Fortification in the Wilderness: The Defenses of Fort Necessity

By Josh Freeman, Park Ranger, Fort Necessity National Battlefield

Why is the Fort so small?

One of the most frequent visitor questions we receive at Fort Necessity is “is that the Fort?”. First time visitors find it hard to believe that the 53-foot diameter structure they view in the middle of the Great Meadows is George Washington’s “fort of necessity”. Perhaps the aptness of the fortification’s name is lost on them, for soon after many visitors will comment “the Fort is so small; Washington was so dumb.” Most casual visitors are confused about what they are viewing at Fort Necessity, their expectations upon hearing the term “fort” having led them to believe they would find some large, European-style castle like structure. Even amongst knowledgeable students of the French & Indian War, familiar with wilderness forts and field fortifications, the common theme is that George Washington was a young, naïve, inexperienced commander who made a militarily stupid decision in July 1754. He placed his “fort” in a low-lying area, surrounded by hills that commanded it, which allowed the French to fire into the fort with impunity and which led to inevitable disaster and defeat. But is this the clear-cut story of Fort Necessity? Is it really that simple?

That Washington was young, naïve and inexperienced is certainly true. A 22-year-old officer with his first command, Washington (as 22-year old’s tend to do) invariably and somewhat inevitably made mistakes. He was in many ways unprepared for the tremendous task assigned him, not the least of which was frontier diplomacy. Although he had experience in planning frontier surveying excursions, and his position in society made him comfortable with leading his perceived social inferiors, Washington was in no way prepared to conduct the intricate dialogue of frontier politics, either with his enemies or his supposed allies. It must be remembered that command of the expedition was not initially entrusted to him, but to the much older and more experienced Colonel Joshua Fry . Unfortunately for Colonel Fry, and to a lesser extent Washington, Fry fell from his horse and died on May 31, 1754. Not expecting the mantle of command from the onset, Washington was now the “next man up.”

But to simplify Washington’s decisions in the campaign of 1754 and the Battle of Fort Necessity in the widely accepted view, that of the dumb kid who didn’t know what he was doing, is in many ways doing a disservice to what actually happened in the spring and summer of 1754 and to the men who toiled and fought there, not least of them Washington. History is often not black and white. Often there is a large amount of gray, and such is the case with the Fort Necessity campaign. Many of our visitors will look at the small circular stockade that stands in the middle of what is left of the Great Meadows and exclaim “how did he fit so many men in there?” To see only the wooden stockade as Washington’s Fort of Necessity is to miss the forest for the trees.

To understand Washington’s decision to build a “fort” in the Great Meadows, and to understand his decision to fight the French on July 3, 1754, readers must first have a basic understanding of military engineering in the 18th century and how it’s knowledge and application translated to the North American wilderness as well as the dynamics and details of Washington’s 1754 campaign. Hopefully, by understanding a little of those two things, readers can better understand Washington’s decisions here in 1754 and have perhaps a slightly better appreciation for the 22-year-old Colonel Washington and his military abilities.

 

Figure I.  Marshal Vauban

Larivière n.d.

The Art of Fortification: The Geometry of War

By the middle of the 18th century widely known and accepted practices for “modern” military fortification had been in place in Europe for nearly a century. Nearly all professional military officers were exposed in some way to what were considered the professional standards of knowledge relating to military engineering and fortification. The most influential figure during the development of the theory and practice of military engineering in the late 17th and early 18th centuries was Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban. Vauban, as Marshal of France under King Louis XIV, developed a system of attack and defense that became the standard throughout Europe. He built numerous forts and fortifications throughout France, which were quickly copied by other European powers. Vauban developed and standardized the best practices for the construction of military defenses. The pentagonal five bastioned fort, like the pictured in figure III, allowed the defenders to fire on attackers from all angles. Soon many of the larger cities of Europe, which served as supply points or magazines for operating field armies, began to construct defenses using Vauban’s system.

 

Figure II. Vauban’s Treatise

De l'attaque et de la defense des places. The Hague, Pieter de Hondt, 1737

The strength of the defenses designed by Vauban meant that it became very difficult and costly to capture them by force. Often a long siege would be required, whereby defenders would be starved or intimidated into surrendering. Siege warfare would emerge to be the predominant form of combat in Europe throughout the first half of the 18th century.

