

Version 4		NATIONAL PARK SERVICE SEARCH & RESCUE REPORT - Page 1						MILL3230											
SAR #:		13-008		Park: GTNP		SAR Account #:		PX.EGRTES010.00.1		Case #		NP13033230							
Start Date:		06/20/13		Start Time:		1730		End Date:		06/20/13		End Time:		2400		Day of Week:		5-Thursday	
Subject Name				ADDRESS						Phone		DOB							
1		Gary Miller		(b) (6) Colorado Springs, CO						(b) (6)		12/9/1957							
2		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)						(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)									
3		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)															
4																			
Subject Info:		Age		Sex		Experience Level													
Subject #1		55		M		2. Beginner/Novice/Limited Skills													
Subject #2		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)															
Subject #3																			
Subject #4		Click		Click Here (5 choices)															
Date Subject Contacted:				6/20/2013				Time Subject Contacted:				1920 hrs							
Location:		Garnet Canyon, between Moraine and Meadows Camping Area, Winter Ascent Route, 9,971 ft.																	
Coordinates:		N 43 43.719 W 110 47.793																	
Notification Method:		2 - Cellular Phone																	
Incident Type:				2 - Rescue				Contributing Factor - 1st:				6 - Fall							
Mutual Aid:				No				Contributing Factor - 2nd:				11 - Judgement Error							
Subject Organization:				7 - Concession Guest				Contributing Factor - 3rd:				Click Here (21 choices)							
Subject Activity:				22 - Mountaineering - Unroped				Rescue Method - 1st:				4 - Helicopter Rescue							
Incident Environment:				10 - Mountains, 5,000 - 15,000 feet				Rescue Method - 2nd:				Click Here (14 choices)							
SAR Disposition:				1 - Subject Found/Rescued				Rescue Method - 3rd:				Click Here (14 choices)							
NUMBER ILL or INJURED:		0		NUMBER NOT ILL or NOT INJURED:		0		NUMBER of FATALITIES:		1		NUMBER of SAVES:		0		UNFOUNDED:		0	
The Following Items Are Reported Only When Incidents Involve Searches For Lost Subjects																			
Search: TYPE						Click Here (5 choices)													
Search: Linear Distance in Miles from PLS (blank if unknown):						miles													
Search: VERTICAL DIRECTION FROM PLS						Click Here (7 choices)													
Search: DURATION						Click Here (10 choices)													
Search: DISPOSITION						Click Here (5 choices)													
Search: HOW SUBJECT WAS FOUND						Click Here (10 choices)													
Brief Summary:																			
<p>At 1730 hours, on June 20, 2013, Teton Interagency Dispatch Center (TIDA) with Rescue Coordinator G. Montopoli received a call for a climber who fell into a moat in the North Fork of Garnet Canyon. Gary Miller, 55 was descending from the Lower Saddle of the Grand Teton after a successful summit of the Grand Teton. Miller was on a guided climb with Exum. Along with two Exum Mountain Guides and two other clients in his group, Miller had previously walked and glissaded without incident. As the clients traversed across a steep slope, guides determined a belay would be needed. While one client was tying into the rope, Miller slipped on snow and slid into an icy water moat near a rock band. Climbing guides, with help from a separate party, successfully extricated Miller from the moat before rangers arrived at the site.</p> <p>Six rangers were flown to a landing spot above the accident site in Garnet Canyon at about 1825 hours. Rescuers raised Miller to a site from where he could be flown in a rescue litter below the helicopter via short-haul to Lupine Meadows, attended by a ranger. At the rescue cache, a team of park medical providers led by Dr. Will Smith of St. John's Medical Center and an Air Idaho Life Flight ship were waiting to provide transport to critical care in Idaho Falls. Because Miller was exposed to a continuous icy spray of 33-degree water for nearly two hours, and very cold conditions two additional hours, he was pronounced dead at 2035 hours. He was then turned over to the Teton County coroner.</p>																			

Version 4	<b>NATIONAL PARK SERVICE</b>			MILL3230
<b>SEARCH &amp; RESCUE REPORT - Page 2</b>				
SAR #:	13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #: PX.EGRTE010.00.1	Case # NP13033230

TIME/COST SUMMARY	Time:	Cost:
NPS Programmed Hours: Actual, regular hours for permanent and seasonal NPS employees.	11.00	\$235.22
NPS Unprogrammed Hours: Actual overtime, hazard pay, emergency hire (AD) and unscheduled part-time, and intermittent employee time & FICA-ER.	157.00	\$6,401.53
Non-NPS Hours: Volunteer, military, and other non-NPS time.	4.00	\$0.00
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>172.00</b>	<b>\$6,636.75</b>

OTHER SERVICES AND MATERIALS	Cost:
Supplies and Equipment: Non-budgeted supplies and NPS equipment replacement.	\$713.79
Other Services and Costs: Meals, travel, equipment rental, contracted hourly services, etc.	\$219.50
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>\$933.29</b>

AIRCRAFT AND VESSEL SUMMARY			
Aircraft Organization:		Vessel Organization:	Vessel Costs:
NPS - Air Operations Cost	\$1,600.60	NPS - Vessels Cost	\$0.00
Other Air Operations Costs	\$0.00	Other Vessel Costs	\$0.00
<b>Totals:</b>	<b>\$1,600.60</b>	<b>Totals:</b>	<b>\$0.00</b>

Non-NPS Total:	\$0.00	NPS Total:	\$9170.64	Grand Total:	\$9170.64	Total Charged to SAR Account:	\$8,935.42
----------------	--------	------------	-----------	--------------	-----------	-------------------------------	------------

Prepared by:	George Montopoli	Approved by:	Scott Guenther
Signature/Date:	<i>George Montopoli</i> 7/5/13	Signature/Date:	<i>Scott Guenther</i> 7/15/13

For incidents with NPS non-programmed costs in excess of \$500, the following signatures are required:

Superintendent:	<i>Mary Scott</i>	Regional Director:		Approved	
Signature/Date:	<i>M Scott</i> 8/7/13	Signature/Date:		Disapproved	

**Narrative:**

**Gary Miller Fatality Report - June 20, 2013**

**Addendum:**

- 1) Dispatch Log (by TIDC Dispatcher T. Smith) - RadioLOG\_0620TWS2.doc
- 2) Fatality Investigation (Miller\_Fatality\_Report.doc) by Ranger R. Baerwald
- 3) Interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (ScottGuentherNotes.pdf)
- 4) Interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Interview (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).doc)
- 5) Interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Interview (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).doc)
- 6) Interview (Phone) with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (PhoneInterview (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).doc)
- 7) On-Scene Operation Report (Operation\_Report\_Miller\_SAR.docx) by Ranger R. Johnson
- 8) Photographic Case Incident Report (MILLERCaseIncidentPhotoReport.doc) by Ranger R. Baerwald
- 9) Photographic Details of the Accident Site (PhotosWithMeasurements\_R.Baerwald.pptx) by Ranger R. Baerwald
- 10) Voluntary Statement by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (VoluntaryStatement (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).pdf)
- 11) Voluntary Statement by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (VoluntaryStatement (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).pdf)
- 12) Voluntary Statement by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (VoluntaryStatement (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).pdf)
- 13) Voluntary Statement by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (VoluntaryStatement (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).pdf)

Narrative continued:

**Involved Individuals:**

Climbing Party

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Gary Miller – client (deceased individual)

(b) (6)

Colorado Springs, CO. 80906

DOB: 12/09/1957 (55)

Assisting Rescue Climbing Party

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Signature/Date: *[Signature]* 7/8/13

Supervisor/Date: *[Signature]* 7/15/13

Version 4	NATIONAL PARK SERVICE			MILL3230
SEARCH & RESCUE REPORT - Page 4				
SAR #: 13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #: PX.EGRTES010.00.1	Case # NP13033230	

Narrative continued:

**Events Prior to the Accident (from Ranger R. Baerwald's Miller\_Fatality\_Report.doc)**

On June 20, 2013 at approximately 0600 hours, two Exum Guides and three clients began their successful ascent of the Grand Teton (13,770'). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exum Guide) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (co-Exum guide) lead their three clients to the summit via the Owen-Spalding Route (II, 5.4). The clients included (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Gary Miller (55) from Colorado Springs, CO. The team of five reached the summit at approximately 1100 hours, and then descended back to the Lower Saddle via the same route.

Once back at the Lower Saddle (11,600'), they packed up their gear and prepared to descend from the Lower Saddle back to the Lupine Meadows trailhead. The guided party started the descent at approximately 1530 hours which is known based on a cell phone call made to the Exum office.

Once they started down, the first steep snow slope, called the "Headwall", was encountered just below the Upper Saddle. They descended on foot with an ice axe in hand (without crampons on) down past the level of the sheer rock feature called the "Prow." Once they were below the Prow, the guides felt conditions were appropriate so they glissaded one at a time down the snow slope to its runout. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was good glissading conditions. When I asked how the clients did, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they had been doing well.

From the Moraine Camping Zone below the Middle Teton the group walked on snow to the next snow covered slope that leads to the Meadows Camping Zone. The group encountered firm snow in the shadows cast by the Middle Teton, so the guides angled out away from the shade and back into the sunshine where they returned to soft and favorable glissading conditions.

This time of year, when there is snow on the summer trail, most climbers and guides choose to ascend and descend the "winter trail," which goes more directly from the Meadows to the Moraine, southwest of the Caves Camping Area and Spalding Falls.

At this point the group of five came to the next steep slope that leads down to the Meadows. The slope makes two distinct drops down to the junction of the North and South Forks of Garnet Canyon. The first slope is a 30-35 degree snow slope that drops approximately 200 vertical feet. The group walked and glissaded un-roped down this slope without incident. The second slope is steeper and longer than the first, with a rock band mid-slope and boulders in the lower angle runout. This slope is a 35-40 degree snow slope in the spring that drops approximately 600 vertical feet and is approximately 900 feet long.

Here the group started out glissading un-roped down the first 150 vertical feet in soft snow. Then the two guides took care when they got closer to the mid-slope rock band. Exum Guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went ahead angling down toward the snow-filled hourglass-shaped chute that was continuous snow to the bottom of the slope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to, and then onto, the rock slab just south of the snow chute. For the first time the icy water moat was seen and noted as something to avoid. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked the passage around the running water and moat hole in the snowpack. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was then the first to go down. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went around the moat and down the steep section of snow. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said "it's OK but stay to the left." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued glissading down the slope approximately 200-300 feet.

Then, Exum Guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the three other clients made their way, walking down un-roped and across toward the middle of the slope. They reached a point where the hourglass-shaped slope steepened. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was slightly ahead and lower than the clients and could then see the watery moat hole below. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to employ the use of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rope and provide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clients with a belay for better control down this section of the snow chute. While the three clients waited for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to prepare (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 25 meter rope, they were directed to plant their axes, kick a stance, and wait until it was their turn. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first tossed an end of the rope to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who tied in and was then boot-axe belayed over by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and then lowered while glissading down. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on a boot-axe belay as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) slid past the moat opening and down to lower angle snow. At the end of the 25 meter rope (80 feet), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) untied and

Signature/Date: *[Signature]* 7/5/13 Supervisor/Date: *[Signature]* 7/15/13

Version 4	NATIONAL PARK SERVICE			MILL3230
SEARCH & RESCUE REPORT – Page 5				
SAR #: 13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #: PX.EGRTES010.00.1	Case # NP13033230	

**Narrative continued:**

then continued glissading down to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The clients were not wearing harnesses at this time so the clients tied the rope around their waist using a bowline knot. In addition to the rope, the two Exum guides also carried some webbing and three or four locking carabiners each.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then retrieved the rope and told MILLER it was his turn. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tossed an end of the rope uphill and over, but it landed a little closer to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go ahead and tie in. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved a few feet to retrieve the rope end, and while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tying into the end, Gary MILLER slipped from his stance and started sliding. Both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw MILLER sliding out of control down the snow slope without his ice axe. MILLER's ice axe was still planted in the snow where he had just been standing. Neither (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed MILLER's initial fall from his stance. No one in the climbing party knows how or why the slip and fall occurred. MILLER was using an Exum issued 70cm Black Diamond ice axe that did not have a wrist loop leash attached to the head. The other clients were also using Exum issued ice axes without a leash.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned in time to see MILLER slide down the 38 feet of snow and over the edge of the rock band. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered MILLER was sliding on his backside with his feet facing downhill. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "he was trying to roll over to his belly".

Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed MILLER slide into the moat's round opening and disappear under the spring snowpack. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "MILLER's upper body hit hard on the downhill edge of the round opening then slid under the snow and disappeared." MILLER was wearing his daypack which is unaccounted for at this time. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the daypack weighed 15-20 pounds.

At that moment it was unknown to anyone how far MILLER went under the snowpack and if he was seriously injured during the fall. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to "stay put". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the downhill edge of the moat and made an initial attempt to contact MILLER. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was initially surprised to hear MILLER call out for help. MILLER's voice was faint but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and MILLER could communicate if they yelled. It was clear that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed help to get MILLER out of the moat. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yelled down to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) co-guide, telling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to come quickly.

Exactly when the slip and fall occurred is not known. The times given by the persons involved are approximate. The approximate time of the accident is between 1630 and 1645 hours.

**Post-Fall Rescue Efforts**

MILLER was now 30-35 feet down a steep, smooth rock slab and under the deep spring snowpack. It is not known how much space MILLER had to move inside the icy cave. It is known that the 33 degree, icy cold water was spraying on him the entire time he was in the moat, and to compound the cold, MILLER was surrounded by ice.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was partway down the snow chute with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and quickly climbed back up to assist. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to untie from the rope and move off the snow to a nearby rocky ledge. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then made a loop in the end of the rope and threw it into the moat. The rope loop reached MILLER. MILLER was able to remove his pack. MILLER put the loop around his upper body and up under his arms. MILLER yelled, "Pull me up." The rope then went tight and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began to pull 1:1 (no mechanical advantage). Utilizing a body belay, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to pull and keep MILLER tight as MILLER made some upward progress. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see that with each pull the rope cut deeper into the lip of the snow which added friction. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was now at the lip of the moat hole with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and helping to pull. MILLER was heard yelling, "Get me out." An ice axe was placed under the weighted rope to reduce the friction at the lip.

While (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held MILLER on a body belay, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lowered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal ice axe into the hole clipped to the free end of the rope. MILLER then tried using the ice axe to get purchase in the snow. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), MILLER was able to gain several more feet as they pulled from above. But then MILLER let go of the ice axe and progress stopped. The last few words of communication from MILLER were, "I lost the ice axe", "I can't climb out",

Signature/Date: *Gary Montpelier* 7/8/13 Supervisor/Date: *Scott Hunter* 7/15/13

Version 4	NATIONAL PARK SERVICE			MILL3230
SEARCH & RESCUE REPORT – Page 6				
SAR #:	13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #:	PX.EGRTES010.00.1
			Case #	NP13033230

Narrative continued:

"pull me out", and he kept saying "Get me out of here!" Soon after, MILLER's upward climbing progress stopped, and the rope went very tight around (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body. Communication with MILLER was lost. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then tugged on the slack rope attached to the ice axe." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "the axe felt caught but came loose with a slight pull." (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then retrieved (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ice axe from the moat.

It is unclear how long the two guides were working to raise MILLER out of the moat. Based on events, statements and working back from the first 911 call received at 1730 hours, approximately 20-to-30 minutes or more had passed since the initial fall into the moat.

