustaining too much use. In 1977, heavy rains caused extensive flood damage to the Ipsut Creek and Sunshine Point campgrounds. Even the old Longmire campground fell into disfavor. The campground was located in the Nisqually River floodplain. Moreover, the access road took the visitor through the Longmire administrative area and across the old Nisqually bridge. The park administration consigned the Longmire campground to overflow use during the 1970s, and finally closed it to the public in 1989. [53]

When the NPS acquired the Tahoma Woods administrative site in 1961 the intent was to move all administrative offices out of Longmire and convert the Longmire area entirely to public accommodations and concession employee housing. This did not work out as planned. Budget cuts set back the timetable by several years; the NPS did not move park headquarters out of Longmire until 1977. By the time the move did occur, NPS officials had decided to keep various administrative functions, including the large maintenance operation, in Longmire. For a while all division chiefs had their offices at park headquarters. This proved to be awkward, and within a few years only the superintendent, administrative officer, and concession specialist kept their offices in Tahoma Woods while the other division chiefs had moved their offices back to Longmire. This arrangement has continued to the present day. Consequently, the NPS retained a strong administrative presence in Longmire, which functioned as a kind of field office to the headquarters at Tahoma Woods. Although the outcome is not at all what park planners had envisioned for Longmire, the arrangement has proven satisfactory from the standpoint of administrative efficiency. [54]

Tahoma Woods has come closer to fulfilling its intended role as an employee village. Out of 26 employee residences originally planned for Tahoma Woods, 14 were built. The NPS has since acquired a number of mobile homes and placed them at the site as well. This compares to some 30 permanent and seasonal employee residences at Longmire. Generally the competition for housing at Tahoma Woods is keener, especially among families with school-age children, who attend the nearby Columbia Crest Elementary/Middle School or Eatonville High School. Approximately one third of the park's permanent employees avail themselves of government housing at one of these two sites, while the rest live in the nearby communities of Ashford, Elbe, Eatonville, and Morton. [55]

The NPS provides seasonal employee housing at Tahoma Woods, Longmire, Paradise, Sunrise, Ohanapecosh, White River, and Carbon River. Except for a few mobile homes, all of this housing dates back to the Mission 66 era or earlier. In 1992, the Denver Service Center contracted with the architectural and engineering firm of Jones and Jones to design a new employee apartment building at Paradise to replace the old Paradise ski lodge. The plan, estimated to cost $4.2 million, is expected to reach completion in the spring of 1997, providing a total of eight apartments for 26 employees. [56]

Roads and Transportation

No new roads or mass transit systems have been developed in the park since 1965. In view of this issue's importance, this section discusses various unimplemented proposals to change the park's road and transportation systems. The section ends with a review of the partial closure of the Westside Road in 1992, which constitutes the only significant change in the park's road and transportation system in the past thirty years.

Sunrise Tramway Proposal. The master plan of 1972 proposed the development of an aerial tramway between the White River valley and Sunrise. The objective of this proposal was "to eventually remove the automobile completely" from the Sunrise area, reserving it for

pedestrian use only. This would alleviate crowding and reduce the level of visitor impacts on the environment. As another benefit, the existing road cut on Sunrise Ridge would be restored to a natural condition. [57]

Although the Sunrise tramway proposal never got to the stage of a detailed engineering study, planners had a rough idea of what it would entail. A direct route of ascent from the White River Valley would involve an elevation rise of 2,500 feet; if this were infeasible, a more gradual route of ascent would be from the east, traversing Sunrise Ridge, requiring an elevation gain of 2,700 feet with some nearly horizontal stretches along the way. Depending on the route, the tramway would carry 300 to 500 passengers per hour (3,000 to 5,000 per day), or about half of the peak daily use by private automobilists. Construction costs for a tramway and terminal buildings would be several million dollars. Visitors would presumably be charged a fee to ride the tramway.

The public response to the proposal was strongly negative. Fully 92 percent of those who commented specifically on the tramway were opposed to it. Respondents mainly opposed the tramway on the grounds that a tramway would degrade the beauty of the area, that a shuttle bus would be less intrusive, or that the existing road made a tramway unnecessary. Park planners eliminated the tramway proposal from the final master plan approved in 1976. [58]

Carbon River and Mowich Lake Road Proposals. Park planners wanted to eliminate automobile use of the Carbon River and Mowich Lake roads, but were thwarted here as well. The master plan of 1972 commented on the Carbon River-Ipsut Creek area,

> This unique resource area of the park is particularly appropriate for the immediate implementation of a visitor circulation system using vehicles other than automobiles. Unlike the loop road accesses to the heavily visited areas of the park, access to this area is by dead-end road. [59]

The master plan proposed to develop a parking area at the park boundary and to limit access to foot, bicycle, and public mini-bus traffic. As for Mowich Lake, the master plan stated,

> Removal of the automobiles from the vicinity of this highly scenic area would greatly increase the quality of the visitor experience. Although implementation of alternate methods of visitor access is not as simple as at Carbon River-Ipsut Creek, efforts should be made to keep automobiles as far from the lake as possible. Consideration should be given to ending the road at the park boundary and using leased parking space on private land outside. [60]

Subsequently, Park Service officials quietly dropped the proposal to close the Carbon River Road to private vehicular traffic. A potential problem was how to schedule mini-bus service in the spring and fall when the area received considerable use but not enough to make public transit economically feasible. Furthermore, there would be no cost savings on road maintenance, since the road would still be maintained for the mini-busses and administrative use. Probably the biggest factor in the plan's abandonment, however, was the concern that closing the road to private vehicular traffic would only turn away visitors rather than get them out of their cars. This visitor use would then be diverted to other areas of the park which were even less able to absorb it. [61]

Park Service officials advanced the proposal to close the Mowich Lake Road somewhat further. For one thing, this proposal had the support of the Seattle Mountaineers. [62] More importantly it had a clearer objective: to give the much-trodden shore around Mowich Lake a chance to recover. In order to win public support for the road closure, the Park Service proposed to rehabilitate the historic Grindstone Trail from the park boundary to Mowich Lake. This would be both more direct and a more pleasurable hiking experience than walking

along the packed soil and rock of the roadbed. [63] For one reason or another, the road closure never happened.

As park planners worked on the general management plan for Mount Rainier, various options for limiting access to Mowich Lake were once again under discussion, including the possible addition of a Mowich Lake entrance station at the Paul Peak trailhead area.

Mass Transit Study Proposal. While the transportation issue in the northwest corner of the park was relatively self-contained, the problem of congestion elsewhere in the park was more complex because the south and east sides of the park were linked together by the Stevens Canyon Road. Indeed, one of the purposes of the Stevens Canyon Road had been to facilitate the one-day scenic loop drive around the mountain. The park's through-road system did not easily lend itself to mass transit. Visitors would be less willing to accept mandatory public transit on a through-road than a dead-end road. If visitors had to leave their private vehicles at Longmire to take a shuttle bus to Paradise, for example, they would likely feel frustrated at being unable to continue over the Stevens Canyon Road. This problem notwithstanding, Mount Rainier's master plan called for a transportation study "to determine the exact methods required to satisfy present and future needs." [64] The master plan explicitly aimed to reduce private vehicle use in the park.

Funding for the transportation study was delayed for many years. Finally, in 1987, Superintendent Guse initiated a study of visitor attitudes toward a potential mass transit system. This study, carried out by the Cooperative Park Studies Unit, University of Washington, used visitor surveys to test the public's receptivity to six mass transit scenarios involving various combinations of return-trip shuttles on the Nisqually-Paradise, Sunrise, and Carbon River roads. The study revealed that visitor opinion was almost evenly divided, with many people holding strong views for or against the proposal. [65]

In 1993 the NPS contracted with a Denver-based company, BRW Inc. to evaluate transportation needs in Mount Rainier National Park. BRW's study included an analysis of summer and winter visitor circulation patterns and an evaluation of the feasibility of implementing a mass transit or Visitor Transportation System (VTS) in order to reduce automobile congestion. On June 2, 1994, the park convened a Transportation Alternatives Workshop at which BRW presented its findings and preliminary VTS alternatives. Regional transit planning authorities attended the workshop together with representatives from a wide range of organizations interested in Mount Rainier National Park. After the workshop, BRW modified the VTS alternatives in light of public comments and the Park Service's review and submitted its final report in 1995. [66]

The Park Service is currently incorporating the VTS alternatives into the park's new General Management Plan (GMMP). The GMP team is going into greater depth than does the BRW study in assessing the transportation system's environmental impacts and the VTS has yet to take final form.

West Entrance Station. The park entrance stations, in recent years, have experience traffic backups during peak periods of visitation. The problem has at times been acute at the Nisqually or west entrance station, where traffic backups may extend west of the park boundary for as much as one mile. The backup inhibits access to commercial properties and creates a hazard for vehicles entering or leaving those establishments. Moreover, the stop and go traffic under the dense forest canopy at this location causes a buildup of exhaust fumes, which is an annoyance to park visitors and a health risk to park employees who work or reside at Nisqually Entrance. Other problems with Nisqually Entrance include the limited amount of parking for visitors requiring backcountry permits, and the dark and damp atmosphere of this location.

In 1984-85, the NPS considered three alternative locations for the west entrance: Kautz Creek, West Sunshine Point, and the Westside Road junction. Questions of where the inevitable traffic backup would be least objectionable had to be weighed against other factors such as space for vehicle parking, security for entrance station personnel, and efficiency of fee collection. Another alternative was to upgrade the existing layout, mainly by adding a second kiosk and third eastbound traffic lane. [67] The park administration favored the West Sunshine Point location. [68] Due to fund limitations, however, none of these alternatives was implemented.

Westside Road Closure. Glacial outburst floods have afflicted the Westside Road periodically. A major glacial outburst flood occurred at the South Tahoma Glacier in August 1967 which devastated the Tahoma Creek campground. Glacial outburst floods of lesser magnitude occurred in 1970 and 1971. After a fifteen-year hiatus, Tahoma Creek experienced another series of glacial outburst floods beginning in 1986. A flood in 1987 inundated the Tahoma Creek picnic area. A pair of floods in July 1988 deposited mud on the Westside Road from the former picnic area to just above Fish Creek and diverted all of Tahoma Creek's streamflow to the westernmost stream channel flanking the roadbed. Heavy rains in mid-October 1988, perhaps combined with additional glacial outburst floods, resulted in erosion of the roadbed and collapse of two sections of road just below Dry Creek. After the road was repaired in 1989, more high water episodes during the winter of 1989-90 caused additional erosional damage. [69]

In May 1989, the park administration prepared an environmental assessment on the proposed flood damage repair which addressed two alternatives: (1) no action (leaving the road closed to travel), and (2) reconstruction of the road on its original alignment and grade. The NPS selected the second alternative as its preferred alternative. During a 30-day public review period, the NPS received just four comments; three in favor of the proposed action and one in favor of keeping the road closed.

Regional Director Charles H. Odegaard expressed reservations about the plan, however. First, if the road were reopened it would expose visitors to the potential hazard of future glacial outburst floods. Therefore, the NPS needed to have more information on this phenomenon and a warning system in place so that visitors could make their own risk assessments. Second, Odegaard maintained that the environmental assessment process was inadequate for evaluating the potential for further damage from glacial outburst floods, or "jokulhlaups," as they were now called. "A primary management planning need is to pre evaluate the Mount Rainier road system in relation to future jokulhlaups, river flooding, and seismic damage," Odegaard wrote. A third and related issue was that NPS policy must be brought into compliance with Executive Orders 11988, "Floodplain Management," and 11990, "Protection of Wetlands." The wording in these executive orders suggested that the Westside Road might have to be phased out or relocated. [70]

Acting on these concerns, the Park Service requested that the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) make a reconnaissance of a potential road realignment. FHWA engineer Scott Rustay reported on two alternatives in December 1991, one involving a steep 15 percent grade and the other involving a 7 percent grade but not entirely bypassing the Tahoma Creek floodplain. Both alternate routes led through old growth forest. Moreover, both alternatives entailed an adjustment of the boundary of the Mount Rainier Wilderness. [71]

Following FHWA's realignment reconnaissance effort, the NPS prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) for management of the Westside Road and released it for a 30-day public review period in January 1993. The EA put forth five alternative management actions for consideration. These included the two FHWA alternative realignments, permanent closure of

the road above Dry Creek (converting the road bed above that point to administratively designated "wilderness"), continuous repair of the existing road, as needed (the "no action" alternative), and temporary closure of the road above Dry Creek to non-administrative vehicular traffic for the forseeable future, leaving it open to foot, stock, bicycle, and administrative use (the preferred alternative). Under the preferred alternative, the NPS would monitor the debris flood activities and consider repairing and reopening the road should the flooding substantially subside. Following public input, the park prepared a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) and implemented the preferred alternative.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART SIX: YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION, 1965-1995

XX. THE CHANGE IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

Resource management in Mount Rainier National Park has changed fundamentally during the past thirty years. At every level of the organization management decisions have become rooted in data evaluation. Resource specialists now collect data in the field, systematize it, and develop manuals and plans so that resource managers can act upon the data in an informed and consistent manner. Resource management has grown more deliberate, thorough, and precise; as former superintendent Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., remarked, resource management is no longer based on simply "observing the resource" and responding on that basis. [1] This fundamental change occurred by a gradual accretion of many new technical staff positions and management plans, and transpired over the whole thirty year period since 1965. The change was dramatic only when viewed over a long time span.

Organizationally, resource management was divided between natural and cultural disciplines. Natural resource management required scientifically trained botanists and wildlife biologists; cultural resource management drew upon the disciplines of archeology, cultural anthropology, curation, history, and historical architecture. Data collection, systematization, and evaluation differed according to the resource and called for increasing specialization by discipline.

NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The major themes of natural resource protection in Mount Rainier National Park have remained consistent throughout the park's nearly 100-year history. These themes, of course, are the protection of the subalpine meadows, wildlife, and forest. But the manner of implementing those protections is very different today than it was thirty years ago. It is in the area of natural resource management that Mount Rainier National Park has seen the most change in the period since 1965.

Meadow Restoration

The park administration recognized a need for changes in subalpine meadow management as early as 1959, when it contracted with C. Frank Brockman for an ecological study of Paradise meadows. Brockman reported that the problem of meadow management was more administrative than biological—that is, the park administration had to find ways of reducing visitor impacts more than anything else. [2] Not surprisingly, then, Superintendent Rutter turned to the park's landscape architect, Ed Bullard, to prepare the park's first meadow management plan. Bullard accepted the aims of natural resource management set out in the famous Leopold Report: the main object of the plan was to restore the scene to the way it had looked when whites first visited the area. [3] There were three important elements to this

plan.

First, the plan called for paving many of the heavily used trails in Paradise meadows. The paving of trails offended some visitors' sensibilities who thought that a bituminous trail surface destroyed the feeling of wilderness. But park officials insisted that paved trails were more defined than unpaved ones and would keep foot traffic more contained. Paved trails would also stand up to heavy use without becoming gullied. They were appropriate in certain intensively used areas such as Paradise meadows and Box Canyon. By paving the trails and posting signs that instructed hikers to stay on the path, park officials hoped to preserve the primitive off-trail scene. The alternative was to see the meadows become further and further dissected by unplanned "social trails." [4]

Second, the plan addressed the fact that natural ecological succession was resulting in encroachment of fir trees in Paradise meadows. Brockman had noted this in 1959. "One probable future problem relative to plant cover in the Paradise Valley should be noted," Brockman wrote. "There is evidence of the growing importance of abies lasiocarpa [sic] in the subalpine meadow plant community; this, evident by simple observation, is substantiated by the summer's study. It seems likely that the park administration may have a vista clearing problem on its hands in the near future." [5] In keeping with the spirit of the Leopold Report, and with Brockman's own recommendation, the meadow restoration plan provided for the systematic removal of tree saplings in order to preserve the meadow in the condition that whites had found it in the late nineteenth century. Perhaps half a million trees were removed in the early to mid-1970s in accordance with this plan. [6]

Third, the plan called for active restoration efforts including riprapping, resodding, and planting areas of bare ground. Superintendent Rutter assigned this task to the protection division and rangers undertook the work as funds allowed. In the late 1960s ranger John Dalle-Molle pioneered meadow restoration in the Yakima Park area, where numerous social trails led from the developed area up to Sourdough Ridge. Work crews obtained soil from roadside ditches in the area and transported it by wheelbarrow and a three-wheeled Cushman motor scooter to the project sites. The soil was placed on the unwanted trails, held in place with jute matting, and planted with subalpine plants taken from road shoulders in the area. SCA and YCC volunteers working under ranger supervision accomplished much of the work. [7]

Meadow restoration efforts were broadened to include backcountry sites after the Backcountry Management Plan came out in 1973. A YCC crew spent a week that summer restoring the meadow at Van Trump Park. The crew planted shrubs, built erosion control devices, and obliterated the social trail that led to the former Van Trump shelter. Meadow restoration in the front country continued, meanwhile, with seasonal laborers in the maintenance division laying dirt and matting on social trails and bare areas around Alta Vista in the Paradise meadows. [8]

Park officials found that meadow restoration worked: areas which had been denuded in the past could, with a little help, recover remarkably well. But they also realized that the fragile meadow areas were still getting pounded and that the NPS would never get on top of the problem unless visitors learned to stay on the trails. As Superintendent Neal Guse, Jr., saw the situation, protecting the meadows was a dual problem involving the natural resource and visitor behavior. He recommended a two-pronged effort involving natural resource studies on the one hand and social science research on the other. Meadow restoration could be made more effective if the park administration understood and even modified visitor behavior. In theory, the recreational carrying capacity of the meadows could be raised if non compliant visitor behavior could be minimized. [9]

In 1986, the superintendent formed an interdivisional committee to prepare a comprehensive plan for restoring the Paradise meadows. The committee included two rangers from the protection division, a ranger-naturalist, the park's landscape architect, the trail crew foreman, the park botanist, and a natural resource specialist. Over the next two field seasons, scientists on the committee documented 913 significantly degraded sites within a 1,000-acre area. Nearly 90 percent of these were social trails while the remaining sites consisted of large bare areas which had been used as viewpoints or rest areas. Meanwhile, Guse invited sociologist Darryll Johnson of the Cooperative Park Studies Unit, University of Washington, to head up a sociological study of "non-compliant use" in the Paradise meadows. Paradise rangers had discovered that the park's standard signs and barriers used in keeping people on the trails were ineffective. The purpose of the study was to identify who the non-compliant users were and test the effectiveness of different signs and barriers in obtaining visitor compliance. The study found that different signing could reduce the rate of non-compliance from 4.9 to 1.7 percent, or by two-thirds. By handing out questionnaires to off-trail hikers, researchers found that non-compliers were typically from the local four-county area, disproportionately non-white or foreign, less than twenty years old, not college-educated, and usually traveling in large groups. Another significant finding was that the presence of uniformed employees in the meadows reduced the level of noncompliance. This study influenced the protection section of the Paradise Meadow Plan. [10]

The committee completed the Paradise Meadow Plan in 1989. The plan's main features were recommendations for changes in the trail system, proposals for additional interpretive exhibits, changes in sign messages, and a restoration plan. Park botanist Regina Rochefort prescribed restoration measures in greater detail in her Restoration Handbook (1990). By then a large restoration effort had already been under way for three years, with some $600,000 spent treating 30 of the sites and initiating work on another 21. The project to that time included the placement of 1,965 silt bars, 991 cubic yards of soil, and 18,895 plants. The current method involves six steps: scarification, stabilization, filling, planting and seeding, site protection, and monitoring. [11]

Such an ambitious program would not have been possible without the assistance of U. S. Army helicopters, which transported the soil and other materials to the restoration sites in sling nets. The Army used the flight-time for training helicopter pilots in high-altitude maneuvers, so that the NPS received this invaluable logistical help at no cost. [12]

Another important component of the program was the greenhouse operation. The park grew plants for meadow restoration in a greenhouse located at Tahoma Woods. Built in 1974-75, the greenhouse was upgraded in the 1980s to include a lath house and shade house. By 1985 the greenhouse operation was producing 16,000 plants a year. This included 38 subalpine species and 13 species from lower-elevation forests in 1991. The park obtained a full-time horticulturalist in 1994 and had plans for a new greenhouse to be built in June 1995. [13]

The Paradise Meadow Plan sought to improve visitor compliance through a variety of measures. Rest areas along the trails were delineated by a rock border and surfaced with gravel to match the adjacent trail surface. Log benches and sitting rocks were flown to many of these locations by helicopter. Five new trailhead signs with maps and interpretive messages were installed, and a new museum exhibit was placed in the Henry M. Jackson Memorial Visitor Center explaining the fragility of meadow vegetation and the cost and complexity of the restoration effort. The interpretive division assigned more roving interpreters to the area. [14] A new cut-off trail, Fourth Crossing Trail, was built to accommodate heavy foot traffic from the valley road to the ice caves area.

The natural resources protection staff used the lessons from the Paradise meadows project to develop a methodology for evaluating human impacts in other subalpine meadows in the

park. In 1987, resource specialist Stephen T. Gibbons made a pilot study of social and way trails in Spray Park using this prescribed format. Gibbons identified 160 unmaintained trails, 15 bareground campsites, and 135 campsite impacts (such as fire rings, positioned logs, and litter) in a 1,108-acre area. These sites were listed in order of priority for restoration work when funds allowed. Some years later, as concern over social trails mounted, the park administration lowered the quota for overnight use of Spray Park. [15]

In 1994, SCA crews worked on meadow restoration in Spray Park and Yakima Park, tackling approximately thirty sites in order of priority. Park staffers anticipate that meadow restoration will continue in these areas, together with the Paradise meadows, as funding allows. [16]

Wildlife Management

The dominant wildlife management issue in Mount Rainier since 1965 has revolved around the elk. Studies of elk ecology in the 1970s and 1980s constituted the single most extensive wildlife study in Mount Rainier's history. Human-bear interactions continued to be a concern of a more routine nature. Recently, wildlife monitoring in the park has branched out to include amphibians, reptiles, fish, and two endangered species of birds, the northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet.