 

Figure III.  The citadel of the city of Lille’, designed and built by
Vauban in 1670

Archives Nationales, Paris, France

The necessity of understanding the science of how to construct both the defenses as well as the siege works to capture them necessitated ever increasing knowledge in the military art. Engineers, those officers specifically trained in the subject, became ever more valuable to armies as dynastic wars continued to rage across Europe. Specialized officer corps and schools began to develop that trained engineers, such as the British Corps of Royal Engineers in 1720 and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwhich in 1741. Engineers became an officer most commanders would not dare to be without on campaign.

 

Figure IV. Tools needed for construction of field works, from John Muller’s 1757 The Attack and Defense of Fortified Places

Engineering in the Forest: The Construction of Fort Necessity

While the 22-year-old Washington was certainly no professionally trained military engineer, he was at least familiar with the basic math that went into their construction. His first job in life was a surveyor, so using a compass and theodolite were very familiar to him, as was measuring and laying out things. He was also familiar with the design and defense of fortifications. While visiting Barbados with his older half-brother Lawrence in 1751, Washington encountered one of the most heavily fortified locations in North America. Young Washington was always a keen observer, and he commented at length about the island’s defenses, especially Charles Fort . Washington also had numerous military manuals available to him. While it is unknown what or even if Washington had manuals with him on the Fort Necessity campaign it is likely that he at least had a knowledge from, or a copy of, Humphrey Bland’s Treatise of Military Discipline, the bible of the British Army . At least one of Washington’s officers had a copy of Bland with him on the 1754 campaign. Bland’s treatise contained several sections on field fortifications . Bland’s manual, like many others of the period, borrowed heavily from the engineering and fortification principles espoused by Vauban and other early visionaries.

As Washington’s little army proceeded into the wilderness in 1754, he knew he needed and was prepared to build fortifications . In fact, his main mission was to build a road and support the fort-building operations already ongoing at the Forks of the Ohio , where the city of Pittsburg stands today. His orders from Governor Dinwiddie were “You are to use all Expedition in proceeding to the Fork of Ohio with the Men under Com’d and there you are to finish and compleat in the best Manner and as soon as You possibly can, the Fort w’ch I expect is there already begun by the Ohio Comp’a” (Captain Trent). He brought with him tools, like those pictured in Figure IV, to build fortifications and blacksmiths to repair old tools and build new ones.

 

Figure V.  A fold-out of designs for redoubts from Le Cointe’s 1761 The Science of Military Posts.

Both European powers understood that forts in the wilderness would not be on the grand scale of their counterparts in Europe. Their remoteness made them expensive to build and maintain, and it was very difficult and costly to resupply them. Only a small number of troops could be kept in garrison for long periods of time. The smaller the garrison, the smaller the fort. They were built to size, so that the number of defenders could man each point within. The defenses of fortifications were also designed based on the types of threats they might face. Fort’s near the coast might expect an attacker to be armed with heavy artillery, such as siege mortars or howitzers, or even to be bombarded from ships naval guns. However, fort’s in more remote wilderness areas might only face small arms or light artillery. The threats they might face also factored into what type or size of fortification would be constructed.

After the arrival of the French in strength at the Forks of the Ohio on April 17th, and his own encounter with the French at Jumonville Glen on May 28th, Washington knew he would be operating out of the Great Meadows for at least several weeks . His plan was to wait and see what the French response would be, as well as to await resupply and reinforcements . He needed a secure supply point to guard his munitions and foodstuffs. He set his men to the construction of fortifications. On May 31st he wrote to his younger brother Jack “we have already got entrenchments and are about a pallisado.” On June 3rd Washington wrote to Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie “we have just finished a small pallisado fort, in which with my small numbers I shall not fear the attack of 500 men.” What Washington had decided to construct was a storehouse surrounded by a wooden palisade, or circular redoubt. A redoubt is an enclosed fortification constructed to defend a key position from attack from any direction . They were generally made from earth or logs and came in many shapes and sizes, generally built to size for the number of defenders. Circular redoubts, such as those seen in Figure V, were favored by many military engineers, especially for numerically inferior forces. It gave a 3600 field of fire and allowed a small garrison to easily cover all angles of defense. Washington’s force at the beginning of June numbered less than 140 men . This was the most logical short-term fortification given Washington’s available and meagre resources.