MILLER was now likely very cold, hypothermic and probably unconscious. At the time of the accident, MILLER was wearing a lightweight top under a blue Schoeller pullover, lightweight Schoeller pants, a pair of black gloves, a white Black Diamond helmet and a pair of red La Sportiva alpine boots in good condition.

MILLER's body weight, which was now all on the rope around (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shoulders, became unbearable to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The two guides transferred MILLER to an ice axe anchor placed downhill of the moat. They determined that they needed to pull uphill in line with the rock slab in order to get MILLER out.

At this time, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) came to assist when they heard the yells for help. They offered their assistance and a 70-meter rope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) climbed up the snow and around the moat to a nearby rocky ridge with several large boulders and established an anchor system in the rocks. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used webbing, carabiners, and a single pulley from the equipment carried by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) set up a 3:1 mechanical advantage system. The 70-meter rope end was then attached to the 25-meter rope looped around MILLER. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the moat opening during this setup process and chopped away at the lip of snow to make it wider. No other communications were made with MILLER during that time.

As (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started hauling upward, the ice axe anchoring MILLER popped out when the haul system went tight. MILLER was moving again but soon became stuck after approximately 5-6 feet. The 30-foot long narrow, icy tunnel in which MILLER was trapped was only 1-2 feet wide and had narrow pinch points. MILLER entered the moat in one direction but was being raised out in a slightly different direction. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was chopping away at the opening with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ice axe which was described as only being 6-12" wide where MILLER was being raised and would eventually need to come out through, because of the pull angle of the raising rope.

At 1730 hours, the first 911 call was received at TCSO and then transferred to the park. The Teton Interagency Dispatch Center (TIDC) took the call and teleconferenced with Rescue Coordinator G. Montopoli at the Lupine Meadows Rescue Cache, where a previous, unrelated SAR had just terminated. The caller was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who explained that Gary MILLER had fallen into a crevasse and that he was not responding. The dispatch log indicated that they had a rope around MILLER but that he was now stuck. At this time, the Miller SAR operation was initiated at the Lupine Meadows Rescue Cache, and plans were formulated for conducting the SAR.

Meanwhile, at the accident site, the haul rope was running at an angle that was not ideal because it was pulling MILLER into a tight pinch point he could not fit through. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then found three old bolts in the rock above the moat. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used one of the old bolts with a green sling to re-direct the haul rope through a carabiner. This helped put the haul rope in line with the larger moat opening that MILLER initially fell through. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked to cross the snow slope to help. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crampons on and crossed. The four (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hauled again while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to excavate and widen the opening, but MILLER became stuck again. Also, another solo climber arrived on scene at about this time. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted by pulling on the haul rope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "MILLER kept hanging up" so they needed to stop, pull up or lower down as needed. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved around and communicated with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then communicated with the haul team.

Signature/Date: *[Signature]* 7/8/13 Supervisor/Date: *[Signature]* 7/15/13

Version 4	NATIONAL PARK SERVICE			MILL3230
	SEARCH & RESCUE REPORT - Page 7			
SAR #:	13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #: PX.EGRTES010.00.1	Case # NP13033230

**Narrative continued:**

As (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to clear snow and the team continued to raise MILLER, MILLER came into view at the opening. MILLER was clearly unconscious and unresponsive. His skin was pale and he was still in the icy water spray. About this time the rescue helicopter flew overhead for the first time. According to the Rangers onboard, MILLER was not out of the moat. According to those on the scene, they pulled MILLER out of the moat soon after the helicopter flew away and landed above near the Moraine Camping Zone.

Based on the observations made by the helicopter crew and statements made by the involved party, MILLER was pulled out of the moat at approximately 1830 hours.

MILLER was then hauled another 5-10 feet further up the rocky slab to get him entirely out of the water and to a ledge, but MILLER became caught on a rocky overhang. At that time three Rangers were descending the snow slope towards the scene.

At 1850 hours, Rangers Johnson, Armitage and Hardesty were the first on scene and confirmed MILLER was out of the moat. They then established two anchor systems in the snow, independent of the guides' anchor and downhill approximately 50 feet from the guides' anchor. Then Armitage rappelled down to MILLER at 1920 hours. MILLER was found out of the water against the rock slab and suspended by the rope which had worked up under his armpits. (See photos taken by Armitage and medical report.)

At 1910, additional Rangers arrived on scene. RANGERS Fletcher, Edmonds and Baerwald assisted with the final raising using a 2:1 mechanical advantage. MILLER was put in a climbing harness in order to redistribute his weight. MILLER was raised by rangers the final 30 feet over the rocky bulge to a ledge at 1930 hours.

Exum Guides (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and CLIENT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained on scene until they were released to hike out to the Lupine Meadows Trailhead. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told earlier to hike ahead to the switchbacks to get better cell service and to call 911. Arrangements were made between the park and Exum to meet up with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was met by other Exum guides and walked out.

**On-Scene Operations Report (from Ranger R. Johnson's Operation\_Report\_Miller\_SAR.docx)**

At approximately 1816 hours, Nick Armitage (medical leader), Drew Hardesty and I (Ron Johnson, on-scene operations leader) departed Lupine Meadows aboard helicopter 26HX piloted by Chris Templeton. Our initial mission was to fly to Garnet Canyon, find the location of the incident, locate a suitable landing spot, and access the site of the incident.

At approximately 1823 hours, we saw several folks standing near a moat with water flowing into it, south of Spaulding Falls at an elevation of approximately 10,000 feet in Garnet Canyon. I contacted 701R (Lupine Meadows Rescue Cache) and gave a description of the scene and stated that we would locate a landing spot above the scene. We landed on a snowfield at an elevation of about 10,500 feet near the eastern end of the Moraine Camping Zone. After the helicopter departed for Lupine Meadows at approximately 1829 hours, we descended on snow and rock to the incident. During the descent, I requested three more rangers be flown to Garnet Canyon to assist with the rescue. At approximately 1847 hours, Rich Baerwald, G.R. Fletcher, and Phil Edmonds departed Lupine Meadows aboard helicopter 26HX. They arrived at the landing spot at about 1858 hours and descended to the incident.

Armitage arrived on scene at approximately 1850 hours and reported that the patient was out of the moat and unresponsive. The patient had been raised out of the moat by the two guides, one client and three other climbers who had offered assistance prior to our arrival. Though the patient was clear of the moat, he was still suspended on a rope on a steep rock slab.

Signature/Date: *Henry Montopol* 7/8/13 Supervisor/Date: *Scott Blount* 7/15/13

Version 4	<b>NATIONAL PARK SERVICE</b>			MILL3230		
	<b>SEARCH &amp; RESCUE REPORT – Page 8</b>					
SAR #:	13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #:	PX.EGRTES010.00.1	Case #	NP13033230

Narrative continued:

After Hardesty and Armitage constructed a snow anchor, Armitage rappelled to the patient, arriving at approximately 1920 hours. While Armitage was assessing the patient, Hardesty, Edmonds and Fletcher prepared anchors and a raising system which utilized a 2:1 mechanical advantage. The anchors and raising system were separate and independent from the anchors and raising system used by the guides, client, and other climbers during the initial raising operation.

After taking into account the patient's condition, his location, and the time of day, rangers at the incident site discussed medical care and evacuation options, and, with advice from 701R, it was determined to raise the patient about 30 feet to a location where he could be placed in a litter and flown to Lupine Meadows for additional evaluation. The patient was raised on a single rope, assisted by Armitage who ascended a separate rope. The raising operation ended at approximately 1945 hours.

With Chris Templeton piloting helicopter 26HX and Jack McConnell spotting, a litter was short-hauled to the incident site at 2000 hours. Helicopter 26HX remained in the air while the patient was placed in a litter and Armitage prepared to attend the litter. The initial attempt to extract the patient and Armitage was aborted when Templeton noted a "red line." At that time, down-canyon winds on the ground were blowing an estimated 10-15 mph with gusts to 20 mph. On the second attempt, Templeton utilized a different approach and performed a successful extraction at approximately 2021 hours. Armitage and the patient were delivered to Lupine Meadows at approximately 2028 hours.

After clearing the scene, all rangers descended to a landing zone just up-canyon from the Meadows Camping Zone. Edmonds and Hardesty were flown to Lupine Meadows in the first flight. Johnson, Baerwald, and Fletcher comprised the second flight. All rescue personnel were at Lupine Meadows at 2120 hours. Helicopter 26HX arrived at the Teton Helibase at 2129 hours.

#### **Additional Lupine Meadows Operation (Ranger G. Montopoli)**

At the Lupine Meadows Rescue Cache, overall SAR operations were directed by Rescue Coordinator G. Montopoli, Operations Chief S. Guenther, Air Operations Director M. Vidak, and other rangers. In addition to the ongoing mountain operations directed by Ranger Johnson and detailed above, other important actions originating at the Rescue Cache included: 1) notification of GTNP Medical Advisor Dr. Will Smith about the incident (about 1830 hours); 2) a request for his presence at the Rescue Cache - he arrived at about 1900 hours; 3) a request for the park ambulance, Medic 1 - it arrived at about 2000 hours; 4) a request for a life-flight [Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (EIRMC) Air Rescue Helicopter] - it arrived at about 2032 hours; and, 5) a request for Critical Incident Stress Debriefing personnel (Ranger K. Frausen) - she arrived at 1900 hours. Other personnel at the Rescue Cache, including two TIDC dispatchers (T. Smith and E. Horn), supported the mountain operation as needed.

Prior to Miller's arrival, Dr. Smith prepared a "mini-ER" (emergency room) and prepared medical personnel in the event that Miller was able to be resuscitated upon his delivery to the Rescue Cache. Advanced cardiopulmonary intervention at the incident location in the mountains was discussed, but the decision to short-haul Miller to the Rescue Cache and then treat him was made. This decision was made because: 1) nearly four hours had passed since Miller was immersed in the cold water; 2) on-scene cardiac agitation could cause an irreversible asystole if Miller was a viable patient; 3) initiation of CPR and AED conversion at the accident scene would have to be interrupted for about 10 minutes during the short-haul to Lupine Meadows - a condition not conducive to successful resuscitation; and, 4) the accident scene's characteristics precluded effective medical interventions.

Miller arrived at the Rescue Cache via short-haul attended by Ranger N. Armitage at about 2028 hours. After applying the Lifepack 10 Defibrillator and other cardiac interventions, Dr. Smith halted the resuscitation effort and pronounced Gary Miller deceased at about 2035 hours. Teton County Coroner Kiley Campbell was requested and arrived at about 2200 hours. He took possession of G. Miller's body for a formal autopsy, and transported him to his facility.

Signature/Date: *G. Montopoli* 7/8/13 | Supervisor/Date: *Scott Hunt* 7/15/13



Version 4	NATIONAL PARK SERVICE			MILL3230
	SEARCH & RESCUE REPORT - Page 9			
SAR #: 13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #: PX.EGRTES010.00.1	Case # NP13033230	

Narrative continued:

**Accident Scene Investigation (from Ranger R. Baerwald's Miller\_Fatality\_Report.doc)**

Evidence at the Scene

- At the scene of the accident I was able to find boot tracks in the snow and a clear slide mark made when Gary MILLER slipped and slid into the moat. (See photos for details.)
- The slide originated at the end of a horizontal set of boot tracks in the soft snow. The boot tracks stopped directly above the moat opening but the moat is not clearly visible from that point. The 38-foot slide mark ends at the round opening of the moat.
- MILLER's ice axe had been moved prior to my investigation. I did learn that it was a 70cm Black Diamond ice axe issued to MILLER by Exum. The axe did not have a wrist loop leash attached to the head of the axe.
- MILLER was wearing La Sportiva, Men's Trango S Evo GTX Mountaineering Boot, issued to him by Exum Mountain Guides. The soles of the boots had slight wear but were otherwise in good condition and appropriate for the conditions.
- Other glissading and boot tracks in the snow above and below the accident site were consistent with the description of events.
- Boot tracks and glissade marks were found approaching the scene from above as described and were presumably those of the 2 guides and 3 clients.
- A single boot track was found going to the rocky slab where [REDACTED] presumably investigated the slope and moat's opening.
- Two glissade marks that match the actions of [REDACTED] and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were found in the snow below the scene.
- I was able to identify an ice axe hole below the lip of the moat which matches the description of the guide's anchoring MILLER with an axe while switching to a 3:1 raise system. (see photos)
- Also in the photos taken on June 20, 2013 (Baerwald), the narrow opening of the moat and the excavation efforts are evident.
- Exum guides blue and white, 25-meter rope with loop (loop cut by rescue rangers)

Location and Measurements

The accident occurred in Grand Teton National Park in the North Fork of Garnet Canyon. The accident site is considered an off-trail climber's route that is often taken in the spring. The path of descent was just north east of the traditional "Winter Trail." The Winter Trail avoids traversing a greater distance across steep snow slopes and is considered a direct way to and from the Lower Saddle of the Grand Teton.

GPS coordinates: N 43 43.719 W 110 47.793  
 Elevation = 9,971'  
 Slope Angle = 38-40 degrees  
 Water Temperature = 33 degrees

Length of Slide to Moat Opening = 38 feet  
 Length of Slide into the Moat = 30 feet

Distance from [REDACTED] to Moat = 42 feet  
 Distance from [REDACTED] to MILLER = 22 feet

Photos

See Photos for additional details.

Interviews

See individual interview statements for details.

Signature/Date: <i>Greg Montoya</i> 7/8/13	Supervisor/Date: <i>[Signature]</i> 7/15/13
--	---

Version 4	<b>NATIONAL PARK SERVICE</b>			MILL3230
<b>SEARCH &amp; RESCUE REPORT – Page 10</b>				
SAR #: 13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #: PX.EGRTES010.00.1	Case # NP13033230	

Narrative continued:

**Prior Training Provided by Exum**

During the days leading up to a climb of the Grand Teton, Exum Mountain Guide clients are given proper, prior training. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Gary Miller attended Exum's multi-pitch climbing level I and level II courses and the snow training day.

Gary Miller attended the Level I course and was instructed by Exum Guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (No score is given.)

Then, Gary attended the all-day snow school at Teton Village. There he was instructed by Exum Guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he was given a high marks for his abilities on snow. (No score is given.) The snow school was held near the base of Corbet's Couloir and concluded with a climb up the 40+ degree steep couloir. Other topics covered during the day included:

- Proper walking on snow – French technique, front point, plunge stepping, turning etc.
- Self-arrest with and without an ice axe
- Self-arrest with an ice axe – recovering from and stopping in various positions
- Self-arrest with an ice axe – steeper slopes and faster speeds.
- Self-anchoring, planting an ice axe and setting up a platform
- Glissading – sitting and standing

The third day Gary attended the Level II course and was instructed by Exum Guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Gary was given a score of 6 out of 6 by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

**Coroner's Report**

Teton County Coroner Kiley Campbell, who took possession of Gary MILLER's body on 06/20/2013, filed a report for the victim (attached with this report).

Coroner Campbell reported that MILLER was exposed to the icy cold waters of the melting snow for an extended amount of time, approximately 2 hours. Immersion in cold water followed by hypothermia was determined to be the cause of death, in an accidental manner.