Elk Management. The elk herds which ranged into Mount Rainier National Park in the summer remained very small until some time after World War II. In 1962, U.S. Forest Service biologist John Larson conducted an aerial census along the Cascade Crest and counted a total of 466 elk, with more than 300 located in the vicinity of Shiner Peak. Larson alerted Superintendent Rutter to the growth of the elk herd, and Rutter formed a task force to study the elk situation and recommend management alternatives. This marked a new beginning in elk management in the park. [17] Whereas NPS biologists in the 1930s were concerned about the elk as an introduced species, NPS biologists in this latter era were more concerned about the elk's numbers. The concern was that timber harvesting was providing more winter range for ungulates (deer and elk) outside the park, driving up the ungulate population, thereby creating an unnatural burden on the subalpine vegetation within the park where the elk herds (more than the deer) grazed in summer.

The NPS, in response, formed an interagency Mount Rainier Deer and Elk Committee with officials from the U.S. Forest Service and Washington State Department of Game. The purpose of the committee was to ensure a free exchange of information on ungulate populations and to provide a forum for discussing management goals. Park officials soon recognized that they needed more scientific data and that the NPS must take the lead in doing research. The NPS contracted with Dr. Charles Driver and the Cooperative Park Studies Unit (CPSU), University of Washington, to begin a long-term study of elk ecology in the park.

While this research was in progress, the Mount Rainier Deer and Elk Management Committee continued to hold yearly or twice yearly meetings. The committee discussed research findings and management alternatives, particularly in regard to hunting outside the park. Sport hunting was potentially an important management tool. In 1976, the Washington State Department of Game agreed to form a small game management unit close to the park (Game Management Area No. 514, Tatoosh) and to institute late season hunts in an effort to reduce the herd. In addition, check points were established to provide biologists with data on tooth samples, reproductive tracts, and ages of harvested animals. The committee was viewed as a model of interagency cooperation. [18]

In 1978 the committee changed its name to the Mount Rainier Wildlife Committee and drafted a new memorandum of understanding. Park personnel continued to trap elk and conduct aerial censuses after funding for the CPSU project ran out in 1976, and the

Washington State Department of Game and Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest instituted a joint elk-tagging program. In 1979 the committee produced a draft elk management plan calling for a further reduction of the herd and submitted it for public review. The proposed elk reduction met with public opposition, particularly among the local population near the game management area, so the plan was shelved pending further research. [19]

Monitoring of the elk population and its effects continued with aerial censusing, fitting of some elk with radio collars, and analysis of vegetational changes in summer elk range. The north and south herds both showed upward trends, with the south herd showing a marked increase in 1983. Population estimates for the whole park were 1,502 in 1979, 1,199 in 1980, 1,446 in 1981, 1,646 in 1982, 1,826 in 1983, and 2,024 in 1984. [20] While these numbers caused concern, a taxonomic study of Mount Rainier's elk by Dr. Christine Schonewald-Cox demonstrated definitively that the elk were not significantly different from elk in the rest of the Cascade Mountains and need not be considered exotic. After years of interbreeding between Yellowstone-area and Roosevelt elk, it was no longer possible to distinguish introduced from native stock. [21] The report by Schonewald-Cox, together with a decline in the elk herd that began in 1985, prompted NPS officials to ask whether the elk population really constituted a management problem after all.

Consequently, when Regional Director Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., appointed Neal Guse, Jr. as superintendent, he specifically requested Guse to take a fresh look at the issue. Guse had worked on a similar issue in Rocky Mountain National Park, where state wildlife officials had been called upon to cooperate with park officials in controlling the elk population. Guse got three new research projects underway. One study reexamined the effects of elk foraging on plant communities in three subalpine meadows. Another assessed the proliferation of elk trails and wallows using aerial photography. [22] The third study investigated the influence of adjacent land use practices on elk population ecology. Collectively, these studies led park officials to downgrade the elk management issue and to substitute remote censusing of elk trail and wallow impacts for aerial censusing. [23]

Bear Management. Bear management constitutes an ongoing natural resource concern in Mount Rainier National Park. The basic outline of bear management has not changed much since 1965. It continues to aim at preserving a natural population of black bears in the park through a program of (1) public education about bears, (2) enforcement of regulations regarding proper food storage and feeding of wild animals, (3) vigilant garbage collection and removal, and (4) relocation of problem bears. Although the NPS has done little research on the bears in Mount Rainier, the park administration has benefitted from a huge amount of scientific study on bear ecology, behavior, and aversive conditioning in other U.S. national parks in the past thirty years. [24]

A ranger releases a bear at Klapatche Point. Problem bears were generally relocated to national forest land. *(Louis G. Kirk photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

Rough estimates of the number of black bears in Mount Rainier National Park place the population at around 100 bears. Bear incidents are relatively infrequent. Official records indicate a rise in the number of bear incidents in the 1970s, correlating perhaps with a growth in backcountry use. The superintendent's annual reports recorded 14 incidents in 1974, 10 in 1976, 7 in 1977, and 11 in 1978. One bear was involved in 18 incidents in the Cougar Rock campground in 1979 before it was trapped and removed to another area. Nearly all of these incidents involved minor property damage rather than injuries; to date there has never been a fatal bear attack in the park. In the late 1970s, improved bear-proofing of campground garbage cans, together with tighter controls on food storage in backcountry camps, significantly curtailed bear-human interactions. [25] The key component of bear management in Mount Rainier continues to be garbage collection.

NPS biologist R. Gerald Wright has pointed out that official statistics on black bear depredations in the backcountry may understate the extent of human-bear interactions. A 1981 study in Yosemite's backcountry, for example, found that only 1.3 percent of estimated damages were reported and only 2.8 percent of financial loss was reported. The study suggested that visitors were reluctant to report bear depredations because they feared receiving a citation for improper food storage. A 1980 study found that 92 percent of backcountry users claimed that they stored their food properly while only 3 percent actually did. [26] Rangers did not report all bear incidents either. As recently as the 1970s, Mount Rainier rangers sometimes relocated problem bears to adjacent national forest lands without officially notifying the Forest Service. [27] Nevertheless, park management currently insists that the black bear population is "substantially wild and fearful of humans," and that "few, if any, human-bear incidents occur within the back country." [28]

Small Mammals. Raccoons, like bears, are prone to beg or scrounge for human food and make themselves a nuisance. Feeding of raccoons could lead to unnatural concentrations of the animal such as sometimes occurred around Longmire. The park administration experimented with live-trapping and removing these individuals in the same way they

removed problem bears, but the program was costly. The best alternative seemed to be to destroy some of the raccoons when their numbers grew unnaturally large. [29]

Beavers were a welcome presence in the park except in those occasional instances when their selection of a site for a beaver pond happened to threaten a part of the park's road system. The park administration had to keep a watchful eye for signs of beaver activity downstream from the park's road culverts. Once in a while beavers needed some persuasion to take their dam-building nature a little farther away from the road. [30]

A 1966 "Long Range Wildlife Management Plan" by park ranger David D. May observed that the reintroduction of the timber wolf in Mount Rainier National Park "is biologically desirable as a possible ungulate management tool and would increase the integrity of our 'natural' wildlife population." But, May added, the reintroduction "would create political and public relations problems of massive proportions." He did not recommend such action for the time being. [31]

Expanding Wildlife Studies. The park gradually increased the amount of wildlife research and monitoring in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1983, park personnel and VIP's conducted a survey of mountain goats. [32] In 1991, a two-person team began an inventory of reptiles and amphibians. Of the fifteen species of reptiles and amphibians previously on record as occurring in the park, all but three were located. No new species were found. The study continued over three years and long-term monitoring sites were established at selected lakes and ponds. [33] In 1993, the park made a limited survey of stream fish populations and identified the rare bull trout, a native fish, which was then being considered for listing under the Endangered Species Act, in three of the park's major watersheds. [34]

Another major wildlife study in Mount Rainier is the endangered northern spotted owl monitoring program which began in 1983. The study focused initially on identification of spotted owl habitat and nesting pairs. By 1987, the objective of the study had evolved from the gathering of baseline data on spotted owls to the monitoring of a potential competitor, the barred owl, as well. Generally two biological technicians were assigned the job of walking transects and calling or attempting to bait owls. Spotted and barred owl sightings were entered into the park's Geographic Information Systems database. [35]

In 1994 the park began surveys of another endangered species, the marbled murrelet, after it was discovered that this sea bird ranged inland and was actually nesting in the park.

Forest and Fire Management

Even though Mount Rainier's forests have long been valued as a major natural resource in the national park, scientific research on the forest communities has generally lagged behind research on the park's subalpine meadow areas and fauna. In the mid-1970s, plant ecologist Jerry Franklin of the College of Forest Resources, University of Washington, prevailed on Superintendent Tobin to support a detailed study of forest community types in Mount Rainier National Park. Franklin and his team conducted field research from 1975 to 1980, and published their findings in The Forest Communities of Mount Rainier National Park (1988).

The preliminary report and vegetation maps that came from this work provided resource managers with sophisticated tools for managing the forest resource. For example, Franklin et al. rated all forest communities for their development potential according to two scales: resistance and resiliance. They defined these classifications as follows:

> Resistance refers to the ability of a habitat to tolerate human impacts, such as trampling, without undergoing major changes in community composition and

> structure. Resistance generally reflects the "toughness" of the vegetative cover. Resilience refers to the ability of vegetation on a habitat to recover once it has been destroyed or severely disrupted. Resilience often reflects the inherent productivity of a habitat. [36]

The authors found that most forest communities at Mount Rainier had moderate to high levels of resistance to developmental impacts and moderate to low levels of resilience. Recovery was slow because the communities were typically comprised of slow-growing plants, especially where snowpacks persisted late in the spring.

The study also had important implications for fire management. Jerry Franklin and Miles Hemstrom reconstructed Mount Rainier's fire history based on historical records, vegetation map patterns, aerial photos, and fire scar analysis. They estimated the natural fire rotation to be 430 years, with some areas of the park showing old growth with an age of more than 700 years. The natural fire regime for the park was thought to be that of infrequent crown and severe surface fires that usually resulted in 100 percent mortality of the trees in the stands. In response to these findings and to the new directions in fire management generally, the park developed a new fire management plan.

Mount Rainier's fire management plan aimed to return fire to its natural ecologic role. It represented a clear break with the park's longstanding policy of suppressing all fires. Specific objectives of the plan included:

> 1. The use of natural prescribed fire as a preferred means for achieving the park objective of natural system management of natural resources.
>
> 2. A method for analyzing each fire and declaring it to be either prescribed or wildfire. Only the latter would be suppressed.
>
> 3. The restoration of fire to its natural role within the ecosystem of the park, making allowances for protection of people and property and other resource values.

Other objectives of the plan covered the suppression of human-caused fires, maintenance of trained personnel, cooperation with other agencies, and removal of fuel build-ups near historic and administrative facilities. The plan was approved in 1987, but was held in abeyance following the controversial fire season in Yellowstone National Park in 1988.

Many new forest management concerns have arisen in recent years which relate to broad environmental changes that do not stop at the park boundary. These include monitoring of acid rain; monitoring of global warming; and inventory of rare, threatened, and endangered plants and animals. After acid rain was documented in western Washington, resource specialists in Mount Rainier began in the mid-1980s to collect baseline data from various lakes and from fog samples at Paradise. Acidic fog has been associated with foliar leaching in some regions, and could affect the forest in Mount Rainier. Monitoring of the effects of global warming is being done by aerial photography, tree counts, and other means. Global warming has the long term potential to raise the treeline on Mount Rainier by several thousand feet, with drastic consequences for the distribution and character of subalpine parks and flower fields. Surveys of rare, threatened, and endangered plants were accomplished by park staff or contract as funds allowed. Park botanist Regina Rochefort produced a handbook for this purpose in 1986 which the regional office made available to other national park units in the Pacific Northwest. [37]

CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Mount Rainier National Park includes a rich assortment of historic buildings, bridges, and other structures associated with the development of the park prior to World War II. Built of native wood and stone, these structures are examples of an architectural style known as "Government Rustic" or "National Park Service Rustic." As noted in earlier chapters, the intent of the architects and landscape architects who designed these structures was to harmonize the park's manmade elements with the natural surroundings. As a group, these structures form a cultural landscape that reflected and shaped visitors' perceptions of the national park experience in the past and continues to do so today. [38] Park managers now consider the preservation of this architectural legacy to be an integral part of their management objectives. [39] This represents a dramatic change of thinking since the Mission 66 era, when park managers assumed that most of the old buildings in the park were nearing the end of their useful life and would soon be removed or replaced.

Recognizing a Rustic Architecture Legacy

Initially the idea that Mount Rainier National Park's physical plant could be of historical value met with resistance from some quarters in the Park Service. Since the Park Service's primary mission was to preserve the national park in its natural condition, some NPS officials reasoned, it did not make sense to preserve old Park Service buildings. This view was reinforced by Director George B. Hartzog's classification of the national park system's units into natural, cultural, and recreational areas. When park managers had to prioritize between various demands on a park's staff time and budget allowance, they were inclined to overlook potential cultural resources. Furthermore, as old buildings fell into disrepair or needed more and more maintenance work to keep them standing, the cost of upkeep had to be weighed against historic preservation values. Park managers generally guarded their prerogative to dispose of old buildings as they saw fit. Thus, the process of identifying, evaluating, and protecting historic structures in Mount Rainier National Park unfolded slowly in an atmosphere of ambivalence and even occasional outright hostility. [40]

An inventory of historical and archeological resources within the park was partially underway when the NPS prepared the new master plan for Mount Rainier National Park in 1972. That document stated that certain buildings provided evidence of past government stewardship of the national park and warranted study "to determine their significance." But as of that year the Longmire cabin was the only historic building being preserved and interpreted to visitors. The Longmire meadow was classified as the park's sole historic site. The environmental statement which accompanied the master plan in 1973 noted that fourteen other structures had been identified as potentially eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. [41]

In 1975, Regional Historical Architect Laurin Huffman contracted with the Denver Service Center for a survey of Mount Rainier's historic buildings for potential listing on the Park Service's List of Classified Structures (LCS). The LCS predated the National Register and was used by the NPS as a management tool for keeping track of all of the agency's historic structures. Robert L. Carper of the Denver Service Center (DSC) visited the park in August 1975 and recommended a total of 92 structures for inclusion on the LCS. After consultation with the superintendent, the regional office pared the list down to 21. [42] Meanwhile, Regional Historian Vernon Tancil had prepared a historic resources study plan for Mount Rainier and had contracted with the Denver Service Center for a historic resource study. DSC historian James Mote visited the park in 1976 and took the opposite point of view from Carper, that structures erected after the park's creation should not be nominated to the National Register of Historic Places. Only the Longmire cabin should be nominated. [43] When Tancil objected that Mote was taking too narrow a view of historic resources, Mote elucidated his position this way:

> I resist what seems to me a trend within the Park Service to confuse Park Service physical growth with events of historical significance. The development of the Park Service as an institution has, of course, historic significance. However, the first ranger station in park X or the first resort hotel in park Y is not, ipso facto, historically significant. This seems to me to be unwarranted self-memorialization on the part of the Park Service. [44]

This crucial philosophical disagreement between Tancil and Mote soon involved the chief of the cultural resources division at WASO, the chief of the historic preservation division at DSC, and Regional Director Russell E. Dickenson. Since the two historians could not agree, Dickenson decided to allot $15,000 for a historic resources study to be undertaken by a third historian. DSC historian Erwin N. Thompson drew the assignment. [45]

Thompson's study was designed to combine and supersede the studies by Carper and Mote. His report inventoried the historic resources and provided a narrative history pertaining to those resources. Agreeing with Tancil on the crucial issue of whether the history of the park itself deserved attention, he devoted a substantial portion of his study to government and concessioner buildings and park administrative history. By the time he completed the study in 1979, the Longmire cabin had been entered on the National Register and the Paradise Inn and Annex were in the process of being nominated. Thompson recommended a total of 87 other structures for nomination to the National Register as well, including ranger stations, ranger residences, service buildings, patrol cabins, trail shelters, fire lookouts, bridges, and entrance arches. [46] Thompson's study provided another impetus for recognizing Mount Rainier National Park's extraordinary Rustic architecture legacy.

Still, the idea met with resistance. Superintendent Briggle found the number of buildings and historic districts proposed for the National Register to be "excessive." He suggested that for some types of buildings, such as patrol cabins and lookouts, one example of each could suffice. "The availability of funds to care for the buildings at the prescribed level for historic structures would be a major concern," Briggle cautioned. [47] Acting Regional Director Charles H. Odegaard concurred with Thompson's recommendations in principle, but advised the DSC to drop the historic district designations for Longmire, Paradise, and Sunrise and to eliminate numerous buildings. [48] The final report came out in October 1981 with the districts and all 90 buildings still included.



Paradise Historic District



Sunrise Historic District



Nisqually Entrance Historic District

In 1982 the regional office fielded a team of historians and historical architects in Mount Rainier with a view toward updating the List of Classified Structures and preparing a preservation guide for building maintenance. (Whereas Carper and Thompson had looked at buildings that were 50 years old or more, the new study included buildings of 40 years age so as to include the many buildings erected during the 1930s and early 1940s.) The team recorded 153 historic structures for the LCS, of which 118 were recommended for nomination to the National Register. One member of the team, C. Barrett Kennedy, joined the park staff at the end of the summer and served as the park's first architectural historian for a little more than a year, completing the voluminous preservation guide. [49]

Meanwhile, as the regional office began to evaluate Mount Rainier's many historic buildings against the National Register's criteria, Regional Historian Stephanie Toothman and her colleagues reached the conclusion that the NPS had in Mount Rainier National Park "one of the most intact and extensive collections of rustic architecture in the National Park System."

[50] Toothman provided a cogent historical explanation for this Rustic architecture legacy in Mount Rainier. "The presence and survival of this group of structures is due to several factors," Toothman wrote.

> 1. Mount Rainier's early pre-eminence within the National Park System as one of the "crown jewels" meant that a significant allotment from available National Park Service funding was devoted to Mount Rainier's development from the mid-1920s through the 1930s, a timeframe that parallels the key stages in the evolution of the rustic style;
>
> 2. The slowdown in park development in the late 1930s and its virtual cessation in the 1940s, with the waning of the public works programs and the onset of World War II, froze existing building stock in the park, eliminating the normal building and replacement cycle for almost a decade;
>
> 3. The growing competition for funding in the post-war era, as new park areas were established and developed, limited funds for Mount Rainier and coincided with the adoption of new stylistic approaches to park architecture; and
>
> 4. A new philosophy of park development, which advocated locating major park facilities outside of park boundaries, meant that major post-war development for Mount Rainier—the Tahoma Woods administrative and residential complex—occurred outside of the park's boundaries and, thus, did not directly impact the existing group of rustic structures. [51]

Toothman titled her paper "Mount Rainier: The National Park as a Cultural Landscape." She and her colleagues contended that the Rustic architecture in Mount Rainier helped to shape visitors' perceptions of "what a national park should look like." The buildings were not only aesthetic in their own right but helped to forge the visitors' national park experience. Moreover, NPS architects and landscape architects had applied the Rustic style "across the board to a range of buildings and functions." The level of detailing on each building varied with the visibility of the structure. Thus, it would not do to preserve representative examples. The whole "cultural landscape" must be preserved.

> While no one single structure at Mount Rainier provides us with the ultimate, classical representative of the rustic style, the survival of this cohesive group with its range of applications provides us with a unique opportunity to study the full evolution of the National Park Service rustic style within a single area, the creation of a cultural landscape by a federal agency. [52]

Although Toothman completed the multiple property nomination form for Mount Rainier in 1984, Regional Director Tobin and Superintendent Briggle remained unconvinced that the National Park Service's Rustic style of architecture constituted an adequate justification for nominating the buildings to the National Register. Toothman was also frustrated in trying to nominate NPS structures at Crater Lake to the National Register, and her counterparts in other NPS regions were facing similar resistance in their efforts to preserve old Park Service structures. At the urging of Toothman and Chief Historian Ed Bearss, Tobin conferred with Director Russell E. Dickenson, who agreed to fund a servicewide study of National Park Service Rustic architecture. The resulting study by William C. Tweed and Laura E. Soulliere-Harrison, completed in November 1986, demonstrated conclusively that the Rustic style had originated in the Park Service after 1916, and was more accurately identified with that agency than the Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1933-42 era. According to Toothman, that study "broke it open." Toothman then received authorization to submit the nomination form for Mount Rainier. Six months later, on May 28, 1987, the Longmire buildings, Paradise Inn,

and the Yakima Park stockade group at Sunrise were designated as nationally significant National Historic Landmarks. On March 13, 1991, the Mount Rainier Multiple Property Submission, consisting of four historic districts and 36 individual buildings or structures, was formally entered on the National Register. [53]

Rehabilitation of Major Historic Structures

Concurrent with the process of recognizing Mount Rainier's Rustic architecture legacy, the Park Service pressed forward with rehabilitation of two major historic structures, the Paradise Inn and the National Park Inn. The Paradise Inn received a $2.8 million renovation during 1980-1981 and the National Park Inn closed for remodeling for thirteen months in 1989-1990. A third major historic structure, Sunrise Lodge, was the subject of several studies during the 1980s. All three of these initiatives involved coordination between cultural resource managers, maintenance staff, and architectural and building contractors.

Paradise Inn. The Park Service sought expert advice for the Paradise Inn as early as 1976, when it contracted with John Morse & Associates for an analysis of the sixty-year-old building's structural weaknesses and needed treatments. Following that report, historical architect David L. Snow of the Denver Service Center made a study of the inn, recommended alternatives for rehabilitation and historic restoration, and estimated the cost at roughly $1.5 million. [54]

The DSC submitted a proposal in February 1979 separating the design work recommended by John Morse & Associates into two contract packages, one coming under line item funding and the other to be covered by ONPS funding. On June 1, 1979, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation determined that the proposed rehabilitation of the inn would not adversely effect the inn's eligibility for the National Register of Historic Places. The inn was determined to be eligible later that same month. The NPS entered into two two-year contracts with building construction companies, with the work authorized to begin after February 11, 1980. [55] Meanwhile, the concessioner began an extensive renovation of the interior of the inn which would continue through most of the decade.