 

What is an Earthwork? The Lost Defenses of Fort Necessity

Washington expected a quick French response to the Jumonville incident. When that did not come, he decided to continue his movement to the west toward Redstone (Brownsville, PA). He planned to build the road to Redstone, there construct a fort surrounding a pre-existing Ohio Company storehouse and await his promised reinforcements and supplies . On June 16th Washington’s force left the Great Meadows, now reinforced to approximately 300 men. Captain James Mackay’s 100-man Independent Company of British regulars, which had arrived on June 14th, remained behind at Fort Necessity . Washington was at Gist's Plantation (Mt. Braddock, PA) on June 29th when he received intelligence that the French at the Forks of the Ohio had been reinforced and were planning to march and attack him. Washington had originally planned to make a stand at Gist's, where a fortification was begun which was termed “the hog-pen fort.” However, a council of war on that same day determined the best course of action was to retreat. Listening to the unanimous advice of his officers, including the recently arrived Captain MacKay, Washington ordered the army to retreat to the Great Meadows. The exhausted and mal-nourished soldiers were forced to carry their provisions, ammunition, tools and even the nine 100-pound iron swivel guns back up and over Chesnut Ridge. Washington had sent all the horses back to the Great Meadows to hopefully hurry forward the supplies that were daily expected. Thus, with most of the horses gone, the men themselves were forced to carry all the equipment, stores and munitions. Washington paid some of the soldiers to carry his personal gear, as he had his horse loaded with ammunition. What could not be carried was buried. The army began its arduous and demoralizing retreat.

When the army finally limped into Fort Necessity on July 1st Washington knew they could go no further. Major Adam Stephen, Washington’s third in command, recalled “July 1st, we arrived very much fatigued at the Meadows, and had continued our Retreat, but for want of Horses and Conveniences to carry our Ammunition. Our men had been eight Days without Bread, and instead of a large Convoy, which we had long expected, there arrived only a few bags of flour: They were so harassed with working on the Fortifications at Gist’s, and with marching, that they were not able to draw the swivels .” Washington’s men were completely exhausted, having spent themselves on several months of back-breaking manual labor building the road plus the excruciating march back up and over Chesnut Ridge. Many of them were ill-clothed, having received no uniform items and still wearing their civilian clothes they had left home in two months previously. For many, having no tents or blankets, exposure had started to take its toll. Many of the men were mal-nourished, the 18th century military rations not really providing them with the nutrients their bodies needed to do such labor. Not only were the rations less than sufficient for their daily needs, but as Major Stephen recalled for over a week they had been on reduced rations, even further lowering their calorie intake. Observing the condition of his exhausted men, Washington made the decision to stand and fight. He believed the French and their American Indian allies would catch him, and he would rather stand and fight in a position he had time to prepare than strung out on the road in the wilderness. Washington had few options as to where to place his fortification. Unlike today, where green grass and cleared fields abound in the area, the Great Meadows in 1754 offered the only opening in the tress for dozens of miles around.

 

Figure VI.  An overhead diagram of Fort Necessity’s cabin, wooden stockade and earthworks from Harrington’s "New Light."

Eastern National

The Great Meadows in the 18^th century could be referred to as an oasis of grass in a desert of trees. And these were not small trees. The old growth virgin forest which surrounded the Great Meadows were giant trees, in some cases 8-10 feet in diameter, tress that had never been cut. Much like modern military principles, defensive works in the 18^th century required open space surrounding them, allowing the defenders “clear fields of fire.” This was a space to kill the enemy before they could get to you. The only area in which Washington could establish a defensive position with enough clear space to build a fortification to house 400 men and still have clear fields of fire was the largest section of the Great Meadows. This is where he had already constructed his circular stockade redoubt. Washington decided to incorporate the stockade into the larger, expanded work.

Never having intended to fight at Fort Necessity, Washington was now forced to construct “field fortifications.” Field fortifications were generally hastily constructed defenses with materials that were readily available, in this case earth and wood. These were not designed to be long term fortifications, just an expedient to protect troops in the short term. The men would not live in them, simply fight from behind them when they needed to . Major Stephen recalled that not long after arriving back at the Great Meadows on July 1st “we set about clearing the woods nearest to us, and carrying in the logs, to raise a breastwork and enlarge the fort.” It is often asked “why didn’t Washington build the fort on top of the hill”, or “why didn’t he clear the trees back.” These statements display a lack of understanding of Washington’s resources and the reality of the 18th century American wilderness. The large virgin trees described above were difficult to cut down, especially by exhausted, mal-nourished men who had hand tools. Had modern engineering equipment, or even chainsaws been available to Washington and his men, then the hill which today hosts the Mount Washington Tavern may have been an excellent site. Obviously, that was not the case. Plus cutting down a tree was one thing, cutting it up and removing it another entirely. Washington understood that an upright tree protected one or two enemies, one cut down and lying on its side now provided a fighting position for many more. Washington had finite resources at his disposal, which were slipping away exponentially. These resources were not just materiel, but also consisted of his men’s strength and stamina, their psychological capacity to withstand the fatigues of labor as well as fear of attack and the unknown. His most important resource, perhaps besides the welfare of his soldiers, was time . Washington’s intelligence had informed him that the French and their American Indian allies were after him and hot on his trail. He didn’t know exactly how much time he had to prepare.