**Final Assessment**

Based on the results of my investigation, I detected no evidence of foul play or suspicious circumstances in this event. All evidence indicates that MILLER died as a result of cold water immersion and hypothermia sustained from an accidental slip and fall into an icy water moat on 06/20/2013.

Immersion in cold water can quickly numb the extremities to the point of uselessness. Cold hands cannot grasp a thrown rescue line, or hold onto an ice axe. Within minutes, severe pain clouds rational thought. And, finally, hypothermia (exposure) sets in, and without rescue and proper first aid treatment, unconsciousness and death.

**Synopsis**

In this section of the report, I (Rescue Coordinator G. Montopoli) try to present an unbiased, comprehensive overview of the accident and determine what, if anything, went wrong; and what could have been done to prevent the eventual outcome. What I discuss is speculative, because I was not at the accident site when it occurred. It is, however, based on over three decades of experience as a climbing ranger at Grand Teton National Park.

Signature/Date: <i>G. Montopoli</i> 7/5/13	Supervisor/Date: <i>[Signature]</i> 7/15/13
--	---

Version 4	<b>NATIONAL PARK SERVICE</b>		MILL3230
<b>SEARCH &amp; RESCUE REPORT – Page 11</b>			
SAR #: 13-008	Park: GTNP	SAR Account #: PX.EGRTES010.00.1	Case # NP13033230

**Narrative continued:**

At about 1630 hours on June 20, 2013, Gary Miller, 55, slipped on snow and slid about 38 feet to a moat opening, then fell another 30' to the bottom of the moat into cascading 33°F water, resulting in his death. He was being guided by Exum, a GTNP concessioner, and was descending back to the valley after a successful ascent of the Grand Teton via the Owen-Spalding Route earlier that day. The accident occurred at about 9,971' on a variant of the "winter trail" that lies between the Garnet Meadows and Moraine just north of the Middle Teton. This route is generally taken by climbers when the established summer trail is snow-laden with hard, steep snow and steep cliffs below. G. Miller was one of three clients being guided by two guides when winter-type conditions on the Grand Teton warrant small parties with a low client-to-guide ratio (in this case 3:2).

There is no question in my mind that G. Miller was deemed competent and capable to ascend the Grand Teton based on his performance in the courses he took at Exum. With Exum, G. Miller had previously attended a Level I course, an all-day snow school, and a Level II course. He received high grades when noted. Also, he appeared to be a physically fit individual, and never was there any mention that he struggled with physical conditioning by guides or co-clients during any of his endeavors with Exum. Hence, he was allowed by Exum to enroll in the guided ascent of the Grand Teton. Exum carefully screens clients before allowing them to ascend the Grand Teton.

Guides (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were experienced and well-respected among Exum guides and members of the local climbing community. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started guiding in 1999 and has guided for Exum since 2007. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started guiding in 2001, and has guided for Exum since 2007. Between the two guides, they accumulated 26 years of guiding, and 14 years of guiding employment with Exum, counting the current year.

During the early climbing season when hard snow and ice are prevalent, guiding the Grand Teton is no easy task. Ascending the Grand Teton by the Owen-Spalding Route was a significant accomplishment in itself, as evidenced by the time that it took in the ascent, and given the fact that the party was considerably small (two guides for three clients).

Route conditions on both the ascent and descent must constantly be appraised, and decisions are made based on those conditions. On the descent, the guides decided to deviate from the typical winter trail because the winter trail was shaded (and presumably hard-packed) due to the lateness of the day. They chose the next couloir to the north between the winter trail and Spalding Falls couloir, which, although steeper, was in the sunlight. I personally believe that they were "comfortable" with their clients, having observed them previously negotiate steeper terrain with and without crampons; with and without belays; and walking and glissading.

During the descent, they recognized the inherently dangerous, exposed moat. Unfortunately, it was not visible until they were a short distance above it, and well after descending a significant distance down the couloir. At this point, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to belay the clients, and instructed them to plant their ice axes, kick a good stance, and await their turn for a belay. After belaying and lowering one client down the couloir, well-past the moat, Miller slipped and fell while the other client was preparing to be belayed. This was the critical moment that resulted in the fatality.

Several issues must be contemplated:

- 1) G. Miller had planted his ice axe, but when he slipped he lost it - it remained planted at its original location. During snow course day at Exum, clients are taught to arrest without an ice axe, or "cat arrest" (grip the snow with fingers and boots like a cat climbing a tree). It appears that G. Miller attempted to initiate that maneuver but was unable to in the short distance. If he had completed the maneuver, perhaps the final outcome would have been different; but he was a novice, and it takes practice and/or prior episodes with better outcomes to hone the maneuver - the reaction to a slip and the maneuver must be instantaneous.
- 2) G. Miller's slide path took him directly to the moat opening with enough force for him to slide/fall through its narrow opening with his pack on. With less acceleration, he may well have not slid through its opening.
- 3) The location at the bottom of the moat where G. Miller ended up was cascading with near-freezing water (33°F), and most likely impossible to climb out of.

Signature/Date: <i>[Signature]</i> for George Montoya	Supervisor/Date: <i>[Signature]</i> 9/25/13
---	---

SEARCH & RESCUE REPORT – Page 12

SAR #: 13-008

Park: GTNP

SAR Account #: PX.EGRTES010.00.1

Case # NP13033230

Narrative continued:

- 4) In a study of accidents in the Tetons conducted from 1950-1996, 23% of fatalities resulted from slips on snow. Most of these involved slips on snow while descending at the end of the day, most likely due to fatigue and complacency. Because of the energy involved in ascending the Grand Teton, it is possible that this was a factor with G. Miller.
- 5) Were the guides flawed in their decision to descend a variant of the winter route? I find it difficult to comment on this point, because I was not there and do not know what the actual conditions were. I do know that, as a guide myself during the 1970s, I often deviated from the norm when ascending mountains to benefit my clients. The Exum guides were most certainly in their minds acting on behalf of their clients' best interests when they deviated.
- 6) Should one of the guides have descended the moat to assist G. Miller? In my opinion, most certainly NOT. There was no space to accomplish anything in the moat, nor ascend, and descending into the moat probably would have resulted in another fatality. They did what they could, given the circumstances.

G. Miller unfortunately died as a result of cold water immersion and hypothermia sustained from an accidental slip and fall into an icy, watery moat, that resulted from several circumstances that came together at one location and point in time, and were unpredictable.

Signature/Date: *[Signature]* for George Montoya

Supervisor/Date: *[Signature]* 9/28/13

United States  
Department of the Interior

Requisition No.  AV1460-P-0031
Date:  6/20/2013


REQUISITION

To:  FMO	Bureau/Office:	Date:
Appropriation/Allotment Number: <b>Account Number:</b> PX.EGRTES010.00.1	Obj. Class Code	Charge Shipping Costs to:  N/A

Vendor: <b>Name of Contractor</b> Helicopter Express, Inc	Deliver to:  Fire Management Office
---	---

Item No.	Description	Quantity	Unit	Unit Price	Amount
1	Flight Time (FT)	1.30	hr	\$982.00	\$1,276.60
2	Extended Pilot (EP)	4.0	hr	\$49.00	\$196.00
3	Extended Driver (ET)	4.0	hr	\$32.00	\$128.00
4	Mileage	0.0	mi	\$1.83	\$0.00
5	Availability	0.00	day	\$3,200.00	\$0.00
6	Flight Date: 6/20/2013				
7	OAS #: Referenced by date				
8					

SAR in Garnet Canyon involving delivery of Rangers to accident site; short-haul of Pt. on attended litter; extraction of rangers back to Lupine Meadows rescue Cache.	Subtotal	\$1,600.60
	Shipping	\$0.00
	Total	\$1,600.60

<b>To Be Completed by Fiscal Authority Only</b>			
FUND CERTIFICATION: Funds in the amounts shown are available and chargeable to the cost authorities above.			
Signature 	Date 7/15/13	Approved by (Signature)	Date
Title: OLSDR		Title	
Requisitioned by (Signature)	Date	Bureau Officer (Signature)	Date
Title:		Title	

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD**

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME <b>GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK</b>	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER <b>NP13033230</b>
LOCATION OF INCIDENT	DATE OF INCIDENT <b>6/20/2013</b>
NATURE OF INCIDENT <b>Search and Rescue, Land Area</b>	<b>Page 1</b>

**NARRATIVE:**

Equipment Replacement Justification for Account Number: PX.EGRTES010.00.1  
Supplies and equipment purchased during the incident were needed to safely carry out the mission. This equipment was either necessary, lost, damaged, destroyed, or rendered unavailable for service on the SAR. The following items were purchased off the account number listed above:

ITEM / MANUFACTURE /Part #	VENDOR	PRICE
Crampons (1 pr) & 6 locking biners	Black Diamond	\$110.26
Benham Bag Dry Clean	Ryan's Cleaners	\$10.78
Replacement Flight Helmet Parts for 2 helmets	Gibson & Barnes	\$297.75
100m of 8mm cord (2)	PMI	\$295.00
5)		
6)		
7)		
8)		
9)		
10)		
11)		
12)		
13)		
14)		
15)		
16)		
	Shipping	
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$713.79</b>

**Attachments:**

Copies of receipts for purchases

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE & DATE) 	APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE & DATE)  7/15/13
--	---

Procurement:  Agency/Acct No: PX.EGRTES010.00 1 Vendor: Moose Enterprises P.O. Box 39 Moose, WY 83012	Bureau/Office: FTS Phone: _____ FTS Fax: _____ Charge shipping costs to: Debit to: _____
--	---

DESCRIPTION	QUAN	UNIT	UNIT PRICE	AMOUNT
Food and Drink for rescue personnel	1			219.50
Justification: Food purchased during an extended SAR operation.				
Estimated Shipping Cost:				
Estimated Total Cost:				219.50

**TO BE COMPLETED BY FISCAL AUTHORITY ONLY**

FUND CERTIFICATION: Funds in the amounts shown are available and chargeable to the cost authorities shown above.

Signature	Title <b>C JLS DR</b>	Date <b>7/15/12</b>
Requested by (Signature) _____	Title _____	Date _____
Approved by (Signature) _____	Title _____	Date _____
Bureau Officer (Signature) _____	Title _____	Date _____

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
**SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD**

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME  Grand Teton National Park	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER <b>13</b>   0   3   0   2   3   0
LOCATION OF INCIDENT  Garnet Canyon – North Fork	DATE OF INCIDENT MO      DA      YR 0   6   2   0   1   3
NATURE OF INCIDENT  Fatality – Climbing accident	
COMPLAINANT'S NAME	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS

**RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION**

**MILLER DEATH INVESTIGATION REPORT - June 20, 2013**

**SUMMARY**

At 1730 hours, on June 20, 2013, Teton Interagency Dispatch Center received a call for help after a climber fell into a moat in the North Fork of Garnet Canyon. Gary Miller, 55, from Colorado Springs, Colorado was descending from the Lower Saddle of the Grand Teton after a successful summit of the Grand Teton earlier in the day. Miller was on a guided climb with Exum, one of the park's authorized concessioners. Along with two Exum Mountain Guides and the two other clients in his group, Miller walked and glissaded without incident to the slope where the accident occurred. One of the guides checked the slope while the others waited. It was determined that they could descend down the snow slope. As the clients traversed across the slope, the second guide determined a belay would be needed. The three clients waited slightly above the guide while a rope was prepared. The guide instructed the clients to plant their ice axes and kick out a stance. Miller was waiting his turn and watched the first client in his group glissade utilizing a roped belay. The first client reached the end of the rope and untied. The rope was retrieved, then an end was thrown uphill toward Miller and the other remaining client. The rope landed closer to the other client. While the other client was tying into the rope, Miller slipped on snow and slid into an icy water moat near a rock band. Climbing guides, with help from a separate party, successfully extricated Miller from the moat before rangers arrived at the site.

Six rangers were flown to a temporary landing spot above the accident site in Garnet Canyon. Rescuers raised Miller to a site where he could be flown in a rescue litter via short-haul to Lupine Meadows. A ranger attended Miller below the helicopter on the flight to the park's rescue cache. Once at the rescue cache, they were met by a team of park medical providers led by Dr. Will Smith of St. John's Medical Center and an Air Idaho Life Flight ship waiting to provide transport to critical care in Idaho Falls. It was determined that Miller was exposed to a continuous icy spray of water for approximately 2 hours, while efforts were made to raise him out of the icy cave. Miller was pronounced dead at 8:35 p.m. at the rescue cache, and his body was turned over to the Teton Country coroner.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER						
Grand Teton National Park	13	0	3	3	2	3	0

Page 2 of 14

**PERSONS INVOLVED**

**Climbing Party**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Gary Miller – client

(b) (6)

Colorado Springs, CO. 80951

DOB: 12/09/1957 (55)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**Assisting Rescue Climbing Party**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Grand Teton National Park	13 0 3 3 2 3 0

Page 3 of 14

**DETAILS**

**The accident occurred at approximately 1630 to 1645 hours on June 20, 2013.**

**The Events Prior**

On June 20, 2013 at approximately 0600 hours, two Exum Guides and three clients began their successful ascent of the Grand Teton (13,770). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exum Guide) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (co-Exum guide) lead their three clients to the summit via the Owen-Spalding Route (II 5.4). The clients included a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Gary Miller (55) from Colorado Springs, CO. The team of five reached the summit at approximately 1100 hours, and then descended back to the Lower Saddle via the same route.

Once back at the Lower Saddle (11,600'), they packed up their gear and prepared to descend from the Lower Saddle back to the Lupine Meadows trailhead. The guided party started the descent at approximately 1530 hours which is known based on a cell phone call made to the Exum office.

Once they started down, the first steep snow slope, called the "headwall", was encountered just below the Lower Saddle. They descended on foot with an ice axe in hand (without crampons on) down past the level of the sheer rock feature called the 'Prow'. Once they were below the Prow, the guides felt conditions were appropriate so they glissaded one at a time down the snow slope to its runout. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was good glissading conditions. When I asked how the clients did, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they had been doing well.

From the Moraine Camping Zone below the Middle Teton, the group walked on snow to the next snow covered slope that leads to the Meadows Camping Zone. The group encountered firm snow in the shadows cast by the Middle Teton, so the guides angled out away from the shade and back into the sunshine where they returned to soft and favorable glissading conditions.

This time of year, when there is snow on the summer trail, most climbers and guides choose to ascend and descend the 'winter trail', which goes more directly from the Meadows to the Moraine, southwest of the Caves Camping Area and Spalding Falls.

At this point the group of five came to the next steep slope that leads down to the Meadows. The slope makes two distinct drops down to the junction of the North and South Forks of Garnet Canyon. The first slope is a 30-35 degree snow slope that drops approximately 200 vertical feet. The group walked and glissaded un-roped down this slope without incident. The second slope is steeper and longer than the first, with a rock band mid slope and boulders in the lower angle runout. This slope is a 35-40 degree snow slope in the spring that drops approximately 600 vertical feet and is approximately 900' long.

Here the group started out glissading un-roped down the first 150 vertical feet in soft snow. Then the two guides took care when they got closer to the mid slope rock band. Exum Guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went ahead, angling down toward the snow filled hourglass shaped chute that was continuous snow to the bottom of the slope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to and then onto the rock slab just south of the snow chute. For the first

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Grand Teton National Park	13 0 3 3 2 3 0

Page 4 of 14

time the icy water moat was seen and noted as something to avoid. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked the passage around the running water and moat hole in the snowpack. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was then the first to go down. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went around the moat and down the steep section of snow. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said "it's OK but stay to the left". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued glissading down the slope approximately 200-300'.