National Park Inn. Major rehabilitation of the National Park Inn at Longmire was recommended as early as 1980, and funding for the project was obtained through the Visitor Facility Fund five years later. The inn was rehabilitated in 1989-90. Although the inn was not formally nominated for the National Register until the fall of 1990, the Park Service proceeded on the basis that the inn had been determined eligible for listing on the National Register. In anticipation of the project, Regional Historian Stephanie Toothman and Park Historical Architect C. Barrett Kennedy collaborated on a historical study of the inn in 1985. Toothman and Kennedy found that the National Park Inn had undergone fairly extensive remodeling in the past; therefore, the Park Service could justifiably take some license in remodeling the building now. The most significant change was to place the entrance to the building in back, so that visitor parking and the main flow of traffic through the Longmire development area could be redesigned. Meanwhile, preservation of the inn's front porch and dormer windows preserved the original character of the building's front facade. The overall plan for visitor circulation in and around the National Park Inn drew upon another cultural resource management study, Lora J. Schiltgen's "Managing a Rustic Legacy: A Historic Landscape Study and Management Plan for Longmire Springs Historic District, Mount Rainier National Park." Unfortunately, new plantings around the outside of the building did not take hold and after a few years the empty rock-lined plantbeds did not have the look that had been intended for them. These plantbeds were to be replanted during the summer of 1995. [56]

Sunrise Lodge. By the early 1980s the Sunrise Lodge needed extensive code and structural

rehabilitation to comply with health and safety standards. The cedar shingle siding had greatly deteriorated in the extreme environmental conditions of the Sunrise area, and the basement had underground water seepage. There was a proposal to convert the lodge into an overnight guest facility while maintaining its historical feeling, but when the cost estimates passed the $2 million mark Regional Director Tobin rejected the idea. [57]

Tobin requested a review of the concession operation at Sunrise by a team from the DSC in December 1985, and the following November he received the DSC's recommendation: replace the lodge with a new visitor services building. [58] A month after receipt of the DSC report, the Park Service notified the Washington State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation that the agency was undertaking a comprehensive design/environmental assessment for visitor services at Sunrise focusing on the lodge. [59]

The NPS considered several design alternatives. The superintendent favored a proposal to eliminate the old lodge and replace it with a new building next to the stockade. The regional office's cultural resources division opposed this, arguing that it would wreck the integrity of the original site plan. Another alternative, to place a new building to the right of the administration building, raised objections for the same reason. The cultural resources division favored replacement of the old lodge with one of compatible design virtually at the same site and this became the favored alternative. The SHPO and the Advisory Council both favored a fourth alternative: rehabilitation of the old lodge. [60]

The Park Service was placed in the awkward position of advocating the elimination of a National Register property contrary to the judgment of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. From the park administration's standpoint, the lodge had become a "maintenance hog" and an unacceptable drain on the park's financial resources. Toothman, for her part, justified eliminating the lodge on the grounds that the building had never been completed and was not architecturally significant. Although the Sunrise historic district had the distinction of being perhaps the earliest comprehensively planned development area in the national park system, the existing lodge building represented only the core structure of what was to have been a large destination hotel with wings on either side. A new building, properly designed, would not unduly affect the integrity of the historic district. It would have the enormous advantage of incorporating design features and materials which could better stand up to the severe climatic conditions at Yakima Park. [61]

Paradise Meadows: A Cultural Landscape Conundrum

As the boundary between natural and cultural resources has become increasingly indistinct and subject to debate in recent years, the 30-year-old dichotomy between natural and cultural resource management has come under strain. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of defining "cultural landscapes." Whereas archeological and historical resources tend to be circumscribable within clearly defined "sites" or "districts," cultural landscapes are by definition spacious and amorphous. Moreover, they are conceptually subtle. Arguably, the NPS could determine that Mount Rainier National Park, as an area which has been managed for a distinct cultural purpose for nearly 100 years, is one large cultural landscape. Drawing boundaries around cultural landscapes and recommending practical guidelines for preserving them promises to be one of the greatest challenges for cultural resource management in the future.

Perhaps the current dilemma over management of Paradise meadows is a forecast of what lies ahead. Resource managers are currently debating what should be done about the encroachment of subalpine fir in the meadows. This dilemma is not new. In his ecological study of Paradise meadows in 1959, Brockman indicated that the park administration might

consider removing successional tree growth in the meadows for "vista clearance" and in order to preserve the much-enjoyed flower fields. Brockman's recommendation was explicitly incorporated into the master plan of 1972:

> The subalpine wild flower fields and meadows of the Hudsonian zone are being invaded by subalpine-fir. In and around Paradise, efforts must be made to restore and preserve the historic distribution of plants in order to provide interpretation and visitor experience within the present impact area. In other areas of this zone, this invasion will be allowed to proceed naturally, correcting adverse influences introduced directly and indirectly by man. [62]

Natural resource managers now advocate that Paradise meadows, like the rest of the subalpine zone, be managed for natural succession. Assuming that current climate changes continue, the natural resource managers' approach would allow the gradual forestation of the Paradise meadows over the next half century or more. This would profoundly change the character of the Paradise historic district and the visitors' experience. Cultural resource managers contend that Paradise meadows is a cultural landscape by virtue of the historical association between the developed area and the flower fields. Park administrators have been intensively managing the area for visitor enjoyment of the flower fields for at least thirty years, and have recognized the need to limit visitor impacts since the park's early years. The issue turns on whether early visitors to Paradise saw the meadows as wild or in some sense domesticated by the network of trails.

If the Paradise meadows are defined as a cultural landscape, natural and cultural resource specialists will have to work cooperatively to ensure its preservation. Currently the park botanist is skeptical. Would cropping the trees at the meadow's edge really be feasible? How would the new Paradise meadow management plan prescribe which trees to clear and which ones to leave alone? How would the trees be removed without damaging the meadows? What would cultural resource managers suggest if natural succession drove out the flowers anyway?

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART SIX: YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION, 1965-1995

XXI. AN OVERVIEW OF PARK SCIENCE

INTRODUCTION

Scientific research has played an expanding role in park administration and resource management since 1965. Scientific data and analysis have been increasingly used to make policy, defend management decisions, and carry out new NPS mandates.

Applied research in the park has fallen into five broad areas: biology, sociology, environmental science, history, and geology. Most areas of applied research pertained to a distinct set of legislative mandates. Biological research, for example, pertained most directly to the park's organic act and the NPS mandate to preserve the area in a natural condition, but also stemmed from the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Environmental science mostly took the form of monitoring air and water quality not only because air and water pollution threatened park values, but also because new environmental laws established national standards and procedures which extended to the national park system. Historical research was required to satisfy the needs of historic preservation as mandated under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.

The park met these diverse research requirements in part by building up a staff of well-educated and trained resource specialists, in part by partnering with other research facilities. For biological research, the park superintendent turned to his own staff ecologists and botanists for some tasks and sought professional service agreements with universities for others. As the Park Service's research budget grew during the 1960s, its numerous contracts with universities eventually spawned a number of university-affiliated Cooperative Park Studies Units, of which the CPSU at the University of Washington, established in 1970, was the first in the nation. The superintendents of Mount Rainier National Park turned to that CPSU and subsequent CPSUs at Oregon State University and University of Idaho for most of the park's major biological research projects. The CPSU at University of Washington also comprised a sociology section to which the park turned for a variety of visitor use surveys in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. These research projects often involved a combination of CPSU staff, university faculty, graduate students, and park staff. In handling all of these research projects the park received administrative help from the Pacific Northwest Regional Office, established in Seattle in 1969.

Meanwhile, the park turned to new divisions within the NPS for help with monitoring of air and water quality and inventorying of cultural resources. The Park Service's Air Quality Division, created in 1978, provided technical assistance to the park beginning in the early 1980s. NPS staff historians in the Denver Service Center, working in conjunction with the cultural resources division in the regional office, produced a historic resource study for Mount Rainier, an inventory of the park's historic resources, and a nomination of its significant resources to the National Register of Historic Places. These specialized activities

were known collectively as "environmental compliance," inasmuch as the park administration had to comply with the National Historic Preservation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and other environmental laws. Park staff performed a limited amount of environmental compliance work, such as the preparation of Categorical Exclusions or the somewhat more involved Environmental Assessments (EAs) prior to any proposed action. But for more far-reaching actions, the park administration drew upon technical expertise in the regional office and the Denver Service Center. These experts provided the more sophisticated analysis that was commonly needed to complete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

Finally, beginning in the 1960s the park turned to another federal agency, the U.S. Geological Survey, for research and advice concerning Mount Rainier's potential for a volcanic eruption. This was not a new partnership—the USGS had been turning out bulletins, professional papers, and scientific monographs on the geologic resources of national parks as long as the parks had been in existence. However, heightened public concern about the destructive potential of Mount Rainier placed new burdens on the park administration to take the public safety more into consideration, and the park administration did not have the capability to satisfy this need itself Park managers therefore turned to USGS geologists for assistance.

The remainder of this chapter describes scientific research in Mount Rainier at the project level. The discussion is not comprehensive; rather, it is intended to suggest the range and depth of the research program since 1965 and the extent to which the park administration reached outside the park staff for expertise. Further discussion of these research problems from a resource management standpoint has been presented in Chapters XIX and XX preceding.

BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Most of the applied research in Mount Rainier National Park involved biological resources. These research projects focused on threats to wildlife and plant communities and were closest to the heart of the NPS mission to preserve Mount Rainier National Park in a natural condition. What set this biological research apart from earlier biological research in the park was its quantity and sophistication. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Park Service was criticized for its lack of commitment to biological research. Beginning in 1958, Congress appropriated funds for a program of applied science in the national parks, and in the early 1960s, a series of reports critiqued the fledgling science program and pointed it in new directions. The most important of these reports was the Leopold Report of 1963. The Leopold Report provided a new framework for biological investigations in Mount Rainier. [1]

The Leopold Report staked out an ambitious role for park biologists. Their research could give park managers the tools they needed to restore natural conditions in national parks, or at least manipulate nature such that the parks would closely approximate "vignettes of primitive America." The Leopold Report proposed that ecological successions could be an aid to park managers if ecological relationships were adequately studied and understood. "In essence," the report's authors boldly stated, "we are calling for a set of ecologic skills unknown in this country today." [2] Prescribed burning, reintroduction of extirpated plant and animal species, control of animal populations—these were just some of the tools that would be at the park manager's disposal.

Biological research in Mount Rainier moved beyond faunal surveys and investigations of individual species to consider whole ecological communities. Specific projects sought to place existing conditions in historical perspective, to consider the effects of past disturbances, and to obtain baseline data that would be useful in the future. While Park Service biologists

no longer subscribe to the Leopold Report's objective of restoring natural conditions to some arbitrary point in the past, they still accept its premise that effective natural resource management must begin with the study of ecological processes. Major studies are described below in chronological order.

Subalpine Meadow Studies. Mount Rainier's modern science program began with Frank Brockman's ecological study of subalpine meadows in 1959-60 (Chapter XVII). This research project tapped funds that Congress had recently appropriated for applied science in the national parks, and it broke new ground with the making of a professional services agreement between the NPS and the University of Washington. [3] More importantly, Brockman's research anticipated the kind of bold manipulations subsequently called for in the Leopold Report. Although Brockman did not suggest the kind of intensive meadow restoration that the park would undertake in the 1980s (he conceptualized "restoration" as a process by which nature—if given the chance—would heal itself), his ecological study did lead to a more active natural resource management which included paving of heavily used trails around Reflection Lakes and Paradise meadows. [4]

In 1985, the park initiated a more ambitious study of changes in the alpine plant community. The research was coupled to a large scale program of restoration aimed at obliterating social trails and reducing human impacts in the meadows. Part of the impetus for the program came from the change in NPS policy that year which allowed parks to retain a percentage of entrance fees, thus providing a source of funding. Research and planning for the project was assigned to park botanist Regina Rochefort, who produced two reports on the problem in 1989 and 1990. [5]

Elk Ecology. Human impacts were not the only threat to Mount Rainier's subalpine meadows; introduced elk posed another. In 1973, the NPS contracted with the CPSU at University of Washington for a study of the effects of elk on Mount Rainier ecosystems. Dr. Charles Driver headed the project, assisted by a graduate student, William P. Bradley, and a seasonal park technician, John Danielson. Field methods included the use of exclosures to reveal the effects of elk browsing on plant growth, and the gathering of elk droppings along selected transects to determine what plants the elk were eating. [6] Originally intended to span three field seasons, the project continued another five years after that and concluded with a report by Bradley and Driver, "Elk Ecology and Management Perspectives at Mount Rainier National Park" (1981). Bradley and Driver concluded that the establishment of elk in Mount Rainier National Park was only secondarily a consequence of the Yellowstone elk introductions in the early twentieth century; primarily it was due to the creation of clearcuts around all sides of Mount Rainier National Park since the 1950s, whose effect was to increase the elk's food supply. The study made it clear that the elk were a permanent presence in the park and that any effort to control their numbers must involve the national forests and the Washington Department of Game. [7]

The NPS followed up the study by Bradley and Driver by concluding another contract with the CPSU at Oregon State University for year to year monitoring of the elk population and vegetational changes. The project team accomplished the former by aerial counts and the latter by continuing analysis of sample vegetation plots. During 1985-88, research on elk ecology moved into still another phase with the use of aerial photographs to map elk trails and wallows, the use of more transects to determine the effects of elk browsing on dry subalpine meadows, and an analysis of land use practices on adjacent national forest lands to develop predictive models for the carrying capacity of the elk's winter range around Mount Rainier. [8]

Throughout the course of this research on elk ecology, NPS officials held yearly or twice-yearly meetings with the field biologists, state game managers, and Forest Service officials in

order to share new data and discuss management alternatives. The group was called the Mount Rainier Deer and Elk Management Coordinating Committee. By frequently exchanging ideas, all parties demonstrated a desire to find a management approach that would reasonably suit all agencies involved.

Forest Communities. Beginning in 1975, the Park Service and the Forest Service jointly sponsored a multi-year study of Mount Rainier's forests. Jerry F. Franklin, chief plant ecologist with the Forest Service, headed the team of five scientists. Don Field, regional chief scientist in the Pacific Northwest Regional Office, and Jim Tobin, superintendent of Mount Rainier, oversaw the Park Service's part of the project funding. Data analysis by the project team continued over five years. Eventually the project resulted in an attractive monograph published by the NPS Science Publications Office. [9]

The project consisted of a "phytosociological analysis" of the forest communities of Mount Rainier and the development of a forest classification system. The objectives of the study were to:

1. Develop a classification of the potential natural vegetation and forest habitat types;

2. Describe the existing forest vegetation and place it in the context of the classification; and

3. Relate the forest communities to key environmental factors.

Franklin and his collaborators defined fourteen types of mature forest stands in the park and five types of forests at distinctive early stages of forest succession. [10] The research findings had a significant influence on management, including the way the NPS updated the park's fire management plan and the way it assessed development impacts in different areas of the park.

Human Impacts in the Alpine Zone. Beginning in 1975, the park initiated a baseline study of Mount Rainier alpine biology. This work culminated in a Ph.D. dissertation by Ola Edwards, "The Alpine Vegetation of Mount Rainier National Park: Structure, Development and Constraints" (1980). Subsequent investigation of alpine biology by Edwards in 1983-85 included the establishment of permanent sample plots along four frequently traveled routes (Curtis Ridge, Ptarmigan Ridge, Mount Ruth, and the Muir Corridor) and the quantitative measurement of components of substrate and vegetation in these areas. The results indicated that human activity in the alpine zone (trampling and campsite use) was damaging the resources. [11]

While Edwards' permanent plot system was maintained in the four ridge areas, it was supplemented in 1988 by systematic surveys for human impacts. Park botanist Regina Rochefort initiated monitoring in all alpine wilderness zones using methods developed and refined in Paradise and Spray Park. She experimented with infrared and low-elevation color photography as a means of documenting vegetation community types and vegetation changes in the heavily used corridor between Paradise and Camp Muir. By 1991, eleven alpine zones had been surveyed and data entered into the Geographical Information Systems (GIS) database. The information has been instrumental in developing overnight camping regulations and Limits of Acceptable Change (LAC) standards for the Wilderness Plan. [12]

Survey of Rare, Endangered, Threatened, and Endemic Plants. The NPS sponsored or conducted its own botanical surveys of rare, endangered, threatened, and endemic plants (RETE surveys) as funding allowed. These were localized studies focusing on areas of new development, expansion of existing development, or heavy use. The first RETE surveys in Mount Rainier National Park were done under contract by Warren W. Tanaka of New Jersey

in the late summer of 1978. NPS biologist Don Tiernan of the Denver Service Center organized the project, which made initial surveys of Chinook Pass, Tipsoo Lake, White River Ranger Station, Klickitat Creek watershed, Sunrise, Yakima Park, and Frozen Lake. [13] Park staff conducted RETE surveys of First Burroughs Mountain and Panorama Point in 1985, and has continued surveys with park staff as funding allows. [14]

Park Lake Studies. Scientific investigation of Mount Rainier's aquatic ecosystems began with a limnological survey of Mowich Lake—one of the park's least productive lakes—in 1967, but little more aquatic biology was done until mounting concern about acid precipitation and impacts caused by visitor use prompted baseline surveys of a number of park lakes in the mid-1980s. The newer studies began with a survey of Reflection Lakes by a team from Washington State University in 1984-85, and soon broadened into a survey of seventeen selected lakes by researchers from the CPSU at Oregon State University in 1988-89. These surveys profiled the physical, chemical, and biological characteristics of the lakes. A resurvey of Mowich Lake in 1988 was particularly noteworthy because it provided a rare glimpse of changes in limnological conditions compared to twenty-one years earlier. [15] Beginning in 1988 and continuing to the present, Mowich Lake was sampled at biweekly intervals from July through October for water temperature, water quality, Secchi disk clarity, nutrients, chlorophyll, and species assemblages and densities of phytoplankton and zooplankton. The research team from the CPSU, Oregon State University, headed by Dr. Gary Larson, published a report in 1994 on the limnological characteristics of high mountain lakes. [16]

Fish Effects on Lake Ecology. In 1993, park staff began a study of thirty lakes and ponds in the northeast corner of the park to assess the distribution and relative abundance of salamanders and frogs in relation to water quality, forest type, and the presence or absence of introduced trout. Researchers determined amphibian densities by snorkeling transects of the shoreline, and estimated fish populations by gill-netting. They collected water samples for laboratory analysis of zooplankton content by a taxonomist at Oregon State University. The project identified a strong correlation between the presence of introduced fish and low densities of amphibians. Moreover, the researchers found that three lakes which had once been stocked but were fished out (Clover, Shadow, and Sunrise lakes) now had large salamander populations. The study continued in 1994 with a view toward identifying methods for removing fish from lakes and streams that were historically fishless in such a manner as to encourage recolonization by amphibians. [17]

Stream Fish Studies. In the fall of 1993, park personnel conducted a survey of stream fish populations with the aim of identifying historical and potential habitat for bull trout (Salvelinus confluentus), which was being considered for listing under the Endangered Species Act. Using an electroshocker to stun the fish, park staff sampled fifty-meter segments of seventeen streams. Bull trout were documented at five sites in three major watersheds located on the west, north, and east sides of the park, and positive identification of one specimen was made by OSU biologist Doug Markel. [18]

SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Since public use and enjoyment were at the core of the NPS mission, the agency had long studied public use trends in national parks. Mount Rainier, along with other parks, compiled data on how many people entered the park, where they came from, what form of transportation they used, and how many days they stayed in the park. "Visitation," the Park Service's unique, all-encompassing term for public use of the parks, connoted that the phenomenon could be, and ought to be, given to analysis. Superintendents frequently began their annual reports with an interpretation of visitor use trends; NPS planners used visitation

data to make projections; concessioners used the data for marketing. Thus, the agency had an informal tradition of sociological study going back to its founding years.

An early effort to deepen the analysis of visitor use data occurred in the late 1960s, when the Park Service contracted with the University of Washington for a study of visitation in Mount Rainier and Olympic national parks. The study team used questionnaires to survey a sample of park users, and University of Washington geographer William Beyer completed the study report in 1970. This was essentially an economic impact assessment to assist park managers as they became more involved with regional planning.

Sociological research in the park took a big step forward following the appointment of Superintendent Neal Guse in June 1984. As a former chief of the Division of Natural Resources in the Washington office, Guse regarded social science research as an important management tool for determining carrying capacity. In Guse's view, the determination of carrying capacity was a dual problem which involved both halves of the NPS mandate to conserve the resources and provide for the public's enjoyment. While biological science was needed to evaluate how many people could use an area without degrading the environment, social science could help managers assess how many people could use an area without impairing the experience for others. Regional Director Daniel J. Tobin, Jr., shared this view. With Tobin's support, Guse instigated a number of sociological studies at Mount Rainier between 1985 and 1990. This led to a close partnership between Guse and Darryll Johnson, project leader of the social science program at the CPSU, University of Washington. [19] Social science research after 1985 included "baseline studies" of visitor attitudes and perceptions, studies of visitor behavior, and visitor surveys directed at specific management issues.

General Visitor Survey of 1985. The general visitor survey of 1985 was a baseline study which sought to profile park visitation in ways that had never been done before. The questionnaire requested information on the visitor's age, level of education, level of income, geographic origin, and environmental persuasion. It asked how large a group they came in, where they went in the park, what they wanted to experience, and whether they were satisfied. It also followed up on the economic impact assessment by Beyer in 1970. The survey was descriptive of the park's predominantly local visitor use.