 

Figure VII. Cross section of Fort Necessity’s earthworks as determined by Harrington’s archaeology shown in bottom image.

Eastern National

With his limited resources, the young commander set priorities of work and put his men about constructing field fortifications to protect his 400 soldiers. It must also be remembered that the entire force would not have been available to work on the defenses. 18th century armies had daily tasks they had to accomplish, and Washington’s was no different. The young commander dispersed his men in groups out conducting reconnaissance, men on picket or guard duty providing security around the camp and men in various details and working parties, such as blacksmiths and bakers . Those men who were working on the defenses constructed two “fleches”, arrowhead shaped walls, viewed in Figure VI, which together formed a semi-rectangular redoubt of earth and wood. When determining the size of the redoubt, the officers used a well-known formula for constructing defenses. Military engineering manuals instructed officers that each file of soldiers needed a pace, or about two feet of space to load, maneuver and fire their musket. In defensive positions, British soldiers in the 18th century stood in two ranks, one behind the other. That meant Washington’s men, some 400 strong, only needed 200 men of frontage. 200 men, according to the formula, would need 400 feet of wall to fight from behind. If you measure the earthworks at Fort Necessity, they are almost exactly 400 feet in length.

It is unknown who precisely supervised the construction of these defenses. Washington was certainly familiar with fortifications, and Captain MacKay was a professional officer with over twenty years of experience and had served in large forts in South Carolina and Georgia. Captain Robert Stobo later claimed to have been appointed “Regimental Engineer”, but there is no contemporary primary source evidence to support this . It is also unknown exactly how the walls were built. No specific contemporary description of their construction exists, but most likely one of the officers measured the angle of the fleches and laid out the line on which the walls, or parapet, were to be built. Then the men began by digging a ditch to serve as a trench on the interior of the line that was laid out, piling up the earth along the line itself. After digging about two feet they then dug a ditch on the exterior, again piling up the earth in the middle. JC Harrington’s 1953 archeology, seen in Figure VII, discovered the two-foot depth of the trenches. Two feet makes sense, as the water table would have been struck at that depth. The Great Meadows was an open grassy area precisely because it was a rather wet, sort of marshy place. After the parapet was constructed, logs were most likely used at certain portions along the wall, especially at the top, to hold down the earth and provide additional cover. There is some archeological evidence to support this.

Eighteenth century military engineering manuals called for earthen redoubts to be built of gabionsfascines, baskets of wood and earth formed together into a wall. If time was not available to construct gabions then fascines, bundles of sticks bound together, were to be used . The British soldiers, although most likely familiar with gabion construction, did not have the time to build such formal structures and thus resorted to readily available and easily used material, dug earth and stacked logs. It is possible fascines were used, but no primary source or archeological evidence has been discovered to prove this. That the earthworks themselves existed is strongly supported by the historical record. Washington recalled that after first forming his men in the meadow in line of battle, his army soon “retired to our trenches” and that he was concerned that the French would endeavor to “force our trenches” by “their superiority of numbers” . Private John Shaw recalled after the battle that prior to the engagement the army “had endeavored to throw up a little entrenchment round them.” The wall was most likely about four feet high, or breast high on most of the men, hence the term breastwork that Major Stephen used . The two-foot ditch on the interior of the wall gave the soldiers standing behind it about six feet of cover.

The longest section of the walls, the part which could fit the most men, faced the southeast and southwest, the direction that Washington knew the French would fight from . This was the area of the wood-line that came the closest to the fort and he had not had the time or resources to clear back farther. Those sections of the earthworks were also where Washington placed his most significant casualty producing weapons, two of his swivel guns. It was likely that the tops of the felled trees were linked together around the exterior of the earthworks to form an “abatis”, a primitive form of modern barbwire. It is unknown how the opening, or sally port, in the earthworks was secured. No archeological work has ever been done at that location. It may have been that, like most redoubts constructed during the period, a traverse, or small wall, was built on the interior of the opening to block incoming fire . Wagons or some other obstacle may also have been used to block the opening.