Then Exum Guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the three other clients made their way, walking down un-roped and across toward the middle of the slope. They reached a point where the hourglass shaped slope steepens. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was slightly ahead and lower than the clients and could then see the watery moat hole below. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to employ the use of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rope and provide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clients with a belay for better control down this section of the snow chute. While the three clients waited for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to prepare (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 25 meter rope, they were directed to plant their axes, kick a stance and wait until it was their turn. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) first tossed an end of the rope to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who tied in and was then boot axe belayed over to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then lowered while glissading down. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was on a boot axe belay as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) slid past the moat opening and down to lower angle snow. At the end of the 25 meter rope (80'), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) untied and then continued glissading down to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The clients were not wearing harnesses at this time so the clients tied the rope around their waist using a bowline knot. In addition to the rope, the two Exum guides also carried some webbing and 3 or 4 locking carabiners each.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then retrieved the rope and told MILLER it was his turn. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tossed an end of the rope uphill and over, but it landed a little closer to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go ahead and tie in. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved a few feet to retrieve the rope end, and while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tying into the end, Gary MILLER slipped from his stance and started sliding. Both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw MILLER sliding out of control down the snow slope without his ice axe. MILLER's ice axe was still planted in the snow where he had just been standing. Neither (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed MILLER's initial fall from his stance. No one in the climbing party knows how or why the slip and fall occurred. MILLER was using an Exum issued 70cm Black Diamond ice axe that did not have a wrist loop leash attached to the head. The other clients were also using Exum issued ice axes without a leash.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned in time to see MILLER slide down the 38 feet of snow and over the edge of the rock band. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered MILLER was sliding on his backside with his feet facing downhill. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "he was trying to roll over to his belly".

Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed MILLER slide into the moat's round opening and disappear under the spring snowpack. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "MILLER's upper body hit hard on the downhill edge of the round opening then slid under the snow and disappeared". MILLER was wearing his daypack which is unaccounted for at this time. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated the daypack weighed 15-20 pounds.

At that moment it was unknown to anyone how far MILLER went under the snowpack and if he was seriously injured during the fall. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to "stay put". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the downhill edge of the moat and made an initial attempt to contact MILLER. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was initially surprised to hear MILLER call out for help. MILLER's voice was faint but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and MILLER could communicate if they yelled. It was clear that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) needed help to get MILLER out of the moat. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yelled down to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) co-guide, telling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to come quickly.

Exactly when the slip and fall occurred is not known. The times given by the persons involved are close. The approximate time of the accident is between 1630 and 1645 hours.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Grand Teton National Park	13 0 3 3 2 3 0

Page 5 of 14

**Rescue efforts post fall**

MILLER was now 30-35 feet down a steep, smooth rock slab and under the deep spring snowpack. It is not known how much space MILLER had to move inside the icy cave. It is known that the 33 degree, icy cold water was spraying on him the entire time he was in the moat, and to compound the cold, MILLER was surrounded by ice.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was partway down the snow chute with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and quickly climbed back up to assist. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to untie from the rope and move off the snow to a nearby rocky ledge.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then made a loop in the end of the rope and threw it into the moat. The rope loop reached MILLER. MILLER was able to remove his pack. MILLER put the loop around his upper body and up under his arms. MILLER yelled, "Pull me up." The rope then went tight and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began to pull 1:1 (no mechanical advantage). Utilizing a body belay, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to pull and keep MILLER tight as MILLER made some upward progress. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see that with each pull the rope cut deeper into the lip of the snow which added friction. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was now at the lip of the moat hole with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and helping to pull. MILLER was heard yelling, "Get me out." An ice axe was placed under the weighted rope to reduce the friction at the lip.

While (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held MILLER on a body belay, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lowered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personal ice axe into the hole clipped to the free end of the rope. MILLER then tried using the ice axe to get purchase in the snow. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), MILLER was able to gain several more feet as they pulled from above. But then MILLER let go of the ice axe and progress stopped. The last few words of communication from MILLER were, "I lost the ice axe", "I can't climb out", "pull me out" and kept saying "Get me out of here!" Soon after, MILLER's upward climbing progress stopped, and the rope went very tight around (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body. Communication with MILLER was lost. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then tugged on the slack rope attached to the ice axe". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "the axe felt caught but came loose with a slight pull". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then retrieved (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ice axe from the moat.

It is unclear how long the two guides were working to raise MILLER out of the moat. Based on events, statements and working back from the first 911 call received at 1730 hours, approximately 20 to 30 minutes or more had passed since the initial fall into the moat.

MILLER was now likely very cold, hypothermic and probably unconscious. At the time of the accident, MILLER was wearing a light top under a blue schoeller pullover, lightweight schoeller pants, a pair of black gloves, a white Black Diamond helmet and a pair of red La Sportiva alpine boots in good condition.

MILLER's body weight, which was now all on the rope around (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shoulders, became unbearable to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The two guides transferred MILLER to an ice axe anchor placed downhill of the moat. They determined that they needed to pull uphill in line with the rock slab in order to get MILLER out.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Grand Teton National Park	13 0 3 3 2 3 0

Page 6 of 14

At this time, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) came to assist when they heard the yells for help. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered their assistance and a 70-meter rope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) climbed up the snow and around the moat to a nearby rocky ridge with several large boulders and established an anchor system in the rocks. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used webbing, carabiners and a single pulley from the equipment carried by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) set up a 3:1 mechanical advantage system. The 70 meter rope end was then attached to the 25 meter rope looped around MILLER. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the moat opening during this setup process and chopped away at the lip of snow to make it wider. No other communications were made with MILLER during that time.

As (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started hauling upward, the ice axe anchoring MILLER popped out when the haul system went tight. MILLER was moving again but soon became stuck after approximately 5-6 feet. The 30-foot long narrow icy tunnel in which MILLER was trapped was only 1-2 feet wide and had narrow pinch points. MILLER entered the moat in one direction but was being raised out in a slightly different direction. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was chopping away at the opening with his ice axe which was described as only being 6-12" wide where MILLER was being raised and would eventually need to come out through, because of the pull angle of the raising rope.

At 1730 hours, the first 911 call was received at TCSO and then transferred to the park. The TIDC took the call and teleconferenced with Rescue Coordinator G. Montopoli at the Lupine Meadows Rescue Cache, where a previous, unrelated SAR had just terminated. The caller was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who explained that Gary MILLER had fallen into a crevasse and that he was not responding. The dispatch log indicated that they had a rope around MILLER but that he was now stuck. At this time, the Miller SAR operation was initiated at the Lupine Meadows Rescue Cache, and plans were formulated for conducting the SAR.

The haul rope was running at an angle that was not ideal because it was pulling MILLER into a tight pinch point he could not fit through. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then found three old bolts in the rock above the moat. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) used one of the old bolts with a green sling to re-direct the haul rope through a carabiner. This helped put the haul rope in line with the larger moat opening that MILLER initially fell through. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked to cross the snow slope to help. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) put (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crampons on and crossed. The four (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hauled again while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to excavate and widen the opening, but MILLER became stuck again. Also another solo climber arrived on scene at about this time. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assisted by pulling on the haul rope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "MILLER kept hanging up" so they needed to stop, pull up or lower down as needed. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) moved around and communicated with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then communicated with the haul team.

As (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to clear snow and the team continued to raise MILLER, MILLER came into view at the opening. MILLER was clearly unconscious and unresponsive. His skin was pale and he was still in the icy water spray. About this time the rescue helicopter flew overhead for the first time. According to the Rangers onboard, MILLER was not out of the moat. According to those on the scene, they pulled MILLER out of the moat soon after the helicopter flew away and landed above near the Moraine Camping Zone.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Grand Teton National Park	13   0   3   3   2   3   0

Page 7 of 14

Based on the observations made by the helicopter crew and statements made by the involved party, MILLER was pulled out of the moat at approximately 1830 hours.

MILLER was then hauled another 5-10 feet further up the rocky slab to get him entirely out of the water and to a ledge, but MILLER became caught on a rocky overhang. At that time three Rangers were descending the snow slope towards the scene.

At 1850 hours, Rangers Johnson, Armitage and Hardesty were the first on scene and confirmed MILLER was out of the moat. They then established two anchor systems in the snow, independent of the guides anchor and downhill approximately 50 feet from the guides anchor. Then Armitage rappelled down to MILLER at 1920 hours. MILLER was found out of the water against the rock slab and suspended by the rope which had worked up under his armpits. (See photos taken by Armitage and medical report.)

At 1910, additional Rangers arrived on scene. RANGERS Fletcher, Edmonds and Baerwald assisted with the final raising using a 2:1 mechanical advantage. MILLER was put in a climbing harness in order to redistribute his weight. MILLER was raised by rangers the final 30' over the rocky bulge to a ledge at 1930 hours.

See 'Operations Report' for additional details about the rescue.

Exum Guides (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and CLIENT (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained on scene until they were released to hike out to the Lupine Meadows Trailhead. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was told earlier to hike ahead to the switchbacks to get better cell service and to call 911. Arrangements were made between the park and Exum to meet up with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was met by other Exum guides and walked out.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued hiking to the Moraine Camping Zone where they spent the night. They intended to climb the Grand Teton in the morning but woke to snowfall. They cancelled their climb and hiked out later that day.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also continued hiking to the Moraine Camping Zone where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) spent the night. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) intended to climb the Grand Teton in the morning. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did summit.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Grand Teton National Park	13 0 3 3 2 3 0

Page 8 of 14

**Evidence at the scene**

- At the scene of the accident I was able to find boot tracks in the snow and a clear slide mark made when Gary MILLER slipped and slid into the moat. (See photos for details.)
- The slide originated at the end of a horizontal set of boot tracks in the soft snow. The boot tracks stopped directly above the moat opening but the moat is not clearly visible from that point. The 38' slide mark ends at the round opening of the moat.
- MILLER's ice axe had been moved prior to my investigation. I did learn that it was a 70cm Black Diamond ice axe issued to MILLER by Exum. The axe did not have a wrist loop leash attached to the head of the axe.
- MILLER was wearing La Sportiva, Men's Trango S Evo GTX Mountaineering Boot, issued to him by Exum Mountain Guides. The soles of the boots had slight wear but were otherwise in good condition and appropriate for the conditions.
- Other glissading and boot tracks in the snow above and below the accident site were consistent with the description of events.
- Boot tracks and glissade marks were found approaching the scene from above as described and were presumably those of the 2 guides and 3 clients.
- A single boot track was found going to the rocky slab where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) presumably investigated the slope and moat's opening.
- Two glissade marks that match the actions of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were found in the snow below the scene.
- I was able to identify an ice axe hole below the lip of the moat which matches the description of the guide's anchoring MILLER with an axe while switching to a 3:1 raise system. (see photos)
- Also in the photos taken on June 20, 2013 (Baerwald), the narrow opening of the moat and the excavation efforts are evident.
- Exum guides blue and white, 25 meter rope with loop (loop cut by rescue rangers)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Grand Teton National Park	13 0 3 3 2 3 0

Page 9 of 14

**Location and Measurements**

The accident occurred in Grand Teton National Park in the North Fork of Garnet Canyon. The accident site is considered an off-trail climber's route that is often taken in the spring. The path of descent was just north east of the traditional "Winter Trail." The standard Winter Trail avoids traversing a greater distance across steep snow slopes and is considered a direct way to and from the Lower Saddle of the Grand Teton.

**GPS coordinates: N 43 43.719 W 110 47.793**  
**Elevation = 9,971'**  
**Slope Angle = 38-40 degrees**  
**Water temperature = 33 degrees**

**Length of Slide to Moat opening = 38 feet**  
**Length of Slide into the Moat = 30 feet**

**Distance from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to Moat = 42 feet**  
**Distance from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to MILLER = 22 feet**

**Photos**

- See Photos for additional details.

**Interviews**

- See individual interview statements for details.



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER						
Grand Teton National Park	13	0	3	3	2	3	0

Page 10 of 14

**Prior Training Provided by Exum**

During the days leading up to a climb of the Grand Teton, Exum Mountain Guide clients are given proper training. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Gary Miller attended Exum's multi-pitch climbing level I and level II courses and the snow training day.

Gary Miller attended the level I and was instructed by Exum Guide, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (no score is given) Then Gary attended the all-day snow school at Teton Village. There he was instructed by Exum Guide, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) he demonstrated good abilities on snow. (no score is given)

The snow school was held near the base of Corbet's Couloir and concluded with a climb up the 40+ degree steep couloir. Other topics covered during the day included:

- Proper walking on snow – French technique, front point, plunge stepping, turning etc..
- Self -arrest with and without an ice axe
- Self –arrest with an ice axe – recovering from and stopping in various positions
- Self- arrest with an ice axe – steeper slopes and faster speeds.
- Self- anchoring, planting an ice axe and setting up a platform
- Glissading – sitting and standing

The third day Gary attended the Level II course and was instructed by Exum Guide, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Gary was given a score of 6 out of 6 by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER						
Grand Teton National Park	13	0	3	3	2	3	0

Page 11 of 14

**Coroner's Report**

Teton County Coroner Kiley Campbell, who took possession of Gary MILLER's body on 06/20/2013, filed a report for the victim (attached with this report).

Coroner Campbell reported that MILLER was exposed to the icy cold waters of the melting snow for an extended amount of time, approximately 2 hours. Immersion in cold water followed by hypothermia was determined to be the cause of death, in an accidental manner.

**Final Assessment**

Based on the results of my investigation, I detected no evidence of foul play or suspicious circumstances in this event. All evidence indicates that MILLER died as a result of cold water immersion and hypothermia sustained from an accidental slip and fall into an icy water moat on 06/20/2013.