Climber Survey of 1985. The climber survey addressed a specific management concern, the problem of human waste disposal in the alpine zone, and tested the extent to which summit climbers on Mount Rainier were aware that there was a problem. With the number of summit attempts per season growing into the thousands, climbers had become a user group with a significant impact on the fragile, alpine environment. The survey was also used to test climbers' reaction to alternative management actions.

Indian Henry's Hunting Ground Survey of 1985. The CPSU conducted a survey of backcountry campers at Indian Henry's Hunting Ground to assist with another specific management concern: use of open meadows for overnight camping. During the preceding decade, many back country camp sites were established in forested areas away from lakes and meadows in order to minimize damage to the meadows. An example was the camp on Devil's Dream Creek, half a mile south of Indian Henry's Hunting Ground. Concerned that some park visitors sorely missed the opportunity to camp in the meadow, the park installed an experimental platform at Indian Henry's Hunting Ground upon which campers could pitch their tent and cook without affecting the vegetation. The survey found that the tent platform was intrusive for some people and unsatisfying for others, and it was removed after the second summer.

Non-compliant Behavior in Paradise Meadows. This study began in 1985 and expanded

two years later. The object was to ascertain what type of people were wandering off-trail in spite of regulations against it, and to test how the park administration might effectively curtail that type of non-compliant behavior. Researchers documented non compliant behavior through field observations and surveys and experimented with different types of deterrents—from symbolic barriers such as yellow ribbons placed along the edge of the trail, to trailside signs, to the stationing of uniformed personnel at key points in the Paradise meadows.

Transportation Survey. The CPSU conducted another survey between July 1988 and August 1989 aimed at a specific management issue, transportation. Asking respondents to comment on a range of scenarios in which public transit would be the sole means of travel over various sections of the park road system, either in winter or summer, the transportation survey indicated which scenarios would meet with the most public support or opposition. Moreover, the survey disclosed which types of park visitors would either support or oppose a public transit system. The report on the survey, printed in 1990, revealed that the issue would be contentious, arousing passions on both sides.

General Visitor Survey of 1990. The park timed this second visitor survey to correspond with the national census and to provide current data for the preparation of the park's new general management plan. While parts of the survey represented a refinement over the 1985 study, core questions were retained in the latter survey in order to identify changes or possible trends in visitor use.

Day Hiker Survey. In 1992, the park initiated a study through the CPSU at University of Washington of day hikers in Spray Park, one of the most heavily used back country areas in the park. This survey sought to determine the behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of the day hiker. It sought to measure visitor satisfaction and perceptions of wilderness management so that park administrators would have a clearer understanding of how the public's enjoyment was affected by crowding and intensive visitor management.

Sunrise and Mowich Lake Visitor Surveys. Two more projects by the CPSU in 1993 involved the phenomenon of visitor displacement. These visitor surveys targeted the users of particular areas—Sunrise and Mowich Lake—and asked them where they would go if their access to the area were limited in one way or another. Recognizing that Mount Rainier National Park was part of a larger recreational complex in the Cascades, park administrators sought to understand how curtailment of recreational use in one area of this complex would effect other areas—both in the park and in the adjacent national forests.

Visitor Distribution and Visitor Experience Surveys. In 1995 the CPSU initiated two new research projects that aimed to assist the team working on Mount Rainier's new general management plan. The Visitor Distribution Survey is intended to identify relative visitor densities at up to 40 sites at regular time intervals during typical busy days during the summer season. This information will be helpful as park planners seek to redistribute visitors away from overcrowded areas. The Visitor Experience Survey uses a combination of mail questionnaires and on-site indicators and standards to develop data that will assist managers in determining recreational carrying capacity and substitutability of visitor experiences.

ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

In the 1980s the NPS began monitoring two resources that had always been taken for granted in Mount Rainier National Park: clean air and clean water. It was another sign of the park's connection to surrounding land uses that air and water quality even required protection. It was also an example of how national park values had evolved. Each year, hundreds of thousands of park visitors found the park's clear mountain air to be a pleasurable contrast to

the smoggy air they breathed at home on a daily basis; some discovered a tonic for the soul in Mount Rainier's pristine lakes and streams. Protection of air and water quality fit squarely within the NPS mandate to preserve the area in a natural condition, but it also received a major boost from new environmental protection laws which recognized everyone's stake in maintaining a healthy environment.

In the Clean Air Act amendments of 1977, Congress mandated an effort to improve or preserve air quality in national parks and wilderness areas. Dozens of these protected areas were listed as Class I areas—singled out by the law to receive special visibility protection. [20] Mount Rainier National Park initially received the Class I designation and subsequently joined a network of air quality monitoring sites under a program called Interagency Monitoring of Protected Visual Environments, or IMPROVE. This gave the park administration added responsibilities and prerogatives.

The park installed a fine particulate sampler, nephelometer, and automated visibility monitoring camera at Paradise. In 1986 it added an ozone monitor at Longmire and a nitrate monitor at Tahoma Woods. In 1987 it added a bulk precipitation collector at Paradise, and the following year fog collectors at Paradise and Sunrise and an ozone monitor at Sunrise. By then, Mount Rainier had the full complement of monitoring equipment as an IMPROVE site. The park received help with the installation and use of this equipment from the Park Service's Air Quality Division (AQD) in Washington, D.C., and the Washington Department of Ecology. [21]

In addition to servicing all of this automated equipment, park staff conducted other types of environmental monitoring. The park prepared photo logs of visibility from Camp Muir, Tolmie Peak Lookout, and Fremont Mountain Lookout. These photo logs showed how visibility changed under various weather, sunlight, and air pollution conditions. Park staff collected various types of organic matter—goat hair, lichen, subalpine fir needles—throughout the park and tested it for the presence of arsenic, sulfur, and heavy metals. [22] All of this research provided evidence of a growing air pollution problem. Elevated ozone levels detected at Paradise were attributable to automobile emissions in the densely populated Puget Sound area. Sulfur dioxide, present throughout the Puget Sound trough, could be traced to two major point sources at the American Smelting and Refining Company smelter in Tacoma and the coal-fired Widco power plant in Centralia. [23] Much of the fine particulate matter in the air around Mount Rainier came from controlled burning on nearby forest land. [24] Lastly, precipitation could at times carry a high level of acidity. [25]

In 1985 baseline studies of the park's water resources were initiated. The purpose of these studies was three-fold: to develop reliable data on the physical, chemical, and biological characteristics of selected lakes, rivers, and streams; to form a better understanding of lake and stream ecology in the park relative to the local environment; and to establish a longterm program of water quality monitoring. [26] Park officials had little to worry about from upstream polluters; only a few creeks in the park originated outside the park. Acid precipitation caused concern, however, as did the potential for stream pollution from visitor use and poorly located pit toilets in the backcountry. The latter led to a study by the CPSU at Oregon State University with funding support from the Water Resources Water Quality Program in the Park Service's Washington office. [27]

HISTORICAL RESEARCH

Historical research in Mount Rainier National Park began with the interpretive program. Visitors liked to learn about the human story at Mount Rainier together with the rich geologic and biologic lessons which the mountain held in store. Many visitors from the nearby cities

of Seattle and Tacoma, feeling an almost proprietary interest in "The Mountain," perceived the local history of Mount Rainier as a part of their own regional identity. To satisfy that public need, park naturalists researched the local history and presented it to visitors in campfire talks, guided walks, and museum displays at Longmire. In this task the park staff long had the benefit of a few basic works by professional historians, such as Edmund Meany's Mount Rainier: A Record of Exploration (1916), and later, Aubrey L. Haines's Mountain Fever: Historic Conquests of Rainier (1962) and Arthur D. Martinson's dissertation, "Mountain in the Sky: A History of Mount Rainier National Park" (1966).

With the growth of the historic preservation movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the park administration had to address a new and rather different need for historical research. The American public, reacting to the increasing pace of social change and development, demonstrated a growing desire to preserve historic resources—particularly buildings and other large structures—which could serve as visual links to an earlier time. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 mandated that buildings and structures of a certain age would be evaluated for their historical significance, and if worthy of preservation, listed on a National Register of Historic Places. This spawned a new field of applied history known as cultural resource management. Cultural resource management called for historical expertise that the park staff did not typically possess. Initially, the NPS concentrated its cultural resource management specialists and research historians in the Washington office, the Denver Service Center, and the regional offices. The regional historian served as the liaison between the park and these experts.

The process of systematically identifying all historic buildings and structures for the Park Service's List of Classified Structures and then evaluating them for the National Register of Historic Places developed slowly. But by the mid-1970s, the Park Service was making funds available for historic resource studies in "natural areas" of the national park system—units that were not known principally for their historic resources. Robert L. Carper of the Denver Service Center's historic preservation division, conducted the first field survey of Mount Rainier's historic structures in 1975, and nominated 92 buildings to the Park Service's own List of Classified Structures. [28] Another historian with the DSC, James Mote, undertook a survey of Mount Rainier's historic resources in 1976-77. [29] This was followed by a more detailed survey and historic resources study report by yet another DSC historian, Erwin N. Thompson, in 1978-81. Thompson identified dozens of significant buildings in four historic districts in the park: Longmire, Nisqually Entrance, Paradise, and Sunrise. [30]

In the summer of 1982, Regional Historian Stephanie Toothman directed a team of historians in a comprehensive survey and documentation of all park structures over forty years of age. The team identified nearly 150 structures of that vintage. When Toothman evaluated these structures against the National Register's criteria for eligibility, she concluded that Mount Rainier National Park was endowed with "one of the most intact and extensive collections of rustic architecture in the National Park System." [31] Toothman nominated no fewer than 118 structures to the National Register of Historic Places in the final multiple property documentation form which she prepared for the park. [32]

Recognition of the park's cultural resources brought new administrative responsibilities and research needs. Superintendent Briggle responded to the increased emphasis on historic preservation in the park by appointing the park's first historical architect, C. Barrett Kennedy in 1984. [33] Now the park hosted a series of research projects, conducted by students and professionals and directed at the preservation and management of these historic structures. There soon appeared, in chronological order, A Historic Structures Maintenance Guide for Mount Rainier National Park (1983), prepared under contract by Portland historical architect Alfred Staehli; Historic Structures Report, National Park Inn, Mount Rainier National Park (1985), by Toothman and Kennedy; Paradise Inn: A Preservation and Design Study, Mount

Rainier National Park (1985), by Professors Donald L. Peting and Robert Z. Melnick and twenty-four students of the School of Architecture and Allied Arts, University of Oregon; and "Managing a Rustic Legacy: A Historic Landscape Study and Management Plan for Longmire Springs Historic District, Mount Rainier National Park" (1986), a master's thesis by University of Oregon student Lora J. Schiltgen. [34]

GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Geological research occupied a different place than biological research in the administration of the park. In the first place, Mount Rainier's geologic significance was one of the reasons for the creation of the national park, and the naturalist staff claimed a proud tradition of doing basic geologic research on Mount Rainier's glacier movements and other geologic phenomena. But as the NPS science program gathered steam in the 1960s, applied research in biology quickly took precedence over geological research. According to the new thinking which crystallized in the Leopold Report, the NPS mission to preserve national parks in a natural condition required a good deal more biology than geology. Even in those unusual instances when the NPS needed geological data to protect national park resources (such as in Death Valley or Glacier Bay, where mining companies owned potentially significant claims), the NPS turned to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) for help.

In Mount Rainier National Park the NPS turned to the USGS for advice on another kind of problem, a public safety issue: the potential effects of a volcanic eruption. Strangely enough, neither the public nor the park administration showed much concern about the threat of an eruption before about 1965. Repeated outburst floods on the Nisqually River in the 1930s and 1940s persuaded some NPS officials that Longmire was not a good site for headquarters, but this was about the furthest extent of their concern. Even the Kautz Creek mudflow of 1947 did not seriously erode people's confidence that the volcano would remain inactive.

Public perceptions began to change in the mid-1960s. The first event to bring home the mountain's latent power was a huge rockslide down Little Tahoma in December 1963. Although no one witnessed the event, geologists easily deduced what had occurred from the trail of debris that led down the north face of Little Tahoma to the Emmons Glacier and from the scars 250 feet high on the valley walls. Geologists estimated that the slide involved some fourteen million cubic yards of rock and that it had shot down the mountain at speeds of 100 to 300 miles per hour, moving on a cushion of air. The rockslide traveled four and a half miles and spent itself only 2,000 feet from the White River campground. [35] Close investigation revealed that at least seven separate rockfalls, possibly triggered by a steam explosion, had occurred in quick succession. [36]

There were several reports of steam explosions on the west side of Mount Rainier. A steam vent reportedly opened on the Kautz Glacier in 1965, and steam explosions were observed above the South Tahoma Glacier in August and September 1967. The latter coincided with a series of minor mudflows, or lahars, down the Tahoma Creek valley. There were further reports of steam and smoke rising from the west side of the mountain in August 1968 and February 1969. That summer, climbers surmised that the mountain subsurface was heating up beneath the northeast flank as an unusual number of crevasses and potholes opened up in the upper Emmons Glacier. [37]

Although the steam explosions abated in the 1970s, Mount Rainier's volcanism did not recede from the public eye. The eruption of Mount St. Helens on May 18, 1980, alerted residents of the Pacific Northwest to volcanic hazards like no other event in the recorded history of the region. Moreover, after a long period of relative quiescence, glacier outburst floods and debris flows on Tahoma Creek began to occur at the rate of three or four per year in the late

1980s, forcing closure of the Westside Road. And if the latter development made an impression on the public, the designation of Mount Rainier as a "Decade Volcano" by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior (IAVCEI) was at least as significant in attracting notice by the scientific community. [38] These events formed the background for a growing amount of volcanic monitoring and research in Mount Rainier National Park.

Mount Rainier and Nisqually Glacier from Canyon Rim, 1962. The glacier-clad volcano is both a natural attraction and a public safety and engineering concern. Note the old road cut to the site of a former bridge which was repeatedly washed out by glacial outburst floods. *(Art Harrison photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

USGS monitoring of the volcano began in the 1960s with the taking of aerial photographs and infrared images of Little Tahoma, the South Tahoma and Emmons glaciers, and the summit craters, and the installation of seismographs at various points on the mountain. USGS geologist Robert M. Moxham made infrared surveys of the summit in September 1964, September 1966, and July 1969, and USGS geologist John D. Unger measured microearthquakes beneath Mount Rainier in 1968 and 1969. [39] After 1980, the USGS upgraded its monitoring capabilities under the agency's new Volcano Hazards Program. The volcano watch now included the use of laser-ranging devices which could detect subtle changes of shape or bulges in the mountain caused by magma rising, and the monitoring of gas emissions from the summit crater. [40]

In addition to monitoring the volcano, USGS scientists worked with the park administration on hazard assessment and emergency plans. Dwight R. Crandell of the USGS prepared the park's first planning document of this nature in 1967. Crandell's report described the warning signs of an impending eruption, recounted the various effects that might be expected from a volcanic eruption and what areas of the park they would most likely impact, and listed evacuation routes. Crandell included a table indicating the level of hazard from these different effects for all the development sites in the park. White River and Tahoma Creek campgrounds both rated "high" in most categories; Crandell indicated that the latter was "in

an especially hazardous location." As for evacuation routes, these were not always by the most direct route away from the volcano. To evacuate the Longmire and Cougar Rock campgrounds, for example, it would be necessary to use the Skate Creek Road in the event that the bridges at Kautz Creek or Tahoma Creek were destroyed. If the one-lane bridge over the Nisqually River at Longmire were washed out, it would be necessary to drive toward the mountain in order to leave the park via Stevens Canyon. [41] The director of the USGS transmitted Crandell's report to the director of the NPS with the comment that the potentially alarmist report would not be publicized by the USGS. [42] (Another evacuation plan, prepared by the Park Service's Edward L. Parsegan in 1969, did not brighten the picture significantly.) [43]

With the designation of Mount Rainier as a Decade Volcano in 1992, scientific interest in the mountain intensified. The purpose of the IAVCEI's Decade Volcano program was to concentrate scientific research on a few "Volcano Demonstration Projects" with the hope of learning lessons that would reduce the social effects of natural disasters. Mount Rainier was selected for a combination of reasons including its proximity to large population centers, its volume of snow and ice (which raised the potential for large-scale mudflows), the steepness and instability of its cone, and its recent eruptive history and seismicity. "Despite such hazard and risk," three Mount Rainier scientists pointed out, "Mount Rainier has received little study; such important topics as its petrologic and geochemical character, its proximal eruptive history, its susceptibility to major edifice failure, and its development over time have been barely investigated." [44] Geologic research definitely had the potential to assist park managers in protecting the public, even within the confines of the park.

By 1993, a dozen separate geologic investigations were underway in Mount Rainier National Park: five by the USGS, one by the Environmental Protection Agency, and six by universities. [45] As the research continued, park personnel worked with federal, state, and university geologists to enhance monitoring, coordinate research, and translate these efforts into a comprehensive disaster-response plan. The findings, it was expected, would be incorporated into the park's new general management plan.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

PART SIX: YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION, 1965-1995

XXII. NEW PARTNERSHIPS

INTRODUCTION

Nineteenth-century men of science marvelled at the mass of ice and the variety of fauna and flora found on the flanks of Mount Rainier, and described the mountain as "an arctic island in a temperate sea." This compelling metaphor has stood as the dominant interpretive theme in the national park down to the present day. Weather and topography conspired to reinforce the island imagery since the mountain was so often viewed or pictured from afar girdled by clouds or rising from a sea of low-lying haze.

In the 1960s, Mount Rainier's island imagery was joined to the image of national parks as islands of nature. With an exploding human population transforming and in many ways degrading the face of the earth, conservation leaders said that national parks would be held above this tidal wave of change. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, addressing the First World Conference on National Parks at the Seattle World's Fair in 1962, likened national parks to "nature islands for the world" in a latter-day Great Flood. National park managers, said Udall, might well "become the Noahs of the 20th century." [1] Picking up on this theme a few months later, Mount Rainier's superintendent, John A. Rutter, commented that new challenges lay ahead for backcountry management as the park became "more and more an 'island' in the midst of land management practices that are in sharp contrast to those of the NPS." [2] The new island imagery—more ominous than inspiring—persisted down to the 1990s, with defenders of the Pacific Northwest's old-growth forest declaring that Forest Service policies threatened to turn Mount Rainier National Park into "an island in a sea of clearcuts." [3]

As compelling as the island metaphor became, it was actually a way of communicating an almost opposite reality: that national parks could not be completely insulated from environmental changes occurring all over the planet. The most that could be achieved was to adapt national park management to a changing social and environmental context in order to minimize adverse environmental effects within the park. Far from being insular in their thinking, park managers had to concern themselves more and more with developments outside the park boundaries. Park management was becoming increasingly contextual, or devised with the larger region in view.

Nowhere was this more apparent than in the Park Service's master planning documents. A new master plan for Mount Rainier, prepared in 1972, contained three sections on (1) the region, (2) the park, and (3) the plan. The proximity of a major metropolitan area, an important factor in Mount Rainier National Park's development from the beginning, loomed even larger in the 1970s as four million people resided within a half-day's drive of the park. People were moving to the Pacific Northwest at such a rate that the region's population growth was on a level with some Latin American countries. This was a young population,

with one-fifth of western Washington residents being between the ages of 15 and 24. Not surprisingly in such a youthful population, there was a high degree of interest in outdoor recreational opportunities and public services that would enhance the quality of life.

In response to this growth and development, federal, state, and local agencies came together to form the Puget Sound Government Conference. "The close interaction between the people in these cities and Mount Rainier makes it imperative that the Park Service expand its participation in a truly regional planning effort," the master plan stated. "Land-use planning and zoning, highway and mass transit planning, and many other aspects of regional planning should, at the formative stage, use input from management. Then, development and program planning can take guidance from completed regional plans." [4]

This chapter examines four areas of management in which the park administration formed new partnerships with entities outside the park, the Park Service, or both. The first section looks at the important relationship between the park and the adjoining national forests. The second section looks at the park's relationship with the private sector—the change in ownership of the major concession, the establishment of another concession for guided summit climbs, concessions for winter use, and the role of nonprofit cooperative associations in fundraising and publishing of interpretive materials. Finally, the third and fourth sections look at mass transit and commercial tourism development proposals which have involved the park administration in discussions with various other entities.

COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE

In 1963, high-level talks between the Park Service and the Forest Service on the proposal to establish a North Cascades National Park presented an opportunity for closer cooperation between Mount Rainier National Park and its neighboring national forests. Associate Director George B. Hartzog, Jr. and Deputy Chief Forester Arthur Greeley visited Mount Rainier with the North Cascades study team that summer to find out to what extent the two agencies coordinated planning at the local level. Afterwards, Hartzog and Greeley directed park and forest officials to consult closely with one another on planning in zones of mutual interest. This led to the preparation of an "exploratory coordinated planning report" in 1965, which dealt mainly with recreational development. Meanwhile, the North Cascades study team proposed some boundary changes between Mount Rainier National Park and the adjacent national forests. These efforts laid the groundwork for cooperation between the park and the forest on elk management and for improved communication on the contentious issue of timber sales along the park boundary.