Although not finished when the French arrived around 11am on July 3rd, Washington’s little fort was fairly well constructed. Even the French commander Captain Louis Coulon de Villiers noted that it “was advantageously enough situated.” De Villiers knew that he could not launch a frontal assault on the redoubt without “expos[ing] the subjects of his Majesty in vain.” The experienced French commander, a veteran of several decades of wilderness service, quickly realized that this fight would be a siege. His French marine infantry, Canadian militia and American Indian allies quickly surrounded the fortification, using the tree line for cover. An all-day fight ensued, with periods of shooting interrupted by periods of rainfall, some torrential. By nightfall, Washington’s force was wet, muddy and tired. Worse, they had suffered over 100 casualties, 30 dead and some 70 wounded. The trenches were filled with water, the men were having trouble shooting back because of fouled muskets and many of them had broken into the army’s rum supply and gotten falling-down drunk. To say the young commander had a few problems is an understatement.

However, the French had problems of their own. Unbeknownst to Washington, de Villiers’s force was basically out of ammunition, low on food and were about to lose a significant portion of their force. It must be remembered that the French column had left Fort Duquesne on June 28th. It is unknown how many French soldiers and their allies were on the battlefield on July 3rd, 1754. The primary sources do not agree on the strength. Our best guess given all the accounts is around 700, approximately 500 French and Canadians and around 200 American Indians. De Villiers’s men had with them only the food and ammunition they could carry on their person. By July 3rd, having been on the march for six days, the French were running low on supplies. Regarding ammunition, the French commander noted that during the battle “the fervor and zeal of our Canadians and soldiers worried me because I could see we would soon be without ammunition” Just as troubling, de Villiers’s American Indian allies told him they were leaving the next morning. They reported British reinforcements were on the march and close by, which was not the case, and that they needed to head home. Some of the warriors of the pays d’en haut, tribes from the interior of Canada, had travelled from as far as the shores of Lake Michigan to be at the battle and were ready to return . De Villiers knew that to be victorious and accomplish his mission, he had to wrap up the engagement before his allies left. At around 8:00pm, de Villiers offered a ceasefire and generous terms for the British surrender. Washington, unaware of the French situation, was eventually convinced to sign. His reasons were many but consisted mainly of the fact that his force had suffered significant casualties and the men he had left were combat ineffective; either their weapons didn’t work, their ammunition was ruined, or they were drunk. His men were in bad shape even before the shooting started. He was very low on food, and resupply and reinforcement were nowhere to be found . Thinking he was heavily outnumbered, he made the most logical decision he could given the circumstances and the terms offered. Around midnight, Washington agreed to surrender Fort Necessity at dawn on July 4th, 1754.

 

Figure VIII. Fort Necessity reconstructed in 1932, showing the large rectangular stockade with a flagpole in the middle.

National Park Service

"I would not trade the discovery of Fort Necessity for a Pharaoh’s grave ship"

The quote above was uttered by JC “Pinky” Harington, chief archeologist of the National Park Service, who was sent to Fort Necessity in the summer of 1953 to discover the truth about the fortifications size and location. For many years, since the reconstruction of the site in 1931-32, there had been a debate about the exact size, composition and location of Washington’s little fort . As constructed from 1932, a large rectangular wooden stockade wall greeted visitors to the site, as seen in figure VIII. However, all primary source accounts of Washington’s construction at the Great Meadows indicated a round structure.

 

Figure IX. Archaeologists discover the burnt off stockade posts of Fort Necessity in 1953.

National Park Service

The first surveys conducted of the site in the early 19th century, with the wooden stockade no longer present, seemed to indicate a rectangular shape. The French had torn down and burned the wooden portions of the fort after they captured it . What early surveyors encountered were the only visible remnants of Fort Necessity left on the surface, the outline of the eroded earthworks. Not understanding what they were looking at, they took these outlines to be the remnants of the exterior wall of the stockade itself . Limited archeology in 1931 seemed to prove the rectangular theory . Harrington, after reviewing the primary source evidence, went to work in 1953 to prove which was correct. After digging numerous test pits and trenches, he quickly became convinced that the stockade portion of the structure had been round. Expanding on this theory, he began larger excavations and quickly proved himself correct. He found the burnt off stockade posts in the ground, arranged in a circular formation approximately 53’ in diameter. Harrington had found Fort Necessity.

 

Figure X. The fort log as discovered by archaeologist JC Harrington in 1953, lying in the interior trench of the earthworks.