Immersion in cold water can quickly numb the extremities to the point of uselessness. Cold hands cannot grasp a thrown rescue line, or hold onto an ice axe. Within minutes, severe pain clouds rational thought. And, finally, hypothermia (exposure) sets in, and without rescue and proper first aid treatment, unconsciousness and death.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER
Grand Teton National Park	13 0 3 3 2 3 0

Page 12 of 14

**Expected Survival Time in Cold Water**

Water Temperature	Exhaustion or Unconsciousness in	Expected Survival Time
70–80° F (21–27° C)	3–12 hours	3 hours – indefinitely
60–70° F (16–21° C)	2–7 hours	2–40 hours
50–60° F (10–16° C)	1–2 hours	1–6 hours
40–50° F (4–10° C)	30–60 minutes	1–3 hours
32.5–40° F (0–4° C)	15–30 minutes	30–90 minutes
<32° F (<0° C)	Under 15 minutes	Under 15–45 minutes

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME Grand Teton National Park	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER 13 0 3 3 2 3 0
---	--

Page 13 of 14

**RADIO LOG SUMMARY – taken from the Jenny Lake Rescue Cache log**

**Initial 911 Call – received by TCSO and transferred to TIDC at 1730 hours.**

**Transferred to the Jenny Lake Rescue Cache;**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	1731	☒ CALL BACK (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) / LOCATION GARNET 10000 FT ABOVE THE MEADOWS FELL INTO A CREVASSE GOT A ROPE AROUND HIM AND PULLED HIM UP STUCK – TRYING TO GET HIM UNSTUCK – UNK INJURIES – NOT TALKING. DON'T KNOW HOW FAR HE SLID. WE DOWNED CLIMBED TO HELP HIM. GOING UP TOWARD THE LOWER SADDLE. WITH THE PEOPLE WHO ARE TRYING TO RAISE HIM UP. EXUM GUIDE [REDACTED] SAYS HE IS UNRESPONSIVE – WE WILL SEND SOME PEOPLE YOUR WAY QUICK. PATIENT NAME GARY MILLER UNK AGE LAND AT THE MORaine AND COME DOWN. BRING WHATEVER YOU NEED FOR CREVASSE EXCAVATION
---------------------	------	---

MEL	1808	☒ ANOTHER PERSON REPORTING THIS INCIDENT – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WAS APART OF THE GROUP COUPLE HUNDRED YARDS DOWN HILL – WENT FARTHER DOWN TILL [REDACTED] GOT RECEPTION. .5-.75 MILES DOWN NO DETAILS DIDN'T SEE IT HAPPEN GARY 58 YOM CONTINUE BACK DOWN THE TRAIL TO LUPINE? STAY THERE AND WAIT FOR YOUR GROUP WITH EXUM GROUP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
-----	------	--

26HX	1816	OFF LUPINE FOR GARNET
26HX	1823	JUST TO THE N OF THE WINTER ROUTE BETWEEN 2 ROCK BUTTRESSES BETWEEN A GULLY – PATIENT IS STILL IN THE MOAT AND WATER RUNNING INTO THE MOAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR A LZ ABOVE THE MOAT

26HX	1829	OFF THE LZ AND E/R TO LUPINE
JOHNSON	1834	QUICK TURN AROUND 3 MORE FOLKS TO THIS LZ – GOOD WITH GEAR WILL LET YOU KNOW – WILL HAVE MORE GEAR SLUNG IN LATER. DRY SUIT? YES IF ONE IS HANDY - ON THIS LOAD
26HX	1847	OFF LUPINE

JOHNSON	1850	PATIENT OUT OF THE HOLE – STILL UNRESPONSIVE
---------	------	--

DR SMITH	1853	☒ PATIENT UPDATE? UNRESPONSIVE AND WAS IN WATER FOR OVER AN HOUR – GOING TO HEAD UP TO LUPINE
----------	------	---

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME Grand Teton National Park	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER 13 0 3 3 2 3 0
---	--

Page 14 of 14

JOHNSON		1854	BRING THOSE 3 FOLKS IN AND WE'LL USE THEM
---------	--	------	---

JOHNSON	1904	UPDATE - PATIENT ACCESS NICK GET DOWN TO THE PATIENT - CONTACT DR SMITH OR WHEELER - ARMITAGE CURIOUS ABOUT HYPOTHERMIA TRAMATIC ARREST VS EMERSON - NOT AT THE PATIENT UNK PULSE	
JOHNSON	1917	NICK WILL BE ON SCENE IN 5 MINUTES - STANDBY ON LIFEFLIGHT DISPATCH	
ARMITAGE	1920	ON SCENE	

430	JOHNSON	1931	BASED ON NICK'S IMPRESSIONS AND WHAT WE HAVE HERE. INPUT GENERAL IMPRESSION DON'T THINK THIS WOULD BE VIABLE TO WORK ON. IT'S BEEN 2 HOURS SINCE TIME OF CALL. 3 HOURS IS PROTOCOL FOR COLD WATER RECESSATATION - IT WILL BE ANOTHER 15-20 MINUTES - PUT THOSE ITEMS ON AND LET US KNOW WHEN THOSE ITEMS ARE ENROUTE. MIGHT DO AN ASSESSMENT IN THE CACHE. SEND THIS PERSON ATTENDED TO. PROBABLY WILL NOT NEED TO SLIDE HIM ON MUCH SNOW.
-----	---------	------	--

EIRMC	DR SMITH	1943	☎ REQUEST FOR LIFEFLIGHT
-------	----------	------	--------------------------

NICK	26HX	2000	LITTER DELIVERED
26HX	ARMITAGE	2015	READY FOR EXTRACTION WITH 1 RANGER - DOWN CANYON WINDS
26HX	ARMITAGE	2021	HOOKED AND READY - COMING UP
26HX		2028	PATIENT ON THE GROUND LUPINE

AIR 1	2032	LANDING AT LUPINE	
-------	------	-------------------	--

DR SMITH	2035	TIME CALLED ON PATIENT	
----------	------	------------------------	--

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) Rich Baerwald 2227 <i>Rich Baerwald</i> 7/3/2013	APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) <i>Sam R. Smith</i> 7/7/13
--	--

Rescue Name: MILL3230  
 Rescue Type: Major SAR  
 Account #: PX.EGRTE010.00.1  
 Case #: NP13033230

Rescue From: 6/20/2013  
 Rescue To: 6/20/2013

# Fatalities: 1  
 # Injured/III: 0  
 # Not Injured/III: 0  
 # Saves: 0  
 Unfounded: 0

Names	Term	Grade	Date	TOD on	TOD off	Resc. Start	Resc. End	Reg. Hours	Reg. Amount	Over. From	Over. To	Over. Hours	Over. Amount	E. Hire Hours	E. Hire Amount	Haz. Hours	Haz. Amount	
Anzelmo,J	P	9/2	06/20/13	0800	1630	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	193.82	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Baerwald,R	P	GL-9/7	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2400	0.00	0.00	1730	2400	6.50	273.39	0.00	0.00	16.00	112.16	N
Baerwald,R	P	GL-9/7	06/21/13	Lieu	Lieu	0000	0200	0.00	0.00	0000	0200	2.00	84.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Baerwald,R	P	GL-9/7	06/24/13	Lieu	Lieu	1000	1400	0.00	0.00	1000	1400	4.00	168.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Baerwald,R	P	GL-9/7	06/26/13	0800	1600	1600	1800	0.00	0.00	1600	1800	2.00	84.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Baerwald,R	P	GL-9/7	06/28/13	0800	1600	1600	1900	0.00	0.00	1600	1900	3.00	125.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Frauson,K	P	12/6	06/20/13	0700	1600	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	211.53	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Frauson,K	P	12/6	06/22/13	Lieu	Lieu	0800	1200	0.00	0.00	0800	1200	4.00	153.84	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Guenther,S	P	11/4	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2400	0.00	0.00	1730	2400	6.50	244.14	0.00	0.00	16.00	121.04	N
Guenther,S	P	11/4	06/21/13	Lieu	Lieu	0700	1900	0.00	0.00	0700	1900	12.00	450.72	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Guenther,S	P	11/4	06/24/13	0800	1600	1600	2000	0.00	0.00	1600	2000	4.00	150.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Guenther,S	P	11/4	07/07/13	0800	1600	1600	1800	0.00	0.00	1600	1800	2.00	75.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Maier,M	P	6/3	06/20/13	0700	1700	1730	2100	0.00	0.00	1730	2100	3.50	93.66	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Nash,M	P	14/3	06/20/13	0800	1600	2000	2300	0.00	0.00	2000	2300	3.00	148.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Schuster,R	P	GL-9/5	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	218.79	0.00	0.00	15.00	99.45	N
Schuster,R	P	GL-9/5	06/21/13	0800	1600	0600	0800	0.00	0.00	0600	0800	2.00	79.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Schuster,R	P	GL-9/5	06/22/13	0800	1600	1600	1800	0.00	0.00	1600	1800	2.00	79.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Smith,T	P	8/4	06/20/13	1400	2400	1730	2230	5.00	113.20			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Voster,H	P	10/3	06/20/13	0500	1500	1730	1830	0.00	0.00	1730	1830	1.00	37.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Wilber,M	P	GL-9/4	06/20/13	1700	2400	1900	2000	1.00	25.77			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Willard,W	P	5/2	06/24/13	0800	1630	0600	0800	0.00	0.00	0600	0800	2.00	46.54	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Armitage,N	S	7/1	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2400	0.00	0.00	1730	2400	6.50	181.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Carr,J	S	5/8	06/20/13	0800	1700	1800	2000	0.00	0.00	1800	2000	2.00	55.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Edmonds,P	S	7/1	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	153.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Fletcher,G	S	7/1	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	153.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Hardesty,D	S	7/1	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	153.40	0.00	0.00	15.00	69.71	N
Horn,E	S	5/1	06/20/13	0900	1900	1730	2300	1.50	22.50	1900	2300	4.00	90.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Jernigan,D	S	7/1	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	153.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Johnson,R	S	7/5	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2400	0.00	0.00	1730	2400	6.50	205.47	0.00	0.00	16.00	84.28	N
Johnson,R	S	7/5	06/21/13	0800	1600	1600	2200	0.00	0.00	1600	2200	6.00	189.66	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
McConnell,J	S	7/1	06/20/13	0800	1600	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	153.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Montopoli,G	S	7/1	06/20/13	0800	1700	1730	2400	0.00	0.00	1730	2400	6.50	181.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Montopoli,G	S	7/1	06/21/13	0800	1600	1600	2000	0.00	0.00	1600	2000	4.00	111.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Montopoli,G	S	7/1	06/23/13	Lieu	Lieu	0800	1200	0.00	0.00	0800	1200	4.00	111.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Montopoli,G	S	7/1	06/24/13	Lieu	Lieu	0800	1000	0.00	0.00	0800	1000	2.00	55.78	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Montopoli,G	S	7/1	07/08/13	Lieu	Lieu	0900	1100	0.00	0.00	0900	1100	2.00	55.78	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Orfe,H	S	7/5	06/20/13	1700	2400	1900	2230	3.50	73.75			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
Springer,J	S	7/5	06/20/13	Lieu	Lieu	1730	2300	0.00	0.00	1730	2300	5.50	173.86	0.00	0.00	7.50	39.51	N
Vanderveer,K	S	7/5	06/20/13	0900	1800	1800	2130	0.00	0.00	1800	2130	3.50	110.64	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N

Rescue Name: MILL3230  
 Rescue Type: Major SAR  
 Account #: PX.EGRTE010.00.1  
 Case #: NP13033230

Rescue From: 6/20/2013  
 Rescue To: 6/20/2013

# Fatalities: 1  
 # Injured/Ill: 0  
 # Not Injured/Ill: 0  
 # Saves: 0  
 Unfounded: 0

Names	Term	Grade	Date	TOD on	TOD off	Resc. Start	Resc. End	Reg. Hours	Reg. Amount	Over. From	Over. To	Over. Hours	Over. Amount	E. Hire Hours	E. Hire Amount	Haz. Hours	Haz. Amount	
Vidak,M	S	7/1	06/20/13	Lieu	Lieu	1830	2300	0.00	0.00	1830	2300	4.50	125.51		0.00	4.50	20.91	N
Smith,W	EH	VIP	06/20/13	Lieu	Lieu	1900	2300	0.00	0.00			0.00	0.00	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	N
						Totals:		11.00	235.22			160.50	5334.29	4.00	0.00	90.00	547.06	

N = Rescuer did NOT take lunch and/or breaks while on the SAR

NPS COSTS:		AIRCRAFT COSTS:				TIME/COST SUMMARY:		
	Cost:	Type:	Cost Rate:	Time:	Total Cost:	NPS:	Time:	Cost:
Reg/Hol Time Cost:	235.22	Heli 25HX	982.00	hr	\$0.00	Program'd (Reg + Hol):	11.00	235.22
Overtime Cost:	5334.29	Ext. Pilot (25HX):	49.00	hr	\$0.00	Unprogram. (OT + Haz):	160.50	5881.35
Hazard Time Cost:	547.06	Ext. Driver (25HX):	32.00	hr	\$0.00	Non-NPS: (Emer. Hire):	4.00	0.00
Emer. Hire Cost:	0.00	Svc. Truck Miles (25HX):	1.83	miles	\$0.00	(USFS: Reg+OT+Haz):	0.00	0.00
		Aircraft Avail. (25HX):	3,200.00	day	\$0.00	Total Personnel Summary:	175.50	6116.57
<b>Total:</b>	<b>6116.57</b>	Heli 26HX	982.00	1.3 hr	\$1,276.60	Total Support Summary:		933.29
		Ext. Pilot (26HX):	49.00	4.0 hr	\$196.00	Total Aircraft Summary:	1.30	1600.60
<b>SUPPORT COSTS:</b>		Ext. Driver (26HX):	32.00	4.0 hr	\$128.00	FICA - ER:		449.92
Food:	219.50	Svc. Truck Miles (26HX):	1.83	miles	\$0.00	Total Rescue Summary:	175.50	9100.38
Lodging/Per Diem:		Aircraft Avail. (26HX):	3,200.00	day	\$0.00			
Other (specify):		Other Aircraft Flight Costs:	0.00	total	\$0.00			
Equip. Replace.:	713.79	Other Aircraft Costs:	0.00	total	\$0.00			
Mtn. Weather:	0.00	OAS Aircraft Surc.:	0.00	total	\$0.00			
<b>Total:</b>	<b>933.29</b>	<b>Total:</b>		<b>1.3</b>	<b>\$1,600.60</b>			
Prepared by: <i>Greg Montesi</i>	<i>7/8/13</i>	Supervisor: <i>S. [Signature]</i>	<i>7/15/13</i>	<i>KE</i>	Division Chief:			

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME Grand Teton National Park	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER 13 0 3 3 2 3 0
LOCATION OF INCIDENT Garnet Canyon – North Fork	DATE OF INCIDENT MO DA YR 0 6 2 0 1 3
NATURE OF INCIDENT Fatality – Climbing accident	
COMPLAINANT'S NAME (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

**Interview Report**

On June 20, 2013 at approximately 2300 hours, I interviewed Exum Guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the Lupine Meadows Rescue Cache. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) volunteered these details after the accident.

**Details**

On June 20, 2013 at approximately 0600 hours, two Exum Guides and three clients began their successful ascent of the Grand Teton. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Exum Guide), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and another Exum Guide, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lead three clients to the summit via the Owen-Spalding Route. The clients included a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Gary Miller from Colorado Springs, CO. The team of five reached the summit at approximately 1100 hours, and then descended back to the Lower Saddle via the same route.

Once back at the Lower Saddle (11,600'), they packed up their gear and prepared to descend from the Lower Saddle back to the Lupine Meadows trailhead. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), they started the descent at approximately 1530 hours, based on a cell phone call he made to the Exum office.

Once they started down, the first steep snow slope was encountered just below the Upper Saddle, called the 'Headwall'. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, they descended on foot with an ice axe in hand (without crampons on) down past the level of the 'Prow'. Once they were below the Prow, they glissaded one at a time down the snow slope to its runoff. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it was good glissading conditions. When I asked how they did, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they were doing well.

From the Moraine Camping Zone below the Middle Teton the group walked on the snow to the next snow covered slope that leads to the 'Meadows Camping Zone'. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, the snow was firm in the shadows cast by the Middle Teton, so they angled out away from the shade and back into the sunshine where they returned to soft and favorable glissading conditions.

This time of year when there is snow on the summer trail most climbers and guides choose to ascend and descend the 'winter trail', which goes more direct from the Meadows to the Moraine, southwest of the 'Caves' and Spalding Falls.

According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the group of 5 came to the next steep slope that leads directly down to the Meadows. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) glissaded and walked down first in soft snow. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) angled down toward the snow filled hourglass shaped chute that was continuous snow to the bottom of the slope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the rock slab south of the moat and checked the passage around the running water and



hole in the snowpack. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was first down and through the narrow section. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said it's OK but stay to the left, then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued glissading most of the way down.

Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the three others glissaded and walked down and across the snow slope. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got to a point where the slope steepens and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could then see the water running into the moat hole below. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not like sending the clients un-roped down past the moat opening. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) directed the 3 (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to plant their axes, kick a stance and wait until it was their turn. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then removed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 25 meter rope from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pack and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tie in first. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was then given a belay as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) slid past the moat opening and down to lower angle snow. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then continued glissading down to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) retrieved the rope and told MILLER it was his turn. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tossed an end but it landed closer to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to go ahead and tie in. While (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was tying into the end, Gary MILLER started sliding. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw MILLER sliding out of control down the snow slope without his ice axe, which was still planted in the snow where he had been standing.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) heard MILLER sliding. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned to see MILLER slide over a rock band and into the round, moat opening. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said MILLER's body hit and caught the top edge of the opening, then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) saw MILLER disappear through the opening. At that moment it was unknown just how far MILLER went under the snowpack and if he was seriously injured during the fall. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to stay put. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went to the moat and attempted to see and hear MILLER. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was surprised to hear MILLER call out for help. MILLER's voice was faint, according to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) initial estimation was that MILLER was at least 40 feet in and under the snow. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated this distance using half of the 25 meter rope to reach MILLER.

According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that this accident occurred at approximately 1645 hours. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yelled to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for help. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was partway down the snow chute with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), so (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and started climbing back up to assist. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to untie from the rope and move off the snow to a nearby rocky ledge.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then made a loop in the end of the rope and threw it in. It reached MILLER. The rope then went tight and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began to pull. Utilizing a body belay, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was able to pull and keep MILLER tight as he made some upward progress. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see that with each pull the rope was cutting deeper into the lip of the snow. This created some friction and additional effort was needed to pull MILLER up. While (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was pulling, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could hear MILLER yelling, "pull me up" and "I can't climb out" and "get me out". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said he was difficult to hear because MILLER was at least 40 feet down in the moat.

By now, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought maybe 15-20 minutes had passed. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was now at the lip of the moat hole with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and helping to pull. While (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) held MILLER's body belay, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) lowered an ice axe into the hole on the free end of the rope. Also, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said an ice axe was placed under the weighted rope to reduce the friction. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said MILLER used the ice axe as a hand hold, and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that MILLER was able to gain another several feet as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pulled from above. But, then MILLER's let loose of the ice axe and progress stopped. Soon the rope went very tight around (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) body.

At this point (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought that MILLER was now too cold to help and possibly unconscious. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said MILLER's body weight became unbearable. So with help from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they transferred MILLER to an ice axe anchor placed downhill of the moat. They determined that they needed to pull uphill, at that point, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) climbed up and over to tie-in with a separate party that had come to assist.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) offered their 70 meter rope that was used to help pull MILLER uphill and out. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they established an anchor system in the rocks and then setup a 3:1 mechanical advantage system. That 70 meter rope end was then attached to the 25 meter rope looped around

MILLER. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remained at the moat opening during this setup process and chopped away at the lip of snow to make it wider.

As the three (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hauled upward, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the ice axe anchoring MILLER popped out when the haul system went tight. MILLER was being raised again and soon came into view at the opening. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that the small opening created difficulty. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said MILLER was clearly unconscious at this time and that he became caught against the narrow snow opening. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued to excavate and widen the opening. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then found an old bolt above the moat opening, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then used to re-direct the haul rope. This helped pull more in line with the moat opening. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) guided MILLER out of the moat. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said the helicopter flew over for the first time just before they were able to get MILLER out of the moat.

According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the helicopter was landing as MILLER was being hauled out of the moat. MILLER was then hauled another 5-10 feet further up the rocky slab but then became caught on a rocky overlap. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could see the first Rangers descending the snow slope to the scene when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decided to wait and let the Ranger's take over.

Once the Rangers were on scene, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) helped as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could and answered questions. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed on scene until (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was released by the Rangers. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) descended to Lupine Meadows trailhead with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had gone ahead earlier to get better cell service, in order to call 911 and make sure help was coming.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

7/3/13

7/3/13

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
**SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD**

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME <b>Grand Teton National Park</b>	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER <b>13</b> <table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"><tr><td>0</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>0</td></tr></table>	0	3	3	2	3	0
0	3	3	2	3	0		
LOCATION OF INCIDENT <b>Garnet Canyon – North Fork</b>	DATE OF INCIDENT MO DA YR <table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"><tr><td>0</td><td>6</td><td>2</td><td>0</td><td>1</td><td>3</td></tr></table>	0	6	2	0	1	3
0	6	2	0	1	3		
NATURE OF INCIDENT <b>Fatality – Climbing accident</b>							
COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS							

**RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION**



On July 27, 2013, I (Ranger R. Baerwald) and Ranger Phil Edmonds conducted a search for Gary Miller's backpack that had been unrecovered since the accident on 6/20/2013. Since that time several attempts had been made to locate the pack but the deep snowpack took approximately a month to melt away from the base of the cliff.


At approximately 1100 hours we descended to the top of the cliff and located the red REI pack at the base of the cliff where Miller had fallen into the moat. The pack appeared to be just as he had left it after the fall. It appeared to be undisturbed and lay adjacent to the rock wall. It was found lying on the rocky ledge with the pack straps facing up. The trekking poles were partly attached and the tip of one was broken off. It's possible that the pack was upright at one time and then tipped over as the snowpack melted.

I estimated the cliff angle to be approximately 80 degrees and 90 degrees in a few spots. I also believe that the initial depth measurements were accurate. Looking at where the pack was found or came to rest once the snowpack melted away, it's likely there was only a small cavity beneath the snowpack adjacent to the rock wall.

Photos were taken of the pack and the surrounding area to document our findings and the summer setting and the steepness of the cliff. The wet smooth rock can be seen in the photos and for reference Ranger Edmonds was photographed near the pack beneath the cliff and the watery spray. (see photos summer and pack) Once we completed our photo documentation the pack was retrieved and carried down to Moose. Then the contents were washed, dried and inventoried. The dry pack weighed approximately 12-14 pounds.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was contacted and asked if [redacted] would like the pack and its contents. [redacted] requested only the head camera and the rechargeable battery pack. [redacted] asked that the remaining items be donated to anyone that could use them.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) Rich Baerwald 	APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)  8/1/13
--	---



CI# NP13033230

Miller's Pack  
Found 7/27/13



Approximate snowline




Photo of Scene  
6/20/13






Photo of pack  
7/27/13, after  
Snow melt



Approximate path of Miller's fall into the moat. Level of the snow imposed on a photo showing where Miller's pack was found on 7/27/2013.





(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Tracks

Miller's tracks

C1=Miller (start of slide)

C2=(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (tie-in location)

G1=(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (point of rope lowering)

G2=(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (excavating snow)

X = Miller (point stopped under snow)

C1 to Mote opening = 38'

Lip of Mote to point of stop = 30'



Photo taken of Miller's pack on  
7/27/2013

Approximate level of the snowpack  
at the time of the accident.



Photos taken by: Rich Baerwald 8/1/13  
& Prepared by

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME Grand Teton National Park		CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER 13 0 3 3 2 3 0	
LOCATION OF INCIDENT Garnet Canyon – North Fork		DATE OF INCIDENT MO DA YR 0 6 2 0 1 3	
NATURE OF INCIDENT Fatality – Climbing accident			
COMPLAINANT'S NAME (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Interview Report:

June 26, 2013, at approximately 1815 hours, I conducted a follow-up phone interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

After reviewing the written and verbal volunteer statement provided the night of the fatality accident that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed, I noted inconsistencies in the statements. In order to better understand what (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled, I re-questioned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about some of the key components of the incident.

I asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "do you remember being belayed down the snow slope before the accident occurred?" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "no, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) now 100% sure (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not belayed by the guides before the accident".

I asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "was Gary MILLER belayed or lowered down the snow slope on a rope before he slipped?" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, no. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembers now that MILLER was not lowered before he slipped, but that they were both waiting to be belayed.

I asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) what happened prior to the accident. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they all came to the steep snow slope where the accident happened and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went first. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) glissaded down to the rock band to check the slope. Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, " (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) glissaded down the slope several hundred feet and stopped."

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, then their guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and the three clients walked out toward the middle of the slope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was next to glissade down past the moat and through the steeper narrow section. I asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), "was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) belayed on a rope while glissading?" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, no. I asked if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was sure. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was sure, because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was comfortable with the glissading.

"Ok, I said. What happened next?" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took out the rope for Gary and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Gary wanted a belay down the steeper slope. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tossed an end of the rope up to MILLER, but it landed closer to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took a step or two and picked up the rope end. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was either picking up the rope or tying in when MILLER slipped". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not see MILLER slip but did see him struggling to stop, then go over and disappear.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was pretty shook up by the whole accident. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told me that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thought the information (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided that night was accurate, but after taking time to think more about it, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) remembered the details much better.

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) <i>Rich Baerwald</i> 7/3/13	APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE) <i>S. L. ...</i> 7/7/13
--	---

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
SUPPLEMENTARY CASE/INCIDENT RECORD

ORGANIZATION (PARK) NAME Grand Teton National Park	CASE/INCIDENT NUMBER 13 0 3 3 2 3 0
LOCATION OF INCIDENT Garnet Canyon – North Fork	DATE OF INCIDENT MO DA YR 0 6 2 0 1 3
NATURE OF INCIDENT Fatality – Climbing accident	
COMPLAINANT'S NAME (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	COMPLAINANT'S ADDRESS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

**Interview Report:**

June 20, 2013, I (Ranger R. Baerwald) conducted an on scene interview with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On June 20, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were approaching the Grand Teton, with the intention of spending that night in the Moraine Camping Zone (permit #58103). The following day they would attempt to climb the Grand Teton.

While hiking to the Moraine Camping Zone, via the 'winter trail'; the two (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed a member of another climbing party glissade down a nearby snow chute. They would later learn that this was Exum Climbing Guide, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Moments later they said they heard (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) communicating with the others above. Then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said they watched a second person glissade down to join (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). They would later learn this was an Exum client named, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).

They then heard yelling from above, soon after they witnessed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) glissade further down. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) they could not see what was happening but thought an accident occurred. The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued hiking and angling higher to a rocky rib where they could see down to the scene of the accident. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that it took them about 15-20 minutes to reach that point. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told me that they offered their help and was told to wait there by the second Exum Climbing Guide, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated that the accident occurred at approximately 16:45 hours. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) witnessed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the outer lip of the moat straining to pull up on a rope, with the rope wrapped around (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) upper body. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had almost climbed back up to help. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the two Exum Guides were communicating with the fallen climber (Gary MILLER) in the moat and under the snowpack, and that they appeared to be making some progress.

It took several attempts to call 911 using (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cell phone but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did get through and reported the accident to the Park Service. When it appeared that the guides needed more help, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yelled down, "I have a 70 meter rope". According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) anchored MILLER to an ice axe at the moat edge, then climbed up and over to the rocky rib where they built an anchor and a 3:1 haul system. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described how the three (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pulled MILLER up another 6-10 feet, but then MILLER became caught against a solid lip of snow. At some point (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) client named (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) crossed over from the north side of the snow chute to assist hauling MILLER out of the moat.

During this raising effort, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said that Exum guide, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was chopping a larger opening at the lip of the moat and pulling on the rope and then trying to steer MILLER out. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, "at this point (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt like Gary was gone". (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) think he died due to hypothermia", because of being in the icy water for

that long. According to [REDACTED] they got MILLER out of the moat at about the time a helicopter flew over for the first time.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] stayed on scene until the Jenny Lake Rangers completed the rescue operation. At that time, I conducted this interview at the scene and helped them round up their rope and other equipment. [REDACTED] said they would be available if I needed more information and then we parted ways, they continued on to the Moraine that night.

I called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] on June 24, 2013 to confirm a few points of [REDACTED] statement. [REDACTED] said that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] woke up to snowfall and chose to descend. [REDACTED] was glad to answer additional questions and I thanked [REDACTED]

SUBMITTED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

*Rick Baerwald 7/3/13*

APPROVED BY (SIGNATURE AND DATE)

*A. D. [Signature] 7/7/13*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**


Photographer: Ron Johnson

Case #: 13-033230

Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident

Page 1 of 10

View from the Junction of the North and South Fork of Garnet Canyon



REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/3/13	[Signature]	2377	7/7/13


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
 NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
 GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**

Photographer: Helicopter Re-con

Case #: 13-033230

Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident

Page 2




REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/8/13	<i>[Signature]</i>	2373	7/7/13

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
 NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
 GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**

Photographer: Helicopter Re-con  
Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident  
Page 3

Case #: 13-033230



REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/3/13	AS	2373	7/7/13


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**

Photographer: Helicopter Re-con

Case #: 13-033230

Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident

Page 4



REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/3/13	Ala	2373	7/7/13




U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**

Photographer: Rich Baerwald / Ron Johnson

Case #: 13-033230

Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident

Page 5



REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/5/13	se	2373	7/7/13

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**

Photographer: Ron Johnson / Rich Baerwald

Case #: 13-033230

Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident

Page 6



View from the Start of MILLER's Slide  
(moat opening is not visible)




Photo taken 6/20/2013  
2030 hours, Baerwald

REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/5/13	RS	2373	7/7/13

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**

Photographer: Ron Johnson / Rich Baerwald

Case #: 13-033230

Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident

Page 7



REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/3/13	AS	2373	7/7/13


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**

Photographer: Rich Baerwald

Case #: 13-033230

Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident

Page 8



REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/3/13	<i>SS</i>	2373	7/7/13

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**


Photographer: Ron Johnson

Case #: 13-033230

Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident

Page 9

View looking South from middle of snow chute



REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/3/13	AE	2373	7/17/13

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK  
**DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPH FORM**

Photographer: Scott Guenther  
Incident: Fatality – Climbing Accident  
Page 10 of 10

Case #: 13-033230



REPORTING OFFICER	BADGE/ID#	DATE	SUPERVISOR	BADGE/ID#	DATE
Rich Baerwald	2227	7/3/13	<i>sg</i>	2373	7/7/13



## National Park Service/Grand Teton National Park Voluntary Statement

Case # 13-033230 Return this Form to Ranger \_\_\_\_\_

Last Name of Witness	First	M.I.	Telephone	Drivers Lic#	SSN	Date of Birth
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)						
Street Address		Mailing Address		City	State	Zip Code
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)						

How long will you be in the area? \_\_\_\_\_ Where can you be located? \_\_\_\_\_

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) hereby make the following statement of my own free will.

I have not been threatened, mistreated or promised reward or lenience in return for giving my statement. "You are notified that statements you are about to make may be presented to a magistrate or a judge in lieu of your sworn testimony at a preliminary examination. Any false statement you make and that you do not believe to be true may subject you to criminal punishment as a class A misdemeanor."