Recreational Development

Superintendent Rutter and his counterpart, Snoqualmie National Forest Supervisor Leonard 0. Barrett, focused initially on recreation planning, an activity in which the two agencies shared essentially the same goals. In the Chinook Pass area, for example, they found that coordinated planning could eliminate duplication, cut costs, and better protect the resources. At Chinook Pass, the park dropped its plans for a hitching rack, loading ramp, and horse trailer pullout area when officials learned that the Forest Service had similar plans for its side of the boundary line. In addition, park and forest officials agreed upon the construction of a new segment of Cascade Crest Trail directly south of Chinook Pass which relieved some of the pressure on the Tipsoo Lake area, and they developed a joint plan for trail and interpretive signs in the Chinook Pass area. [5]

Coordinated planning between the park and Gifford Pinchot National Forest led to a number of innovative ideas. Forest officials expressed keen interest in the park's invitation to present

joint interpretive programs at Ohanapecosh campground. They also supported a proposal to develop a joint wayside exhibit on Backbone Ridge, where the visitor could see and compare national park and national forest lands. This was an interesting idea: to call attention to the boundary and interpret the contrasting land management schemes on either side of it. Still another proposal was to construct trails across the Tatoosh Range (and across the southern park boundary) in order to encourage backcountry use of this area. [6]

The most ambitious example of coordinated recreational planning centered on the Silver Springs area outside the northeast corner of the park. Park officials were already looking to the nearby Crystal Mountain resort, founded in 1962, to relieve pressure on the Sunrise and White River areas of Mount Rainier National Park. [7] At the foot of the Crystal Mountain access road, the Forest Service planned to expand its campground development and lease sites for a motel and store. Superintendent Rutter had a mixed reaction to these plans; the Silver Springs development would ease the demand for camping sites in the park but would also increase the amount of day use. In any case, Rutter supported plans to develop a new visitor information center at Silver Springs jointly with the Forest Service. [8]

It fell to Rutter's successor, Superintendent John A. Townsley, to hammer out a memorandum of agreement with the Forest Service on the specifics of the joint development of a White River visitor information station. Less than a year after the agreement was signed, however, the station site was inundated with water from the White River during a two-day storm in June 1968. When studies indicated that the site could not be adequately protected from the flood hazard, both agencies backed off from the plan. [9]

By 1973 the U.S. Forest Service had built its own visitor center in the Silver Springs area and the NPS was invited to contribute exhibits. The Forest Service mostly operated the visitor center as an unmanned facility but the NPS provided a VIP (volunteer) on many weekends. [10]

Ten years later the Park Service and the Forest Service completed a joint visitor information station at the junction of highways 410 and 123. Superintendent William J. Briggle helped dedicate the new facility on May 27, 1983. [11]

In 1990, the Park Service undertook another significant cooperative effort: rehabilitation of the Mather Memorial Parkway (MMP). Superintendent Briggle participated in meetings of an MMP Steering Committee comprising representatives of the park, Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest, Wenatchee National Forest, the Federal Highway Administration, and the Washington State Department of Transportation. A team of landscape architects and natural resource specialists from the Denver Service Center and Harper's Ferry Center prepared development guidelines. The objectives of the rehabilitation project, which was slated to cost an estimated $40 million, were to improve the recreational facilities throughout the parkway, provide a managed transition zone adjacent to the roadway that would minimize damage to natural resources, and develop guidelines for integrated roadside detailing, maintenance, signs, and interpretation. The plan was sensitive to the original purpose of the parkway, which was to provide a continuous, scenic driving experience for the whole 75-mile length of this Cascades highway. As the authors of the development guidelines explained, "The guiding philosophy for modifications along the parkway is to perpetuate and communicate the respect and protection of the aesthetic, natural resource, and recreational values that were common to land-managing agencies in the 193 0s." [12]

On paper, this looked like a good deal for the national park. Here was a plan of integrated design with preservationist underpinnings, prepared by NPS personnel with funding support from the Forest Service. But it had problems. State Highway Department officials wanted the parkway built to federal highway standards, with a relatively large "clear zone" on either side

of the roadway. Briggle found himself alone among the members of the MMP Steering Committee in resisting the state's plan. When environmental groups learned that the plan called for widening the road corridor and cutting down hundreds of old-growth trees within the park, they attacked the Park Service's environmental impact statement on the project. Park officials thrashed this out with representatives of the Sierra Club, Mount Rainier National Park Associates, National Parks and Conservation Association, and others during 1992-93. Briggle decided to break away from the MMP interagency plan, even though that meant the forfeiture of Federal Highway Administration funds. [13]

The NPS proposed its own plan (to be funded out of the general NPS budget) calling for spot maintenance, vista clearance, and preservation of the forest canopy over the road. Determined to prepare a satisfactory EIS this time, the NPS deferred the project while it consulted with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) on the project's potential effects for spotted owls or marbled murrelets. Surveys of these two endangered species were scheduled for the summers of 1994 and 1995, after which the park might enter into formal consultation with the FWS as required under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. In the meantime, environmental groups turned their attention to the Forest Service's EIS, which contained similar deficiencies to that of the Park Service. [14] The controversy and breakdown of cooperation over the Mather Memorial Parkway rehabilitation served as a reminder that interagency cooperation could cut both ways, fostering an uncomfortable degree of interdependence as well as the desired influence over developments outside the park.

Timber Sales Adjacent to the Park

In the early 1960s, as the park administration strove to improve coordinated planning with the adjoining national forests, officials were careful to play down expectations with regard to logging activity adjacent to the park. Interagency discussions on this topic at that time were brief. The problem, as Park Landscape Architect Sherman D. Knight saw it, "pretty much boils down to the fact that there are two distinct and separate functions to be served" by the two agencies. [15] Superintendent Rutter judged that NPS input on this problem was worthwhile only insofar as new logging roads fit into the Forest Service s recreational planning. [16]

The proliferation of access roads was in fact Rutter's primary concern with regard to logging near the park. It was Forest Service policy to make logging roads available for public use upon completion of timber sale contracts. These roads would soon turn areas of the park that were administered as backcountry into virtual front country. "Road systems being developed in Snoqualmie National Forest, in conjunction with timber sales, will approach as close as 330 feet to the Park's remote boundaries," Rutter informed the regional director. Rutter continued,

> These developments have not suddenly confronted us. There has been a steady approach to the Park over the years as the Snoqualmie and Gifford Pinchot National Forests, particularly the former, have moved to more remote sections in their timber sale programming. Many sections contiguous to the Park's north, west and south boundaries lie in this last remnant of ripe timber that is being made available for sale. However, in recent discussions with Forest Service officials concerned, we have learned that the increased problems of unplanned access to remote sectors of the Park will become actual in two years. [17]

Rutter's answer to the problem was to assign more seasonal rangers to backcountry patrols. As the Forest Service proceeded with these timber sales in the 1960s and 1970s, it became evident that logging so close to the park had other effects as well. First, there was the negative visual impact when the park boundary was turned into a straight edge of forest

bordering a clearcut. Beyond that sharp line, the patchwork of clearcuts on nearby hills blighted the views from many points in the park, such as Rampart Ridge, Gobbler's Knob, and Klapatche Point. Second, burning of slash during logging operations generated smoke, which impaired visibility. This not only affected the view out of the park, it generally reduced air quality inside the park too. Third, it was discovered that clearcuts could lead to changes in the forest ecology as much as one quarter of a mile away from the edge of the clearcut. In particular, abrupt forest edges were vulnerable to windstorms. Fourth, the young growth that grew back in clearcuts provided good browse for elk. This caused the elk population in the Cascade Mountains around the edge of the park to increase unnaturally. Some of the elk migrated into the subalpine meadows of the park during the summer, creating the specter that these areas could become overgrazed. All of these effects of logging made it imperative that park officials have some input on timber sale programming outside the park.

Fortunately, forest officials were fairly cooperative, allowing park officials to review plans for timber sales adjacent to the park. These areas were systematically mapped to show where the potential for blowdowns was most likely to develop or cause extensive damage, and timber sales were adjusted accordingly. In some instances, logging roads were closed to public use after the completion of a timber sale. By 1985, the Conservation Foundation could cite the cooperation between Mount Rainier National Park and Mount Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest as one of the "impressive examples of coordination among the park service and other federal and non-federal public agencies that administer adjoining lands." [18] Superintendent Guse met annually with the superintendents of Olympic and North Cascades national parks and the supervisors of national forests in western Washington to discuss problems of mutual concern. [19]

About that same time, however, the Forest Service began to increase timber sales in certain areas, purportedly in order to compensate for wilderness protections placed on other areas of the national forests in 1984. Critics maintained that the Forest Service was harvesting timber at an artificially high rate over and above what it needed to compensate for new land restrictions. Three new timber sale proposals along the northern boundary of Mount Rainier National Park—Lost Creek, Chenuis Creek/Cayada Mountain, and Fawn Ridge—raised considerable opposition in 1989-91. The areas contained old growth forest, sheltered wildlife that migrated in and out of the park, and fell within the viewsheds of such popular viewpoints in the park as Tolmie Peak Lookout. While the Park Service stopped short of taking the side of environmental groups who were attempting to block the timber sales through legal action, NPS officials pushed for various concessions. These included road closures following the completion of the timber sale, alternative treatments for disposing of slash, and a cutting schedule that would minimize logging-truck traffic on the Carbon River Entrance Road during periods of heavy visitor use. [20]

On May 23, 1991, Federal District Court Judge William L. Dwyer issued an injunction against any further timber sales in old growth forest on public lands until the Department of Agriculture developed new standards and guidelines for management of spotted owl habitat. Thus, the proposed timber sales along Mount Rainier National Park's northern boundary were held in abeyance. When the Department of Agriculture duly completed its new forest plan in 1994, it remained unclear whether the court would find this plan untenable under the Endangered Species Act as well. The plan established "late successional reserves" to protect old growth in the national forests and stressed recreational values over commercial timber values in a larger part of the national forests. But it reopened some old growth stands to harvesting. Moreover, as far as the national park was concerned, it did not resolve the old problem of public access roads in the national forests which led virtually to the park boundary. [21]

Interagency Wildlife Management

Park officials had long recognized that effective wildlife management required cooperation with land managers outside the Park Service. With the coming of each winter, deer and elk populations migrated out of the park to private and national forest lands where they were subject to sport hunting. For decades, park officials had worked with state and county game commissioners and wardens to ensure that limitations placed on sport hunting were adequate to protect these populations.

In 1962, Forest Service Biologist John Larson had made an aerial census of elk along the Cascade Crest, and counted a total of 466 elk, with over 300 of them located around Shiner Peak on the east side of the park. NPS officials at that time were surprised to learn that so many elk were summering in the park. Superintendent Rutter formed a task force among the park staff to study the elk situation and make recommendations for management. The task force built some exclosures and tried to assess whether elk were overgrazing the vegetation in the subalpine meadows. The task force finally had to acknowledge that it needed more sophisticated data to recommend anything. If one thing had become clear, however, it was the need for increased communication with other agencies on this issue. [22]

Accordingly, in 1968 Superintendent Townsley initiated an interagency committee consisting of representatives from the park, Snoqualmie National Forest, Wenatchee National Forest, Gifford Pinchot National Forest, Washington Department of Game, Washington State Sportsmen's Council, and Weyerhaeuser Company. Meeting once or twice each year, the group called itself the Mount Rainier Deer and Elk Management Coordinating Committee, or later simply the Mount Rainier Wildlife Committee. Park officials made use of data collected outside the park during each elk hunting season, and shared data of their own after the commencement of rigorous scientific field studies in the mid 1970s. What emerged from this was a general recognition of the fact that forestry practices outside the park were influencing elk ecology inside the park. Elk population control would most likely rest on a combination of special hunting seasons set by game managers, careful monitoring by the Park Service, and enlightened forestry practices by the surrounding land managers.

This complicated situation grew still more complicated when the issue of Indian hunting rights was raised. In 1982, Superintendent William J. Briggle negotiated with the Washington Department of Game to initiate a special hunt of the "north herd" elk in Snoqualmie National Forest. A state senator, John D. Jones, inquired of the Washington Attorney General's Office whether this would bear on the right of Indians to "hunt on open and unclaimed land." An Interior Department solicitor commented that federal cases in Idaho and Oregon had found that national forests did constitute "open and unclaimed land," and further, that the state could only regulate hunting by Indians if such regulation was necessary for conservation. The solicitor found that the hunt which the Park Service proposed was aimed at controlling the herd rather than conserving it; therefore, a special hunt would in fact impinge on Indian treaty rights. [23] As a result, representatives of the Yakima Indian Nation and Muckleshoot Tribe were invited to join the Mount Rainier Wildlife Committee. [24]

Federal and state agencies and the Indian tribes continued to cooperate on this issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s, even as the Park Service's research findings indicated that the elk were no longer a priority resource issue.

Boundary Adjustments

The North Cascades Study Report of 1965 recommended that the southern boundary of Mount Rainier National Park be extended to include about eleven sections of national forest land along the south side of the Tatoosh Range. This resurrected a proposal which had

surfaced before in the 1900s, 1930s, and 1940s. The main intent of the proposal was to afford greater wilderness protection to the area, which was both scenic and roadless.

The park administration made slow progress on the proposal. Forest officials agreed to the addition in principle but wanted to have close input on the final recommendation. They gave the project low priority. Superintendent Townsley budgeted for a cadastral survey of the south boundary, which was completed between 1970 and 1972; Regional Director Rutter advised Hartzog, "Due to nearby logging operations, it is extremely important that the boundaries of Mount Rainier National Park be firmly established as soon as possible." [25] But NPS officials could not summon much enthusiasm for the proposal among Washington's congressional delegation.

That the proposal once again got nowhere appears to have been due to public indifference more than anything else. Some local objection to the boundary addition developed among sport hunters in the Randle area, but forest officials assured park officials that this did not affect their agency's support for it. [26] Rather, it was the lack of enthusiastic support for the Tatoosh addition which undermined it. Perhaps the North Cascades National Park proposal absorbed so much of the environmental community's energy at this time that there was nothing left for the Tatoosh addition. [27] The NPS included the proposed boundary adjustment—together with a smaller boundary adjustment on Backbone Ridge so as to bring all of the Stevens Canyon Road within the park—in the Master Plan for Mount Rainier National Park in 1973. Public reaction to the proposal was favorable but hardly intense. Of 1,405 written responses to the master plan, comments on the Tatoosh proposal ran 245 in favor, none opposed, with another 1,160 expressing no opinion on that issue. The Mazamas' "favorable" comment, for example, was that either agency could manage the area as long as it was designated a wilderness area. [28] The area was designated as wilderness within the national forest system in 1984.



Proposed 1987 Boundary Adjustments

Superintendent Guse worked with his counterparts in the Forest Service to get three small boundary changes included in the Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988. By this act, two

small additions to the park, totaling 240 acres, were made where the Westside Road rounded Klapatche Point and the Stevens Canyon Road rounded Backbone Ridge, and one small 31-acre deletion was made where the Crystal Mountain ski area encroached on the summit of Crystal Mountain. [29]

Cooperation in Fire Management

The Park Service and the Forest Service routinely cooperated in fire suppression. During the unusually dry summer of 1977, several lightning storms between July 25 and August 21 started more than fifty forest fires. Two of the largest fires at Cougar Lake and Pigeon Peak required considerable manpower and flight time to suppress. With so many fires burning in the park at once, an "overhead team" from the Wenatchee National Forest arrived to assist in supervising fire crews. Despite the extreme fire hazard that summer, only 21 acres in the park burned. The total cost for suppression and presuppression came to $92,791. [30]

When the fire hazard in Mount Rainier was moderate to low—as was more often the case—rangers on the Mount Rainier staff were assigned to fire duty outside the park, both in the nearby national forests and farther afield. Mount Rainier's fire management personnel were integrated into an interagency plan called the incident command system (ICS), which broadened the scope of action from fire suppression to any emergency and from the NPS and the Forest Service to all federal land management agencies. [31] One Mount Rainier staff member, Chief of Operations Robert Dunnagan, headed an interagency overhead team which saw duty in various western states in the 1980s. As the appointed "incident commander," Dunnagan brought together fire managers in western Washington from the Forest Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington Department of Natural Resources, and other land management agencies. [32]

By the 1980s, cooperation between the park and the national forests extended to fire management planning too. Both agencies sought to make their prescriptions for natural fire—that is, their guidelines for deciding which fires would not be suppressed—more compatible with one another. Two factors were at work in bringing the Park Service and Forest Service into closer agreement on this issue. For the Park Service's part, there was a gradual turning away from an "isolationist" point of view as more and more rangers moved outside of the park's boundaries or got involved with volunteer fire departments in surrounding communities. The removal of park headquarters from Longmire to Tahoma Woods contributed to this, though the changing mentality was evident throughout the Park Service. [33] For the Forest Service's part' the agency's increasing commitment to recreational values relative to timber production changed the complexion of natural fire. In those national forest areas that were designated wilderness, the two agencies had little reason to take different approaches toward fire management. Thus, fire managers in the national forests and Mount Rainier National Park tried to "interlace" their respective fire plans to the fullest extent possible. [34]

Both agencies were in the process of formulating more comprehensive fire management plans in the mid-1990s, creating an opportunity for an unprecedented level of cooperation in the future. Mount Rainier's wildland fire management plan, which Superintendent Guse approved in 1988, was called back for review after the sensational fires in Yellowstone that year undermined public confidence in the Park Service's so-called "let burn" policy. Meanwhile, the Forest Service's fire management plans were undergoing review so that they would accord with the new forest plan for the preservation of old growth forest in the Pacific Northwest. The new forest plan called for "late successional reserves" to protect old growth and habitat of the threatened spotted owl. By 1995, both the Park Service and the Forest Service were revising their fire management plans in consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service in an effort to ensure that they would meet the requirements of the Endangered Species Act. [35]

NEW CONCESSIONERS

Concession operations in Mount Rainier National Park saw a marked improvement beginning around 1972. This was a most welcome change after four decades of poor business conditions, contentiousness over the terms of the concession contract, deferred maintenance on the buildings, uneven service to the public, and personality conflicts between concession management and the park administration. The marked improvement was attributable to the changing business climate for overnight accommodations at Mount Rainier (which was already improving as early as the late 1950s) and a change in ownership of the major park concession between 1968 and 1972. The change in ownership opened the door for separation of the mountain guide service from the hotel concession, an arrangement that served the park well for the next twenty years and more.

Fred Harvey, Inc. and Guest Services, Inc.

On October 4, 1968, Fred Harvey, Inc., purchased all the assets and liabilities of the RNPC. Fred Harvey was a Delaware corporation with restaurants, lodges, and retail stores in nine states, including concessioner facilities in five national parks and monuments in California and Arizona. To affect this transaction, Fred Harvey merged with Amfac, Inc., a diversified company with headquarters in Hawaii and a capital stock of $145 million. The terms of the RNPC buyout included a transfer of $225,000 worth of stock shares of Amfac to the shareholders of the RNPC, retention of all RNPC employees by Fred Harvey, and an effort by both the RNPC and Fred Harvey to obtain a new concession contract with the NPS "so that Fred Harvey could be provided an opportunity to properly consider additional investment requirements at Mount Rainier National Park." [36]

Fred Harvey operated the RNPC as a subsidiary from October 4, 1968, to June 20, 1972, at which time it sold its interests in the company to Government Services, Inc., or GSI. The company was renamed Mount Rainier National Park Hospitality Service, with Pat Davis serving as general manager. The parent corporation, GSI, was a non-profit organization which specialized in government employee food service in Washington, D.C. GSI requested that the ski tow and guide service be separated from the food and lodging service, and the NPS approved the request. [37]

The recruitment of a capable management staff, together with a steady improvement in occupancy rates and retail sales by the concession, laid the foundation for an effective partnership between GSI and the NPS. Alan W. Schramm served as GSI's general manager from 1976 to 1982, followed by Robert Seney from 1982 to 1985, and Elizabeth Marzano after 1985. In addition, the company employed from four to seven facilities and operations managers who were reassigned to other activities during the winter season in order to develop a more stable and experienced management staff. GSI's managers resided locally (the company purchased land three miles outside the Nisqually entrance and built three managers' residences, an office, a warehouse, and a laundry facility, in 1982) and worked closely with park officials. They helped to cultivate a good relationship by co-sponsoring an annual employee picnic for NPS and GSI employees. In 1989, the general and assistant general managers of GSI participated in a post-season meeting of park concessioners and NPS personnel at Olympic National Park, where topics ranged from labor pooling and tourism trends to the institution of an aggressive recycling program in Mount Rainier National Park. [38]

Capital returns for GSI were healthy. Occupancy rates reached 93 percent for Paradise and 84 percent for Longmire in the 1978 summer season. The eruption of Mount St. Helens on May 18, 1980, resulted in one very poor season for GSI as there were large numbers of

cancellations of room reservations by people who were wary of coming into the area, but economic losses were checked somewhat by consolidating all Paradise-area food service at Paradise in the Paradise Inn for that summer. The following year the Paradise Inn's occupancy rate rebounded to 90 percent. [39] A review of the concession operations by a team of specialists from the Denver Service Center in 1985 found the operation to be "a typical seasonal business from an expense and management perspective." The park concession was "well managed, with no significant opportunities to decrease expenses or increase operating efficiencies." Paradise was the best "profit center" in the park, as indeed it had been since 1917. [40]

During the 1980s, GSI successfully extended its operating season at Paradise into May and October. This was a project, it will be recalled, in which the RNPC had experienced repeated disappointment. In 1988, after obtaining a new 25-year contract agreement with the government, GSI hired a full time marketing director for its west coast operations (in Mount Rainier and Sequoia/Kings Canyon national parks) specifically to determine how the company could most effectively operate during these so-called "shoulder seasons." [41]

The new partnership between the park administration and GSI brought two tangible rewards. First, the public expressed a fair degree of satisfaction with food and lodging services in the park. Despite occasional problems with its high-spirited, young, seasonal employee staff, GSI consistently achieved an above average rating in meeting its contractual obligations. [42] In 1993, Superintendent Briggle gave the company "very high marks...for an aggressive employee recruitment program that resulted in a fine staff of service-oriented young people who garnered praise from many visitors during the summer." [43]

Second, GSI had the public-spiritedness to invest a considerable amount of its own capital in building improvements and to cooperate with government-funded building renovations that frequently reduced business revenues temporarily. GSI undertook a program of steady building improvements as early as 1973, with a remodel of the snack bar and gift shop in the Paradise Inn and kitchen improvements in both the Paradise Inn and the National Park Inn. GSI remodelled the food service area in the National Park Inn during the winter of 1977-78, and the gift shop/front desk areas in that building in 1979-80. Beginning in 1979, GSI embarked on a lengthy renovation of the Paradise Inn, focused mainly on replacing and updating the furnishings in all the guest rooms. GSI expended approximately $200,000 for this project in the first three years alone, and finally completed it during the winter of 1989-90. [44]

GSI cooperated with park officials and planners from the Denver Service Center in more extensive rehabilitation projects. These included structural stabilization of the Paradise Inn during the mid-1980s, renovation of the National Park Inn in 1989-90, and plans for replacement of the Sunrise Lodge with a new building, perhaps in 1996. GSI's role in renovating the National Park Inn was noteworthy for two reasons: first, because it entailed the complete suspension of overnight lodging and food service at Longmire for thirteen months (from April 1989 to May 1990); second, because of the way the project was funded.