National Park Service

But what he also discovered around the stockade were the remnants of what he quickly identified as earthworks . Harrington and his workers found the remnants of the trenches that surrounded the wooden circular redoubt. From his archeology, Harrington believed that the majority of the earthwork’s parapet, or wall had been made of earth. He also discovered that the interior and exterior trenches were dug to about two feet each, the earth thus removed piled up in the middle to about the height of four feet . In one place, Harrington even found one of the logs he believed had been used to construct the earthworks (see figure X).

 

Conclusion

Hopefully this brief examination has helped you understand that the story of Fort Necessity and the battle here, as well as the accounts of its participants, is far from black and white. There is very much a shade of gray to the story. It cannot simply be posited that the 22-year-old Virginia colonel was simply a young, dumb, naive kid who didn’t know what he was doing. In fact, there is much evidence to the contrary. Unlike Washington’s trenches during the battle, the popular perception of the young commander’s decisions simply doesn’t hold water.

Upon closer examination, Washington on this campaign generally made logical decisions based on the conditions confronting him and his available resources. That he was inexperienced and to a certain extent unprepared for his first command is not really debatable. But, given the conditions and circumstances Washington faced, would another British officer have fared much better? There were more than a few regular British Army colonels in their early to mid-twenties. Which professional officer had they been plucked from Europe and deposited in the American wilderness would have achieved more? The answer, I would argue, is none.

Washington faced daunting challenges in the 1754 campaign. An unexpected leadership role, untrained men, disgruntled officers, chronic shortages of food and supplies, rugged terrain, a vague understanding of his mission (especially after the Jumonville skirmish), lack of clear guidance from, and a remoteness to, his higher headquarters and Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie, an experienced and skilled enemy and many others. Yet the young officer accomplished a great deal. He moved his force over the mountains and into the wilderness, he built a road where one had not existed previously, he had made decisions when they were thrust upon him, he had looked out for the welfare of his officers and men where he could, he had built a defensive position that even his experienced adversary had remarked on admirably and he had led men gallantly in combat. He had begun to become a combat leader and had learned important lessons that would serve him the rest of his life.

To truly understand what happened at Fort Necessity, and whether Washington performed well, it is necessary to consider the conditions he faced. All the obstacles, limitations and issues he labored under. He had been asked to do something that had never before even been attempted in the history of British America; to lead a British military force over the mountains and into the wilderness of the Ohio Valley. When all these things are considered and the young Virginian’s performance is reevaluated, can he not, at least grudgingly, be given the benefit of the doubt? Although he had most certainly stumbled on his first step onto the world stage at Jumonville Glen Washington recovered well. His performance under the stresses of combat leadership during the rest of the 1754 campaign had proven he had some military merit and the ability and character to lead men in battle. Those traits, and his experience at Fort Necessity in 1754, would be the foundational building blocks of the titanic career that was to follow.

Bibliography and Suggested Reading

Primary Sources

Bland, Humphrey. A Treatise of Military Discipline, 7th Edition (London, T&T Longman, 1753).

Brock, R.A., ed. The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758 (Richmond, VA: Virginia Historical Society, 1883).

Cleland, Hugh, ed. George Washington in the Ohio Valley (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955).

Fitzpatrick, John C., ed. The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799, Volume I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1931).

Kent, Donald H., ed. George Washington’s Journal for 1754 (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 1952).

Pleydell, J. C. An Essay on Field Fortification, Intended Principally for the Use of Officers of Infantry (London: J. Nourse, 1768).

Russell, Samuel L., ed., Coulon de Villers: An Elite Military Family of New France (Savanah, GA: Russell Martial Research, 2018).

Secondary Sources
Alberts, Robert C. The Most Extraordinary Adventures of Major Robert Stobo (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).
Chandler, David. The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough (New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, 1976).
Harrington, J. C. New Light on Washington’s Fort Necessity (Richmond, VA: Eastern National Park and Monument Association, 1957).
Houlding, J. A. Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Kopperman, Paul E. "The British Army in North America and the West Indies, 1755-1783", British Military and Naval Medicine, 1600-1830 (2007).

Websites
“Washington’s Journey to Barbados”,” Mount Vernon.org, 2002, https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/washingtons-youth/journey-to-barbados/.
“A Glossary of Fortification Terms,” American Battlefield Trust, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/glossary-fortification-terms.

See Also
“The Geometry of War: Fortification Plans from 18th Century America.” William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan. October 15, 2012. https://clements.umich.edu/exhibit/geometry-of-war/.
“Building and Attacking Redoubts.” Journal of the American Revolution. June 24, 2015. https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/06/building-and-attacking-redoubts/.