Incident Garrett Canyon North Fork  
 Location Garrett Canyon North Fork  
 on the 20th day of June 2013 at 11:15 AM(PM)

Statement: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was below the incident area roughly 60-70 meters  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was speaking with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) yelled to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to rush back up hill  
 to help. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been glissading into the meadow  
 area of Garrett Canyon when one of the clients,  
 Gary Miller, fell into a moat. After rushing back up  
 hill to join (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) began effort with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
 to pull Gary from the moat. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got to  
 the scene, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had already lowered a loop as  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rope down to Gary. Gary was able to slip  
 the loop around his body. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) tried to pull him

I have read the above and foregoing statement consisting of    page(s), and it is true and correct to the best of my memory and knowledge

Signature of person giving statement		Time:	Date:
Officer: <u>Scott Guenther</u>		Badge Number: <u>2373</u>	Date: <u>6/20/13</u>
Witness: <u>[Signature]</u>			Date: <u>6/20/13</u>

## Voluntary Statement

Pg. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_

**CONTINUED STATEMENT OF:**

out, but could not. [redacted] lowered (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Ice axe on the other end of [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rope in hopes Garry could climb out. He could not and let go of the axe. At that point another patrol climbing gear assisted [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with their 70m climbing rope. [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) connected that rope to the one connected to Garry and used a haul system to raise him. [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stayed at the edge of the ~~the~~ moat to excavate and communicate issues to the hauling party. Garry was unresponsive at this time. [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) excavated a larger hole in the snow and connected the back end of the 70m rope to Garry to help pull him uphill and away from a pinon point of rock and snow in the moat. After much work, Garry's body was extracted from the moat. [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) got him up roughly 10 feet above the lip. His body was stuck on a small overhang ledge and [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not raise him anymore. The Jenny Lake rescue rangers arrived shortly after this. [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) turned the scene over to them and assisted ~~how~~ how [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could. [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then packed our gear and proceeded down the mountain with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to meet for [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) debrief. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had ran to call 911. As [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) worked to extract Garry from the moat

I have read the above and foregoing statement consisting of \_\_\_ page(s), and it is true and correct to the best of my memory and knowledge

Signed	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	Time:	11:35 PM	Date:	4/20/2013
Officer	Scott Guenther	Badge Number:		Date:	6/20/13
Witness:				Date:	



Name:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Address:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date of Birth:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Contact Information: Phone #'s, Home -

Cell -

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Work -

Email:

Are you injured?

NO

YES, If YES, describe injury and how it occurred:

Climbing Party: (first and last name of all members in your climbing party):

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Information regarding today's event:**

Yrs. Climbing:

Ability level:

Were you ascending or descending?:

Relationship to victim:

Years climbing with victim:

Plan for the Day:

What did you/your party do yesterday (24 hrs. prior to event)?:

What did the victim do yesterday (24 hrs. prior)?:

Where did you start from today?

What time did you start today?

Was there at trip/climbing leader?

Who was it?

Any concerns about the plan/or location you/your party were headed?

Comfort level of the party:

Where did the route information come from?

Continuation of what happened:

Coming down saw fields; noticed the moat; told [redacted] a moat; putting  
in track across above moat; glissade again to rock downhill of moat ~  
60+ m; saw line down; [redacted] looked up & heard [redacted] yell; left [redacted] &  
looked it ↑; [redacted] kept saying hurry up hurry up;  
when [redacted] got there, [redacted] had Gary on a rope, loop was around him;  
rope had saved it;  
put locker off a site on other end of ice axe + lowered that it;  
couldn't see Gary but could hear him; tried to get help w/ [redacted] axe;  
Gary yelled that he had lost other axe (couldn't hang on); guy w/ 70m  
rope offered help; Gary tried off a close latched axe;  
[redacted] Phil to set up anchor; [redacted] screaming to Gary but he wasn't responding;  
70m man m/pA looked to end of 25m rope; raising started; one stayed above  
in the rope; raised till parallel; [redacted] lowered a bit of 70 to free Gary;  
finally as lowered enough saw to free; hauled Gary another 10 or 12 feet until hung  
up on a little rock;  
Thinks Gary was in the water the whole time; even during raise;  
"Oh Gary - I can't climb out; you gotta pull me out; kept saying - get me out of here;  
had to yell to be heard);  
- phill to fall; saw then above moat; [redacted] sitting eye out to balcony;  
not sure if [redacted] had rope; Thinks [redacted] saw soon on rope; Gary just standing there  
- thinks he was down in moat 15-20'; had maybe been pulled up a bit;  
- did well a climb; no rope off saddle; plunge stopped down; then silhouetted in control;

SIGNED:

- Scott Gaensker. Notes -

DATE:

6/20/13

TIME:

11:30 pm.

Name: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Address: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Date of Birth: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Contact Information: Phone #'s, Home - Cell - Work - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Email:

Are you injured?  NO  YES, If YES, describe injury and how it occurred:

Climbing Party: (first and last name of all members in your climbing party):

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Gary Miller

Information regarding today's event:

Yrs. Climbing: Ability level: Summited <sup>North</sup> OS (on snow partial)

Were you ascending or descending?:

Relationship to victim: Client - Snow school

Years climbing with victim:

Plan for the Day: Descend 5:30 (glissaded below Prow)

What did you/your party do yesterday (24 hrs. prior to event)? Ascended to S

What did the victim do yesterday (24 hrs. prior)?:

Where did you start from today?

What time did you start today?

Was there at trip/climbing leader? Who was it?

Any concerns about the plan/or location you/your party were headed?

Comfort level of the party: Good

Where did the route information come from?

Have you climbed in the Tetons before? If yes, what?

Position of the victim in the line:

Did the victim have any medical condition or was he/she sick?

What type of equipment was being used just prior to the event (Ice axes, crampons, ropes)?

*Stk red sportivax*

Was anything said just prior to the event? (i.e.: "watch out!", "this is loose!")

Weather conditions – How and when did you notice the weather?

Did your party make any changes in plans that were weather related?

How did you get off the mountain?

WHAT HAPPENED – in your own words (Use attachment if needed):

*avoiding harder snow in shade*

Descending in softer snow, *1st to choke / then noted slot*  
 Belayed *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* went 1st past choke / slot w/ water.  
*(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* was throwing rope to *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* while *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* was tying in Gary  
 slipped & fell, his axe still in place. *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* stay put.  
 Gary was not in site for *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)*, starting to yell, Gary responded  
*(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* was downhill pulling w/ shoulder belay and was making  
 progress, Gary was yelling "Up, down, pull." *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* with *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)*  
 lower an axe for help. *It* was determined the need to

OTHER INFORMATION - that is important to know?

*re-direct pull.*  
*(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* went to join *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* to haul system. fixed  
 lip rope to axe. *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* moved to set-up haul system  
 Using both rope tied together. *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)* stayed at lip.

I have made the above statement of my own free will and accord. I have no been threatened, mistreated or promised reward or lenience in return for giving my statement.

SIGNED: *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)*

DATE: *6/20/13*

TIME: *11:40 pm*

PRINTED: *(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)*

Continuation of what happened:

Haul team moved Gary quite a ways. But snagged.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

out away the lip. found bolts  $\hat{=}$  re-direct.  
then out but caught again on rock. Rangers arrived from above

Lost response around time of fixing axe at lip. - Needed  
to escape body Belay & pull uphill.

Time went by while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was chopping away at lip.

25 m rope - just enough to reach w/  $\frac{1}{2}$  rope's loop on one end.  
axe on other.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

went on down, saying stay left. Continued down on  
glisade. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) checked out spot before going further and stopped  
when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted slot. All stay. plant axe and  
wait for the rope. Gary should have stayed put but  
not sure why he moved.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

was lowered 1st past slot  
then (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was next. Tied in.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

SIGNED:


Ranger: Rich Baerwald

DATE:

6/20/13

TIME:

11:40 PM



## National Park Service/Grand Teton National Park Voluntary Statement

Case # 13033230 Return this Form to Ranger \_\_\_\_\_

Last Name of Witness	First	M.I.	Telephone	Drivers Lic#	SSN	Date of Birth
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	/	/	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
Street Address		Mailing Address		City	State	Zip Code
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)				(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		

How long will you be in the area? (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Where can you be located? \_\_\_\_\_

I (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) do hereby make the following statement of my own free will.  
(giving statement)

I have not been threatened, mistreated or promised reward or lenience in return for giving my statement. "You are notified that statements you are about to make may be presented to a magistrate or a judge in lieu of your sworn testimony at a preliminary examination. Any false statement you make and that you do not believe to be true may subject you to criminal punishment as a class A misdemeanor."

Incident \_\_\_\_\_  
Location See below  
on the 20<sup>th</sup> day of June 2013 at 1<sup>0</sup> AM/PM.

Statement: approx 1645 descending from Grand Teton location headwall between meadow and moraine. Encountered short glissade after exam guide (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to a waiting location for which others in group were to follow. An incident about 150 yds upslope that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not see occurred. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) summoned up to help. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was instructed to wait where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was. Shortly after told to call '911' - unable to reach (4:57 PM) poor reception instructed to descend to meadow to see if able to complete call - still no reception - descended further trying intermittently until able to contact 911 (6:05 PM)

I have read the above and foregoing statement consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ page(s), and it is true and correct to the best of my memory and knowledge. Notity of emergency & uncertain origin of above incident

Signature of person giving statement <u>(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)</u>	Time: <u>1008 PM</u>	Date: <u>6/20/13</u>
Officer: <u>Scott Gaenther</u>	Badge Number: <u>2373</u>	Date: <u>6/20/13</u>
Witness: <u>[Signature]</u>		Date: _____



## National Park Service/Grand Teton National Park Voluntary Statement

Case # 13033230 Return this Form to Ranger \_\_\_\_\_

Last Name of Witness	First	M.I.	Telephone	Drivers Lic#	SSN	Date of Birth
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)			(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	
Street Address	Mailing Address		City	State	Zip Code	
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	—		(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)			

How long will you be in the area? \_\_\_\_\_ Where can you be located?  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

I, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) do hereby make the following statement of my own free will.  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ on giving statement)

I have not been threatened, mistreated or promised reward or lenience in return for giving my statement. "You are notified that statements you are about to make may be presented to a magistrate or a judge in lieu of your sworn testimony at a preliminary examination. Any false statement you make and that you do not believe to be true may subject you to criminal punishment as a class A misdemeanor."

Incident \_\_\_\_\_  
 Location \_\_\_\_\_  
 on the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 20\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ AM/PM.

Statement: \_\_\_\_\_ were hiking down from Grand teton lower saddle when  
 \_\_\_\_\_ voice we came to an area where \_\_\_\_\_ could slide. \_\_\_\_\_ went  
 down first and said it was ok, but to be very careful and to make  
 sure to go slow, and begin sliding from a spot where you would  
 avoid the rock w/ running water. \_\_\_\_\_ then slid down and  
 made it seem pretty safe and easy. Both Gary and \_\_\_\_\_ were a  
 little uneasy and \_\_\_\_\_ said \_\_\_\_\_ would bail \_\_\_\_\_ down if wanted.  
 \_\_\_\_\_ both said yes. Gary went down first while \_\_\_\_\_ was lowering  
 him until the rope came short. \_\_\_\_\_ was going to be lowered to  
 Gary next, so when he got his footing \_\_\_\_\_ said it was ok  
 to take off the rope. Moments after Gary lost his footing

I have read the above and foregoing statement consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ page(s), and it is true and correct to the best of my memory and knowledge.

Signature of person giving statement _____	Time: 11:15	Date: 6/20/13
Officer: <u>Ron Johnson</u>	Badge Number: <u>2373</u>	Date: <u>6/20/13</u>
Witness: _____		Date: _____

Voluntary Statement

CONTINUED STATEMENT OF:

and began sliding. He attempted to self-arrest but the axe immediately came loose from his hands. Gary slid down 15-20 ft, ~~slipping~~ before sliding over the end of a large rock w/ water flowing over it. He went over it and fell between the rock and snow where the water had carved a large opening. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately threw him a rope and tried pulling him out unsuccessfully. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) then ran to help out. Realizing it wasn't working they switched to plan B and set up a pulley system. Gary became unresponsive 30-45 minutes after the incident and couldn't help himself or give (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) any feedback on what to do. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) coming up the mountain assisted with trying to get Gary out. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) efforts were not enough to get him out in time or alive. He was not fully taken out of the crevasse until the rangers arrived approximately 2 hours after the incident.

I have read the above and foregoing statement consisting of \_\_\_ page(s), and it is true and correct to the best of my memory and knowledge

Signed:	Time:	Date:
Officer: Ron Johnson	Badge Number:	Date: 6/20/13
Witness:		Date:



**GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK NEWS RELEASE**  
National Park Service

U.S. Department of the Interior

Grand Teton National Park

PO Box 170

Moose, Wyoming 83012

Jackie Skaggs/ 307.739.3393

Jenny Anzelmo-Sarles/ 307.739.3431

---

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: June 21, 2013 13-39

### **Multiple Emergencies & Climbing Fatality Caused Active Day for Rangers**

MOOSE, WY — Thursday, June 20 became another rigorous day for park rangers at Grand Teton National Park. Numerous rangers responded to a cardiac arrest incident in Buffalo Valley, while other rangers handled two back-to-back rescue missions in the Tetons; one resulted in a fatality.

Teton County requested assistance from Grand Teton National Park rangers for a cardiac arrest underway in Buffalo Valley around 11 a.m. A park ambulance and six rangers jointly responded with Jackson Hole Fire/EMS personnel to the incident location. The 56 year-old male was pronounced dead after nearly an hour of resuscitation efforts.

Teton Interagency Dispatch Center received a call for help from a location on Mount Owen (elevation 12,928 feet) just before 2:30 p.m. for an injured climber. Jeff Judkins, 38, of Lander, Wyoming and his climbing partner were on an ascent of the Crescent Arête (elevation 11,200 feet) when a door-sized rock broke free as Judkins was pushing himself onto it. Judkins fell about 15 feet before impacting a sloping ledge below. He continued to fall roughly five additional feet before his climbing protection caught him. Luckily, neither Judkins nor his partner was stuck by the rock as it fell.

Two park rangers were inserted via short-haul to a nearby ledge just before 5 p.m. and they prepared the two climbers for short-haul extrication from the accident site to Lupine Meadows. This rescue was completed at 5:15 p.m. The Crescent Arête is adjacent to the Northeast Snowfields route on Mount Owen, and is an uncommon climb due to its technical nature. It is rated a 5.7 on the Yosemite Decimal System. Fred Beckey and Yvon Chouinard made the first ascent of this climb in September of 1959.

Moments after completing the first mountain rescue, Teton Interagency Dispatch Center received another call for help after a climber fell into a moat in the North Fork of Garnet Canyon. Gary Miller, 55, from Colorado Springs, Colorado was descending from the Lower Saddle of the Grand Teton, after a successful summit of the peak earlier in the day, when he slipped on snow and slid into an icy water moat near a rock band. Miller was on a guided climb by one of the park's authorized concessioners. Climbing guides successfully extricated Miller from the moat before rangers arrived at the site.

Six rangers were flown to a temporary landing zone near the moat location in Garnet Canyon. Rescuers raised Miller to a site where he could be flown in a rescue litter via short-haul to Lupine Meadows by a

Teton Interagency contract helicopter. A ranger attended Miller below the helicopter on the flight to the park's rescue cache. Once at the rescue cache, they were met by a team of park medical providers led by Dr. Will Smith of St. John's Medical Center, and an Air Idaho Life Flight ship waiting to provide transport to critical care in Idaho Falls. Miller was pronounced dead at 8:35 p.m. at the rescue cache and his body turned over to the Teton Country coroner.