Each year GSI contributed a percentage of revenues to the Visitor Facility Fund (VFF); the amount started at around 3 percent in the early 1980s and rose to around 6 percent a decade later. [45] The VFF was administered by the National Parks Foundation and was used to fund major building renovations throughout the national park system. [46] In 1985, the NPS transferred responsibility for the VFF to the Denver Service Center, and plans got under way to use VFF funds for a major renovation of the National Park Inn. GSI, as a contributor to the VFF and the inn's operator, actively participated in the planning process for renovating the National Park Inn. After a one year delay owing to a lack of successful construction bids, the renovation began in April 1989 and was completed on schedule thirteen months later. The

remodel gave the inn several additional guest rooms and moved the parking lot and front entrance to the south side of the building. [47]

Over the years park officials usually accommodated GSI when the company requested the elimination of various peripheral operations from its contract. This pattern began in 1972 with the separation of the mountain guide service from the ski tow operation. It continued with the turning over of firewood sales in most of the park campgrounds to another concession, Mountain Wood Company of Tacoma, in 1976. GSI ceased operating the gasoline station at Sunrise after 1979, and gave up gasoline sales at Longmire in 1994. The superintendent's management assistant, Robert Hentges, invited GSI to take charge of the snow play activity at Paradise during the winter and was not surprised when GSI declined. [48] The Park Service showed more flexibility in dealing with GSI on these matters than it had with the RNPC earlier. The concession was not expected to provide various services at a loss; if a branch of the operation was unprofitable, it was eventually pruned from the concession contract.

Rainier Mountaineering, Inc.

In the 1960s the guide service developed into a significant commercial enterprise. By the end of that decade a handful of mountain guides were leading hundreds of clients to the summit each year. Park officials saw no reason to curtail this public use of Mount Rainier; Superintendent Daniel J. Tobin, Jr. observed that without a professional guide service many visitors would be denied the opportunity to attempt a summit ascent. "To climb the mountain," Tobin wrote, "is a compelling reason to visit and use the Park." [49] It only made sense to separate this growing and highly specialized enterprise from the lodging and food service provided by the RNPC.

The Park Service found two willing entrepreneurs in Lou Whittaker and Jerry Lynch. Whittaker had been guiding on Mount Rainier since 1951; Lynch had had a long association with the RNPC as horse guide and manager of the Paradise Inn before establishing a law practice in Tacoma. They were already partners in an outdoor equipment store in Tacoma called Whittaker's Chalet. In 1968, Whittaker and Lynch formed Rainier Mountaineering, Inc. (RMI). Their partnership was highly successful and the new company showed promise. In 1972, Whittaker got out of the outdoor equipment retail business and Lynch became an equal partner in RMI. "We made him president and me vice president," Whittaker wrote. "Jerry did the paperwork and I did the guiding. He's always been the detail man, I've always been the personality out front, hawking clients and guides... .It's been a natural division of labor for us, and a longtime friendship." [50]

Whittaker and Lynch worked aggressively to secure their position in Mount Rainier National Park, pressing the NPS for a five-year contract. When GSI bought Fred Harvey's interest in the RNPC in 1972, an opportunity appeared to present itself GSI announced that it wanted to divest the RNPC of all guide service, equipment rental, and the ski tow operation. That spring, while the Park Service was beginning to prepare a prospectus for the new guide concession, Whittaker and Lynch produced a flamboyant new brochure for RMI. The brochure angered Superintendent Townsley, who thought it was premature and in poor taste. The brochure embarrassed the Park Service because it made the Park Service's efforts to put a new concession prospectus out for bid look rigged. Moreover, the Park Service had not yet decided whether to roll the winter operation and the guide service into a single prospectus. This took Whittaker and Lynch by surprise for they did not want to operate the ski tow. [51]

After going full throttle into the guide business in 1972, Whittaker and Lynch had to run RMI on a yearly permit for three more years while they awaited the Park Service's prospectus. The main reason that the NPS delayed issuing a prospectus was that an

environmental assessment of the prospectus raised the question of whether the busy corridor between Paradise and Camp Muir would be recommended for wilderness protection. This led NPS officials to postpone issuing the prospectus until after the park's new master plan and wilderness proposal had gone through the public review process.

RMI finally obtained its first five-year concession contract in 1975. It received another five-year contract in 1980, and a seven-year contract after that. In 1985, some climbers formed an organization called "Open Rainier" to protest what they perceived to be RMI's unfair climbing monopoly in the park, and park staff held at least two formal meetings with the organization to hear its concerns. But the park received only one application for the guide concession other than RMI's and it had no difficulty determining that RMI was the stronger candidate. In 1993, the concession contract was rewritten such that the concessioner would have to provide more help in search and rescue operations, environmental cleanup along the concessioner's primary guiding route, and funding for an engineering study for Camp Muir rehabilitation. The new contract was still pending in the spring of 1995. [52]

The number of visitors who attempted to climb Mount Rainier grew fairly steadily through the 1970s and 1980s, subject to variations in the amount of good climbing weather each summer. By the mid to late 1980s, RMI was leading about 2,000 clients on summit attempts each summer, with the success rate hovering around 60-65 percent. [53] Guided climbs accounted for approximately one fourth of all summit attempts. The guides not only provided a service to these many clients, they frequently helped park rangers rescue non-guided or "independent" climbers too. [54]

RMI placed a strong emphasis on client safety. Fatalities were rare. But on June 21, 1981, ten RMI clients and one guide were killed by an icefall on the Ingraham Glacier. Survivors of the tragedy said that they saw a big serac collapse about 1,000 feet higher on the mountain, triggering a massive avalanche. Half of the party got away; half were swept into a crevasse and buried under tons of ice. The event occurred shortly after sunrise. At 6:20 a.m., Superintendent Briggle was banging on Whittaker's door in Ashford, telling him there had been an accident on the mountain. Whittaker rode with Briggle up to the Guide House at Paradise, where rescue operations were already underway and the families of the victims would shortly begin to gather. The survivors, bruised and shaken but not badly injured, straggled in at midday. It was the worst climbing disaster in North American history. Weeks later, following a detailed investigation by park officials and a team of glaciologists, it was found that RMI's guides had acted in a reasonable manner and that the icefall had been an act of God. [55]

RMI guides generally served a three-year apprenticeship before they were given responsibility for whole climbing parties. An apprentice guide would work with two experienced guides, and if the new guide did not progress during the first season he or she would not be hired back the following spring. RMI looked for "people skills" as well as climbing ability; guides had to be perceptive toward their clients' level of confidence and fatigue. Apprentice guides could lead a rope of four or five clients, but RMI did not put them in charge of a whole climbing party. In 1994, RMI had nearly thirty guides who were qualified to lead parties to the summit. [56]

RMI's operations changed relatively little over the years. The Guide House at Paradise, Camp Muir, and the Ingraham Glacier-Disappointment Cleaver route to the summit were the concessioner's principal stamping grounds. The most significant changes occurred at Camp Muir, which RMI's guided parties used for an overnight stop on the way to the summit. In the early years, clients bunked with the guides in the stone shelter at Camp Muir known as the Cook Hut, or the guides would pitch tents on the ridge. But tents could not hold up in bad weather at that elevation, and needed to be repaired or replaced several times each summer,

so the Park Service permitted RMI to build a "temporary" client's shelter at Camp Muir in 1970. RMI had the prefabricated structure airlifted to the site in pieces by helicopter. Thereafter, the guides occupied one room in the shelter, the clients the other, and the Cook Hut was used for meals. RMI hired "cabin girls" to do the cooking. [57] In 1981, the park administration shut down RMI's meal service at Camp Muir because the sanitary conditions could not meet U.S. Public Health Service standards for a food service facility; henceforth clients had to prepare their own meals, which generally consisted of freeze dried packages. [58]

Despite growing concerns about the water supply and human waste at Camp Muir (see Chapter XIX), the concession received average to high performance ratings from the park administration year after year. In 1986, RMI became the first guide service and climbing school to obtain accreditation by the American Mountain Guides Association. Superintendent Guse hoped that accreditation would help the guide service obtain affordable liability insurance—an overhead cost that was becoming increasingly expensive for high-risk outfits like RMI. [59]

Winter Use Concessions

From about 1965 to 1975, the predominant recreational winter use of Mount Rainier National Park changed from downhill to crosscountry skiing. If these two forms of winter recreation had once been quite similar, in the decade 1965-1975 they became very different from one another. As the sport of downhill skiing became increasingly commercialized, more and more downhill enthusiasts came to shun Paradise in favor of more developed ski areas in the national forests. Crosscountry skiing, conversely, enjoyed a growing appeal as outdoor recreationists sought an alternative to the crowds and commercialism that were becoming so much a part of downhill skiing. Not surprisingly, there was a rapid turnover of winter use concessions in Mount Rainier National Park during this time of transition. Winter use concessions not only contended with the old problems of bad weather, road closures, and a weekend-only clientele; they also faced a changing public demand.

To a certain extent, decisions by the park administration helped to reshape winter use of the park. Park officials felt a natural affinity for crosscountry skiers and snowshoers while they came to see downhill skiing as an inappropriate use. Park officials had a more ambivalent response to two additional winter uses, snowmobiling and sliding (snowplay). In managing most of these winter uses, the park administration sought help from new concessioners and volunteer associations.

Downhill Skiing. Even after the development of new ski areas at Crystal Mountain and White Pass in the early 1960s, a few thousand downhill skiers continued to use the slopes above Paradise. Superintendent Rutter, like his predecessor Preston Macy, wanted the concessioner to keep rope tows and a snack bar operating at Paradise to accommodate this winter use of the park. Reluctantly, the RNPC maintained a winter snack bar service in the Paradise Lodge until the old building was slated for demolition. [60] Winter snack bar operations were confined to the National Park Inn at Longmire in the winter of 1965-66, and were introduced in the new Paradise Visitor Center beginning in the winter of 1966-67. Paul Sceva restricted the RNPC's winter operation to weekends and holidays, grumbling to the company's stockholders that the winter season would never amount to much "as long as rope tows are the only means of up-hill ski transportation." [61] Proposals for a permanent chair lift at Paradise resurfaced for the last time in 1968. [62]

In the fall of 1966, the RNPC turned over the coming winter operation at Paradise, together with the following summer's guide service, to a subcontractor by the name of the Kendall Corporation. This was not a success. The Kendall Corporation made a marginal profit on the

winter operations but lost money on its climbing equipment rentals and guided trips to the summit, glaciers, and Paradise ice caves. The Kendall Corporation filed for bankruptcy, the RNPC sued, and the rope tow equipment was turned over to the RNPC in a final settlement. [63] At this point Lou Whittaker and Jerry Lynch took over the guide service, while a separate subcontractor, John R. Anderson of Mt. Rainier Ski & Guide Service, Inc., purchased the ski tow operation. The guide service began to flourish, while the ski tow operation remained a marginal enterprise. The Park Service considered recombining the two in 1972, but decided against it. [64]

With the advantage of hindsight this was undoubtedly the correct decision, for the public's interest in summit climbs grew while its desire for downhill skiing at Paradise diminished. Despite a forty-year tradition of downhill skiing at Paradise, there was no strong sentiment for keeping the tradition alive. Indeed, there was a growing sentiment that the rope tow operation was an inappropriate use of the area. Although the four rope tows were taken down after each winter season, there remained the necessity of putting up pole markers each fall. Park officials noted that the equipment used in transporting the poles up the hill damaged the meadows. [65]

The last years of the rope tow operation may be quickly summarized. When GSI bought Fred Harvey's interests in the RNPC in 1972, it requested elimination of the ski tow operations from its concession contract. The Park Service obliged, issuing a one-year concession permit to Dick Vanderflute of Paradise Ski Tows, Inc. [66] The Park Service delayed preparation of a new prospectus for the winter concession for the same reason that it postponed issuing a prospectus for the guide service concession: it did not want to confound the public review process for Mount Rainier's master plan and wilderness recommendations. Three years after the winter concession had been divorced from the main park concession, on September 5, 1975, the NPS issued a prospectus for a five-year contract to operate the ski tow. It received one response, which did not meet the terms of the prospectus. [67] Paradise Ski Tows, Inc., meanwhile, operated under a year to year permit from 1972 to 1975 and then folded. [68] This marked the end of Mount Rainier's tradition of downhill ski use.

Crosscountry Skiing. Although the park did not keep statistics on the amount of crosscountry ski use, it undoubtedly increased during the 1970s. In 1972, park rangers marked a crosscountry ski trail from the Paradise Visitor Center to Nisqually Vista, and organized volunteers into a unit of the National Ski Patrol to assist in the protection of visitors in the Paradise area. Park officials estimated that crosscountry skiers outnumbered snowshoers by ten to one in the Paradise area in 1980. [69]

Crosscountry skiing remained solely an independent activity in the park until January 1979, when RMI initiated a program of ski and snowshoe rental and crosscountry ski instruction at Paradise. RMI ran the program out of the Guide House during the rest of that winter and the winter of 1979-80, but discontinued the program in 1980-81 for lack of public demand. On the east side of the park, meanwhile, Pete Sandvigen of Back and Beyond Trading Post, Inc., obtained a one-year permit in 1979 to operate a mobile crosscountry ski and snowshoe rental facility in the Cayuse/Chinook Pass area, but this venture was not commercially successful either. [70]

Following a winter without any ski rental service (1981-82), park officials asked GSI to provide this service. In November 1982, GSI opened a Ski Touring Center in the Hiker Center building at Longmire. The Ski Touring Center rented skis and snowshoes and offered skiing lessons at Cougar Rock and Paradise. Park interpreters led snowshoe walks from the Paradise Visitor Center, and park staff marked three crosscountry ski trails in the Paradise area. [71] GSI and the park staff maintained this cooperative program year after year. Beginning in the winter of 1993-94, the Washington Ski Touring Club provided weekend

volunteers for ski patrols on the trails out of Paradise. This was the first such volunteer effort in nearly twenty years. With the use of volunteers and paid weekend seasonals, the ranger staff greatly increased the number of ranger patrols into the more distant areas around Paradise that were frequented by weekend skiers. [72]

A non-profit corporation called Mt. Tahoma Trails Association initiated a system of crosscountry ski trails and overnight huts on the west edge of the park in 1989. The association utilized existing logging roads, together with the Westside Road, to develop a trail system that grew to more than 88 miles in extent by 1994. It included three large huts plus a cylindrical shelter called the Colonnade Yurt just west of Sunset Park on land belonging to the Champion International Corporation. On November 20, 1990, Mount Rainier National Park entered a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Forest Service, Washington Department of Natural Resources, Champion International, and Mt. Tahoma Trails Association outlining how the huts and trails would be managed. Trail grooming, ski patrols, hut reservations and handling of a refundable damage deposit for use of the huts was handled entirely by the Mt. Tahoma Trails Association. The Park Service's most important stipulation was that a hut located in the park would have to be dismantled and removed at the end of each winter season. [73]

The potential existed for an overnight hut on the Westside Road, half the 23-mile distance from the barricade on the Westside Road to the parking area on Champion International land west of Sunset Park. Several factors, besides the practical difficulty of arranging automobile transportation over the circuitous roads between these two trailheads, discouraged use of this spectacular route, however. Snow conditions for the first 6.4 miles of the Westside Road were problematic, the 4.8-mile stretch of trail through Sunset Park was rated "backcountry/expert" by the Mt. Tahoma Trails Association, and Champion International charged a $13 fee per person for entry upon its land. As a result, Mt. Tahoma Trails Association saw no need for investing funds and a lot of volunteer labor in a removable ski hut inside the park. The national park remained fairly peripheral to the Mt. Tahoma Trails system. [74]

Snowplay. In the 1960s Paradise became a popular place for parents to take their children sliding. [75] "Snowplay," as park officials termed this use, was in keeping with the park's legislated purpose as a public playground and with the longstanding administrative goal of spreading public use over the whole year. As early as 1972, the park administration encouraged this public use by preparing a run or runs and by coordinating with the Emergency Search and Rescue Scouts (ESARS) of Tacoma for weekend volunteers to supervise the snowplay area. [76] Although no accurate records on snowplay were kept before 1981, the number of sliders grew perceptibly during the late 1970s, reaching an estimated 5,000 during the winter of 1979-80. [77]

Unfortunately, snowplay was a public activity that entailed a significant rate of injury for the participants. Based on accurate estimates of the number of sliders and exact records on the number of injuries each winter from 1981 to 1991, park officials learned that the injury frequency rate could be held down to about 1 or 1.5 per thousand if the activity was closely supervised. Ranger supervision generally involved grooming the runs once each morning and restricting the activity to those few groomed runs. The issue then arose: to what extent should the park devote its finite resources to this public use instead of resource protection during the summer?

Superintendent Guse was a strong proponent of this winter use. He assigned the task of grooming the trails to the trails foreman in the maintenance division, and the task of supervising the sliders to four snowplay rangers. The latter assignment was not a popular one; spending a whole day on snow with dozens of parents and children was exhausting work. In 1987, Guse raised the grade level for snowplay rangers from GS-1 to GS-3 and increased

their number from four to five so that these rangers could be rotated onto lighter duty one day in five. Guse thought that some of the rangers' resistance to snowplay as an "inappropriate use" was motivated by staff sympathy for these rangers. He felt that winter play was part of the cultural heritage in Mount Rainier National Park and must be properly provided for. [78]

Superintendent Briggle's position on snowplay was more ambivalent. During his first term as superintendent of Mount Rainier National Park, Briggle initiated the program of ranger supervision of the snowplay area. This had a marked effect in reducing the number of injuries sustained by sliders each winter. But in his latter term as superintendent, Briggle found this use of staff resources increasingly difficult to justify. With the number of funded ranger positions shrinking year after year, Briggle wanted to redirect the funds used for the five snowplay ranger positions to other urgent park needs. In the fall of 1992, he instituted a major change in management of the traditional snowplay area at Paradise, ending the decade-old policy of trail grooming and ranger supervision. As a result, sliders used ungroomed slopes of their own making and the number of injuries rose from 4 in the winter of 1991-92 to 35 in the winter of 1992-93. Several of the visitors who were injured required ambulance transport out of the park. The following winter, Briggle once again assigned maintenance and ranger staff to the snowplay area but to a more limited extent than before. By the third winter, Briggle still thought that this was a highly questionable use of staff resources, but he now looked to resolve the issue under the aegis of the park's new general management plan. If the snowplay area were eliminated, he expected, it would be controversial. [79]

Snowmobiling. Snowmobilers first appeared in the park in the mid-1960s. They used both the Paradise and Chinook Pass areas. At first the park administration took the passive approach that snowmobiling did no significant harm to the environment and had a legitimate place in the park along with other forms of winter recreation. This greatly disturbed former park naturalist Frank Brockman, who sent a protesting letter to the park administration and copies to NPS Director George B. Hartzog, Jr., and Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas. "While your term 'oversnow vehicles' may give [snowmobiles] a nod of acceptance," Brockman wrote, "the fact remains that they are motor scooters on skis and that their exhausts are noxious and offensive to the sightseer and tourist who tries to find solitude and escape from city traffic and noises." Brockman went on to imply that there was nothing in the park regulations to prevent snowmobilers from using the crosscountry ski trails around Paradise. [80]

Over the years, the attitude of park officials toward snowmobiling remained about the same as it had been when Brockman penned his critical letter. Other than to restrict snowmobiling to designated park roads, park officials generally accepted this recreational use as long as the numbers of snowmobilers remained small. Mount Rainier National Park never experienced the wave of snowmobile use that overtook Yellowstone, where 4,000 snowmobiles entered the park in one weekend during the winter of 1969-70. [81] Mount Rainier officials were confident that the number of snowmobilers would remain small because Mount Rainier's winter use was virtually all local, and Washington residents did not take to snowmobiling the way residents of New England or upper midwestern states took to it, for Washington's climate and topography were generally not favorable for snowmobiling. Park officials refused to look for a problem where they did not think one existed.

Numbers of actual snowmobiles in the park have remained sketchy. The final environmental statement for the park's master plan, completed in 1976, stated that 707 snowmobiles entered the park in 1973, and described this use as "light." [82] Superintendent Tobin's statement for management in 1977 estimated the number of snowmobiles as from 50 to 60 annually, and described this use as "almost nil." [83] Subsequent statements for management offered no figures but maintained that snowmobile use was "very low" or "on the low side." [84]

COOPERATING ASSOCIATIONS

Mount Rainier National Park had a longstanding partnership with the Mount Rainier Natural History Association, a non-profit organization founded by Park Naturalist Frank Brockman in 1940. The association published various interpretive brochures, field guides, pictorial books, and other items of interest to Mount Rainier visitors. After covering yearly expenses, the association turned over all receipts to the Park Service—mostly to Mount Rainier National Park. In 1972, for example, the association had gross receipts of $33,000 and a net profit of $5,000, most of which it turned over to Mount Rainier National Park to assist with the procurement of audiovisual materials, library books and periodicals, film and developing, and Yellowstone centennial year programs. Thus the association not only assisted the NPS in its mission to serve the visiting public, it also acted as a fundraiser. [85]

The staff of the Mount Rainier Natural History Association worked closely with the chief naturalist and his interpretive staff. In 1973, seasonal naturalists Jim Ross and Charlie Grimwood prepared a self-guiding nature trail and accompanying booklet, "Life Systems: The Forest and Springs of Ohanapecosh," which the association published. In 1976, seasonal naturalists worked with the association to acquire several historical costumes for use in "living history" presentations. In 1982, the association funded a botany seminar for park staff given by Ola Edwards. These were representative of the diverse projects on which the park staff and the association cooperated. [86]

The Mount Rainier Natural History Association amalgamated with other national park associations to form the Pacific Northwest National Parks Association in 1974. The new organization comprised branches at Mount Rainier, Olympic, North Cascades, Coulee Dam, San Juan Islands, Fort Vancouver, and Whitman Mission. The association expanded further to include national forests, becoming the Pacific Northwest National Parks and Forests Association (PNNPFA) in 1981. The association took in interpretive and visitor service programs of the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1993, renaming itself the Northwest Interpretive Association. Throughout this evolution, the association maintained a separate account for sales relating to each park, and profits accruing to the Mount Rainier Branch of the association showed a steady growth. The Mount Rainier Branch took a "giant step forward" in 1990 with the opening of a bookstore in the Henry M. Jackson Memorial Visitor Center at Paradise. Sales increased by 11 percent for the year, exceeding $250,000 gross. All profits by the Mount Rainier Branch went into the park's Branch Budget and Special Projects fund. [87]

Superintendent Briggle and Olympic National Park Superintendent Maureen Finnerty launched the Mount Rainier and Olympic National Parks Fund in 1993. The organization came to include Washington's third national park, North Cascades, in March 1994. The intent of this organization was chiefly to raise funds from the private sector for the benefit of the three parks—to form a more ambitious partnership between the federal government and private donors. Whereas the Northwest Interpretive Association focused on aiding the interpretive program, the Mount Rainier, Olympic, and North Cascades National Parks Fund would be used for a wide range of needs—what Briggle called the strategic objectives for taking these parks into the twenty-first century. Though not new, the concept had rarely been applied before in the western national parks. The National Parks Foundation provided a $25,000 grant in the way of seed money for the new organization and within two years Briggle and the superintendents of Olympic and North Cascades National Parks had enlisted the financial support of many powerful businessmen and politicians in the region. [88]

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

As recently as the Mission 66 era, park planners had still regarded the private automobile as a boon to Mount Rainier National Park. They assumed that the completion of the Stevens Canyon Road, together with a system of wayside exhibits, would improve visitor circulation in the park and relieve congestion at Paradise and Sunrise. They anticipated that many visitors would enjoy self-guided auto tours of the park, spreading use more evenly. By the early 1970s, however, park planners had reversed their thinking on the automobile. The 59-page master plan for Mount Rainier which park planners completed in 1972 could be read in part as a diatribe against the automobile. The plan called for a strong commitment to mass transit development, forebearance of any further development to accommodate the automobile, closures of portions of the Westside and Mowich Lake roads, determined efforts by the Interpretive Division to separate park visitors from their cars, and NPS involvement in regional highway and mass transit planning. The thousands of cars that entered the park each summer weekend were no longer a boon but a blight on the national park experience. [89]

But park planners overestimated the public's willingness to embrace mass transit, and Mount Rainier's superintendents by and large showed little inclination to get out in front on this issue. [90] Most of the master plan's proposals for limiting automobile use in the park went unfulfilled. Park transportation studies finally got under way in 1990, while the commitment to work with the cities of Seattle and Tacoma on regional transportation planning finally bore fruit in 1992—twenty years after the master plan was written. During that twenty year interval automobile use in the park increased by 40 percent. Nevertheless, there were indications in the early 1990s that the park administration was finally coming to grips with the longstanding problem of too many automobiles.

In 1992 Superintendent Briggle held discussions with City of Tacoma officials concerning a proposal to develop a Mount Rainier excursion train from Tacoma's Freighthouse District to a point a few miles outside the Nisqually Entrance. The city secured the rights from Weyerhaeuser Corporation, the present owner of the old Tacoma-Eastern Railroad line, to more than 67 miles of track, and proposed to build a new terminal somewhere between Elbe and Ashford. City officials estimated the cost of rehabilitating the line would be approximately $6 million; new depots and platforms would cost another $1 million. [91]

GATEWAY COMMUNITIES

As visitation outstripped the capacity of concessioner and campground facilities in national parks in the 1950s and 1960s, so-called gateway communities began to spring up outside park entrances all over the nation. These gateway communities bristled with competing motel, restaurant, and gas station signs, while their curios shops and junk museums appealed to the tourist's worst instincts. The towns of Gatlinburg, Tennessee, and West Yellowstone, Montana, were two notorious examples. There was a bit of tourist development outside the Nisqually entrance to Mount Rainier National Park, but for many years the approach roads to Mount Rainier remained relatively free of tourist traps because so much of the park's visitation was local.

The cityscape encroaching on Mount Rainier as seen from Fife, forty miles to the northwest, September 1984. Park managers have become increasingly involved in regional environmental issues such as rural land use zoning, mass transit planning, and air quality control. *(Bob Butts photo courtesy of Mount Rainier National Park.)*

By the mid-1970s, some environmentalists were suggesting that the Park Service and other federal land management agencies should have the power to prevent uses on nearby private lands that detracted from public land values. In a few instances, notably in the Redwood National Park Act, Congress gave the Park Service statutory authority to prohibit certain land uses if those uses threatened to harm park resources. [92] Lacking any such statutory authority or tradition of involvement outside Mount Rainier National Park, park officials did not protest the creep of roadside tourist development between Elbe and the Nisqually entrance during the 1970s and 1980s. [93] Statements for management in 1977, 1985, and 1988 made no mention of the problem.

Two developments in the 1990s pointed to an incipient change of policy. The first development, ironically, cast the national park itself as the agent of unwelcome growth. When the park put forward a plan to establish a rest area and information center near the Tahoma Woods headquarters, seven miles west of the park entrance, local citizens objected. They formed a group called Neighbors Opposed to Park Expansion, or NOPE, and successfully blocked the plan. Although the park administration was thwarted in this instance, it gained overall by the fact that the creation of NOPE opened lines of communication between local residents and park officials. Superintendent Briggle recognized the value of opening lines of communication with other local citizen groups in Elbe, Greenwater, Puyallup, and other nearby communities. "There's some risk in getting involved in outside politics," Briggle told a Seattle Times reporter in an interview in 1994. "But the risk is greater if I don't." [94]

The second development that foreshadowed a change of policy toward gateway communities was the proposal for a large new resort near Ashford, tentatively called Mount Rainier Resort at Park Junction. When the plan was first announced, it consisted of little more than a golf course and a 150-room hotel. Later, in July 1993, the developers filed a county permit application in which they proposed to build a 250-room hotel, 220 homes, a recreational

vehicle park, a forestry-theme visitor center, 70,000 square feet of retail space, and 120 cabins and apartments for employees. Still later, the developers filed further planning documents that added a second 150-room hotel, 50 more employee cabins, and as many as 400 additional homes to the development plan. [95]

The Park Service monitored this development proposal carefully. On a strictly practical level, the potential existed for a conflict over water rights, as the resort would require a large amount of water to be pumped out of the area near Tahoma Woods. More to the point, the huge resort development threatened to cause congestion and detract from the experience of driving to Mount Rainier; or worse, it threatened to form the nucleus for a sprawling new gateway community like Gatlinburg or West Yellowstone on the edge of Mount Rainier National Park. At the beginning of 1995 the park administration had yet to take a public stand on the issue, but some Park Service officials were predicting that the development loomed as one of the park's most significant challenges in the future. [96]

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CONCLUSION

The central purpose of Mount Rainier National Park is to preserve the area in a natural condition for the enjoyment of present and future generations. This public intent was incipient in the establishment of the Pacific Forest Reserve in 1893, and definitely spelled out in the Mount Rainier National Park act of 1899. Mount Rainier National Park has been shaped by more than a century of federal management and intensive public use in fulfillment of that purpose.

It is often remarked that the National Park Service mission contains an irreconcilable tension between preservation and use. Preserving nature and providing for the public's enjoyment of nature represent a pair of directives that can never be absolutely compatible with one another. This classic tension has animated management decisions in Mount Rainier National Park since the park's founding. Park managers, negotiating that conflict over and over again in whatever specific context it arose, looked for guidance to the current, dominant philosophical assumptions about what a national park should be. These culturally-based assumptions have changed markedly over the past 100 years.

What becomes clear from a study of the administrative history of Mount Rainier National Park is how multi-faceted the tension between preservation and use has been in this park. The philosophical assumptions that have guided park management have encompassed much more than changing cultural constructions of nature. They have included such diverse considerations as appropriate and inappropriate recreational uses in a national park, the proper role of private capital in a national park, the sanctity of national park resources in the context of economic mobilization for total war, and the value of national park visitation to the state or regional tourism economy.

Indeed, until fairly recently the fiercest disagreements over proper administration of Mount Rainier National Park took into account the park's natural resources only tangentially. Concession policy, road development, public works in the Depression era, winter use--these were the issues that attracted the most public discourse. It is only in recent decades that the most controversial issues of park management began to revolve around natural resources.

The national park idea is at once ennobling and imbued with a disquieting sense of loss. Our urge to preserve pieces of wild nature springs directly from our national experience of westward expansion. Anxious about the loss of the frontier at the close of the nineteenth century, Americans fashioned a new view of wild nature, remaking North American wilderness into an indispensable and dwindling commodity. National parks were one answer to a vanishing frontier. They were monuments to our wilderness heritage. National parks became our relics, our ancient ruins. They were intrinsically nostalgic places.

Today, as the twentieth century draws to a close, we face a recurrence of this cultural anxiety in the prospect of our national parks becoming so inundated with people that the national park experience is changed beyond recognition. Reflecting that concern for the national park system as a whole, the dominant management issue in Mount Rainier National Park in the

foreseeable future will be how to contend with upwards of two million visitors annually while preserving the "national park experience. "

The pattern of visitor use in Mount Rainier National Park has changed in remarkable ways over the past 100 years. Visitor numbers have grown from an estimated 2,000 in 1899 to more than 2 million per year in the 1990s, an increase of a thousand-fold. Automobile use has increased by an even greater percentage. Moreover, private vehicles have grown larger in size; probably more people visit the park in gargantuan recreational vehicles today than ever came by bus or train in years past. Meanwhile, average visitor stays have grown shorter and shorter. Various visitor activities have fallen in and out of favor, from golf to mineral baths to downhill skiing. Obviously the "national park experience" is a malleable and evolutionary concept.

In one important respect, the pattern of visitor use seems to be coming full circle in Mount Rainier National Park. Visitor use began as a predominantly local phenomenon, and it appears to be headed back in that direction.

The critical test for park managers in the coming years will be found in their ability to define preservation for the public. As park managers search for that elusive balance between preservation and use, they will need to articulate again and again what the public wants its national parks to be. Superintendents of Mount Rainier National Park will need to direct that message to the visitor to an ever increasing degree.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

APPENDIX A: KEY PERSONNEL

Superintendents

Grenville F. Allen (Acting Superintendent) 1901-1909
Edward S. Hall 1910-1913
Ethan Allen 1913-1914
John J. Sheehan (Supervisor) 1915 (January to May)
DeWitt L. Reaburn (Supervisor) 1915-1919
Roger W. Toll 1919-1920
William H. Peters 1920-1922
Clarence L. Nelson (Acting Superintendent) 1922-1923
Owen A. Tomlinson 1923-1941
John C. Preston 1941-1951
Preston P. Macy 1951-1961
John A. Rutter 1962-1967
John A. Townsley 1967-1972
Daniel J. Tobin, Jr. 1972-1977
William J. Briggle 1977-1984
Neal G. Guse, Jr. 1984-1991
William J. Briggle 1991-

Assistant Superintendents

Oscar W. Carlson 1923-1928
Harthon L. Bill 1946-1952
Curtis Skinner 1952-1960
John Rutter 1960-1962
J. Leonard Volz 1962-1965
Robert H. Bendt 1965-1966
David A. Richie 1966-1967
Bob Chandler 1967-1970
John Parks (Chief of Operations) 1972-1976
Robert D. Dunnagan 1983-1992*

Chief Rangers

Albert D. Rose 1947-1958
Ruben Hart 1959-1966
Joseph L. Orr 1966-1971
Alan Atchison 1972-1977
Robert D. Dunnagan 1977-1983*
John Jensen 1983-1994
John Krambrink 1994-

Chief Naturalists

Russell K. Grater 1947-1949
Merlin Potts 1950-1956
Vernon R. Bender, Jr. 1956-1964
Charles J. Gebler 1964-1966
Norman A. Bishop 1966-1972
Harry Wills 1972-1978
Dale Thompson 1978-1981
William Dengler 1981-

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*At different points during his tour at Mount Rainier National Park Robert Dunnagan's title was Chief of Operations, Chief Ranger, and Assistant Superintendent.

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MOUNT RAINIER

Wonderland
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APPENDIX B: VISITATION

Year	People	Year	People	Year	People
1899	2,000 (est.)	1934	242,757	1964	1,439,922
1904	554	1935	239,309	1965	1,643,142
1905	928	1936	317,345	1966	1,722,258
1906	1,786	1937	349,289	1967	1,805,863
1907	2,063	1938	381,876	1968	1,682,740
1908	3,611	1939	361,787	1969	1,795,238
1909	5,960	1940	456,637	1970	1,925,131
1910	8,000	1941	446,636	1971	1,742,611
1911	10,306	1942	389,857	1972	1,682,376
1912	8,946	1943	138,381	1973	1,528,186
1913	13,501	1944	125,744	1974	1,495,514
1914	15,038	1945	287,289	1975	1,521,302
1915	35,166	1946	468,225	1976	1,972,334
1916	23,986	1947	496,220	1977	2,437,332
1917	35,568	1948	580,135	1978	2,094,372
1918	43,901	1949	573,183	1979	1,981,454
1919	55,232	1950	568,098	1980	2,001,002
1920	56,491	1951	871,577	1981	1,964,846
1921	55,771	1952	877,388	1982	1,536,014
1922	70,376	1953	768,015	1983	1,581,987
1923	123,708	1954	794,955	1984	1,669,193
1924	161,473	1955	879,214	1985	1,638,837
1925	173,004	1956	850,747	1986	1,830,751
1926	161,706	1957	915,829	1987	1,825,629
1927	200,051	1958	1,115,815	1988	1,799,978
1928	219,331	1959	1,105,072	1989	2,023,900
1929	217,783	1960	1,538,663	1990	1,936,215
1930	265,620	1961	1,592,829	1991	2,235,591
1931	293,562	1962	1,905,302	1992	2,358,296
1932	216,065	1963	1,544,300	1993	2,192,062
1933	170,194			1994	2,206,083

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MOUNT RAINIER

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An Administrative History of Mount Rainier National Park

APPENDIX C: LEGISLATION

1. An Act To set aside a portion of certain lands in the State of Washington now known as the Pacific Forest Reserve, as a public park, to be known as Mount Ranier [sic] National Park. Approved March 2, 1899.

2. An Act Making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and nine, and for other purposes. Approved May 27, 1908.

3. An Act To accept the cession by the State of Washington of exclusive jurisdiction over the lands embraced within the Mount Rainier National Park, and for other purposes. Approved June 30, 1916.

4. An Act Making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and for other purposes. Approved June 12, 1917.

5. An Act To revise the boundary of the Mount Rainier National Park in the State of Washington, and for other purposes. Approved May 28, 1926.

6. An Act To provide for uniform administration of the national parks by the United States Department of the Interior, and for other purposes. Approved January 26, 1931.

7. An Act To extend the south and east boundaries of the Mount Rainier National Park, in the State of Washington, and for other purposes. Approved January 31, 1931.

8. An Act Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to acquire on behalf of the United States Government all property and facilities of the Rainier National Park Company. Approved September 21, 1950.

9. An Act To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to provide a headquarters site for Mount Rainier National Park in the general vicinity of Ashford, Washington, and for other purposes. Approved June 27, 1960.

10. Public Law 100-668. Title III--Mount Rainier National Park Wilderness. Approved November 16, 1988.

FIFTY-FIFTH CONGRESS. SESS. III. CHS. 375-377. 1899. 993

March 2, 1890.

CHAP. 377.—An Act To set aside a portion of certain lands in the

State of Washington, now known as the Pacific Forest Reserve, as a public park, to be known as the Mount Ranier National Park.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all those certain tracts, pieces, or parcels of land lying and being in the State of Washington, and within the boundaries particularly described as follows, to wit: Beginning at a point three miles east of the northeast corner of township numbered seventeen north, of range six east of the Willamette meridian; thence south through the central parts of townships numbered seventeen, sixteen, and fifteen north, of range seven east of the Willamette meridian, eighteen miles more or less, subject to the proper easterly or westerly offsets, to a point three miles east of the northeast corner of township numbered fourteen north, of range six east of the Willamette meridian; thence east on the township line between townships numbered fourteen and fifteen north, eighteen miles more or less to a point three miles west of the northeast corner of township fourteen north, of range ten east of the Willamette meridian; thence northerly subject to the proper easterly or westerly offsets, eighteen miles more or less, to a point three miles west of the northeast corner of township numbered seventeen north, of range ten east of the Willamette meridian (but in locating said easterly boundary, wherever the summit of the Cascade Mountains is sharply and well defined, the said line shall follow the said summit, where the said summit line bears west of the easterly line as herein determined); thence westerly along the township line between said townships numbered seventeen and eighteen to the place of beginning, the same being a portion of the lands which were reserved from entry or settlement and set aside as a public reservation by proclamation of the President on the twentieth day of February, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and ninety-three, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and seventeenth, are hereby dedicated and set apart as a public park, to be known and designated as the Mount Ranier National Park, for the benefit and enjoyment of the people; and all persons who shall locate or settle upon or occupy the same, or any part thereof, except as hereafter provided, shall be considered trespassers and be removed therefrom.

Mount Ranier, National Park, Washington, established.

Location.

Vol. 27, p. 1063.

SEC. 2. That said public park shall be under the exclusive control of the Secretary of the Interior, whose duty it shall be to make and publish, as soon as practicable, such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the care and management of the same. Such regulations shall provide for the preservation from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural condition. The Secretary may, in his discretion, grant parcels of ground at such places in said park as shall require the erection of buildings for the accommodation of visitors; all of the proceeds of said leases, and all other revenues that may be derived from any source connected with said park, to be expended under his direction in the management of the same, and the construction of roads and bridle paths therein. And through the lands of the Pacific Forest Reserve adjoining said park rights of way are hereby granted, under such restrictions and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may establish, to any railway

Secretary of the Interior to make regulations, etc.

Leases, disposition of funds.

Rights of way to park granted through Pacific Forest Reserve.

or tramway company or companies, through the lands of said Pacific Forest Reserve, and also into said park hereby created, for the purpose of building, constructing, and operating a railway, constructing and operating a railway or tramway line or lines, through said lands, also into said park. He shall provide against the wanton destruction of the fish and game found within said park, and against their capture or destruction for the purposes of merchandise or profit. He shall also cause all persons trespassing upon the same after the passage of this Act to be removed therefrom, and generally shall be authorized to take all such measures as shall be necessary to fully carry out the objects and purposes of this Act.

Protection of fish and game.

Trespassers.

SEC. 3. That upon execution and filing with the Secretary of the Interior, by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, of proper deed releasing and conveying to the United States the lands in the reservation hereby created, also the lands in the Pacific Forest Reserve which have been heretofore granted by the United States to said company, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, and which lie opposite said company's constructed road, said company is hereby authorized to select an equal quantity of nonmineral public lands, so classified as nonmineral at the time of actual Government survey, which has been or shall be made, of the United States not reserved and to which no adverse right or claim shall have attached or have been initiated at the time of the making of such selection, lying within any State into or through which the railroad of said Northern Pacific Railroad Company runs, to the extent of the lands so relinquished and released to the United States: *Provided*, That any settlers on lands in said national park may relinquish their rights thereto and take other public lands in lieu thereof, to the same extent and under the same limitations and conditions as are provided by law for forest reserves and national parks.

Grant of land to Northern Pacific Railroad in exchange for land relinquished.

Proviso. Lieu lands to settlers.

SEC. 4. That upon the filing by the said railroad company at the local land office of the land district in which any tract of land selected and the payment of the fees prescribed by law in analogous cases, and the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, he shall cause to be executed, in due form of law, and deliver to said company, a patent of the United States conveying to it the lands so selected. In case the tract so selected shall at the time of selection be unsurveyed, the list filed by the company at the local land office shall describe such tract in such manner as to designate the same with a reasonable degree of certainty; and within the period of three months after the lands including such tract shall have been surveyed and the plats thereof filed by said local land office, a new selection list shall be filed by said company, describing such tract according to such survey; and in case such tract, as originally selected and described in the list filed in the local land office, shall not precisely conform with the lines of the official survey, the said company shall be permitted to describe such tract anew, so as to secure such conformity.

Patent.

Description in selection list of unsurveyed land, etc.

SEC. 5. That the mineral-land laws of the United States are hereby extended to the lands lying within the said reserve and said park. extended to park.

Mineral land laws extended to park.

Approved, March 2, 1899.

CHAP. 200.—An Act Making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and nine, and for other purposes.

ALIGN="center">
May 27, 1908.
[H. R. 21260.]

[Public, No. 141.]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums be, and the same are hereby, appropriated, for the objects hereinafter expressed, for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth. nineteen hundred and nine, namely:

Sundry civil expenses appropriations.

* * *

MOUNT RAINIER NATIONAL PARK: For continuing the construction of the wagon road into said park, from the west, heretofore surveyed and commenced, under the direction of the Secretary of War, to be immediately available, fifty thousand dollars.

Mount Rainier Park.

Hereafter the location of mining claims under the mineral-land laws of the United States is prohibited within the area of the Mount Rainier National Park, in the State of Washington: *Provided, however,* That this provision shall not affect existing rights heretofore acquired in good faith under the mineral-land laws of the United States to any mining location or locations in said Mount Rainier National Park.

Mining locations prohibited.

Proviso.
Prior rights not affected.

CHAP. 197.—An Act To accept the cession by the State of Washington of exclusive jurisdiction over the lands embraced within the Mount Rainier National Park, and for other purposes.