Additional details about the climbing fatality are not available pending completion of an incident investigation.

—NPS—

[www.nps.gov/grte](http://www.nps.gov/grte)

---

*Jackie Skaggs*  
*Public Affairs Officer*  
*Grand Teton National Park &*  
*John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Memorial Parkway*  
307.739.3393  
[jackie\\_skaggs@nps.gov](mailto:jackie_skaggs@nps.gov)

**TETON INTERAGENCY DISPATCH CENTER**

DISPATCHER: TWS

CONSOLE #: 701R

DATE: 6/20/2013

TO	FROM	TIME	RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
			SAR NUMBER 13-008 / MAJOR SAR NUMBER PX.EGRTES010.00.1 / CASE NUMBER NP13033230 Gary Miller 12/09/1957 (b) (6) (b) (6) Colorado Springs CO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	VOSTER	1730	☎ GOT ANOTHER CALL. GARNET CAYNON- CLIMBER FELL TO A CRAVASS
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	1731	☎ CALL BACK (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) / LOCATION GARNET 10000 FT ABOVE THE MEADOWS FELL INTO A CREVASSE GOT A ROPE AROUND HIM AND PULLED HIM UP STUCK - TRYING TO GET HIM UNSTUCK - UNK INJURIES - NOT TALKING. DON'T KNOW HOW FAR HE SLID. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) DOWNED CLIMBED TO HELP HIM. GOING UP TOWARD THE LOWER SADDLE. WITH THE PEOPLE WHO ARE TRYING TO RAISE HIM UP. EXUM GUIDE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) SAYS HE IS UNRESPONSIVE - WE WILL SEND SOME PEOPLE YOUR WAY QUICK. PATIENT NAME GARY MILLER UNK AGE LAND AT THE MORaine AND COME DOWN. BRING WHATEVER YOU NEED FOR CREVASSE EXCAVATION
TIDC FIRE		1744	☎ WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE HELIBASE IS AWARE OF THE NEXT SAR CALL - NO NEED FOR HELITACK CREW MEMBERS TO RESPOND
DR. SMITH		1756	☎ MALE FELL INTO A CRAVASS / UNRESPONSIVE PATIENT - I'LL BE AROUND LET ME KNOW WHAT YOU NEED 1 <sup>ST</sup> LOAD HARDESTY, OPS JOHNSON, MEDS ARMITAGE
	JEREMIAH	1754	☎ NEED ANY HELITACK PEEPS? NEGATIVE - GOING TO SEND THEM ALL HOME
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	1803	☎ NEG CONTACT
	MEL	1808	☎ ANOTHER PERSON REPORTING THIS INCIDENT - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) WAS APART OF THE GROUP COUPLE HUNDRED YARDS DOWN HILL - WENT FARTHER DOWN TILL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GOT RECEPTION. .5-.75 MILES DOWN NO DETAILS DIDN'T SEE IT HAPPEN GARY 58 YOM CONTINUE BACK DOWN THE TRAIL TO LUPINE? STAY THERE AND WAIT FOR YOUR GROUP WITH EXUM GROUP (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	1813	☎ NEG CONTACT
	26HX	1816	OFF LUPINE FOR GARNET
26HX		1817	POSITIVE AFF
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	1820	☎ NEG CONTACT
	KAREN	1822	☎ OPERATING ON NIIMS / NASH ASKED
	26HX	1823	JUST TO THE N OF THE WINTER ROUTE BETWEEN 2 ROCK BUTTRESSES BETWEEN A GULLY - PATIENT IS STILL IN THE MOAT AND WATER RUNNING INTO THE MOAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR A LZ ABOVE THE MOAT
	26HX	1829	OFF THE LZ AND E/R TO LUPINE
	26HX	1831	ON THE GROUND AND SHUTTING DOWN LUPINE
	ARMITAGE	1832	HAVE THOSE GUYS EXTRA SET UP SPIKES ON THE NEXT LOAD

**TETON INTERAGENCY DISPATCH CENTER**

**DISPATCHER: TWS**

**CONSOLE #: 701R**

**DATE: 6/20/2013**

TO	FROM	TIME	RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
ARMITAGE		1834	NOT GOING TO SEND ANYONE ELSE UP UNTIL THEY LET US KNOW HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE NEEDED AND ANY GEAR NEEDED
	JOHNSON	1834	QUICK TURN AROUND 3 MORE FOLKS TO THIS LZ - GOOD WITH GEAR WILL LET YOU KNOW - WILL HAVE MORE GEAR SLUNG IN LATER. DRY SUIT? YES IF ONE IS HANDY - ON THIS LOAD
	410	1845	LEAVING MOOSE ANYTHING NEEDED? NEGATIVE
JOHNSON		1846	26HX IS SPOOLING
	26HX	1847	OFF LUPINE
	TYSON	1847	☎ TXED TO GEORGE
26HX		1848	POSITIVE AFF
	JOHNSON	1850	PATIENT OUT OF THE HOLE - STILL UNRESPONSIVE
JOHNSON	26HX	1861	STILL NEED THIS NEXT LOAD?
ARMITAGE	JOHNSON	1851	DO WE STILL NEED THESE 3? UNK
26HX	JOHNSON	1851	HOLD OFF FOR A LITTLE BIT WE'LL GET A BETTER ASSESSMENT - SHOULD FIGURE IT OUT IN THE NEXT 2-3 MINUTES THEN WE'LL DROP THEM OFF - HANGING OUT
	DR SMITH	1853	☎ PATIENT UPDATE? UNRESPONSIVE AND WAS IN WATER FOR OVER AN HOUR - GOING TO HEAD UP TO LUPINE
	ARMITAGE	1854	FULL WATER EMERSION FOR OVER AN HOUR - STILL NOT RESPONSIVE
JOHNSON		1864	BRING THOSE 3 FOLKS IN AND WE'LL USE THEM
JOHNSON		1865	LET US KNOW WHAT EQUIPMENT YOU'LL NEED
	ARMITAGE	1858	RON WILL GIVE A BETTER SIZE UP ONCE BRIEFED. OVER AN HOUR SINCE PATIENT - RAISING HIM WITH A ROPE AROUND HIS TORSO
	26HX	1858	INBOUND TO LUPINE
	26HX	1901	ON THE GROUND LUPINE
	JOHNSON	1904	UPDATE - PATIENT ACCESS NICK GET DOWN TO THE PATIENT - CONTACT DR SMITH OR WHEELER - ARMITAGE CURIOUS ABOUT HYPOTHERMIA TRAMATIC ARREST VS EMERSION - NOT AT THE PATIENT UNK PULSE
DR SMITH		1906	☎ NEED TO GET THE DETAILS IF IT WAS MORE THAN AN HOUR OF SUBMERSION - 58 YOM NEED MORE DETAILS - MECHANISUM - PUT ON THE PHONE WITH SCHUSTER
	JOHNSON	1907	NOTIFY EXUM PATIENT IS ONE OF THEIR CLIENTS - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (430 MAKING NOTIFICATION)
	HANNAH	1914	☎ FOR 410
TIDC		1916	☎ PAGE M1 TO STAGE AT LUPINE WITH A DRIVER
	JOHNSON	1917	NICK WILL BE ON SCENE IN 5 MINUTES - STANDBY ON LIFEFLIGHT DISPATCH
	TIDC	1917	☎ GOING TO PAGE FOR A DRIVER ONLY
	ARMITAGE	1920	ON SCENE

**TETON INTERAGENCY DISPATCH CENTER**

DISPATCHER: TWS

CONSOLE #: 701R

DATE: 6/20/2013

TO	FROM	TIME	RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
TIDC		1922	KELLY IS GOING TO GET M1
JOHNSON	430	1923	LOOK AT THE MOAT WITH WATER COMING DOWN. PATIENT IS OUT OF MOAT 30 BELOW FROM WHERE THE WATER IS COMING OUT OF A SNOWBANK ARMITAGE RAP OFF SNOW ANCORS TO PATIENT NOT IN WATER OFF TO THE SIDE OF THE STREAM / PLAN ONCE ASSESSMENT IS DONE RAISE THE 2 TO A BETTER PLACE TO PACKAGE THE PATIENT OR FLY HIM OUT TO SHORT-HAUL / STANDBY SETTING UP FOR THE RAISE AND WAITING ON NICK'S ASSESSMENT. LET US KNOW WHEN YOU KNOW WHAT EQUIPMENT YOU NEED. LITTER PACKAGE SET UP THERE TO PUT A PATIENT IN AND THE STUFF WE HAVE THERE. WITH THE BASIC PACKAGE - ADD ANOTHER CAMERA.
430	ARMITAGE	1925	UPDATE WILL NEED MEDICAL COLD NOT BREATHING CANNOT GIVE MUCH CARE ON SCENE. - TEMP WE GET HIM UP WITH THOSE SIGNS DO THE RAP AND EXTRICATION. DO WE DO THE FULL WORKUP ON HIM. ANY SIGNS OF TRAMA? AFFIRM CLIMBING ROPE WRAPED UNDER HIS SHOULDER APPEARS THAT ROPE BROUGHT HIS SHOULDER AREA UPPER THORAX AREA UP AROUND HIS HEAD. DON'T KNOW IF THIS INJURY IS COMPATIBLE WITH LIFE. NO RESPONSE TO PAIN AND NO RESPONSE TO OPEN AIRWAY CORE TEMP IS COLD. FULLY EMERSED AT SOME POINT. WAS NOT RESPONSIVE AFTER BEING RAISED WITH THE ROPE AROUND THE SHOULDER.
DREW	NICK	1927	SINGLE ROPE RAISE WILL BE ADAQUATE
430	JOHNSON	1931	BASED ON NICK'S IMPRESSIONS AND WHAT WE HAVE HERE. INPUT GENERAL IMPRESSION DON'T THINK THIS WOULD BE VIABLE TO WORK ON. IT'S BEEN 2 HOURS SINCE TIME OF CALL. 3 HOURS IS PROTOCAL FOR COLD WATER RECESSATATION - IT WILL BE ANOTHER 15-20 MINUTES - PUT THOSE ITEMS ON AND LET US KNOW WHEN THOSE ITEMS ARE ENROUTE. MIGHT DO AN ASSESSMENT IN THE CACHE. SEND THIS PERSON ATTENDED TO. PROBABLY WILL NOT NEED TO SLIDE HIM ON MUCH SNOW.
	TIDC	1933	☎ [REDACTED] IS ON THE PHONE AND STILL WAITING ON THE TRAIL. GO AHEAD AND SEND [REDACTED] DOWN WILL HAVE AN EXUM GUIDE TO MEET [REDACTED] ON THE TRAIL
RON	430	1934	WILL SEND THE LITTER WITHOUT THE AED - WILL DO AN ASSESSENT DOWN HERE.
	MEL	1938	☎ [REDACTED] IS WEARING AN ORANGE DOWN JACKET AND GRAY PANTS [REDACTED] CAN SEE THE LK 1-1.5 HOURS - WILL CALL BACK TO LET US KNOW [REDACTED] IS OUT
DR SMITH	JOHNSON	1941	LOOKING FOR WHAT PATIENT CARE NEEDS TO BE DONE HERE BESIDES PACKAGING THE PATIENT AND GETTING HIM TO THE VALLEY - GET THE LITTER COMING THIS WAY - WILL EXPEDITE
EIRMC	DR SMITH	1943	☎ REQUEST FOR LIFEFLIGHT
TIDC		1944	☎ NEED THE LAT LONG FOR LUPINE MEADOWS - 43 44 36 X 110 43 49 CONVERT TO 43 44.604 X 110 43.834
RON	430	1950	26HX SPOOLING
JOHNSON	430	1953	EXUM GROUP LEFT ABOUT 10 MINUTES AGO - ONE CLIENT IS WALKING OUT AND SOME GUIDES ARE WALKING UP - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) HAS SENT SOME TEXT MESSAGE TO THE OFFICE
	EIRMC	1955	☎ WITH EIRMC - AIR 1 RESPONDING GOING TO BE 5-10 MINS FOR THE CREW - THEN 30 MIN
NICK	26HX	2000	LITTER DELIVERED
26HX	JOHNSON	2001	LOOKING AT A SOLID 15 MIN TO GET HIM READY FOR EXTRACTION - HANGOUT CALL US IN WHEN YOU ARE READY.
	(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	2006	☎ EIRMC - AIR 1 GOING TO BE 25 MINUTES TO SCENE / CONFIRM FREQ (b) (7)(E) CONTACT 701R

**TETON INTERAGENCY DISPATCH CENTER**

**DISPATCHER: TWS**

**CONSOLE #: 701R**

**DATE: 6/20/2013**

TO	FROM	TIME	RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
26HX	ARMITAGE	2011	WILL BE READY IN 5 MINUTES
26HX	ARMITAGE	2015	READY FOR EXTRACTION WITH 1 RANGER - DOWN CANYON WINDS
ARMITAGE	26HX	2018	GOT TO BAIL OUT OF HERE RED LINE
26HX	ARMITAGE	2021	HOOKED AND READY - COMING UP
	JOHNSON	2022	LOAD COMING IN - BRAIN STORM OPTIONS UP HERE
26HX	LUPINE	2024	LOUD AND CLEAR - WE'LL BE STANDING NEAR THE CACHE DOOR DELIVER LITTER TO THE DOOR.
	26HX	2028	PATIENT ON THE GROUND LUPINE
	26HX	2030	ON THE GROUND SHUTTING DOWN
	AIR IDAHO	2031	HAVE YOU LAND ON THE PAD TO THE SOUTH SOMEONE IN THE YELLOW SHIRT TO GUIDE YOU THERE
	AIR 1	2032	LANDING AT LUPINE
JOHNSON	MONTOPOLI	3034	GET DOWN TO AN LZ - HEAD DOWN TOWARD THE CAVE OR MEADOWS. IT WILL BE A BIT TILL WE CAN GET THERE.
	DR SMITH	2035	TIME CALLED ON PATIENT
TCSO		2036	☎ NEED THE CORONER - CONTACT PERSON FOR WHEN HE GETS UP THERE? COORDINATOR MONTOPOLI - DR SMITH IS HERE. NUMEROUS OTHER RANGERS
	JOHNSON	2103	WE ARE SET - 26HX IS OFF LUPINE
26HX		2103	WILL ADVISE WHEN YOU ARE POSITIVE AFF
26HX		2104	POSITIVE AFF
	26HX	2110	LANDING LUPINE WITH 2 RANGERS
	26HX	2113	OFF LUPINE TO PICK UP SECOND LOAD
	26HX	2113	INBOUND FOR LUPINE
TIDC		2119	☎ INCASE (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) CALL'S PATCH [REDACTED] THROUGH TO KAREN FRAUSON'S CELL OR HOME NUMBER
	26HX	2120	ON THE GROUND LUPINE
TCSO		2122	☎ STATUS OF THE CORONER TO LUPINE? UNK THEY CALLED HIM AT 2028 AND HE WAS ON HIS WAY
KILEY		2123	☎ CHECKING STATUS/RESPONSE TIME 30-45 MINUTES OUT - STILL IN JACKSON BUT ON MY WAY
	26HX	2123	OFF LUPINE FOR THE HELIBASE
26HX		2132	NEG CONTACT
HELIBASE		2133	☎ NEG CONTACT
	TIDC	2135	☎ CORONER IS ENROUTE AND 26HX LANDED AT HELIBASE 2129