June 30, 1916.
[S. 3928.]

[Public, No. 124.]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the provisions of the act of the legislature of the State of Washington, approved March sixteenth, nineteen hundred and one, ceding to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the territory embraced within the Mount Rainier National Park, are hereby accepted and sole and exclusive jurisdiction is hereby assumed by the United States over such territory, saving, however, to the said State the right to serve civil or criminal process within the limits of the aforesaid park in suits or prosecution for or on account of rights acquired, obligations incurred, or crimes committed in said State but outside of said park, and saving further to the said State the right to tax persons and corporations, their franchises and property, on the lands included in said park. All the laws applicable

Mount Rainier National Park, Wash.
Sole jurisdiction over, ceded by Washington to United States.

State process, etc.

to places under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall have force and effect in said park. All fugitives from justice taking refuge in said park shall be subject to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the State of Washington.

Jurisdiction of Washington western district.

SEC. 2. That said park shall constitute a part of the United States judicial district for the western district of Washington, and the district court of the United States in and for said district shall have jurisdiction of all offenses committed within said boundaries.

Punishment under Washington laws.

SEC. 3. That if any offense shall be committed in the Mount Rainier National Park, which offense is not prohibited or the punishment for which is not specifically provided for by any law of the United States, the offender shall be subject to the same punishment as the laws of the State of Washington in force at the time of the commission of the offense may provide for a like offense in said State; and no subsequent repeal of any such law of the State of Washington shall affect any prosecution for said offense committed within said park.

Hunting, fishing, etc., prohibitions.

SEC. 4. That all hunting or the killing, wounding, or capturing at any time of any wild bird or animal, except dangerous animals when etc., it is necessary to prevent them from destroying human lives or inflicting personal injury, is prohibited within the limits of said park; nor shall any fish be taken out of the waters of the park in any other way than by hook and line, and then only at such seasons and in such times and manner as may be directed by the Secretary of the Interior. That the Secretary of the Interior shall make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary and proper for the management and care of the park and for the protection of the property therein, especially for the preservation from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits other than those legally located prior to the passage of the Act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and eight (Thirty-fifth Statutes, page three hundred and sixty-five), natural curiosities, or wonderful objects within said park, and for the protection of the animals and birds in the park from capture or destruction, and to prevent their being frightened or driven from the park; and he shall make rules and regulations governing the taking of fish from the streams or lakes in the park. Possession within said park of the dead bodies, or any part thereof, of any wild bird or animal shall be prima facie evidence that the person or persons having the same are guilty of violating this Act. Any person or persons, or stage or express company, or railway company, who knows or has reason to believe that they were taken or killed contrary to the provisions of this Act and who receives for transportation any of said animals, birds, or fish so killed, caught, or taken, or who shall violate any of the other provisions of this Act or any rule or regulation that may be promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior with reference to the management and care of the park or for the protection of the property therein, for the preservation from injury or spoliation of timber, mineral deposits other than those legally located prior to the passage of the Act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and eight (Thirty-fifth Statutes, page three hundred and sixty-five), natural curiosities, or wonderful objects within said park, or for the protection of the animals, birds, or fish in the park, or who shall within said park commit any damage, injury, or spoliation to or upon any building, fence, hedge, gate, guidepost, tree, wood, underwood,

Regulations, etc.

Vol. 35, p. 365.

Evidence of violations.

Punishment for violations.

Vol. 35, p. 365.

timber, garden, crops, vegetables, plants, land, springs, mineral deposits other than those legally located prior to the passage of the Act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and eight (Thirty-fifth Statutes, page three hundred and sixty-five), natural curiosities, or other matter or thing growing or being thereon or situated therein, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, and be adjudged to pay all costs of the proceedings.

Forfeiture of guns, traps, etc.

SEC. 5. That all guns, traps, teams, horses, or means of transportation of every nature or description used by any person or persons within said park limits when engaged in killing, trapping, ensnaring, or capturing such wild beasts, birds, or animals shall be forfeited to the United States and may be seized by the officers in said park and held pending the prosecution of any person or persons arrested under charge of violating the provisions of this Act, and upon conviction under this Act of such person or persons using said guns, traps, teams, horses, or other means of transportation, such forfeiture shall be adjudicated as a penalty in addition to the other punishment provided in this Act. Such forfeited property shall be disposed of and accounted for by and under the authority of the Secretary of the Interior.

Commissioner. Appointment, authority, etc.

SEC. 6. That the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington shall appoint a commissioner who shall reside in the park and who shall have jurisdiction to hear and act upon all complaints made of any violations of law or of the rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the Interior for the government of the park and for the protection of the animals, birds, and fish, and objects of interest therein, and for other purposes authorized by this Act.

Judicial powers in violations of rules, etc.

Such commissioner shall have power, upon sworn information, to issue process in the name of the United States for the arrest of any person charged with the commission of any misdemeanor, or charged with a violation of the rules and regulations, or with a violation of any of the provisions of this Act prescribed for the government of said park and for the protection of the animals, birds, and fish in said park, and to try the person so charged, and, if found guilty, to impose punishment and to adjudge the forfeiture prescribed.

Appeals.

In all cases of conviction an appeal shall lie from the judgment of said commissioner to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, and the United States district court in said district shall prescribe the rules of procedure and practice for said commissioner in the trial of cases and for appeal to said United States district court.

Procedure in criminal case.

SEC. 7. That any such commissioner shall also have power to issue process as hereinbefore provided for the arrest of any person charged with the commission within said boundaries of any criminal offense not covered by the provisions of section four of this Act to hear the evidence introduced, and if he is of opinion that probable cause is shown for holding the person so charged for trial shall cause such person to be safely conveyed to a secure place of confinement within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Washington, and certify a transcript of the record of his proceedings and the testimony in the case to said court, which court shall have jurisdiction of the case: *Provided,* That the said commissioner shell grant bail in all cases bailable under the laws of the United States or of said State.

Proviso. Bail.

SEC. 8. That all process issued by the commissioner shall be directed to the marshal of the United States for the western district of Washington, but nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the arrest by any officer or employee of the Government or any person employed by the United States in the policing of said reservation within said boundaries without process of any person taken in the act of violating the law or this Act or the regulations prescribed by said Secretary as aforesaid.

Services of process.

SEC. 9. That the commissioner provided for in this Act shall be paid an annual salary of $1,500, payable quarterly: *Provided,* That the said commissioner shall reside within the exterior boundaries of said Mount Rainier National Park, at a place to be designated by the court making such appointment: *And provided further,* That all fees, costs, and expenses collected by the commissioner shall be disposed of as provided in section eleven of this Act.

Salary. *Provisos.* Residence.

Disposed of fees, etc.

SEC. 10. That all fees, costs, and expenses arising in cases under this Act and properly chargeable to the United States shall be certified, approved, and paid as are like fees, costs, and expenses in the courts of the United States.

United States fees, etc.

SEC. 11. That all fines and costs imposed and collected shall be deposited by said commissioner of the United States, or the marshal of the United States collecting the same, with the clerk of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

Deposit of fines and costs.

SEC. 12. That the Secretary of the Interior shall notify, in writing, the governor of the State of Washington of the passage and approval of this Act.

Acceptance of cession.

Approved, June 30, 1916.

June 12, 1917.
[H. R. 11.]

[Public, No. 21.]

Chap. 27.—An Act Making appropriations for sundry civil expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, namely:

Sundry civil expenses appropriations.

* * *

Mount Rainier National Park, Washington: For protection and improvement, construction of roads, bridges, fences, and trails, and improvement of roads, including not exceeding $1,250 for the purchase of a motor-driven vehicle and the maintenance and repair thereof, $75,000.

Mount Rainier.

Hereafter the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to accept patented lands or rights of way over patented lands in the Mount Rainier National Park that may be donated for park purposes.

Acceptance of donated lands, etc.

May 28, 1926.
[H. R. 10126.]

[Public, No. 303.]

CHAP. 410.—An Act To revise the boundary of the Mount Rainier National Park in the State of Washington, and for other purposes.

Mount Rainier National Park, Wash. Boundary modified. Description.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the boundary of the Mount Rainier National Park is hereby changed so as to read as follows: Beginning at park boundary monument numbered 1, established on the east line of section 4, township 17 north, range 7 east, Willamette meridian, by a survey of the boundaries of Mount Rainier National Park, Washington, by the General Land Office, plat dated April 17, 1909; thence southerly along the present west park boundary line as established by said survey, being the midtownship line of range 7 east, to its intersection with the south bank of Nisqually River; thence easterly along said bank to its intersection with the present south park boundary line at a point east of park boundary monument numbered 28, as established by said survey, being the township line between townships 14 and 15 north; thence easterly along said south park boundary line to the southeast corner of the present park boundary; thence northerly along the present east park boundary line to park boundary monument numbered 59, as established by said survey, being the midtownship line of range 10 east; thence due north to the south bank of White River; thence northeasterly along said bank to a point due east of park boundary monument numbered 67; thence due west to said monument numbered 67; thence westerly along the present north park boundary line, as established by said survey, being the township line between townships 17 and 18 north, to its intersection with the north bank of Carbon River; thence westerly along said bank to a point due north of park boundary monument numbered 1; thence due south to place of beginning; and all of those lands lying within the boundary above described are hereby included in and made a part of the Mount Rainier National Park; and all of those lands of the present Mount Rainier National Park excluded from the park are hereby included in and made a part of the Rainier National Forest, subject to all national forest laws and regulations.

Excluded lands added to Rainier National Forest.

Laws extended to. Vol. 30, p. 993.

Vol. 39, p. 243.

SEC. 2. That the provisions of the Act of March 2, 1899, entitled, "An Act to set aside a portion of certain lands in the State of Washington, now known as the 'Pacific Forest Reserve,' as a public park, to be

known as the 'Mount Rainier National Park,' " the Act of June 10, 1916, entitled "An Act to accept the cession by the State of Washington of exclusive jurisdiction over the lands embraced within the Mount Rainier National Park, and for other purposes," the Act of August 25, 1916, entitled "An Act to establish a national park service, and for other purposes," and all Acts supplementary to and amendatory of said Acts are made applicable to and extended over the lands hereby added to the park : *Provided*, That the provisions of the Act of June 10, 1920, entitled "An Act to create a Federal power commission; to provide for the improvement of navigation; the development of water power; the use of the public lands in relation thereto; and to repeal section 18 of the River and Harbor Appropriation Act, approved August 8, 1917, and for other purposes," shall not apply to or extend over such lands.

Vol. 39, p. 535.

Proviso.
Federal Power Act not applicable.
Vol. 41, p. 1063.

Approved, May 28, 1926.

CHAP. 47.—An Act To provide for uniform administration of the national parks by the United States Department of the Interior, and for other purposes.

January 26, 1931.
[S. 196.]

[Public, No. 574.]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That hereafter no permit, license, lease, or other authorization for the prospecting, development, or utilization of the mineral resources within the Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado, or the Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona, shall be granted or made.

National parks, administration.
Mineral prospecting, etc., Mesa Verde, Colo., or Grand Canyon, Ariz., forbidden.

SEC. 2. That hereafter the Secretary of the Interior shall have authority to prescribe regulations for the surface use of any mineral land locations already made or that may hereafter be made within the boundaries of Mount McKinley National Park, in the Territory of Alaska, and he may require registration of all prospectors and miners who enter the park : *Provided,* That no resident of the United States who is qualified under the mining laws of the United States applicable to Alaska shall be denied entrance to the park for the purpose of prospecting or mining.

Mount McKinley, Alaska.
Regulations for surface use of mineral lands within.

Registration of miners, etc.
Proviso.
Entries.

SEC. 3. That hereafter no permit, license, lease, or other authorization for the use of land within the Glacier National Park, Montana, or the Lassen Volcanic National Park, California, for the erection and maintenance of summer homes or cottages shall be granted or made : *Provided, however,* That the Secretary of the Interior may, in his discretion, renew any permit, license, lease, or other leases, etc. authorization for such purpose heretofore granted or made.

Glacier, Mont., and Lassen Volcanic, Calif.
Permits for summer homes, etc., prohibited.

Proviso.
Renewal of present leases, etc.

SEC. 4. That hereafter the acquisition of rights of way for steam or electric railways, automobile or wagon roads, within the Lassen Volcanic National Park, California, under filings or proceedings under laws applicable to the acquisition of such rights over or upon the

Acquisitions of rights of way forbidden.
Lassen Volcanic, Calif.

national-forest lands of the United States is prohibited.

Certain valleys of Flathead River, Glacier, Mont.

SEC. 5. That hereafter the acquisition of rights of way through Certain valleys of the valleys of the north and middle forks of the Flathead River for steam or electric railways in the Glacier National Park Montana, under filings or proceedings under the laws applicable to the acquisition of such rights over or upon the unappropriated public domain of the United States is prohibited.

Grants of rights of way, repealed.
Within Mount Rainier, Wash.
Vol. 30, p. 994, repealed.

SEC. 6. That the provisions of the Act of March 2, 1899 (Thirtieth Statute, page 993), granting rights of way, under such restrictions and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may establish, to any railway or tramway company or companies for the purpose of building, constructing, and operating a railway, constructing and operating a railway or tramway line or lines, so far as the same relate to lands within the Mount Rainier National Park, Washington, are hereby repealed : *Provided, however,* That nothing herein shall be construed so as to prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from authorizing the use of land in said park under contract, permit, lease, or otherwise for the establishment and operation thereon of a tramway or cable line, or lines, for the accommodation or convenience of visitors and others.

Proviso.
Exception.

Within Rocky Mountain, Colo.

Vol. 38, p. 900, repealed.
U. S. C., p. 405.

SEC. 7. That the provision of the Act of January 26, 1915 (Thirty-eighth Statute, page 798), authorizing the Secretary of the Interior, in his discretion and upon such conditions as he may deem wise, to grant easements or rights of way for steam, electric, or similar transportation upon or across the lands within the Rocky Mountain National Park, is hereby repealed.

Approved, January 26, 1931.

January 31, 1931.
[H. R. 15008.]

[Public, No. 584.]

CHAP. 71.—An Act To extend the south and east boundaries of the Mount Rainier National Park, in the State of Washington, and for other purposes.

Mount Rainier National Park, Wash.
Lands added to.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the tract of land within the following-described boundaries be, and the same is hereby, excluded from the Rainier National Forest and is hereby added to and made a part of the Mount Rainier National Park, in the State of Washington :

Description.

Beginning at a point on the present east boundary of Mount Rainier National Park one and one-quarter miles southerly from the northeast corner of the said park as fixed by the Act of May 28, 1926 (44 Stat. 668); thence extending east to the summit of the hydrographic divide between Silver Creek and White River; thence along the summit of Crystal Mountain to the summit of the Cascade Mountains; thence southerly along the summit of the Cascade Mountains to a point in

section 20, township 15 north, range 11 east, Willamette meridian, whence flow the waters of Bumping River to the east and Carlton and Cougar Creeks to the south and west; thence southwesterly along the summit of the divide between Carlton Creek and the waters flowing into the main fork of Ohanapecosh River to the quarter section line of section 9, township 14 north, range 10 east, Willamette meridian; thence westerly along the quarter section Line of sections 9, 8, and 7 to the west boundary of said township; thence due west to the right or west bank of Muddy Fork of the Cowlitz River; thence northerly along the right bank of said Muddy Fork to a point exactly due east of post numbered 34 on the south boundary of Mount Rainier National Park as surveyed in 1908; thence due west to said post numbered 34; thence along the boundary of said park as surveyed in 1908 to post numbered 35; thence easterly along the south boundary. of said national park as surveyed in 1908 to the southeast corner thereof; thence northerly along the east boundary of said national park as surveyed in 1908 to post numbered 59; thence along the east boundary of said park as revised by the Act of May 28, 1928, supra, northerly to the point of beginning.

Regulations applicable to additions.

SEC. 2. All laws applicable to and in force within the Mount Rainier National Park as of the date hereof, and all regulations issued pursuant thereto, are hereby made applicable to and extended over the land added to the said park by this Act : *Provided,* That no fee or charge shall be made by the United States for the use of any roads in said park built or maintained exclusively by the State of Washington.

Proviso. Free roadways.

Approved, January 31, 1931.

[CHAPTER 970]

AN ACT

September 21, 1950 [H. R. 1882]

[Public Law 800]

Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to acquire on behalf of the United States Government all property and facilities of the Rainier National Park Company.

Rainier National Park Company. Acquisition of property by Interior Department.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his discretion and under such terms and conditions as he may deem proper, to acquire on behalf of the United States, at a price considered by him to be reasonable, all of the property and facilities of the Rainier National Park Company within the Mount Rainier National Park used for the purpose of furnishing accommodations and conveniences to the public visiting said park, excluding, however, such facilities of the company as are used in furnishing transportation for the said park.

Appropriation authorized.

SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sum or sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Approved September 21, 1950.

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74 STAT.] PUBLIC LAW 86-522—JUNE 27, 1960 219

Public Law 86-521

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of the Interior to provide a headquarters site for Mount Rainier National Park in the general vicinity of Ashford, Washington, and for other purposes.

June 27, 1960
[S. 1358]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, in order to apply the present headquarters site in Mount Rainier National Park to public use for which it is more suitable and to provide a headquarters for the park, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to provide a park headquarters in the general vicinity of Ashford, Washington, and for such purpose to acquire in this vicinity, by such means as he may deem to be in the public interest, not more than three hundred acres of land, or interest therein.

Mount Rainier National Park. Headquarters site.

SEC. 2. The headquarters site provided pursuant to this Act shall constitute a part of Mount Rainier National Park and be administered in accordance with the laws applicable thereto.

Approved June 27, 1960.

PUBLIC LAW 100-668—NOV. 16, 1988 102 STAT. 3965

TITLE III—MOUNT RAINIER NATIONAL PARK WILDERNESS

SEC. 301. DESIGNATION.

(a) WILDERNESS.—In furtherance of the purposes of the Wilderness Act (16 U.S.C. 1131 et seq.; 78 Stat. 890), certain lands in the Mount Rainier National Park, Washington, which—

16 USC 1132 note.

(1) compromise approximately two hundred and sixteen thousand eight hundred and fifty-five acres of wilderness, and
(2) are depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Boundary, Mount Rainier National Park, Washington", numbered 105—20,014A and dated July 1988,

are hereby designated as wilderness and therefore as components of the National Wilderness Preservation System. Such lands shall be known as the

Mount Rainier Wilderness.

SEC. 302. BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS.

(a) PARK BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS—The boundaries of the Mount Rainier National Park as established in the Act of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat. 993), as amended; (16 U.S.C. 91-110b), are further revised to add to the Park approximately two hundred and forty acres, and to exclude from the park approximately thirty-one and one-half acres, as generally depicted on the map entitled "Mount Rainier National Park Proposed 1987 Boundary Adjustments", numbered 105—80,010B and dated January 1987, which shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Washington office of. the National Park Service, United States Department of the Interior and at Mount Rainier National Park.

16 USC 110c.

Public information.

(b) FOREST BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENT.—The boundaries of the Snoqualmie National Forest and of the Gifford Pinchot National Forest, are hereby revised to include in the Snoqualmie National Forest approximately thirty-one and one-half acres, to exclude from the Snoqualmie National Forest approximately thirty acres, and to exclude from the Gifford Pinchot National Forest approximately two hundred and ten acres, as generally depicted on a map entitled "Mount Rainier National Park Proposed 1987 Boundary Adjustments", numbered 105-80,010B and dated January 1987, which shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Washing ton, District of Columbia office of the Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture and at the Snoqualmie and Gifford Pinchot National Forests.

Public information. District of Columbia.

(c) ADMINISTRATION OF PARK LAND.—(1) Federal lands, and interests therein formerly within the boundary of the Snoqualmie National Forest and the Gifford Pinchot National Forest. which are included within the boundary of the Mount Rainier National Park pursuant to this Act are, subject to valid existing rights, hereby transferred to the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior for administration as part of the Park, and shall be subject to all the laws and regulations of the Park.

(2) The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to accept either concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction over lands and waters included within Mount Rainier National Park by this Act. The Secretary shall notify in writing the Governor of the State of Washington of the acceptance of any such jurisdiction ceded to the United States by the State. The existing exclusive Federal jurisdiction, where it exists in the Park, Shall remain in effect until Such time as the Secretary and the Governor shall agree upon the terms and conditions of concurrent legislative jurisdiction for Said Park pursuant to section 320(i) of the Act of October 21, 1976 (90 Stat. 2741).

(3) AUTHORIZATION OF LAND ACQUISITION.—The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire from willing Sellers by donation, purchase with donated or appropriated funds, exchange, bequest, or otherwise all non-Federal lands, waters, and interests therein included within the boundary of the Mount Rainier National Park pursuant to this Act.

(d) ADMINISTRATION OF FOREST LAND.—(1) Federal lands, and interests therein formerly within the boundary of the Mount Rainier National Park, which are excluded therefrom and are included within the boundaries of the Snoqualmie National Forest pursuant to this Act are, subject to valid

Gifts and

existing rights, hereby transferred to the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture for administration as part of the Forest, and shall be subject to all the laws and regulations applicable to the National Forest System.

property.

(2) For the purposes of section 7 of the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965 (78 Stat. 903, as amended; 16 U.S.C. 4601-9), the boundaries of the Snoqualmie National Forest and the Gifford Pinchot National Forest, as modified pursuant to this Act, shall be treated as if they were the boundaries of those national forests on January 1, 1965.

(3) Effective upon acceptance thereof by the State of Washington, the jurisdiction which the United States acquired over those lands excluded from the boundaries of the Mount Rainier National Park by this Act is hereby retroceded to the State.

SEC. 303. PARADISE POWERLINE.

The Secretary is authorized to upgrade, maintain and replace as necessary, the Paradise powerline from Longmire to Paradise: *Provided,* That to the extent practicable, such maintenance and operation shall be conducted in such a manner as to protect scenic viewsheds.

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